AR-Online logo 

 

 

Posted Friday, October 22, 1999


Quick navigation

Alphabetical index (text)

 


Friday, October 22, 1999

War against Yugoslavia

U.S. Leaders Wanted More Aggression

 

WASHINGTON (AP) -- The U.S. military's top Kosovo commanders suggested Thursday their hands were tied by NATO politicians and that they would have been far more aggressive in going after Serb forces if permitted.

"I'd have gone for the head of the snake on the first night," said Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, the Air Force general who ran the 78-day air war.

He said he would have waged a massive air campaign against Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital.

"I'd have turned the lights out the first night. I'd have dropped the bridges across the Danube. I'd hit five or six political and military headquarters in downtown Belgrade," Short told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The committee is reviewing the Kosovo campaign and lessons learned from it.

U.S. and NATO officials have acknowledged they ordered the military to take an incremental approach to striking Yugoslavia, initially sparing downtown Belgrade and Montenegro, in hopes that President Slobodan Milosevic quickly would capitulate.

They also said the air campaign was encumbered by arrangements allowing each allied nation to review targets before they were struck. That system was streamlined after several weeks and the military commanders were given somewhat greater latitude in choosing targets.

Army Gen. Wesley Clark, who also was the supreme NATO commander in Europe, told senators he felt "very strongly that once the threshold is crossed and you're going to use force, that force has to be as decisive as possible in attaining your military objectives."

Clark has complained in the past about NATO's micromanagement of the campaign, including selecting of targets and putting certain targets off limits.

Still, Clark testified that despite differences of opinion on tactics, all of NATO's conditions were met:

"We said there had to be a ceasefire; there was. We said the Serbs (military) had to come out; they did. We said NATO had to go in; it has. We said the refugees had to return; they have."

The committee chairman, Sen. John Warner, R-Va., has criticized the administration's refusal to consider a ground war option.

"Time-tested military doctrine teaches us that conflicts, no matter what the size, should be fought with military commanders making decisions on military matters," said Warner, a former Navy secretary.

"Of particular interest to this senator are the NATO decisions not to even allow the planning ... of a ground operation."

He said the military commanders brought "a unique perspective to the committee's ongoing investigation of the Kosovo operation."

"We're not trying to find fault. It's a review," he said.

Adm. James O'Ellis, commander in chief of U.S. naval forces in Southern Europe, was less openly critical of NATO's oversight.

"We will never know how much more costly alliance inaction might have been," Ellis said. "We know, though, that Kosovo today, though far from perfect, is a much better place than when we began our efforts."

Short told the committee that he did not think NATO should have played such a heavy role in target selection.

"Admiral Ellis and I should have been given target categories from which we could choose at the tactical and operational level, and been given the ability to go after that target set as we saw fit with the assets made available to us to bring them down," Short said.

"You've got to let us do our job," he said. "The restrictions that were placed upon us ... were extraordinary in my judgment" and put U.S. pilots and crews "at increased risk and made us predictable."

For instance, he said that after some civilians were killed on bridges, NATO forbid him from striking bridges except after midnight and before dawn.

Sen. Carl Levin of Michigan, the senior Democrat on the panel, said that "the problem is, we're members of an alliance which operate together under certain rules. It's a democratic alliance, and that by its very nature is going to create some limitations on our unilateral decisions."

Our opinion

IT would be interesting to know what General Short and his fellow commanders know about the 1945 Nuremberg Charter and the Judgements of 1946, and their rulings on the criminality of waging undeclared and unprovoked wars against countries, and against the bombing of civilian targets.

Perhaps it is time for the US armed forces' commanders to be given some education on this kind of holocaust as well as on the one waged by the Nazis against the Jews which seems to dominate most public thought and debate recently.

The above news item is reproduced without editing other than typographical

 Register your name and address to go on the Mailing List to receive

[ Go back to AR Online Index ]

© Focal Point 1999 e-mail:  write to David Irving