A more fundamental obstacle to the invasion was the nature of the Russian terrain, of which the “Red Donkey” had made no mention at all. Hitler had been undaunted by the sheer distances involved, since unlike Napoleon in 1812 he had the internal combustion engine and the airplane—indeed, he had tempted providence by launching “Barbarossa” on the very anniversary of Napoleon’s invasion.
But in the months to come Hitler was to learn that horses did have certain advantages over mechanical transport. The Russian roads dissolved into bottomless morasses when the rains came ; railroads were few and far between, and only tracked vehicles remained mobile when it rained, so the gasoline for the tanks had to be hauled the immense distances from the railheads by relays of farm carts and tractors.
One of Hitler’s two private secretaries wrote a closely observed account of her impressions of the Wolf’s Lair
on June 28. This worm’s-eye view of one of the most powerful men on earth deserves quoting at length if only for the scene it sets : This morning the Chief said that if ever the German soldier deserved a laurel wreath it was for this campaign. Everything is going far far better than he hoped.
There have been many strokes of good fortune, for example, that the Russians met us on the frontier and did not first lure us far into their hinterland with all the enormous transport and supply problems that would certainly have involved. And again, that they did not manage to destroy their two bridges at Dvinsk. It would have been a big waste of time if we had first had to rebuild those bridges. I believe that once we have occupied Minsk our advance will surge forward.
If there are any isolated Communists left among our own ranks, they will definitely be converted when they see the “blessings” of life on the other side…. The next day, July 5, 1941, with the Russian campaign seemingly drawing to an end, Hitler explained to the same select lunchtime audience why he had attacked Russia without a formal declaration of war or even the pretext of an “incident.” “Nobody is ever asked about his motives at the bar of history.
Why did Alexander invade India ? Why did the Romans fight their Punic wars, or Frederick II his second Silesian campaign ? In history it is success alone that counts.” He, Hitler, was answerable only to his people. “To sacrifice hundreds of thousands [of troops] just because of the theoretical responsibility-issue [for starting the war] would be criminal. I will go down in history as the destroyer of bolshevism, regardless of whether there was a frontier incident or not.
Only the result is judged. If I lose, I will not be able to talk my way out with questions of form. Look at Norway—we would never have succeeded if I had announced my intention first, yet it was vital for the fate of Germany. And vice versa : if Churchill and Reynaud had kept a still tongue in their heads I would probably not have tackled Norway.” The Vatican also let it be known that it “welcomed the war” with Russia.
That Churchill had broadcast his immediate offer of aid to Russia on the first day of “Barbarossa” did not surprise Hitler. (In private he mocked the strange spectacle of “Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt as fighters for freedom !”) But that the exiled Dutch queen should broadcast over the BBC her deepest sympathy for the Russian people conveniently revolted him, and he instructed that the Dutch royal family’s remaining wealth in Holland was to be confiscated forthwith.
Meanwhile, a Dutch East Company was founded in Holland to organize the provision of food for the Netherlands from the Ukraine and to negotiate contracts for Dutch specialists and workers to emigrate to the east. Japan alone shunned what Hitler regarded as her obligations to the Axis : Hitler believed that with “Barbarossa” proving such a crushing success, Axis interests would now best be served by Japan attacking the Soviet Union.
He preferred land contact between the Japanese and German armies along the Trans-Siberian railway to an attack on Singapore. The Japanese were forcefully reminded that their foreign minister had himself declaimed in Berlin that no Japanese statesman could uphold Japanese neutrality if Germany became involved in war with Russia. But Japan viewed Hitler’s immediate prospects soberly.
On July 2, Weizscker commented, in his diary : “The Japanese are still playing us along. All we know is that they don’t want to attack Singapore as yet. If and when they will help against Russia remains to be seen.”