Books
Of The Times Date: April 16, 1981,
Thursday, Late City Final Edition Section C; Page
21, Column 1; Cultural Desk Byline:
Lead: By Drew Middleton THE
WAR BETWEEN THE GENERALS.
By David Irving. Congdon & Lattes Inc. 427
pages. Illustrated. $17.95.SOMERSET
MAUGHAM once wrote that Henry James had turned
his back on the greatest event of the 19th
century, the rise of the United States to world
power, to report the tittle-tattle of London tea
parties. David Irving, the author of "The War
Between the Generals," has reduced the greatest
campaign of World War II to the level of latrine
gossip. Text: This is not the story of how the
Allies landed in Normandy, broke out and ultimately
drove into Germany. It is a minor account of
arguments between the generals who led those
armies, of their drinking and womanizing, their
jealousies and petty complaints. No one, from
Eisenhower and Churchill to minor
commanders, emerges unscathed. Familiar
RevelationsOddly enough, much of what Mr. Irving, a
Briton, presents as startling revelation is pretty
well known and has been since the generals started
writing their memoirs in the 1950's. For example,
Sir Alan Brooke's comment that Eisenhower,
"though supposed to be running the land battle, is
on the golf links at Rheims - entirely detached and
taking practically no part in running the war"
first appeared in Sir Arthur Bryant's book
on Brooke and the war published more than 20 years
ago. The author has painted the lily by putting
words into the mouths of some of his main
characters that serve only to heighten effect. Although there is a long list of "archival
sources," there are no footnotes to connect the
quotations with the sources. Moreover, you get the
feeling that when Mr. Irving finds a particularly
gamy quotation, he rushes it into print without
considering the reliability of its source. In fact,
without any sourcing indicated, the author has
Gen. Omar N. Bradley telling Gen. Bedell
Smith, Eisenhower's chief of staff, with far
more violence than Smith had ever known from him
before, "Montgomery is a third-rate general and he
never did anything or won any battle that any other
general could not have won as well or better." He
may well have said it, but unless there is a
reference, we cannot be sure. There is no reference
to where and when General Bradley made the
statement, no indication from which of the archives
it is drawn. Frequently Mr. Irving is in error. Maj. Gen.
Harold R. Bull was not Eisenhower's chief
adviser but his G-3 (chief of operations), a much
different thing. The German resistance on the
Western front did not stiffen in April 1945; by
that time the German armies were falling apart. Mr. Irving appears so eager to recount the
personal and professional failings of the generals
that he fails to give as much attention as he
should to the actual course of the campaign. A
pity, because when he puts his mind to it, as in
his description of D-Day on Omaha Beach, the result
is very good. But in general the book is incoherent
and uneven. This is especially true when the author
deals with some of the important issues. The chief strategic issue that confronted the
Allies after they had erupted from Normandy was
between Eisenhower's policy of an advance on a
broad front into Germany and the project, advanced
by Field Marshal Montgomery and supported by Sir
Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, for a single thrust into the heart of the
Reich. Gen. George S. Patton Jr., of course,
held the same view, although in his planning the
thrust was to be made by his Third Army. This issue should have been treated in a single
chapter, because the future course and duration of
the war depended on its resolution. Mr. Irving
refers to it frequently, but the material is not
pulled together or presented coherently. Another weakness is the treatment of the Battle
of the Bulge and the events at American First Army
headquarters after the dismal news of the German
success began to pour in. The author seems to be
ignorant of what happened at First Army
headquarters in those critical days. Mr. Irving is highly critical of almost all the
Allied commanders' generalship although,
surprisingly and accurately, he pays tribute to
Montgomery's original plan for the landing in
Normandy. This called for the British advance to
pin down the bulk of the German armor, thus
allowing the Americans to break out on the right
flank. What happened, the author says, was "just
the way that Montgomery wanted it." Only Mortal
MenMr. Irving's assessment of generalship during
the campaign in Normandy suffers from a disposition
to think that the Allied plans invariably went
wrong. They did not. The author is correct to draw attention to the
serious weaknesses in logistical support that
overcame the Allied armies after they had plunged
eastward from Normandy and beyond Paris. But again,
this was known at the time and reported
extensively. Mr. Irving seems to take a juvenile delight in
the sections in which he depicts Patton's
womanizing and vanity, Eisenhower's vacillation and
Churchill's dramatics. It is as though he expected
all leaders to be without fear and without
reproach. If he had been closer to his subjects, he
would have known that they were mortal men
grappling with tremendous problems day after day
after day and that, in consequence, they often
stumbled and transgressed. Copyright
1999 The New York Times Company | 
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