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Ramanujan
still argues,
, that the Wannsee conference did discuss killing the Jews
Was killing really not on the Wannsee agenda?
I ADMIRE your tremendous breadth of knowledge of WWII, but in the name of intellectual honesty, I ask whether you agree with my points below. Consider these passages of the
Wannsee
Protocol:
PARAGRAPH A:
In conclusion the different types of
possible solutions were discussed, during which
discussion both Gauleiter Dr. Meyer and State Secretary
Dr. Buehler took the position that certain preparatory
activities for the final solution should be carried out
immediately in the territories in question, in which
process alarming the populace must be avoided.
PARAGRAPH B
The possible final remnant will, since it
will undoubtedly consist of the most resistant portion,
have to be treated accordingly, because it is the product
of natural selection and would, if released, act as a the
seed of a new Jewish revival (see the experience of
history.)
Ramanujan
-
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David Irving replies:
WELL, I have dealt with these points
before.
First, since the conference report is in itself deliberately vague, we should, and can, turn to the interrogations of all the participants for further information. I know that I did so. All stated under interrogation that killing was not on the agenda, though at least one felt that the language used (by Adolf
Eichmann‘s adjutant Günther) was unnecessarily coarse, referring to the Jews being deported in terms more appropriate to cattle.
Second, the argument about
“alarming the populace” is not strong enough by itself.
There is evidence that when the deportations of Jews from the Generalgouvernement began, it led to unrest among the remaining Poles who (a) believed they knew what the likely fate of those deported was, and who (b) believed that they, as Poles, were likely to be next. This alarm would however result whatever the actual fate of the deportees was.
I refer in my biography of Dr Joseph Goebbels to a 1943 tour of the
Generalgouvernement by his legal adviser,
Schmidt-Leonhardt, who reported on precisely the above concerns to him. As I stated, one paragraph of the
Schmidt-Leonhardt report has been physically cut out of the document and placed in the Minister’s safe, as it was
geheime Reichssache, i.e. probably referring too explicitly to liquidation.