Longerich: The Systematic Character of the National Socialist Policy for the Extermination of the Jews

I. Introduction

1. After the Wannsee Conference of 20 January, in the Spring of 1942, the Nazi regime began to implement a programme aimed at the complete physical extermination of European Jewry. The victims were either deported to be murdered in gas-chambers in special extermination camps, or came to their death in other ways—whether by execution or due to the devastating living conditions prevailing during their deportation and in the ghettos and work camps.

2. In order to carry out this mass murder of millions of people, the Nazis set up a complex machinery of destruction characterised by a division of labour. When closely examined, the individual elements of this machinery and the manner in which they where co-ordinated, leave no room for doubt that the murder of these people proceeded in a systematic way.

The organisation and extent of the deportations; the “liquidation” of ghettos, the selection of those deemed “fit for work” from those “unfit”, the exploitation of those “fit” for work in a programme of forced labour which generally led to total exhaustion and death, the construction of regular “death factories”, the removal of the corpses and traces of the extermination process—these are all compatible elements of a system of planned mass murder.

3. This system for the implementation of the death of millions of persons “functioned” in its entirety as of July 1942. It thus took more than one year until the mass murder of Jews—initiated in the occupied Soviet areas in June of 1941, and extended to further areas in East and Southeastern Europe from the Fall of 1941 onwards—was transformed into a programme for the extermination of all European Jews.

4. The following report gives proof to the assertion that the mass murders of hundreds of thousands of Jews between the Summer of 1941 and the Summer of 1942—which were still restricted to the areas of Eastern and Southeastern Europe—were systematic in character. This is to say, these mass murders followed a unified pattern, were carried out on the basis of central commands, and must be regarded as representing a conscious expression of the policy of the Nazi regime.

It will be shown that in this time period (Summer 1941 to Summer 1942) essential elements of the Nazi policy of extermination were developed with the goal of murdering more and more people in ever shorter time intervals. As of the Summer, 1942, these plans were assembled into one extermination plan for all of Europe.

This report categorically rejects the notion that the murder of European Jews in the Second World War was the consequence of a series of isolated murder campaigns occurring without plan in haphazard and differing ways as a result of decisions by subordinate institutions- i.e. murder actions not displaying a common pattern or unified control.

5. The investigation will cover three complexes: a) mass executions in the occupied Soviet Union in the second half of 1941: b) the regional mass murder of the Jewish civilian population outside of the Soviet Union between the Fall of 1941 and Spring of 1942; c) the transformation of these mass murders into a unified deportation and extermination machinery in the area dominated by Germany in the Spring and Summer of 1942.

II Mass executions in the Soviet Union

1. The systematic character of the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of Jewish civilians in the occupied Soviet areas in the second half of 1941 will be demonstrated on the basis of two different groups of historical documents: the orders issued to perpetrate these murderous actions and the documented evidence for the activities of the killing units.

It will be shown that this mass murder was centrally controlled, that it was the expression of a consciously followed policy of the Nazi regime and that it was executed according to a unified scheme. (It should be noted that the term occupied Soviet territories will include those areas which were annexed by the Soviet Union after 1939.)

2. The executions of Jewish civilians in the occupied Soviet areas can be divided into the following phases:

3. To begin, it must be established that the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of Jewish civilians in the occupied Soviet areas was an expression of the policy of the Nazi regime. The war against the Soviet Union was planned from the start by the Nazi leadership as a war of racial extermination with the purpose of decimating the population of the occupied territories.

This intention of the Nazi leadership has been clear to the historical profession for a long time and is generally accepted by scholars.1

4. The former Higher SS- and Police Leader, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, testified on this question during the Nuremberg trials: Himmler had already stated in a speech made before the beginning of the war, at the Wewelsburg, a cult site of the SS, that the war against Russia was intended to decimate the Slavic population by 30 million.2 This goal was to be achieved by means of a systematic policy of starvation of the indigenous population.

Unmistakable statements to this effect by top Nazi leaders are available. Thus Göring indicated to the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, in November 1941 that in the course of the year “20-30 million persons will die in Russia of hunger”.3 At a meeting of Secretaries of State on 2 May 1941, directives were set for the future economic exploitation of the Eastern territories to be occupied: it was stated therein that “without doubt umpteen millions of people will starve to death when we

take what we need from the country”.4 The guidelines for the future economic organisation of the East (Agricultural Staff Group) from 23 May 1941 very clearly affirmed that, with respect to the industrialised areas in northern Russia (which were no longer to be supplied with goods from the southern areas): “Many tens of millions of people will be made superfluous in this area and will die or be forced to emigrate to Siberia.5

5. The basic principles of this starvation policy were made clear in the directives which Göring issued for the economy in the newly-occupied Eastern territories, the so-called green portfolio.6 German policy towards the Jewish minority in the Soviet Union must be seen in the light of these plans which took for granted the death of millions of persons.

6. Because the Nazi leadership considered Jews especially “inferior” and dangerous and assumed that the Communist system in the Soviet Union was totally dominated by “the Jews”—the Nazis were particularly persevering in the persecution of the Jewish minority in the occupied Soviet territories. The murder of Jewish civilians cannot be attributed to the initiative of subordinate Nazi leaders. It is rather the result of a racially motivated and systematically planned extermination policy.

