today’s ” AR-online” again AR-Online recent issues: July 1999 June 1999 May 1999 April 1999 March 1999 February 1999 January 1999 December 1998 November 1998 October 1998 September 1998 August 1998 July 1998 Alphabetical index (text) “The chortling claims of Nato’s smirking spokesman Jamie Shea and a succession of allied generals that the Yugoslav military suffered 10,000 casualties and a third of their 400-plus tanks had been destroyed by air strikes, have
proven ludicrously wrong.” – Peter Worthington, Toronto Sun, July 21, 1999 The Toronto Sun July 21, 1999 LETTERS Nato “victory” more like a disaster By PETER WORTHINGTON Milosevic’s ‘surrender’ is far from proof that air power alone wins wars ECAUSE Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic capitulated after 78 days of Nato/U.S. air strikes, there’s a growing feeling that those who warned air power alone can’t win wars were wrong.
Even the current guru of military history, John Keegan , has acknowledged that his original view that air power alone couldn’t win Kosovo was wrong. The likes of University of Calgary historian David Bercuson and various media commentators quickly adjusted to the new line that air power, indeed, could win wars. While there’s justifiable relief at Milosevic’s so-called “surrender,” it is far from proof that air power alone can win a war.
On the contrary, Kosovo tends to reinforce the view that in a real war, air power while significant, even vital, cannot do it alone. Still, the new “mythology” persists. Alistair Horne in Britain’s Spectator put it wryly: “This unique victory has proved the old adage about truth being the first casualty.”
Despite Nato’s spin-doctoring and disinformation (yes, disinformation) it’s clear that the Yugoslav Army, far from being beaten, ravaged, demoralized, is virtually intact with astonishingly little “collateral damage. The chortling claims of Nato’s smirking spokesman Jamie Shea and a succession of allied generals that the Yugoslav military suffered 10,000 casualties and a third of their 400-plus tanks had been destroyed by air strikes, have proven ludicrously wrong.
Revised assessments now suggest the Serb military suffered some 400 casualties, and lost maybe 13 tanks. What Nato aircraft and rockets “destroyed,” after some 40,000 sorties, were mostly dummy tanks, armoured vehicles, aircraft, missiles sites, guns. Our side was shocked when the Serbian army withdrew from Kosovo virtually unscathed – equipment in top shape, morale high, troops more indignant than relieved at Milosevic’s “betrayal.”
The relatively few Western journalists in Kosovo at the time of Slobo’s “surrender” (if that’s what it was) reported the lack of damage to the Serb military – individuals like the BBC’s intrepid John Simpson and Scott Taylor , publisher of the military magazine Esprit de Corps. On reflection, Nato’s air “victory” may not have been all that was hoped. The political front collapsed, not the military.
Judging from inflated rhetoric when the “war” started, the end result was closer to disaster than victory. The original mandate of 19 Nato countries cajoled and coerced by the U.S. was to save Kosovo’s Albanians from slaughter or being driven from their homes. When what was initially intended to be a “weekend war” to “bluff” Milosevic into quickly backing down and complying with Nato demands didn’t work, Nato revised its goal to enabling refugees to return home.
This, after untold thousands were slaughtered, villages razed, and a million refugees in flight. All as a consequence of Nato’s war. Some victory. While Milosevic is