Churchill’s War Stalin’s conversations with Allied leaders Oct 14-17, 1944. From Library of Congress, H H Arnold papers, box 225 COPY TOP SECRET October 23, 1944. GEM Dear Hap: As I agreed this afternoon, I am attaching the memoranda of the conversations with Marshal Stalin on military matters which took place during the middle of October. You will see that these conversations set out in more detail the information contained in General Deane’s and my cables.
Sincerely, [George Marshall] Enclosures: Notes of Meetings October 14, 1944 October 15, 1944 October 17, 1944 General H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Room 3-E — 1009 Pentagon Building. COPY Conversation, October 14, 1944 Present: Marshal I. V. Stalin Mr. V. M. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs General of Armies A. I. Antonov Lieutenant General Shevchenko Mr. Pavlov, Soviet Interpreter The British Prime Minister, Mr.
Churchill Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke General Sir Henry Hastings Ismay Major General Jacob General Burrows Major A. H. Birse, Second Secretary of British Embassy The American Ambassador, Mr. Harriman Major General John R. Deane Mr. Edward Page, Second Secretary of Embassy Subject: The Military Situation I. Field Marshal Brooke gave a detailed explanation of the Allied military operations in western Europe, Italy, and Burma.
A copy of his remarks as taken down by General Jacob is attached hereto. II. General Deane gave a full account of the Pacific operation of the Allies. A copy of the statement made by him is attached hereto. III.
General Antonov gave the following account of the Russian military operations: -2- After successful operations in liberating White Russia, in advancing to the East Prussian frontier and to the Vistula River, and in defeating the German groupings in Rumania which resulted in the withdrawal of Rumania from the war, the Soviet armies started flanking operations in the Baltic and in Rumania, the latter continuing on into Hungary.
It was decided that before invading Germany the Baltic must be entirely cleaned up of enemy groupings which were still looming over the Soviet forces, since it was believed by the Soviet High Command that it would be most difficult to invade Germany until the Baltic had been completely liberated. For this reason operations were conducted from Siauliai westward to Memel and from Valk westward to Riga. At the same tine operations were carried on to liberate the islands of Osel and Dago.
Soviet forces advancing from Siauliai have arrived on the Baltic seacoast north and south of Memel. Now all the German communications from the Baltic leading into Germany have been taken. In addition Riga was occupied yesterday. The operations in the islands of Osel and Dago have almost been completed, There are small enemy groupings in the southern part of Osel. As a result of the Baltic operations about 30 German divisions have been entrapped in the coastal regions between Riga and Memel.
As these divisions are still intact, the Baltic operations cannot be considered as completed. These German groupings must be liquidated. In the south the Soviet armies have reached the Tisza River on a broken front reaching from Solnok to the junction of the Tisza and the Danube.
On October 14 Soviet forces were fighting southwest of Debretsen where the main German groupings are concentrated. Three German tank divisions and numerous infantry divisions are located in this locality. As a result of the Soviet troops reaching Debretsen and the Tisza, the enemy groupings northeast and south of Kluj are in a difficult position. They are forced to retreat in order to avoid encirclement.
In Yugoslavia Soviet forces fighting with Tito have reached the outskirts of Belgrade. (Earlier in the conversati
on Marshal Stalin stated that the Red Army would not advance farther west in Yugoslavia after capture of Belgrade but would concentrate on occupying Hungary and on encircling as many as possible of the German forces there. He explained that the drive in this sector would be through Austria to take Vienna.
This would open up a route into Germany to the west of Czechoslovakia and then to the northwest in the direction of the Oder at Breslau.) -3- It may appear at first sight that the enemy has freedom of movement on the central front. This is not true in fact. On this front, although there are no operations with major objectives, the enemy forces are tied down. They are being contained by continuous battles.
The purpose of these operations is to sound out the enemy defenses, especially on the East Prussian frontier. In reply to a question raised by the Prime Minister, it was stated that the total German strength on all fronts numbered 180 divisions dispersed as follows: in the Baltic, 30 divisions (encircled); in Hungary, 22 to 23; in the north, 8; in the center, 120. In addition the Hungarians have 26 divisions at their disposal. Opposing these enemy forces are 300 Soviet divisions.
With respect to the Hungarian forces, the Hungarian Government was not carrying out the preliminary armistice conditions accepted several days ago. If they failed to do so within two days, the Soviet armies would advance. In any event, the Hungarian divisions were almost encircled. At the present time the main task is clear — to clean up the Baltic and to force Hungary to withdraw from the war .
When this was done, the Soviet armies would be faced with their main objective – the invasion of Germany. It is hard to say in which direction this invasion will take place. Much will depend on the result of the operations now going on. In any case it may be stated that the success of the Soviet operations in Hungary opens up a new route into Germany from the south. Consequently invasion can come from both the east and the south.
