June 27, 2000 Allies
Knew of Plan for Italy's Jews By Michael Dobbs Washington Post Staff
Writer The message from Nazi
security headquarters, as deciphered by
Allied code-breakers, was blunt and
chilling. Despite the reservations of some
German officials in Rome, Nazi leaders
were determined to push ahead with "the
immediate and thorough eradication of Jews
in Italy." Released yesterday at the National
Archives as part of a massive effort to
declassify World War II war crimes
records, the decrypted Nazi message of
October 1943 shows for the first time that
the Allies had extensive and almost
contemporaneous intelligence on the Nazi
roundup of Italian Jews, thanks to
Britain's Enigma code-breaking operation.
It provided new evidence in a long-running
debate on what the Allies knew about the
Holocaust at the time and whether anything
could have been done to prevent the
murders of millions of Jews. The intercepted intelligence messages
were circulated to a small group of
British officials, including Prime
Minister Winston Churchill, and
also were swiftly relayed to the U.S.
government. Although Churchill was an avid
consumer of raw Enigma intelligence, it is
not known whether he or anyone of
authority in Washington read these
particular reports. Historians described the release of
400,000 pages of material -- from the
Office of Strategic Services, the wartime
forerunner to the Central Intelligence
Agency -- as a major step for
understanding the secret war between the
Allies and Nazi Germany. The documents
include some of the most closely guarded
secrets of the war, dealing with OSS
sources and methods, the so-called "crown
jewels" of the American wartime
intelligence operation. While hailing the documents' release,
which was made possible by the 1998 Nazi
War Crimes Disclosure Act, historians and
some U.S. officials expressed frustration
over the protracted declassification
process. "We are encountering some very
disturbing truths" with the release of
these documents, said Eli
Rosenbaum, director of the Justice
Department's Nazi-hunting office. "Too
much has been kept secret for too
long." Among troubling questions raised by the
documents is why Allied prosecutors failed
to bring war crimes charges against SS
General Karl Wolff, who played a
key role in the deportation of thousands
of Italian Jews. There has been
speculation that the Allies permitted
Wolff to go free because of his contacts
with Allen Dulles, the
Eisenhower-era CIA chief who then was
serving as an OSS agent in Switzerland,
and because of Wolff's role in arranging
the Nazi surrender in Italy. Wolff was held in an Allied internment
camp until he was released in 1949. He
lived outside Munich until he was arrested
in 1962 in connection with the deaths of
300,000 Jews at the Treblinka death camp.
He was tried in West Germany and sentenced
to 15 years imprisonment. "This raises some very difficult moral
questions," said Elizabeth
Holtzman, a former U.S. congresswoman
and one of the authors of the war crimes
declassification law. "Was this the
beginning of an effort to protect Nazi war
criminals after the war?" The OSS documents are expected to shed
more light on the extent to which
successive U.S. governments made use of
former Nazis such as Wolff in waging a new
intelligence war against the Soviet Union
and its communist allies. Previously
declassified records have shown that the
Allies recruited hundreds of high-ranking
German scientists and helped some SS
officials leave Europe for South America
in return for their cooperation. While historians have known that
British cryptographers succeeded in
breaking the SS security
service code in the summer of 1943,
the content of messages dealing with
deportation of Italian Jews was previously
classified. The messages were typically
deciphered within three or four days. An
OSS officer stationed at Bletchley Park,
the British code-breaking headquarters,
had access to the messages as soon as they
were deciphered and transmitted them back
to Washington. The deciphered messages were
supplemented by information from
well-placed espionage agents, the most
important of whom was Fritz Kolbe,
a key German Foreign Ministry official,
who made frequent trips to Switzerland,
where he secretly met with Dulles. The
newly released documents show that Kolbe
provided Dulles with corroborating
information about the liquidation of
Italian Jews at the end of 1943. Italian Jews had enjoyed a measure of
protection from deportation during the
early years of the war under the Italian
Fascist leader, Benito Mussolini,
who maintained a degree of independence
from Nazi leader Adolf Hitler. But after
Mussolini was overthrown in July 1943 and
the Nazis occupied northern Italy, the
Jews' position became much more
precarious. The
intercepted intelligence traffic shows
that German officials in Rome first
received an order to seize the 8,000
Jews living in the capital on Oct. 6.
The
roundup began 10 days later on the
personal order of Hitler, overruling
the qualms of lower-level
officials. On
Oct. 20, according to the documents,
the German security police commander in
Italy reported that a transport of Jews
had left Rome en route to
Auschwitz.
Postwar records show that only a few
hundred Jews survived. While there is evidence that the Allies
had good intelligence about the Auschwitz
death camp as early as 1943, scholars have
differed over whether it filtered up to
top wartime leaders, such as Churchill and
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In
what was until recently the standard
academic work on the subject, "Auschwitz
and the Allies," published in 1981,
British historian Martin Gilbert
argued that the name Auschwitz did not
make any impression on Allied officials
until mid-1944. Some historians believe the notion that
Allied leaders were largely ignorant of
the Holocaust will now have to be revised.
Others go even further and argue that
Churchill and Roosevelt had a moral
obligation to issue much more explicit
public denunciations of Nazi behavior
based on the intelligence intercepts. "A statement by Churchill or Roosevelt
might have led the Jews of Rome to take
seriously the evidence of imminent
deportation," said Timothy Naftali,
an intelligence expert at the University
of Virginia, one of two American academics
appointed by the National Archives to
review the latest materials. Naftali acknowledged, however, that the
British and U.S. governments did not want
to jeopardize their code-breaking
operation. Other records suggest that the question
of Nazi persecution of the Jews was very
much on the mind of Allied leaders.
Churchill, who often read intercepted
intelligence traffic, was constantly
badgering his foreign minister, Anthony
Eden, for statements condemning Nazi
brutality. Eden generally opposed such
statements on grounds that there was
little the Allies could do to stop the
Nazis from committing war crimes short of
winning the war. © 2000 The Washington Post
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