This is reflected in the relevant orders to the Wehrmacht and the SS and police units.

A. Orders

1. The Wehrmacht had been trained to view the Jewish minority as closely bound to the Soviet system and therefore as an enemy; this indoctrination had taken place even before the beginning of the war. On 3 March 1941 Hitler gave his Chief of the Leadership Staff of the Wehrmacht (Wehrmacht-Führungsstab), Jodl, the order to edit a draft of the “Guidelines for Special Areas relating to Instruction Nr. 21”,7 which was to regulate the basic principles for administration in the occupied areas.

According to Hitler, particular care was to be given to the following principles: “The Jewish-Bolshevist intellegentsia, the previous ‘oppressor’ of the people, must be eliminated.”8 This . “elimination” was not to be performed primarily by the army itself but rather by means of special SS commandos.

Thus the final version of the guidelines “Richtlinien auf Sondergebieten zur Weisung Nr. 21” from 13 March 1941, in accordance with Hitler’s instructions from 3 March 1941, read as follows: “In the operational area of the army the Reichsführer SS [i.e.

Himmler, P.L.] is to be given special duties according to orders from the Führer for the preparation of the political administration; these responsibilities are a consequence of the battle which is finally to be carried out between two opposite political systems”.9

2. A few weeks before the beginning of the war, members of the Wehrmacht were directly engaged to fight against the “Jews” as the supposed “carriers” of the Bolshevist system. In the Guidelines for the Conduct of the Troops in Russia from 19 May, which gave the company leaders the necessary reference points for an indoctrination of the soldiers in the coming ideological battle it was stated:

1. Bolshevism is the mortal enemy of the National-Socialist German people. This corrupt world view and its supporters warrant Germany’s struggle. 2. This struggle demands ruthless, energetic and drastic measures against the Bolshevik agitators, guerrillas, saboteurs and Jews as well as the complete removal of all active and passive resistance.10

1. Bolshevism is the mortal enemy of the National-Socialist German people.

   This corrupt world view and its supporters warrant Germany’s struggle. 2. This struggle demands ruthless, energetic and drastic measures against the Bolshevik agitators, guerrillas, saboteurs and Jews as well as the complete removal of all active and passive resistance.10

3. In order to implement the above mentioned “special duties by order of the Führer which are the consequence of the battle which is finally to be carried out between two opposite political systems”, Reichsführer SS Himmler set up four special “Einsatzgruppen” (EG) of the Security Police and the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst, SD) which included about 3000 men, divided into Einsatz and Special (Sonder) Commandos.

They were ordered to move behind the front lines and to proceed against all “subversive endeavours directed against Reich and State”.11

4. On the basis of written documents it can be shown that the Chief of the security police, Heydrich, issued two instructions to these groups before their departure for the occupied Soviet areas. These were orders (1) to initiate pogroms with the help of collaborationists from the region and (2) to liquidate Jews when they could be identified as members of some vaguely described Jewish elite or if they were in any other way “suspicious”.

5. We have two documents written by Heydrich which are based upon these verbal instructions. Heydrich’s note to the heads of the Einsatzgruppen of 29 June referred to the previously distributed order to foster “self-cleansing efforts” (Selbstreinigungsbestrebungen), i.e. pogroms of the Jewish population.

These “self-cleansing efforts” by anti-communist or anti-Jewish groups in the area to be occupied, according to Heydrich’s instructions, were “not to be hindered”, rather, these efforts should be initiated but this should be done “without leaving a trace”, intensified, and when necessary “steered in the correct direction”.12 In a further note dated 2 July, Heydrich informed the Higher SS and Police Leaders—i.e.

Himmler’s highest regional representatives in the areas which were to be occupied—about “the most important instructions by me to the Wehrmacht and the commandos of the Security Police and the SD”.13 Here it was stated once again that “self-cleansing efforts” (Selbstreinigungsversuchen) in the areas to be occupied were not to be hindered,14 but that on the contrary, they were to be encouraged—but without leaving a trace.

6. Furthermore, in the same note from 2 July, Heydrich listed under the key-word “executions” those groups of persons who were to be shot by the Einsatzgruppen:

To be executed areall

all functionaries of the Comintern (as well as all professional Communists) the higher, middle and radical lower functionaries of the Party, the Central Committees, the district and regional committees people’s commissars Jews in Party and State functions other radical elements (saboteurs, propagandists, snipers, assassins and agitators, etc.)15

7. This order is certainly not to be interpreted as meaning that Heydrich intended to limit executions to those Jews who held “Party and State functions”. Given the fact that in the course of war preparations the supposedly close connection between Jews and the Soviet system was repeatedly emphasised, it can be concluded that the instructions to execute “other radical elements” was primarily directed against the Jewish population.

Even the last word of this itemisation, “etc.” shows that the circle of “other radical elements” was by no means clearly delineated.

8. Further, the idea that efforts were made from the beginning to limit the set of Jewish victims precisely to “Jews in Party and State functions” is not compatible with the (stated) intention of allowing collaborators to initiate these “self-cleansing operations”, i.e. pogroms and massacres. A pogrom once begun cannot be confined to specific Jewish victims chosen according to their function.

