SKELETON ARGUMENT OF THE
CLAIMANT
1. The Claimant, Mr David John Cawdell Irving
("Irving") seeks permission to appeal against two
orders of Gray J, the first dated 11th April 2000,
and the second dated 5th May 2000. 2. By his order of 11th April 2000, Gray J
ordered inter alia that judgment should be for the
Defendants, Penguin Books Limited, ("Penguin") and
Professor Deborah Lipstadt ("Lipstadt"), that the
Claimant should be refused permission to appeal,
and that the Claimant should pay the costs of the
First and Second Defendants, to be the subject of a
detailed assessment. 3. By his order of 5th May 2000, Gray J ordered
inter alia that, by four o'clock on Friday 16th
June, 2000, the Claimant should pay the sum of
£150,000 on account of costs to the First and
Second Defendants, pending the detailed assessment
directed by his order of 11th April 2000. 4. References in this skeleton argument to
paragraphs by number are to the paragraphs so
numbered in Gray J's judgment, save where otherwise
stated. Background and Dramatis Personae 5. The background to the action and its Dramatis
Personae are so well known that little need be said
about them, save that Irving does wish to draw the
Court of Appeal's attention to the intimidating
atmosphere of hysterical press hostility in which
the trial took place, whipped up in particular by
The Guardian, which is a defendant in separate
proceedings brought by Irving against one Gitta
Sereny and Guardian Newspaper Limited. The issues as pleaded 6. There is a very fair summary by Gray J at
paragraphs 1.1 to 2.16 of his judgment, which
Irving adopts, subject only to one point on
paragraph 2.16, set out at paragraph 7 below.
Irving also adopts Gray J's words at 13.1:- "The charges levelled at Irving's
historiography appear to me to lie at the heart
of what Lipstadt wrote about him in Denying the
Holocaust." i.e., not charges of "racism" (whatever that
might be) or anti-Semitism, which (as Gray J
rightly observed) were not alleged by Lipstadt in
Denying the Holocaust, nor pleaded by Irving as a
libel upon him by his Statement of Claim, nor yet
pleaded or relied upon by way of particulars of
justification in either Defendant's Defence. 7. While Irving generally adopts Gray J's
summary, he submits that the natural and ordinary
meaning of Lipstadt's words at p. 213 of Denying
the Holocaust, viz. "Nolte, echoing David Irving,
argues that the Nazi 'internment' of Jews was
justified because of Chaim Weizmann's September
1939 declaration that the Jews of the world would
fight Nazism" is that Irving approves of the
imprisonment and (by the popular innuendo apparent
from the use of quotation marks around the word
'internment') the killing of Jews in concentration
camps. To the extent necessary, Irving will seek
leave to amend his Statement of Claim to plead this
matter more fully. The grounds of appeal 8. The Claimant seeks permission to appeal on
the grounds (1) that the findings of justification
in respect of the defamatory charges on which the
Defendants succeeded were against the weight of the
evidence, (2) that the judge erred in law in
admitting the evidence of Evans as to the
construction of the words "Holocaust denier," (3)
that the judge erred in law in admitting the
evidence of Van Pelt (i) at all, or (ii) at any
rate with reference to (a) chemistry and (b) the
technology of crematoria, and (4) in applying
section 5 of the Defamation Act, 1952 in respect of
the libels on which the Defendants offered no
evidence, or which the Defendants wholly failed to
justify. 9. When refusing permission to appeal his order
of 11th April 2000, Gray J observed that
"essentially [the] case turned on questions
of fact, the most important of which entailed
assessing the Appellant's credibility. Public
interest can be [a] reason for granting
permission, but that is a question best left to the
C.A." 10. Undoubtedly this case is of the greatest
public interest. The trial at first instance
attracted worldwide publicity. The issues canvassed
were of the greatest importance for the
interpretation of the political and military
history of the twentieth century. Irving relies on
this ground in seeking permission to appeal. He
contends no less strongly that Gray J erred
seriously in weighing the evidence, so that his
findings are wrong and unjust. 11. The basis on which Gray J assessed the
Appellant's credibility was not an adverse general
estimate of Irving, or his demeanour as a witness,
or his general character. Indeed, Gray J makes the
most flattering observations about Irving as a
military historian at 13.7. Irving gratefully
adopts all that Gray J says in 13.7, and relies
upon it in support of his submission at paragraph
[ ] below. 12. Neither Defendant gave oral evidence, nor
did they call any witnesses of fact, but only
experts, to whom the Claimant returns at paragraph
[ ] below. It accordingly follows that Gray
J was certainly not impressed by the Defendants'
demeanour, as Lipstadt took good care not to have
her own evidence tested in cross-examination. The Law 13. Gray J's findings are based upon adverse
inferences arising out of his assessment of the
weight of the real, expert and documentary
