China
apparently sold its version of
Python-3 . . . to
Iraq. And Israel was set to
sell China the Phalcon, an
airborne early-warning radar
system, until it was forced by
the United States to cancel
the deal. | Asia
Times December 4, 2002[News
on "America's Closest
Ally"] Israel's
role in China's new warplane
By David Isenberg THE recent unveiling
(sort of) of China's first domestically
designed (sort of) fighter jet was the
culmination of a long saga of
international military-hardware wheeling
and dealing that has seen US-designed or
-funded high-tech weaponry fall into the
hands of potential military rivals.
The showpiece of many years' work,
dating back to the late 1980s, recently
happened -- albeit unobserved -- when
China confirmed the existence of, but did
not unveil, the Jian-10 fighter jet. It
had been reported that the J-10 (F-10
being the export version, using North
Atlantic Treaty Organization designation)
would be shown in public for the first
time during the fourth China International
Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition (Airshow
China 2002) held in Zhuhai in southern
Guangdong province from November 4-10, but
the plane did not appear. The J-10 is a multi-role single-engine
and single-seat tactical fighter, with a
combat radius of 1,000 kilometers.
Although billed as a domestically produced
fighter, in truth the J-10 could not have
happened without the help of other
countries, especially Israel. The program
began in the late 1980s and is thought to
be based on an Israeli design. It contains Israeli and Russian
avionics, and is powered by Russian
engines. Chinese engineers developed the
J-10 from a single F-16 provided by
Pakistan, and with assistance from Israeli
engineers associated with Israel's
US-financed Lavi fighter program, which
was canceled in 1987, according to the
Federation of American Scientists
website. The Lavi was based on the US F-16 and
built with US$1.3 billion in aid from
Washington. In 1983, when US support for
the Lavi commenced, the program was
opposed vigorously by the Defense
Department, partly because of re-export
concerns. An early supporter of the Lavi was
George Shultz, then secretary of
state in the administration of US
president Ronald Reagan. Shultz
would later label his advocacy of the
program a "costly mistake". Only in early
1995 did the US government make public
its concerns about Israel's
Lavi-related technology re-exports to
China. David Lari, director
general of Israel's Ministry of
Defense, acknowledged in an Associated
Press interview that "some technology
on aircraft" had been sold to China and
that some Israeli companies may not
have "clean hands". Yet China's acquisition of the Russian
Su-27, after China had attempted for years
to develop the J-10 aircraft with
equivalent technology to perform similar
functions, is seen by some experts as a
sign that China lacks confidence in its
domestic industrial capabilities. Though it has never been certain
precisely what specific technologies and
systems Israel provided, it was reported
that the Jian-10's radar and fire-control
system is the Israeli-made ELM-2021
system, which can simultaneously track six
air targets and lock on to the four most
threatening targets for destruction. In December 1991, US intelligence
officials announced that Israel planned to
open a government-coordinated and
-sponsored "arms office" in China. Given
what the Israelis had to offer, and what
the Chinese needed, it was most likely
that a transfer of avionics and other
technologies developed in the Lavi program
would ensue, since there was a void in the
Chinese avionics and fire-control system
capability due to the 1989 termination of
a US-Chinese program in response to
Tiananmen Square. China and Israel started
collaboration in the early 1980s and
full-scale cooperation was under way
officially by 1984. As neither China nor Israel was capable
of developing the propulsion system
required by the J-10, in 1991 China
acquired the AI31F turbofan engine from
Russia for incorporation into the J-10
fighter. This engine is also used in the
Su-27 air-superiority fighter that Chinese
acquired from Russia. As the performance of the AL31F engine
is significantly better than that of the
American PW1120 originally slated for the
Lavi, it may be anticipated that the
performance of the J-10 will be
accordingly enhanced. Built by the Chengdu
Aircraft Industrial Corp, the J-10
attempts to rival current
fourth-generation Western fighters. China has inked a 10-year deal with the
Russian engine maker SRPC Salut for 300
Al-31F engines for its J-10 program and
will begin production of the jets next
year. The plane is said to have
capabilities similar to the Su-27, the
Russian MiG-29 and the US F-16 fighter
