Historians
are gradually coming round to endorse David Irving's
viewpoints.
[...] According to the published version of the OKW war diary, Hitler promptly discussed the overall situation with the general staffs of both army and air force, but, "as usual, again no bold decisions are taken. It is as though the Führer is no longer capable of doing so." (81) As David Irving points out, however, this frequently cited passage is a postwar interpolation designed to cast Hitler in a poor light. It does not appear in the original, unpublished manuscript by Helmuth Greiner, the OKW's diarist, and it is inconsistent with Hitler's recorded actions on the days both preceding and following 21 December [1942].(82) Rather than vacillating, the Führer stood firm, repudiating the "defeatist" views of his generals with typical dogmatism. He strongly disagreed with Manstein's and Zeitzler's assessments and rejected their suggestions. Still determined to hold Stalingrad, the only major prize of an extremely costly summer campaign, he insisted that Sixth Army might attempt to join up with Hoth's corps only if it continued holding its positions on the Volga.
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DAVID IRVING COMMENTS: I was the first historian to draw attention, in my Introduction to Hitler's War, to the large number of faked or partially faked diaries in circulation, like those of General Gerhard Engel, Hitler's army adjutant, published by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (who should have known better: I warned them). |
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