evidence. Gray J found that Irving could not
honestly and reasonably have come to his stated
conclusions, faced with the historical record taken
as a whole. 14. On such findings, the correct approach is
laid down in Lord Reid's speech in Benmax v. Austin
Motor Co. Ltd [1958] A.C. 370 at 376:- "... in cases where there is no
question of the credibility or reliability of
any witness, and in cases where the point in
dispute is the proper inference to be drawn from
proved facts, an appeal court is generally in as
good a position to evaluate the evidence as the
trial judge, and ought not to shrink from that
task, though it ought, of course, to give weight
to his opinion." 15. See also per Baggallay J.A. in The
Glannibanta (1876) 1 P.D. 283 at 287 to 288:- "Now we feel... the great weight that
is due to the decision of a judge of first
instance whenever, in a conflict of testimony,
the demeanour and manner of the witnesses who
have been seen and heard by him are... material
elements in the consideration of the
truthfulness of their statements. But the
parties to the cause are nevertheless entitled,
as well on questions of fact as on questions of
law, to demand the decision of the Court of
Appeal, and that Court cannot excuse itself from
the task of weighing conflicting evidence and
drawing its own inferences and conclusions,
though it should always bear in mind that it has
neither seen nor heard the witnesses, and should
make due allowance in this respect." 16. It follows, it is submitted, that permission
to appeal should be granted if it appears to the
Court of Appeal that Gray J has drawn the wrong
inferences from the real, documentary and expert
evidence. The weight to be attributed to the evidence of
the Defendants' experts 17. "The duties and responsibilities of expert
witnesses in civil cases" (per Cresswell J) were,
it is respectfully submitted, well described by
Cresswell J in The Ikarian Reefer [1993] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 68 at 81 to 82. This part of Cresswell
J's judgment was by no means disapproved when the
C.A. reversed him at [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
455. They "include the following":- "1. Expert evidence presented to the
Court should be, and should be seen to be, the
independent product of the expert, uninfluenced
as to form or content by the exigencies of
litigation."2. An expert witness should provide
independent assistance to the Court by way of
objective, unbiassed opinion in relation to
matters withing his expertise. An expert witness
in the High Court should never assume the role
of an advocate. "3. An expert witness should state the facts
or assumption upon which his opinion is based.
He should not omit to consider material facts
which could detract from his concluded
opinion. "4. An expert witness should make it clear
when a particular question or issue falls
outside his expertise." 18. Gray J describes the Defendants' five expert
witnesses and their purported areas of expertise at
4.17. 19. Irving's case is that all five were
motivated by ideological bias, and that Evans in
particular and Longerich to a lesser extent were
motivated by personal hatred, so transgressing
against Cresswell J's principles 1 and 2, that
Evans offended gravely against 3 in relation to the
Schlegelberger memorandum (para. [ ] below)
and the Bartz telex (para. [ ] below).
Irving contended throughout that Van Pelt is
doubtfully an expert in any relevant discipline at
all. On the most generous view of Van Pelt's
expertise, he gave crucial evidence on matters in
respect of which he did not even purport to be an
expert, contrary to 4, namely the chemistry of
fumigation and killing by gas chamber, and the fuel
consumption of crematoria. 20. Further, the fees
which the Defendants paid to these experts for
giving their evidence were so grotesquely large
(Gray J was shocked by the figures on 5th May 2000,
especially the payment to Funke, who made a very
short appearance indeed at trial) that they could
not possibly have given evidence "uninfluenced as
to form or content by the exigencies of
litigation". 21. The experts' fees were: Van Pelt
£109,244.24, Funke £92,557.94, Longerich
£76,195.25, Evans £70,181, and Browning a
(relatively) modest £27,632.12. Subject Matter of Expert Evidence 22. It is an important part of Irving's
application for permission to appeal to challenge
how far expert evidence is admissible at all on the
meaning of the words "Holocaust denier". 23. At 13.92 Gray J said: "I accept the evidence
of Evans, which was not challenged by Irving, that
what characterises a 'Holocaust denier', in the
sense in which that term is used by Lipstadt in
Denying the Holocaust, is that he or she holds or
expresses some or all of the views which I have
listed in paragraph 8.5 above." 24. Irving went through each of Evans's criteria
in turn, asking Evans whether, to be a Holocaust
denier, he merely had to satisfy one of these
criteria, or all four. Evans never answered this
question properly. Irving contends that, as a
matter of fact, he certainly does not satisfy
Evans's second and third criteria, which were not
established against him on the evidence. See para.