jets, but with an estimated cost of less
than $10 million, it could rival other jet
makers on the international market. In March 1997,
despite official denials from Israeli
officials, the US Office of Naval
Intelligence in its unclassified
"Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike
Warfare" restated more strongly than it
had the previous year its belief that
US-derived technology from the canceled
Israeli Lavi fighter was being used on
China's new F-10 fighter. It said, "The design has been
undertaken with substantial direct
external assistance, primarily from Israel
and Russia, with indirect assistance
through access to US technologies." In fact, according to the annual
intelligence report, "the F-10 is a
single-seat, light multi-role fighter
based heavily on the canceled Israeli Lavi
program". Until it was canceled in 1987, much of
Lavi technological development was paid
for by the United States. Ironically, the
potential capability of F-10 fighters was
cited by both the US Navy and Air Force as
one of the future threats justifying the
expenditure of billions on new tactical
aircraft, such as the F-22, F/A-18F, and
Joint Strike Fighter. The fact that possibly US-derived
technology provided by an ally might be
contributing to that potential threat is a
delicate subject. However, this is not the
first time accusations of illegal
technology have been made. A March 1992 report by State Department
inspector general Sherman Funk,
"Report of Audit: Department of State
Defense Trade Controls", states that
alleged Israeli violations of US laws and
regulations "cited and supported by
reliable intelligence information show a
systematic and growing pattern of
unauthorized transfers ... dating back to
about 1983". In the summer of 2000, the
Washington Times reported that a
memo circulating inside the Pentagon's
Defense Threat Reduction Agency told
analysts they no longer had to gain input
from the Defense Intelligence Agency
before deciding whether controlled
technology should be transferred to
Israel. The DIA had compiled evidence that
Israel had violated US export regulations
by transferring missile, laser and
aircraft technology to China.
Subsequently, when Israel tried to sell
the Phalcon to India, the US government
demanded that Israel limit arms exports.
Israel was told that it must inform the US
of all weapons transfers to 27 nations
regarded as "countries of concern" such as
China, India and Yugoslavia. "Israel ranks second only to Russia as
a weapons-system provider to China and as
a conduit for sophisticated military
technology, followed by France and
Germany," stated a report this year by the
US-China Security Review Commission, a
panel established by Congress to examine
security and economic relations between
the two countries. "Recent upgrades in
target acquisition and fire control,
probably provided by Israeli weapons
specialists, have enhanced the
capabilities of the older guided missile
destroyers and frigates" in the Chinese
navy's inventory, it said. The commission cited Israel as a
supplier to Beijing of radar systems,
optical and telecommunications equipment,
drones and flight simulators. Arms exports
have not only played a crucial role in
offsetting Israel's trade imbalance but
have also performed a key role in
furthering its diplomatic efforts. The
sale of arms and technology has become one
of the most effective techniques to
furthering Israeli goals overseas. The quiet ties with China and India and
the growing alliance with Turkey in the
1980s and the 1990s are good examples of
strong links based on such cooperation.
The J-10 is hardly the only result of
Israeli-Chinese military cooperation. For
example, the Chinese F-8, the same type of
plane that collided with the US
reconnaissance plane last year, is armed
with Israeli Python-3 missiles. The Python, adapted from the US ALM-9L
Sidewinder missile, has a high degree of
US technology. Ironically for Israel,
China apparently sold its version of
Python-3, called the PL-8, to Iraq. And,
as was widely publicized, Israel was set
to sell China the Phalcon, an airborne
early-warning radar system, until it was
forced by the United States to cancel the
deal. The US Central Intelligence Agency also
believed Israel was marketing its STAR
cruise missile in China. The STAR
incorporates sensitive US technology. And
former US officials report that both
Israel and the Dutch company Delft made
unauthorized sales of US thermal-imaging
tank sights to, among others, China. The sights were installed on China's 69
MOD-2 tanks, some of which were sold to
Iraq. The United States acquired physical
evidence of this transfer after these
tanks were used against US marines in the
1991 Gulf War. ©2002
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