9. That the Einsatzgruppen received explicit orders to murder Jewish civilians has been confirmed by all members of the leadership of the Einsatzgruppen who were questioned about this after the war. From this testimony we have consistent corroboration that in the period from Spring to the Summer of 1941 the Einsatzgruppen received orders for the mass murder of the Jewish civilian population in the occupied Soviet Union.

Even though there are differences in the testimonies as to the exact time and place of the issuance of orders, it is nevertheless remarkable that none of those interrogated disputed having been given the order to liquidate and that the large majority of the former leadership personnel testified that they received instructions for the indiscriminate liquidation of the entire Jewish population, including women and children.

10. An analysis of the available individual testimonies gives the following picture: a series of former leaders- whether of the Einsatzkommandos (EK) or the so-called Special Commandos (Sonderkommandos) who were interrogated on this question after the war, i.e.

Walter Blume (Leader of the Special Commando 7 a)16, Martin Sandberger (Leader of the EK 1 a)17, Rudolf Batz (Leader of the EK 2)18, Alfred Filbert (Leader of the EK 9)19, as well as Karl Jäger (leader of the EK 3)20 testified that at the beginning of the war Heydrich had informed them of an order by the Führer which made clear that the Jewish population in the Soviet areas to-be occupied were to be liquidated; Paul Johannes Zapp (Leader of the Special Commando 11 a)21 testified further that

this command also explicitly ordered the murder of women and children. Several other former leaders testified in this regard that precise orders for the liquidation of the Jewish civilian population were issued—but not until the war had been started—yet still in the Summer of 1941 by the Einsatzgruppen leaders;.

namely Erwin Schulz (Leader of the EK 5)22, Gustav Nosske (EK 12)23, Karl Tschierschky (member of the staff of EG A)24, Otto Bradfisch (Leader of the EK 8)25, and Erhard Kroeger (Leader of the EK 6)26. Two Leaders, Günther Herrmann (Leader of Commando 4 b)27 and Erich Ehrlinger (Leader of the EK 1b)28 testified only that they had been ordered by the Einsatzgruppen commanders to shoot Jewish men after the invasion of the Soviet Union.

B. The murders by the commandos

Evidence can be found to show that as early as the first days of the war against Russia the Einsatzgruppen initiated “self-cleansing pogroms” as well as the executions of Jewish men.

1. Pogroms organised by the commandos

1.1 The report of EG A, which was deployed behind the Army unit A, written after the middle of October, the so-called “Stahlecker-report”, contains a detailed description of the “self-cleansing efforts” (Selbstreinigungsbestrebungen) initiated by the EG:

The task of the security police must be to start the self-cleansing and to set it on the right track in order to reach the secret goal of purgation as quickly as possible.

No less significant was the goal of creating established and provable hard facts for the future—that the liberated population, on its own, reach for the most severe measures possible against the Bolshevist and Jewish opponent—without leaving direction by the German authorities being recognizable.29

The task of the security police must be to start the self-cleansing and to set it on the right track in order to reach the secret goal of purgation as quickly as possible. No less significant was the goal of creating established and provable hard facts for the future—that the liberated population, on its own, reach for the most severe measures possible against the Bolshevist and Jewish opponent—without leaving direction by the German authorities being recognizable.29

In this context it was “obvious from the very beginning that the implementation of pogroms was possible only in the first days following the occupation”.30.

1.2 Besides, according to the Stahlecker report, “surprisingly” it was at first “not easy” to initiate the first pogroms in Lithuanian Kovno; they began after the Lithuanian partisan leader who was selected as the one to implement the pogrom was given appropriate “indications” from a small advanced party deployed in Kovno, as to how to do so “without any external signs of German organisation or German initiation”31.

During these pogroms, which took place between 25 June and 28 June and which cost the lives of about 3800 Jews, Jewish men were forcibly collected from their dwellings by Lithuanian “militiamen” and herded into in public places where they were killed or brought to military bases and shot.32

1.3 Already at the beginning of July however, those in EG A concluded, as reported in an event report (Ereignismeldung), that in Kovno “further mass executions…were no longer possible”.33 They were therefore stopped..

In Riga the Einsatzgruppe was able to initiate a pogrom whereby 400 Jews were murdered, only however “by means of appropriate pressure upon the Lithuanian auxiliary police (Hilfspolizei)”.34 Further pogroms in the city were “not feasible”35 because the population had rapidly calmed down.36

1.4 At the end of July, the EG A also reported pogroms in other Lithuanian cities; it was recounted for example that in “Mitau and surroundings … the 1550 Jews still remaining had been ruthlessly eliminated by the population”.37

1.5 Evidence for pogroms initiated by the Germans exist for EG C in the Ukraine as well. Thus Ukrainian nationalists committed mass murder in the area of Tarnopol under the direction of Special Commando 4 b: On 7 July, about 70 Jews were “brought together and exterminated by Ukrainians with a massive load of explosives”38; the Commando also reported its activities in Tarnopol in the event report from 11 July, mentioning altogether over 127 executions and a further 600 people murdered by

Ukrainians “in the course of the persecution of the Jews inspired by the EK”.39

1.6 Further “self-cleansing measures” initiated by the EG C can be inferred by reading the event reports: “Thus in Dobromil the synagogue was set on fire.