[ ] below. 25. Moreover, as a matter of law, Gray J should
not have received expert evidence on the meaning of
ordinary English words; see in this respect
Hodgkinson on Expert Evidence at p.155:- "... it may appear to be of benefit to
call an expert witness as to meaning, or, as is
more likely, to ask an expert, already giving
evidence as to other matters in the case, to
express a view on meaning in the light of his
experience and skill. Save in limited and
specific circumstances, though, an expert's
views are inadmissible and should not be
canvassed." 26. As to the limited and specific exceptions,
see Lovell and Christmas v. Wall (1911) 104 L.T. 85
per Cozens-Hardy M.R.:- "If a document is in a foreign language, you may
have an interpreter. If it contains technical
terms, an expert may explain them. If, according to
the custom of a trade or the usage of the market, a
word has acquired a secondary meaning, evidence may
be given to prove it." 27. As to the rule, see per Fry J. (a judge very
learned in matters of construction) in Holt &
Co. v. Collyer (1881) 16 Ch. D. 718 at 720, when
rejecting evidence as to the meaning of a
word:- "In my view the principle upon which
words are to be construed in instruments is very
plain. Where there is a popular and common word
used in an instrument, that word must be
construed prima facie in its popular and common
sense. If it is a word of a technical or legal
character, it must be construed according to its
technical or legal meaning. If it is a word
which is of a technical and scientific
character, then it must be construed according
to that which is its primary meaning, namely its
technical or legal meaning. But before you can
give evidence of the secondary meaning of a
word, you must satisfy the Court from the
instrument itself or from the circumstances of
the case that the word ought to be construed,
not in its popular or primary signification, but
according to its secondary intention." 28. The effect of receiving Evans's evidence on
this crucial issue was to allow Evans rather than
the Court to set the parameters within which the
Defendants would have to justify the pleaded
libels. It is submitted (1) that Gray J erred in
law in accepting Evans as an expert on the meaning
of two ordinary English words, (2) that he should
have reached his own view what "Holocaust denier"
means, unassisted by expert evidence, and (3) that
since he failed to do so, the Court of Appeal ought
now to do so instead. The meaning(s) of German words 29. This is a proper subject for evidence. It is
submitted that in accordance with Fry J's criteria
of construction, such words must be construed prima
facie in their popular and common sense. If, for
example, the Defendants suggest that the word
abtransportiert should be translated in some other
sense than "deported", which is its popular and
common sense, it is for them to prove that. Van Pelt's qualifications as an
expert 30. On Day
9 (25th January 2000) the following somewhat
extraordinary exchange took place between Irving
and van Pelt.: - "Q. You studied at the University of Leiden,
am I correct?
- "A: Yes, I did.
- "Q: And you are now Professor of the History
of Architecture at the University of Waterloo in
Toronto?
- "A: No. The issue of my appointment is kind
of confusing. I am in the Department of
Architecture and hence I am officially a
Professor of Architecture. Your title as
Professor depends on the department you are in.
However, I teach in what we call the Cultural
History stream, so normally, in order to prevent
confusion in ordinary usage, I would call myself
Professor of Cultural History because, both in
my background, my PhD and my teaching duties, I
teach cultural history in the architectural
school. However, when I was advised about the
way I had to create my curriculum vitae for this
proceeding, I was told that I had been to be
extremely precise in the legal sense of what I
was, so again I put in Professor of
Architecture.
- "Mr Justice Gray: So you are really a
cultural historian?
- "A: I am really a cultural historian.
