November 25, 2000 [Images
added by this website] ARTS & IDEAS British
Historians Rethink Churchill's
Legacy By BENJAMIN SCHWARZ ALTHOUGH
Americans have embraced Winston
Churchill as one of the great
statesmen of the 20th century, he has
never enjoyed unqualified adulation in his
own country. A maverick -- or, less charitably, a
political turncoat -- Churchill was and
still is regarded by many of his fellow
Tories as an opportunist and a
grandstander. And the British left could
never stomach his arch-imperialism and
pronounced reactionary streak.
Nonetheless, for a long time everyone in
Britain seemed to agree that Churchill
was, as the great left-wing historian
A. J. P. Taylor anointed him, "the
savior of his country," the man who
defiantly led the British people in their
seemingly hopeless resistance to
Hitler. Even this image of Churchill, though,
has been under assault. Most recently
Frank Johnson, a columnist and
former editor of The Spectator, the
venerable conservative weekly, aroused
enormous controversy this spring when he
raised a question in the magazine that
historians have been debating for
more than a quarter
century: Did Churchill consider
negotiating with the Nazis in
1940[*] That debate is part of another, wider
and even more acrimonious one among
British historians and political figures:
Should Churchill have negotiated a
compromise peace with Germany? The argument revolves around the
confusing and inconclusive records of
deliberations in Churchill's cabinet in
May and June 1940 over whether Britain
should discuss peace terms with Germany,
records over which historians have argued
for the 30 years that they have been
available. There is no disagreement that the
cabinet debated whether Britain should
sound out Hitler on what kind of peace
terms he might offer. Nor is there any
doubt that Churchill made comments that do
not entirely support his image as the
stalwart hero, pursuing the goal of
"victory at all costs" and refusing even
to contemplate negotiations with Berlin.
He is recorded as declaring, for example,
that "if we could get out of this jam by
giving up Malta and Gibraltar and some
African colonies," he would "jump at it,"
although he didn't see any such prospect.
He also declared that he was prepared to
accept "peace on terms of the restoration
of German colonies and the overlordship of
Central Europe," which presumably included
continued occupation of Czechoslovakia and
western Poland, although, again, he said
that such an offer was "most
unlikely." The question is how to interpret these
remarks. To
historians
like John Lukacs, the author of
several books on the period, and Martin
Gilbert, Churchill's official
biographer, who depict Churchill as an
uncompromising hero, such remarks are
evidence only of Churchill's extraordinary
political skill. Consider the context.
Churchill made those statements during
debates with his foreign secretary,
Lord Halifax, one of the most
ardent advocates of appeasement in the
1930's. Halifax was trying to convince the
cabinet that Britain should immediately
send out feelers to Hitler, arguing that
if negotiations were conducted at all, the
sooner they got started the better, since
peace terms were likely to be more
acceptable while France was still in the
war and before British aircraft factories
were bombed. Thus, Churchill's argument to
wait for better terms was actually a way
of warding off Halifax's plea to enter
negotiations immediately. Talk of peace
was merely a debating tactic. Revisionist historians like Sheila
Lawlor, director of the British think
tank Politiea; Clive Ponting, a
professor at the University of Swansea,
Wales; and Andrew Roberts,
Halifax's biographer, say there is little
evidence for that interpretation in the
historical record. Halifax, they argue,
wasn't a craven defeatist. He simply did
not understand that by late May of 1940
there was very little that Britain and
France could offer Hitler that he was not
already in a position to seize. Churchill,
on the other hand, recognized that, at the
very least, Britain had to maneuver into a
better bargaining position, saying, "A
time might come when we felt that we have
to put an end to the struggle, but the
terms would not then be more mortal than
those offered to us now." What people forget, the revisionists
argue, is that during the cabinet debates
in May 1940 every British policy maker
assumed that, without a negotiated
settlement, the quarter-million British
soldiers trapped at Dunkirk would be
killed or captured. They also argue that
the idea of an armed truce with Germany
didn't carry the same moral odium it does
today. (Even Churchill speculated in 1935
[sic. in fact,
1937] that Hitler "will go down
in history as the man who restored honor
and peace of mind to the great Germanic
nation"). Finally they argue that in May
1940 Britain was under even more severe
economic and military constraints than
those that had inspired the appeasement
policies of the 1930's. Continuing the war
would itself inexorably bring an end to
Britain as an independent power through
national bankruptcy. Indeed, the
inevitability of economic collapse,
coupled with the bleak strategic
prospects, might have seemed to point to
one answer: to accept that Germany now
dominated Europe and make the best
possible peace with Hitler's regime. It is on this point that the second,
more controversial historical question has
centered. Some British revisionist
scholars such as John Charmley, a
historian at the University of East
Anglia, dismiss Churchill for not seeking
a settlement, which they assert could have
safeguarded the empire and kept Britain
from becoming what they see as a vassal of
the United States. The
revisionists argue that in 1940
Churchill had no strategy for winning
the war. More important, they maintain
that by fighting on to 1945, Churchill
assured the liquidation of the empire
and guaranteed that the only victors
would be the Soviet Union and the
United States. Even scholars who find these arguments
flawed acknowledge that Churchill's best
reason for fighting on was one of which he
had no knowledge at the time: that as
early as July 1940 Hitler was
contemplating turning against the Soviet
Union. Of Hitler's intentions, no
prediction can be found in British
intelligence reports and strategic
assessments. And so the revisionists
dismiss Churchill's so-called strategy in
1940 as simply to keep plodding on, as
Churchill acknowledged. But to historians like David
Reynolds of Cambridge University, the
revisionists' belief that Britain could
have maintained any kind of working
settlement with a dominant Germany is
ridiculous. With Germany in possession of
bases along the northern and western
coasts of France, the British were acutely
vulnerable to blockade and hence would
have been largely dependent on the
sufferance of Berlin. Ultimately Churchill's strategy, by
design or luck, worked. As they argue, it
was hardly unreasonable of Churchill to
hope that during the chaotic diplomatic
and military environment that prevailed in
the absence of an agreement, the United
States and the Soviet Union might well be
dragged into the conflict against Hitler.
After all, those nations' long-term
interests clashed with Germany's to a far
greater extent than Britain's did. In
the end, the revisionists' position that
Churchill sacrificed Britain's empire and
independence by choosing to fight on is
true but beside the point, they argue. No
matter what course Churchill followed in
1940, Britain's ability to maintain its
position as a world power was over. While historians may argue over
Churchill's culpability for the loss of
that status, it was a development over
which Churchill himself despaired. This is
why, as an old man, he spoke of Britain's
experience during the two world wars, and
lamented: "We answered all the tests. But
it was useless." © 2000
New York Times. All rights
reserved.
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