In Sambor 50 Jews were clubbed by the outraged crowd.”40 A few days later it was reported that “In Krzemieniec about 100 to 150 Ukrainians have been murdered by the Russians […] the Ukrainians in self-defence killed 130 Jews with clubs in revenge”.41 In Tarnopol and Choroskow, according to the report, it was possible, by means of pogroms, “to finish off 600 and 110 Jews respectively.”42

1.7 At the end of July, EG C was forced to state that “attempts at that time to cautiously inspire pogroms against Jews unfortunately did not show the hoped-for results.”43 The further the Einsatzgruppen penetrated inside the Ukraine, the more they were forced to admit that the local population was not prepared to incite pogroms.44

2. Executions by Einsatzgruppen and police battalions in the first weeks of the war (Shooting of Jewish men)

2.1.1 For three of the four commandos subordinate to the EG A, mass executions of Jewish men can be demonstrated in the first days and weeks after the beginning of the war:—The EK 1b shot 1150 Jewish men in Dvinsk at the beginning of July, after they had been arrested by Lithuanian auxiliary forces which had been “strengthened in their work by the activities of the EK.”45—After the pogrom in Riga, over 2000 further Jews were killed “partially by the Lithuanian auxiliary police and

partially by our own men”46 in the period up to the middle of July, 1941, as reported by the EK2. In Mitau, a unit of the EK 2—supposedly in the first half of July—shot about 160 Jews, among them women and children.47

2.1.2 – The EK 3 organised mass executions of Jewish men from the beginning of July48 in the military base of Kovno. The Leader of the Commando, Jäger, reported on 1 December 1941 that the executions, which had been taking place since 4 July in Fort VII of the Kovno base, had been carried out “upon my orders and my command by the Lithuanian Partisans”49; the victims, according to Jäger’s count, numbered 2530 Jewish men and 47 women.

Three days later, according to Jäger, a group of men of his Commando began mass executions also outside of Kovno “together with the Lithuanian partisans”50 in which 1400 people, mostly Jewish men were murdered.

2.1.3 The EG A were helped by a Commando which was formed from members of the SD and the Gestapo in the German border town of Tilsit and which was known as “Einsatzkommando Tilsit”. This Commando also shot mostly Jewish men in the period directly following upon the onset of the war: on 24, 25 and 27 June they executed 201, 214 and 111 civilians in the area beyond the border of Lithuania, in the villages of Garsden, Krottingen and Polangen respectively.

This shooting, mostly of Jewish men was carried out in “retribution” for supposed civilian attacks upon the approaching units.51

2.1.4 In the following days, the ” EK Tilsit” carried on further “cleansing operations” in the border areas, for example on 2 July in Tauroggen, on 3 July in Georgenburg and in Augustovo and in Mariampol and Vladislav52, in which altogether 3302 people were shot, according to the event report of 18 July.53 For the entire month of July, further executions by the commandos, especially of Jewish men, can be documented in varied places.54 The fact that in later reports on No. 465).

Streim, SWCA, p. 6, pp. 333ff. executions in this area only the murder of women, older men and children were noted—not however the murder of men of draft age—is an indication that in fact all Jewish men of this age group had been murdered in the first wave of executions.55

2.1.5 The executions were granted full endorsement by Reichsführer SS, Himmler, as well as by the Chief of the Security Police, Heydrich. From a teletype message from the Gestapo postal station in Tilsit, dated 1 July, it emerges that Himmler and Heydrich visited the border areas and were informed about the “measures” which had been implemented and approved them “completely”.56

2.1.6 A few days later, Heydrich expressly confirmed—in a written order—that the executions of the EK Tilsit corresponded to his directions: in an order dated 4 July he explained to the Einsatzgruppen Chief that he had granted permission for commanders of the Security Police and the SD as well as for police stations (Staatspolizeistellen) “to carry out cleansing operations in the areas bordering upon the territories which had been newly occupied in order to relieve the Einsatzgruppen and

commandos, and especially, to secure their mobility.57

2.2.1 The mass executions of Jewish men in the month of July can be documented for all four Commandos of the EK B:—The SK 7a in Vileyka “liquidated the entire male Jewish population”; this was done as early as the end of June or in the first days of July as recounted in an event report.58 Similarly, the SK 7 a was responsible for the shooting of 332 Jews in Vitebsk at the end of July—beginning of August59 as well as for a further “action” in Gorodok in which about 150-200 Jewish men were

shot.60 Mass executions of Jewish men are documented for the SK 7 b in Borissov (July) and in the area of Orscha/Mogilev (end of July—beginning of August).61

2.2.2 – In Bialystok alone, at the beginning of July, the EK 8 initiated—among other events—two “actions” by which, according to the determination of German courts, at least 800 or at least 100 Jewish men were shot; later in Baranovice two further executions took place—with at least 100 Jewish victims shot in each case; finally, at the end of July and in August the EK participated decisively in mass executions in Minsk whereby more than 1000 Jews were killed.62

2.2.3 A unit of the EK 8 was ordered to Slonim in the middle of July, where according to the event report of 24 July63 “in collaboration with the order police (Ordnungspolizei) a major action against Jews and other communist-linked elements was accomplished, whereby about 2000 persons were arrested for communist machinations and looting. Among these, 1075 were liquidated on the same day”64