It may possibly turn out that the southern route will be more feasible since the Germans have no prepared defenses there. In reply to a question raised by the Prime Minister, General Antonov stated that it was hard to give an indication of the timing of the invasion. The strong groupings in the Baltic must be wiped out. It was now autumn in Hungary and weather conditions were bad. The Soviets were faced with the same communications difficulties which Marshal Brook had mentioned.
Roads and railroads had been destroyed and they must be repaired. – 4 – IV. The Prime Minister inquired whether, broadly speaking, it could be anticipated that the Germans would be unable to move their forces from the east to the west. Marshal Stalin now actively entered the conversation. He said that he believed that operations would proceed more rapidly than General Antonov anticipated.
The Baltic divisions, which he said were 38 in number, were out of commission and tied down in the area between Memel and Riga. It was very difficult to move them out and embarrassing for the Germans to operate without them. If the Soviets were to place against these divisions 50 divisions, which it was easy to do since the Soviet Government had a superiority and “could indulge in such a luxury”, these German divisions were doomed.
In addition, the Germans were obliged to disperse their forces over the entire front which the Soviet armies were keeping alive. The fact that the Soviets had encircled these 38 divisions obviously assisted the Russians elsewhere. At the present time large areas were exposed to Soviet blows and it was unlikely that the Germans could hold out. This was also true in the south.
The Soviet High Command anticipated cutting off another large German grouping and then advancing on a line to Bratislava, Vienna, and the Moravian Gate. All the German groupings in this area would be encircled. This of course would facilitate blows in the north. But it was not thought by Marshal Stalin that the Germans would be finished off this year.
The Soviet armies would probably have a winter campaign after a short breathing spell, and after January it would be easier to say when Germany would collapse. In any case the two difficult German positions in the north and south “testify to the fact that they (the Germans) would not be able to move any forces from the east to the west”. Since the Soviet High Command expected to knock out Hungary by persuasion or by force, the German position would be very embarrassing.
Czechoslovakia would be exposed and the Russians would be able to advance right up to Breslau. If the British and Americans as Allies requested the Russians to release certain German divisions, the Russians would refuse to do so. Marshal Stalin then turned to the Warsaw situation. He explained that operations there resembled the operations against Kiev. The Dniepr River, for example, was 600 meters in width, whereas the Vistula was 700 meters.
Both Kiev and Warsaw were situated on heights on the eastern bank. If the Soviet forces attempted to take Warsaw by a frontal attack, they would be oblige to destroy the city, This they did not wish to do, In addition they were unable to make full use of -5- their air forces because of their reluctance to destroy Warsaw. They were planning to outflank the city like Stalingrad.
The timing of the encirclement of Warsaw and the attack on East Prussia would of course depend upon the progress of operations on the two flanks mentioned by General Antonov. The Prime Minister remarked that the Germans had 7 or 8 divisions in Finland. Marshal Stalin stated that at the present time the Red Army was only two miles from Petsamo and expected to take the area any day now.
There were remnants of three German divisions in this area which might attempt to withdraw through Sweden into Norway. In addition there were five German divisions in the Rovanarvi (?) area in the north central part of Finland. An offensive was planned also against these divisions which were not up to full strength but were well equipped. They also might request the Swedes to let them through.
Marshal Stalin suggested the possibility of a joint British and Russian operation in Norway to cut off these divisions. The Prime Minister explained that the British had no more ground forces available but were ready to discuss any feasible manner of assisting the Russians by naval cooperation. He requested the Marshal to let him know what the British could do. The Marshal said that be would do so after Petsamo had been captured.
Marshal Stalin handed to the Prime Minister and the American Ambassador a note which was being transmitted to the head of the Hungarian Mission in Moscow. A copy of this note is attached. It was agreed that the next meeting, at which time Russian participation in the war against Japan would be discussed, would take place at six o’clock tomorrow. EP: nn Copy for General Deane DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR. 5200.0 TRANSLATION SECRET TO THE HEAD OF THE HUNGARIAN MISSION, COLONEL-GENERAL FARAGO GABOR.
The Hungarian truce representative, Colonel Utasi Lourend, who has arrived in Szeged from Budapest, is an utterly uninformed person, and, in virtue of this, is unable to carry on negotiations with the representatives of the Soviet Command regarding the fulfilment by the Hungarian Government of the preliminary armistice conditions.
The Hungarian Government requested the Soviet Government to discontinue the offensive in the sector towards Budapest in order that it might remove a part of its troops from this sector and send them to Budapest. The Soviet Government granted this request of the Hungarian Government, yet the latter not only did not remove its troops from the River Tisa in order to send them to Budapest, but resumed operations especially in the Szolnok area.
The aforementioned circumstances show that the Hungarian Government has apparently started on the course of non-fulfilment of the preliminary armistice conditions undertaken by it.