- "Mr Irving: This is a point of some
substance, my Lord. We need to know precisely
what your qualifications are to offer your
expertise to the court. I do not mean this in
the least sense in a derogatory manner because,
as I say, I have read both your book and your
report with the utmost interest. However, we
need to know what your areas of expertise
actually are. In Britain, of course, we have the
Royal Institute of British Architects. Are you
familiar with the fact that it is illegal in
England to call yourself an architect unless you
are registered with the RIBA?
- "A: That is in most countries like that,
yes, I know.
- "Q: In Holland, the equivalent is the Bond
van Nederlandse Architecten, am I correct? I am
sorry about my pronunciation.
- "A: Yes, Bond van Nederlandse
Architecten.
- "Q: Which is the rough equivalent of the
RIBA?
- "A: Yes.
- "Q: Am I right in saying that you are not
registered with the Bond van Nederlandse
Architecten?
- "A: I have never had any reason to do so,
since I never studied in an architectural
school..
- "Q: So you cannot legally pretend to be an
architect, if I can put it like that?
- "A: No, I could be prosecuted.
- "Q: You could be prosecuted?
- "A: Yes.
- "Q: Rather like Mr Leuchter was prosecuted
in Massachusetts for pretending to be an
engineer?
- "A: Yes.
- "Q: You can probably see the thrust of this
particular question. In other words, your
expertise, as an architect, is the same as Mr
Leuchter's expertise was an engineer?
- "A: I do not really know. I have been
teaching in architecture school now since 1984.
I have taught design courses, specially in small
architecture schools one needs to chip in
wherever one does. I have been on architectural
juries and quick sessions, mostly on a weekly,
bi-weekly, kind of frequency. I did...
- "Q: You have never learned architecture? You
have never studied architecture at university?
You have never taken a degree in
architecture?
- "A: I do not have a degree in it, but I have
been confronted with the architectural practice
and, apart from that, I have worked for various
architects, one of them, Sir Dennis Leston, here
in England, when he was designing the Synagogue
in Jerusalem. I have worked with Jack Diamond in
Toronto. So I have been in architectural offices
very often and other practices.
- "Q: And, of course, you are now advising the
present Auschwitz authorities on the
reconstruction, if I can put it like that, of
the Auschwitz site?
- "A: I was advising them, yes."
31. Even if Van Pelt has sufficient practical
experience of architecture to be classified as an
expert in that field, which is certainly not
conceded, it is strongly submitted that Gray J
erred seriously in law in admitting Van Pelt's
evidence on delousing (7.123) and the technology of
crematoria (7.124). Section 5 of the Defamation Act, 1952 32. Gray J further states (rightly, it is
submitted) at 13.167 that to invoke section 5 of
the Defamation Act, 1952 in respect of any libels
which they fail to justify, the Defendants have to
prove that such libels do not materially injure
Irving's reputation compared with the defamatory
charges which they succeed in justifying. Gray J
accepted that the Defendants succeeded on section
5. 33. One of the three defamatory charges which
the Defendants wholly failed to justify was
"Lipstadt's claim that Irving was scheduled to
speak at an anti-Zionist conference in Sweden in
1992, which was also to be attended by various
representatives of terrorist organisations such as
Hezbollah and Hamas." (Per Gray J at 13.166). 34. It is submitted that this libel is so very
grave that, as a matter of law, section 5 does not
avail the Defendants, even if Irving fails on every
other issue. The Allegation that Irving is an
"Extremist" 35. It is submitted that, as a matter of law, it
is not sufficient to plead by way of particulars of
justification that someone is an "extremist," let
alone to introduce this point in the course of
argument without pleading it sufficiently or at
all. 36. Greer LJ said in Tolley v. Fry
[1930] 1 KB 467 at 479:- "Words are not defamatory, however much
they may damage a man in the eyes of a section
of the community, unless they also amount to
disparagement of his reputation in the eyes of
right-thinking men generally. To write or say of
a man something that will disparage him in the
eyes of a particular section of the community
but will not affect his reputation in the eyes
of the average right-thinking man is not
actionable within the law of defamation." 37. A statement is not defamatory simply because
it is untrue, so to suggest that someone takes a
particular political position is not defamatory per
se, even if it is completely untrue. See per Street
J. in Slatyer v. Daily Telegraph [1907] 7
NSWSR 488 at 498, a New South Wales case, which is
generally accepted as good law in England, and is
cited with evident approval at note 90 to para.