2.2.4 The leader of the EK 8, Otto Bradfisch, testified on this point that as early as the advance on Minsk he had already noticed that although no express order had been given “to exterminate the Jewish population in a place or area solely and alone because of it’s racial origin”,65 nevertheless in practice the orders given by EK B were so broadly conceived that “every Jew was to be regarded as a danger for the fighting troops and therefore to be liquidated”.66

2.2.5 From the testimony of the Higher SS and Police Leader Russia Centre, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, given in 1966, we know that Nebe’s attitude is to be traced to a Himmler directive. According to Bach’s testimony, Himmler had already expressed to Nebe on his visit to Bialystok

on July 8 that “basically every Jew is to be seen as a Partisan..”67 Three days later, the Commander of the Police Regiment Centre, whose headquarters were in Bialystok, determined that “all those male Jews of the ages between 17 and 45 taken as looters should be shot according to martial law”.68 By means of this order the extermination of the able-bodied Jewish population was made possible without further restrictions.

2.2.6 – In a report issued by EG B concerning the activities of Ek 9 in Vilna from July, 1941 it was claimed that “In Vilna the EK of that place have liquidated 321 Jews in the period before 8 July”. The Lithuanian order patrol which was placed under the command of the EK after the dissolution of the Lithuanian political police was instructed to become involved in the liquidation of the Jews.

For this purpose, 150 Lithuanian officials were called up; they captured the Jews and put them in concentration camps where they underwent “special treatment” (Sonderbehandlung) on the same day. This work had now begun and from then on “continuously on a daily basis about 500 Jews and other saboteurs were liquidated”.

The total nunber of Jews killed in the month of July in Wilna on the initiative of the EK 9 and the Lithuanians came to at least 4000-5000,69 but possibly more than 10,000 people.70

2.2.7 Direct intervention by Himmler and Heydrich can also be ascertained in the area of the EG B. We have already mentioned Himmler’s order given in Bialystok

on July 8 to shoot Jews on principle as partisans; there was also an order given three days later by the Commander of the Police Regiment Centre to shoot Jews taken as looters according to martial law. In a report written in the first few days of July by the Leader of the EG B on the activities of the sub-unit of EK 9 in Grodno and Lida it was stated: “In Grodno and Lida to begin with—in the first few days—only 96 Jews were liquidated.

I gave the order that this was to be intensified considerably.”71 The background to this order was the fact that Himmler and Heydrich had criticised the low level of activity of the Commandos during their visit in Grodno

on June 30. Heydrich, in a general order on 1 July demanded “more mobility in the tactical organisation of the deployment”.

He criticised the fact that in Grodno—as many as four days following the occupation—no single member of the Security Police and the SD had yet made an appearance.72 On 9 July, Himmler and Heydrich were once again in Grodno73 and were apparently able to convince themselves that the EG B order to intensify the liquidation had in the meantime been obeyed—this according to the event report:

The activities of all commandos have developed satisfactorily. First of all, the liquidations which are now occurring daily in ever greater measure are functioning well. The enforcement of the necessary liquidations is in any case ensured for all events.74

The activities of all commandos have developed satisfactorily. First of all, the liquidations which are now occurring daily in ever greater measure are functioning well. The enforcement of the necessary liquidations is in any case ensured for all events.74

2.2.8 This passage makes clear that in the case of the EG B, as early as a few weeks after the beginning of the campaign, the necessity for achieving a schedule of a certain quota of liquidations in a systematic way already existed as a concept.

2.3.1 The shooting of Jewish men can be documented for the month of July for all four Commandos of EG C:—Commando 6 shot at least 80 Jewish men in “retribution” for the supposed attacks by the parting Russian troops as early as 30 June in Dobromil, on the orders of the HSSPF Russia South, Jeckeln, and the Leader of the EG C, Rasch.75 —The EK 5 and 6 together participated in the massacre of the Jews of Lvov which was organised by the Higher SS and Police Leader South, Friedrich Jeckeln, as

well as the staff of Group C. As justification for this massacre, the Einsatzgruppen proposed “retribution”: this was supposed to be retribution for the murder by Soviet authorities—immediately before their departure—of Ukrainian nationalists found in the jails of the city.76 In the event report it is stated: “About 7000 Jews were collected and shot by the Security Police in retribution for these inhuman atrocities…

Above all, Jews between 20 and 40 were seized, whereas artisans and specialists were set aside in so far as it was meaningful.”77

2.3.2 – After its participation in the massacre in Lvov, Commando 5 initiated different “actions” in Berditshev78 and in the nearby areas, such as Chmielnik79, where a “retribution action” in which 299 people, mostly Jews, were shot, occured.—The EK 6, after deployment in Dobromil and Lvov, spent the second half of July in the Ukrainian town of Winniza, where it undertook further executions, including one with 146 victims and another which resulted in the death of 600 Jews.80

2.3.3 – The Special Commando 4 a, according to its own report at the end of June, had already shot over 300 people who were first labelled “communists” and then “Jewish communists” in Sokal.81 At the beginning of July it perpetuated an even more extensive massacre in Luzk, where according to its own report, 2000 Jews were killed “as a measure in response to the murder of Ukrainians”.82

The Commando moved further towards Shitomir where in three “actions” in July over 600 Jewish men were murdered. On 7 August a further group of 402 Jews were shot.83

2.3.4 – In the second half of July, the SK 4 b shot at least 100 people in Vinniza in the context of the so-called “intellegentsia action”.84 Their own report on this action makes clear the arbitrary character of their persecution of the “Jewish-bolshevist leadership” When an “overhaul of the city for leading Jewish personalities had produced scarcely satisfying results”85, according to the report, the leaders of the Commandos

ordered that the leading Rabbi of the city appear before them and imposed upon him the duty to locate—within 24 hours—the entire Jewish intellegentsia who were required to appear for the purpose of registration. When the first gathering proved numerically unsatisfactory, those Intelligenzjuden who had appeared were sent away with instructions to find more Intelligenzjuden on their own and to bring them in the next day.

