the Dresden air raids 1945 The TARGET MAP: Wing Commander Maurice Smith, the master bomber in the first raid on Dresden at 10:15 pm, gave David Irving the target map used in this attack; the sector marked for attack (above in pink) included none of the strategic communications or industrial targets referred to by Taylor in his book. The target for the second raid was just the center of the firestorm created by the first.
See picture gallery . [A Critique] “Dresden” by Frederick Taylor (Bloomsbury, 2004) It is claimed that this is the first serious reappraisal for more than 20 years of the bombing of Dresden in February 1945. It is not clear in what sense the reappraisal has been made: The description of the RAF raids on 13 and 14 February is covered in depth but details are scattered throughout the book. It is difficult to obtain a coherent picture.
References are made to districts and localities but names mentioned in the text cannot always be related to map locations. The maps are significantly lacking in useful detail. On the one map of the city, it is almost impossible to trace the course of the railways. There appears to be considerable attention to detail in some aspects but there are some discrepancies.
For example, in the table of bombs dropped by 1, 3, 6 and 8 groups, the enumeration of the bombs dropped does not always add up to the totals given (pages 278-280). No.1. Bomber Group is reported to have dropped 145 four thousand pound mines, 101 two thousand pound mines and 111 -five hundred pound bombs giving a total of 387.3 tons of high explosive, HE. On the quantities and sizes given, the total weight of HE should be in fact 837 500 lbs. or 373.9 tons.
The difference is not significant in terms of the raid but it does show a slapdash approach to what is claimed to be a definitive account. (The weights of HE bombs dropped by the other Bomber Groups are consistent). Dresden is variously described as a “city of culture” or an “industrial city”. Taylor takes the latter view and numerous references to factories producing war material are scattered throughout the text.
No attempt has been made to produce even a rough estimate of the extent of the industry or of the fraction of industrial effort devoted to war materials, even assuming it is possible to define a war product. (A radio valve for example may be used in a domestic receiver or in the radio set of a tank.). German factories were producing civilian goods up to a very late stage of the war.
The marshalling yards receive only perfunctory treatment although railway communications had been defined as one of the main objectives of the bombing campaign. It is somewhat surprising that the main railway installations were not attacked by the RAF. although identified as targets by the USAAF for the daylight raids. Possibly the main claim for the book to be definitive is the contribution to what Taylor calls “the numbers game”.
He goes to some length to quote ridiculously high figures for casualties put out by the Germans and Russians but his attempts to rubbish the work of other authors are somewhat suspect. It is very difficult to authenticate records of nearly 60 years ago even if they are suspected of having been altered. Given the circumstances of the raid, a body count would have been virtually impossible.
One may compare the numbers of bodies recovered from the Flanders battlefields after WWI — even though every man could be accounted for in regimental records, there were many thousands listed as “missing believed killed”. The book quotes Walter Weidauer , the communist mayor of Dresden as denying (page 448) reports that tens of thousands of victims were so thoroughly incinerated that no individual traces could be found. But would it have been feasible to establish the absence of remains?
Bodies cremated in the fierce heat of the firestorm would not leave much trace, especially if the remains were crushed by falling buildings. Certainly there were many thousands of refugees in the city and it is not likely that the Russians would have been meticulous in tracing those “missing”. The accounts of strafing attacks criticised by Taylor (Appendix B) are difficult to verify because of the confusing effects of bombing, cannon fire and anti-aircraft shrapnel on eye-witnesses.
There was certainly no strafing during the RAF raids. If there was any machine-gun fire (at 20 000 feet!) it was probably warning shots to deter German night fighters. In the USAF daylight raids, only A Group were given permission to break away and attack ground “targets of opportunity” but is not clear whether the targets were refugees, German troops or POWs. In later wars, the USAAF have shown a propensity to shoot first and ask questions afterwards.
The anecdotal accounts of the survivors of the raids are interesting but the undue emphasis given to the stories of one small community makes them of little value in assessing the overall picture. Overall, the book fails to address fully the question “why?.” The top level directives and the back-pedalling by Churchill to avoid responsibility for the raid are quoted but there is no coherent account of the decisions that led to “area bombing” of towns. Surprisingly.
I can find only one mention of Professor Lindemann , (right), Churchill’s constant companion and guru, and that only in connection of the Butt Report on bombing accuracy. Yet Lindemann had exerted a strong hand on the development of the policy and, although several advisers had advocated bombing of towns and cities, Lindemann pushed Churchill towards the final decision.
In 1942 Churchill had persuaded the Lord President ( Anderson ) to start an investigation into the effects of bombing on British cities and the work was carried out by S Zuckerman and J D Bernal , who circulated a report[2] in April of that year, but Lindemann nine days earlier sent Churchill a minute, based on their preliminary findings.
He advocated the bombing of the fifty-eight German cities which had a population of over 100,000 (no distinction was made between “industrial” cities and other centres). It was estimated that each ton of bombs dropped would result in 100-200 workers being rendered homeless. (He glossed over the estimate that four workers would also be killed).
He assumed that German industry would be brought to a standstill and the collapse of German morale would end the war. “The Destruction of Dresden” by David Irving, Macmillan (1975) “Churchill and the Prof” by Thomas Wilson, Cassell (1995)