With reference to the above, the High Command of the Soviet forces requires that the Hungarian Government, within 48 hours of receipt of these present demands, shall fulfil the obligations which it has undertaken regarding the preliminary armistice conditions and above all: Break off any relations whatsoever with the Germans and begin active military operations against their troops; Set about the withdrawal of Hungarian troops from the territories of Roumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia;
Send in the same way as before, via Szeged, by 0800 hours on the 16th October, full information of the dispositions of German and Hungarian troops to the representatives of the Soviet Command, and, at the same time, report to the aforementioned Soviet representatives on the progress that has been made in carrying out the preliminary armistice conditions. 14th October, l944.
By authority of the Supreme High Command of the Soviet Forces: Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, army General ANTONOV. TOP SECRET Detailed explanation of the Allied military operations in western Europe, Italy, and Burma, as given by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke at a meeting held in the Kremlin
on October 14, l944. Referred to in paragraph I of memorandum of conversation. 1. THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY. (a) Western Front Sir Alan Brooke explained, with the help of a map, the present position of the armies on the Western front. He pointed out that the speed of the advance was now dependent upon the organization of supplies. The armies were still depending largely on Cherbourg, and were served by a road and rail system which had not yet been properly restored.
It was of very great importance to get the use of Antwerp as soon as possible. We had secured the port intact, but had not yet got the sea approaches, and operations were now in progress directed to clearing the Germans from the islands on the North of the Scheldt, and from the bridgehead which they still held on the South bank. At the sane time, operations were in progress Northward from Antwerp and Eastward from the Corridor, in order to clear the country West and South of the Meuse.
Meanwhile 15,000 Germans were invested in Dunkirk, and other garrisons were in Lorient, St. Nazaire, Bordeaux and the Channel Islands. On the main front of the armies there were some 60 German Divisions, though these were not up to full strength. The Allies now had 60, and would have 78 by the end of the year -thanks to the flow of American Divisions. Mr. Churchill remarked that the Allied Divisions were strong Divisions.
If allowance was made for Corps troops, Army troops, and the appropriate proportion of line of communication troops, the overall strength of a British Division worked out at about 40,000, and an American Division at about 50,000 men. Marshal Stalin enquired what we thought was the equivalent strength of the German Divisions. Sir Alan Brooke said that if they were up to strength, they could be reckoned at more than 25,000.
We were not being held back by lack of men, but purely by maintenance facilities. A large quantity of ammunition would be required for the forcing of the Siegfried. Line, and this had not yet been accumulated the front. The Allied plan – 2 – was first to reach the Rhine, then to force a crossing North and South of the Ruhr, with the object of encircling the industrial area. The main axis of the Allied advance would then be directed on Berlin.
Simultaneously there would be an advance on the Southern front towards Frankfurt, and then North Eastward towards Leipzig. The advance would, however, depend upon the progress of the main thrust in the North. On the extreme right of the line, the American and French Armies which had advanced from Marseilles would operate through the Belfort Gap, seize crossings over the Rhine, and move East. This, however, was more in the nature of a feint.
We expected difficulties in forcing the crossing of the Rhine, but hoped to achieve it with the help of airborne divisions. At the present moment Aachen was surrounded, and fighting was proceeding in the streets. Mr. Churchill emphasised that the Allies in the West had a large superiority of force once the communications could be developed to the pitch of enabling this force to be deployed and supplied.
We hoped to be able to cut off about 150,000 Germans in Holland, and would then drive steadily towards Berlin. All this, however, depended upon the Russian Armies on the Eastern front holding great German forces now deployed there. Any large switch of German Divisions from East to West would alter the position. Marshal Stalin enquired whether the operations which had been described scald take place in the near future. Sir Alan Brooke said that they would be continuous.
Marshal Stalin said that the Germans would not be to switch Divisions from East to West, as they would not be able to switch Divisions from East to West, as they would be fully engaged. The Russians had had the same kind of difficulties when approaching Warsaw as the Allies had had on the Western front. They had not found it possible to get into Warsaw on the heels of the Germans. The Ger-mans had had time to strengthen the defences of the approaches.
The Russians well knew what it was to have to operate over communications which had been well destroyed. (b) Southern Front Sir Alan Brooke said that General Alexander’s advance had now carried him beyond the Gothic Line along almost the whole front. His forces were now moving down into the Po Valley towards Bologna, the 8th Army on the Adriatic Flank and the 5th Army through the center. We hoped to drive the Germans across the Po.
Kesselring would then have to withdraw his divisions from northwest Italy. These would have to move northeast as they could not go north except into Switzerland. Mr. Churchill said that if the Germans did withdraw into Switzerland, we should, of course, follow them. Sir Alan Brooke said that Kesselring would probably hold the line of the Adige which covered both his lines of retreat through the Brenner and Ljubljana Passes. Kesselring had 28 divisions now on the Italian Front and if he went