These measures were carried on for a third time with the result that in this way almost the entire class of Intelligenzjuden were registered and liquidated.86

ordered that the leading Rabbi of the city appear before them and imposed upon him the duty to locate—within 24 hours—the entire Jewish intellegentsia who were required to appear for the purpose of registration. When the first gathering proved numerically unsatisfactory, those Intelligenzjuden who had appeared were sent away with instructions to find more Intelligenzjuden on their own and to bring them in the next day.

These measures were carried on for a third time with the result that in this way almost the entire class of Intelligenzjuden were registered and liquidated.86

2.3.5 The first conclusive report about the activities of EG C in Belorus from the beginning of July, 1941, contains an important indication that the group staff understood the given orders to execute as meaning that not only Jews in “party and state positions” were affected: “On the basis of the instructions issued by the RSHA, the liquidation of functionaries of the state and police apparatus in all the named cites of Belorus was undertaken.

Concerning the Jews the same orders were followed.”87

2.3.6 The event report of 20 August (EG C) describes an “action” and this description also very clearly exposes the use of “retribution” as a pretence.

In Januszpol, a city a quarter of whose population was Jewish, in the last few days especially the Jewish women have shown impudent and arrogant behaviour because of limitations imposed upon them. They tore their own and their children’s clothes off their bodies. As provisional retribution, the Commando which arrived for the purpose of re-establishing the peace shot 15 male Jews. Further retribution measures followed.88

In Januszpol, a city a quarter of whose population was Jewish, in the last few days especially the Jewish women have shown impudent and arrogant behaviour because of limitations imposed upon them. They tore their own and their children’s clothes off their bodies. As provisional retribution, the Commando which arrived for the purpose of re-establishing the peace shot 15 male Jews. Further retribution measures followed.88

2.3.7 When the Einsatzgruppen stated in this report that “retribution measures against looters and Jews continued to be carried out according to plan”89 it made clear that “retribution” was being carried out according to a scheme and independent of the existing situation.90

2.4.1 In addition to the four Commandos of the EG, yet another Commando was deployed in the Ukraine in July by the Commander and Chief of the Security Police in Cracow which was sent to support the EG C in the eastern Polish areas.91 This Commando perpetrated mass executions in July, in which the majority of the victims were Jewish men.

This is documented in the event report of 3 August: “From 21 July to 31 July, 1941, 3947 people were liquidated.”92 According to the event report of August 9, in Brest-Litowsk, 510 people, in Bialystok 296 people were liquidated.93

2.4.2 This unit, which was immediately labelled as EG z.b.V.(for special tasks, zur besonderen Verwendung) presented a report at the beginning of August from the eastern Polish area which clearly reveals how excessively “retributions” were applied at this point, and that this term was actually used as camouflage language for mass murder:

In the area near Pinsk a member of the militia was ambushed and shot. For this 4500 Jews were liquidated.94

In the area near Pinsk a member of the militia was ambushed and shot. For this 4500 Jews were liquidated.94

2.5.1 For all five Commandos of the EG D there exists documentation for mass executions of Jewish men in the period before August:—A sub-unit of the Special Commando 10 a was sent to the town of Kodyma because of a request from the Wehrmacht stating that the “Jews and bolshevists” from there were planning to sabotage the occupation powers. The sub-unit arrested 400 persons on the spot, mostly Jews, put them through an “interrogation” and then shot 98 people.95

2.5.2 – The Special Commando 10 b (which was subordinate to the 3rd Rumanian army) participated

on July 8 and 9 in a massacre of Rumanian troops in Czernovitz where the Commando, according to its own report killed “100 Jewish Communists because German and Rumanian units who were approaching were allegedly shot at from the Jewish quarter”.96 At the end of July, the EG D reported that “from about 1200 Jews who had been arrested, 682 had been killed in co-operation with the Rumanian police”.97 Sub-units of EK 10 b performed further executions of Jewish men in other sites in the following

weeks.98

2.5.3 – The Special Commando 11 a recorded at the beginning of August the liquidation of “now up to 551 Jews” in Kishinev, justifying it with “sabotage” and “retribution”.99 These executions took place in front of the Chief of the EG D, Ohlendorf, whose staff was situated in Kishinev and who witnessed at least this one execution.100

2.5.4 – The Special Commando ll b began its first mass execution on August 7, 1941 in Thigina, where according to the event report of August 7, 155 Jews were shot.101

2.5.5 – The EK 12 performed two executions in Babtshinsky on July 20 and July 21 whereby 94 persons were killed according to the event report of 23 August1941.102

2.6.1 However not only Einsatzgruppen, but also different battalions of the German Order Police perpetrated massacres on the Jewish civilian population in the first few weeks of the military advance in the occupied Eastern areas.—In Bialystok, the Police Battalion 309 committed a massacre as early as 27 June in which at least 2000 Jews, among them women and children were victims.

