British
secret service reported in July 2002 on Bush’s
plans to fabricate evidence to justify attacking
Iraq

Actual text of the secret memorandum reporting a meeting between British prime minister Tony Blair
and his Intelligence chiefs, July 23,
2002

SECRET
AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES
ONLY

[To:] DAVID
MANNING

From: Matthew
Rycroft

Date: 23 July 2002 S 195 /02

cc [copied to]: Defence
Secretary [Geoffrey
Hoon], Foreign Secretary
[Jack Straw],
Attorney-General [Lord
Goldsmith], Sir
Richard Wilson,
John Scarlett [of
MI6], Francis
Richards, CDS [Chief of Defence
Staff], C [Sir Richard Dearlove, head of
MI6],

Jonathan Powell, Sally
Morgan, Alastair Campbell [of
Blair's staff]

IRAQ: PRIME
MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
[2002]

Copy addressees and you [David
Manning] met the Prime Minister [Tony
Blair] on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett [of MI6, now its new chief] summarised the intelligence and latest
JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US.

Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C [Sir Richard
Dearlove, chief of the British secret
Intelligence service] reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD.
But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.

The NSC [National
Security Council, i.e. Condoleeza
Rice] had no
patience
with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief
CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and
Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow
build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour)
air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the
south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation
plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and
Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in
Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US
Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary [Jack Straw]
said he would discuss this with Colin
Powell this week. It seemed clear that
[President George W]
Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.

We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General [Lord
Goldsmith] said that the desire for regime change was
not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister [Tony Blair] said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change.

The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if
Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that
Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on
Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime
Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the
Prime Minister to set out the political context to
Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the
assumption that the UK would take part in any
military action. But we needed a fuller picture
of US planning before we could take any firm
decisions. CDS should tell the US military that
we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the
Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime
Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

See Also