2.19 of Gatley. 38. That, it is submitted, is the case, however
"extreme" the position in question may be. True it
is that there are cases (they are to be found at
note 88 to para. 2.19 of Gatley) in which it has
been held that it is defamatory to say of a man
that he is a Communist, but they are best explained
on the basis that the libels complained of carried
the implication that the plaintiff was a traitor in
the pay of a foreign power, or that he advocated
overthrowing the state by violence. 39. Thus Devlin LJ said in Kantorowicz v.
Cookridge, The Times, 10 October 1960, at the
height of the Cold War, and at a time when the full
extent of Stalin's crimes was already well known,
that it would not in all circumstances be
defamatory of a man to say that he was a
Communist. 40. An extremist is merely a man whose ideas
depart radically from the prevailing climate of
opinion at a particular time. Anyone who suggested
that the suffrage should be extended to the working
classes would have been considered an extremist in
the climate of opinion which held sway in 1800;
anyone who suggested that the suffrage should be
extended to women would have been considered an
extremist in the climate of opinion which held sway
in 1900. These were never morally reprehensible
positions. Thus to prove that Irving associates
with "extremists" ought to avail the Defendants
nothing. 41. The crucial distinction in this case, it is
submitted, is between libels 8A and 8B at paras.
[] and [] below. 42. The principal issues on appeal in relation
to justification, numbered by reference to the
importance which Irving attributes to them, and not
chronologically, are Irving's treatment of (1)
Hitler's personal knowledge of the scale and scope
of Nazi atrocities against the Jews during the
Second Word War ("WWII") generally, (2) Auschwitz
in particular, and (3) the events of Kristallnacht.
Irving's case is that (1) and (2) are crucial,
while (3) is important. 43. The Defendants additionally sought
(successfully) to justify by reference to Irving's
treatment of (4) Hitler's 1924 trial following the
unsuccessful Beer Hall putsch and (5) the crime
statistics for Berlin in 1932. Irving contends that
(4) and (5) are of secondary importance. 44. The Defendants further succeeded on their
plea of justification by reference to (6) Irving's
account of the bombing of Dresden in February,
1945, (7) Irving's anti-Semitism and racism, and
(8A) the claim that Irving associates with right
wing extremists. 45. The Defendants did not attempt to justify
Lipstadt's allegation (8B) that Irving associates
with violent extremists, and failed to justify
Lipstadt's allegations that Irving (9) works in his
office under a portrait of Hitler, (10) had damaged
the historic glass microfiches of the Goebbels
diaries in the Moscow archives, and (11) had broken
an agreement with the director of the Moscow
archives. 46. As to (7) and (8A): on the Defendants' case
as pleaded, (7) is prejudicial and irrelevant, or
goes at most to Irving's motive for treating (1),
(2), (3), (4) and (5) as he allegedly did, and
could not of itself justify the pleaded libels,
while (8A) is irrelevant, and could not under
section 5 or otherwise justify the pleaded
libels. Hitler's personal knowledge of atrocities
committed against the Jews during WWII 47. Though anathemized by Lipstadt as a
"Holocaust denier," Irving has never denied (1)
that the Nazis and their allies committed
systematic mass murder of Jews on a chilling scale,
especially in the Baltic states, in Byelorussia and
the Ukraine, but also in Russia proper, in Poland,
and in other occupied countries in eastern Europe,
or (2) that many mass killings were latterly
carried out as a matter of policy on the personal
orders of Himmler and Heydrich, though (3)
particularly in the early stages of Operation
Barbarossa (the invasion of the Soviet Union in
June, 1941), mass killings were carried out not
also by German forces, but also by local,
non-German, anti-Semitic elements, especially in
the Ukraine and in the Baltic states, acting
independently of Himmler and Heydrich for reasons
of their own. 48. Two examples are:- (i) Irving has broadcast on Australian
radio that, from June 1941 onwards, over a
million Jews were shot on the Eastern Front. A
transcript of that broadcast was in evidence.(ii) In his book Hitler's War, Irving writes
that by 1943:- "The increasing brutalisation of the
war showed itself in many ways. . . Himmler
revealed to his SS Gruppenführer
(generals) on October 4, and to the Party's
Gauleiters on October 6 that by the end of
1943 the last Jews in occupied Europe would
have been exterminated." 49. The key issue under (1) is therefore the