In the course of this action, members of the Battalion forced at least 500 into the Synagogue and murdered them by setting fire to the building.103

2.6.2 – In Bialystok, Police Battalion 316 and 322 staged a massacre in the middle of July whereby altogether 3000 Jewish men were killed.104 A few days before this massacre, on the afternoon of 8 July, Himmler appeared in Bialystok together with the Chief of the Order Police, Daluege.105 In a meeting with SS and Police Officers Himmler stated, according to Bach-Zelewski’s testimony, that “basically every Jew was to be regarded as a partisan”.106 On the next day, Daluege announced in a speech

to members of the Police Regiment Centre that “Bolshevism must now be definitively exterminated”.107 Two days later, on 11 July, the Commander of the Police Regiment Centre issued the order to shoot all Jewish men between the ages of 17 and 45 convicted as looters.108 The police made it very easy to “convict” Jews as “looters”; three days previously, members of the Battalion 322 had searched the Jewish quarter and confiscated the goods therein as “loot”.109 Jews were thus per se “looters.”

2.6.3 – The Police Battalion 316 perpetrated in Baranowicze a further massacre in the second half of July with probably several hundred dead; it was later involved in two mass executions in Mogilev, whereby on September 19, 3700 Jews (also women and children) were killed.110

2.6.4 – The Police Battalion 307 shot several thousand Jewish civilians in Brest-Litovsk around July 12; almost all were men between 16 and 60, it was a supposed “retribution measure” (Vergeltungsmaßnahme). Immediately before the massacre, Daluege, the Chief of the Police Regiment Centre, Montua, Bach-Zelewski and further Higher SS Leaders had assembled in Brest.111

2.6.5 – The Battalion 322 received a radio message from the HSSPF, directing them to “send a company to liquidate the Jews”.112

In the war diary of the Battalion for August 9 it is noted: “Company 3 captures all male Jews to be found between the ages of 16 to 45 in Bialovice and evacuates all other Jews of Bialovice.”113 And on the next day, it read: “Company 3 follows through on the liquidation of the male Jews in the prisoner assembly camp in Bialovice. 77 Jews aged between 16 and 45 were thereby shot.”114

2.6.6 Once again Jewish men were shot by the same company of Battalion 322 a few days later in Marovka-Mala in the area near Bialovice. In the war diary of the Battalion for August 8 it is stated: “259 women and 162 children were evacuated to Kobryn. All male Jews of 26-65 (282 heads) and one Polish person were shot for plundering.”115 Later, it must have been between 10 August and 15 August, an order arrived which increased the age limit for Jewish men to be shot from 45 to 65.

2.7.1 From these numerous individual facts the following conclusions can be drawn:

2.7.2 For almost all Einsatz or Special Commandos and for a number of Battalions, the mass shooting of Jewish men of draft age—hundreds or thousands of people for each unit—can be documented for the period as early as the end of June or in July. These shootings were mostly carried out under the pretext of “retribution”, punishment for “plundering” or else portrayed as a struggle against “partisans”..

This behaviour corresponded to commands which the Einsatzgruppen had received at the beginning of the campaign. In some cases, as we have seen, the leaders of the units even made reference to having received orders to this effect.

2.7.3 The behaviour of the units followed a standardised pattern which however was not altogether uniform: the age limit of those to be shot varied from one unit to another; while in some places the entire male population in the designated age group was shot, the executions in other places included different percentages of the male population.

Clearly the leaders of the units also had a certain amount of leeway as concerns the nature of the orders given to them; as we have seen, these were not always very precise and left a certain amount of room for interpretation.

2.7.4 This sort of “indirect” command, based upon the intuition and initiative of the subordinates, is characteristic for the Nazi system. It was employed especially when subordinates were being asked to do something which clearly violated the accepted law.

The Highest Party Court of the Nazi Party had appropriately characterised this sort of “indirect” command in 1939, when it was asked to deal with the question of whether Party members were to be punished for capital crimes committed in the course of the November pogrom of 1938.

The Highest Party Court concluded at that time that “for active Nazis from the early period of struggle it was self-evident… that in actions where the Party does not want to openly appear as the organiser, orders are not issued with absolute clarity or in the smallest detail.

He [the active Nazi, P.L.] is therefore accustomed to interpret more than is literally stated, just as those who give the orders often are accustomed—in the interest of the Party—not to state everything but to hint at what is to be achieved by the command. This is especially the case when it is a question of illegal political demonstrations.”116

2.7.5 This technique of command-giving was also employed in 1941 in connection with the mass murder of Soviet Jews. The leaders of the individual units were granted a certain latitude, only however within the context of a framework determined by the SS leadership.

2.7.6 In order to assure that the basic policy intentions of the SS leadership were actually put into practice by the units, Himmler, Heydrich and Daluege undertook extended inspection tours in the occupied Eastern territories in the first few weeks of the war. In this way, they encouraged the units to continuously increase the number of Jewish men to be shot. The inspection trips thus constituted an important instrument for reinforcing the system of “indirect command”.

The units continuously reported these shootings, as we have seen from the event reports; these reports were made known to a large number of agencies in the Reich.