extent of Hitler's personal knowledge of and
responsibility for the systematic mass murder of
Jews, the historicity of which Irving does not
dispute. 50. Irving's case (summarized by Gray J at
5.137, 5.138 and finally at 13.30) is that there is
an important "chain of documents" which shows that,
so far from having "ordered the biological
annihilation of European Jewry" (5.94) Hitler
intervened on occasion to check atrocities against
the Jews, in accordance with his policy of
deferring a "solution to the Jewish problem" until
after WWII. 51. Irving does not dispute that there is also a
contrary line implicating Hitler. Having weighed
the evidence as a professional historian, he
prefers the first line of documents to the second,
and is, he says, amply justified in so doing. 52. It was not however sufficient in order for
the Defendants to make good their plea of
justification to persuade the Court that, on the
balance of probabilities, and in the light of the
materials now available to scholars, the second
line is to be preferred to the first. 53. The distinction to be drawn is closely akin
to that between the differing tests for negligence
and deceit. As Gray J rightly observes at 13.3,
"the issue... is Irving's treatment of the
available evidence," and at 13.4, "Irving rightly
stresses that the Defendants have accused him of
deliberately perverting the evidence." 54. As to Gray J's findings under (1):- The Schlegelberger Memorandum 55. The Schlegelberger
memorandum is central to the appeal on the
facts. Contrary to Gray J's express finding at
5.162, Irving has never acknowledged that the
Schlegelberger memorandum is in any sense
"unsatisfactory." On the contrary, he has always
contended that it is a contemporaneous, authentic,
brief, official, precisely worded, internal
ministerial record of Hitler's thinking on the
Jewish question, and so of seminal importance. 56. Schlegelberger was a civil servant in the
Reich Ministry of Justice. In English translation
his memorandum reads:- "Mr. Reich Minister Lammers informed me
that the Führer had repeatedly declared to
him that he wants to hear that the solution of
the Jewish Problem has been postponed until
after the war is over. That being so, the
current discussions are of purely theoretical
value, in Mr. Reich Minister Lammers' opinion.
He will moreover take pains to ensure that,
whatever else happens, no fundamental decisions
are taken without his knowledge in consequence
of a surprise briefing by any third party." 57. Gray J errs in the gravest fashion in
assessing the real evidence actually before him
when he states at 13.33 that the Schlegelberger
memorandum was "unsigned" and "an Abschrift (copy)
rather than an original document... " and that
"there is no clear evidence of the context in which
the note came into existence." 58. A facsimile of the Schlegelberger memorandum
was before Gray J in Court at all times. As is
apparent from the facsimile itself, it is not
(unlike most of the Defendants' documents) an
Abschrift (typed copy) at all, but an original with
holograph signatures. The original is still in
German Federal Archives in its original Reich
Justice Ministry file called Behandlung der Juden
("Treatment of the Jews"), which provides all
necessary contextual material. The whole text makes
it plain that the Judenfrage ("Jewish question") to
which Hitler refers is by no means confined to the
issue of Mischlinge (people of mixed descent), as
suggested by Evans. 59. On the Defendants' case and Gray J's
findings, the Schlegelberger memorandum was
generated at a crucial point in the chronology of
the Holocaust, just a few weeks after the Wannsee
Conference of January, 1942, as to the supposed
importance of which see paragraph [ ]
below. Gray J told leading Counsel for the
Defendants on Day
6, 19 January 2000, at page 168 of the
transcript:- "Mr Rampton, does it simplify matters
if I say I am prepared to accept that there is
good internal evidence that it is March or
thereabouts 1942?" 60. While Gray J observes at 5.161 that:- "The Defendants argue that no reputable
and objective historian would nail his colours
to the mast in the way that Irving has done by
admitting only one possible interpretation of
the note," he fails to point out that no reputable and
objective historian other than Irving has ever
mentioned this memorandum at all, yet it mentions
the Führer, the "solution of the Jewish
problem", and "decisions", all in one paragraph,
expressly stating that Hitler wished to see the
"solution of the Jewish problem" postponed until
the war was over. 61. The Defendants have produced nothing
whatsoever of this evidential value relating to the
critical issue, namely the role of Hitler himself.