2.7.7 Thus it is clear that the murders had a systematic character: they cannot be explained as spontaneous reactions of individual SS leaders to specific local situations; rather they followed a uniform pattern and were in accord with central orders.

3. Expansion of the shooting to the entire Jewish civilian population.

As will be shown in this section, the SS and police units in the Summer and Fall of 1941, as they extended the shooting to Jewish women and children, followed the same uniform pattern described above. The murder of the Jewish civilian population took on new dimensions with the employment of two SS brigades, one led directly by Reichsführer SS Himmler with the help of a Special Commando staff.

3.1.1 In the area behind the central section of the Front, the character of the mass executions began to enter a new stage as a result of the use of the SS Cavalry Brigade. This Brigade carried out a first “cleansing operation” in the Pripet marshes between 29 July and 12 August under the leadership of the Higher SS and Police Leader, by which 13,788 “looters” (i.e. mostly Jews) were shot and 714 were held prisoner.

On the side of the Brigade 2 were killed and 15 wounded.117 Between 17 August and 23 August the Cavalry Brigade initiated a second “action” by which, according to their own report, altogether 699 Red Army men, 1001 partisans and 14,178 Jews were shot.118 Shortly before these two “actions”, Himmler had visited Baranovice where he ordered the brigade to kill all Jewish men and the women as well—although in a different way.

From a radio-telegraph text dated August 1 from the Second Cavalry Regiment we can read: “Explicit order of the RFSS. All Jews must be shot. Jewish women to be driven into the swamp.”119

3.1.2 In fact at first the Cavalry Regiment was supposed to kill only the Jewish men. The fact that Himmler had given a clear signal at the end of July that women also were not to be spared, together with the fact that the number of Jewish men killed by the Cavalry Brigade (which lay under the personal responsibility of the HSSPF Russia Centre) had reached unprecedented dimensions—proved to have a radicalising effect for all units under Bach-Zelewski’s command.

3.1.3 The shooting of women in the HSSPF area Russia Centre began as early as the first half of August and it was done by the EK 9. In this time period—in the course of several “actions” in Wilejka—members of EK 9 shot at least 320 Jews, among them women and children.120 Filbert, the Leader of the EK 9, affirmed in his interrogation testimony that the order to shoot women and children was given to him by Nebe, the Leader of the EG B, at the beginning of August.121

After the executions in the Wilejka area, Commando 9 marched to Vitebsk in August, where several thousand people were murdered in multiple “actions” in the period up to October.122

3.1.4 – The Leader of the EK 8, Bradfisch—as he testified after the war123—was also informed by Nebe that “there exists an order from the Führer according to which all Jews, i.e. also women and children, are to be exterminated”.

Bradfisch testified further that shortly thereafter, when Himmler came to inspect an execution which Bradfisch’s Commando was carrying out in Minsk,124 Himmler said to him that “since an order from the Führer existed calling for the shooting of all Jews, this order had to be carried out, as difficult as this may be for us”.125

3.1.5 The undifferentiated shooting of women and children which is announced here by Himmler can be documented in the case of the EK 8 only for the period beginning as early as September but occuring mostly after October. A sub-unit stationed in Bobruisk carried out at least seven executions in September-October 1941; among them, one single “action”, which must have taken place in the first half of September, involved the shooting of 400 men, women and children.126

3.1.6 A “major action” (Grossaktion) in Lahoisk was carried out by a sub-unit of EK 8 (probably the one stationed in Borissov); it most likely took place in the first half of September with the support of a Commando from the SS division “das Reich” . According to event reports from 20 September, in this “action” 920 Jews were executed.127 Also in this case, since it was thereafter declared “free of Jews” (judenfrei) it follows that all women and children of the village must have been murdered.

3.1.7 The same sub-unit of EK 8, along with the units left in Minsk, shot 1401 Jews—men, women and children in Smolowicze around the end of September in a “major action” as reported in the event reports. In the appropriate event report it was stated further that:

After the deployment of this cleansing operation, there are no Jews left in the north, south or west of Borissov.128

After the deployment of this cleansing operation, there are no Jews left in the north, south or west of Borissov.128

3.1.8 – As early as 1 September, the police battalion 322 in Minsk had shot “914 Jews, including 64 Jewish women”, following a meeting which had taken place there on August 29 between Bach-Zelewski and Daluege.129 In the war diary of the battalion the justification given for the shooting of a large number of Jewish women was that they were not wearing a Jewish star when arrested in a police raid.

3.1.9 On September 25, the Battalion 322, in the context of a training exercise which involved representatives of the Wehrmacht (including Division and Regiment Commanders) from the Police, and SD, cordoned off and searched a village. Concerning this “exercise” the war diary of the unit reported that no partisans could be found but that “an inspection of the population revealed the presence of 13 Jewish men, 27 Jewish women and 11 Jewish children.

Of these—13 Jewish men and 19 Jewish women were executed in conjunction with the SD.”130

3.1.10 It was only after this bloody exercise in the beginning of October, in the area of EI B, that generalized murder of members of the Jewish population was carried out on a full scale. From this point on, massacres resulting in thousands of deaths of men, women and children became the rule.

Source Information
Original Publication: 1999-06-15
Digital Archive: Focal Point Publications
Accessed: June 4, 2026