The Defendants' experts have pretended in their
books that it does not even exist. Their conduct in
this regard amounts to an egregious suppresio veri
et suggestio falsi. The "Wannsee Conference" 62. As to 5.142 Irving's slim bundle of actually
existing documents is set against Evans's sweeping,
grandiose and wholly unparticularized reference to
a "vastly greater number" of contradictory
documents, not one of which does Evans
identify. 63. Lipstadt herself thought that the minutes of
the so-called "Wannsee
conference" crucial to the historiography of
the Holocaust, describing at page 214 of Denying
the Holocaust:- "... the 1942 Wannsee Conference, at
which Heydrich and a group of prominent Nazis
worked out the implementation of the Final
Solution... " 64. Gray J evidently agreed with this view.
While at 13.36 Gray J said: "I do not regard the
arguments advanced by Irving... as being without
merit: they are worthy of consideration," he
nevertheless rejects Irving's interpretation of the
Schlegelberger memorandum at 13.35, giving as one
of his principal reasons:- "that the evidence suggests that at the
Wannsee conference in January 1942 (where
Heydrich claimed to be speaking with the
authority of Hitler) a programme for the
extermination of Jews had been discussed and in
broad terms agreed upon." 65. Lipstadt's and Gray J's observations wholly
disregard the contents of the Wannsee protocol.
Irving put the relevant quotes to Gray J in his
closing speech:- "For a long time the confident public
perception was that the Wannsee protocol, of the
20 January 1942 meeting, recorded the actual
order to exterminate the European Jews. Yehuda
Bauer, the director of Yad Vashem, the world's
premier Holocaust research institution in
Israel, has stated quite clearly: 'The public
still repeats, time after time, the silly story
that at Wannsee the extermination of the Jews
was arrived at.' In his opinion Wannsee was a
meeting but 'hardly a conference,' and he even
said: 'Little of what was said there was
executed in detail.' (Canadian Jewish News, 30
January, 1992) Despite this, Your Lordship has
had to listen to the 'silly story' all over
again in this Court from the expert witnesses."
(Day
32, 15 March, 2000). 66. Moreover, anachronism is a widely recognized
fault in historical methodology. An approach based
on the interpretation of documents written in 1942
in the light of events which happened in 1943 or
1944 is fundamentally flawed. 67. As to the other documents discussed in Gray
J's judgment:- The deportation of the Berlin Jews and the
Riga massacres (paras. 5.90 to 5.110 and 13.21 to 13.25) 68. It is submitted that Irving's treatment of
these episodes is (1) to be preferred to Evans's,
alternatively, (2) is a fair alternative
interpretation of the material available to
Irving. 69. As to 5.106, Gray J wrongly summarizes the
evidence when he says:- "In relation to the entry in Himmler's
log for 1 December 1941, Irving said that he
misread Himmler's spidery Suetterlin
handwriting: he thought he had written
Judentransporte in the plural. It was, he said,
a 'silly misreading'." 70. In fact Judentransport occurs in the entry
for 30
November, 1941 entry, and haben zu bleiben,
which Irving admitted misreading as Juden zu
bleiben, on 1 December, 1941. Irving never admitted
misreading Judentransport as Judentransporte. 71. Evans's criticism of Irving's explanation
for this mistake cited by Gray J at 5.110 is merely
one instance of Evans's gross bias against Irving,
and anxiety to impute the worst possible motives to
him at every turn. The misreading of Himmler's
difficult handwriting in respect of the phrase
haben zu bleiben as Juden zu bleiben was
regrettable, and eventually corrected. Irving was
the first to find and transcribe these notes from
Himmler's very difficult old-German handwriting,
using barely legible photocopies in the 1960s. He
inevitably made numerous errors of transcription.
Others have since gone over the same notes and
polished and refined the transcriptions. The
excision of this sentence from the text has made no
difference to the thrust of Irving's argument that
there was a direct connection between Himmler's
arrival at Hitler's HQ on 30 November 1941 and his
telephone call to Heydrich, ordering a halt to the
liquidation of the Berlin Jews. 72. Turning to this point at 13.21, Gray J
says:- "The second criticism (which is more
important for the purpose of this case) is that
Irving is in error when he claims that the
instruction not to liquidate the Jews on that
transport emanated from Hitler. There is no
evidence that Hitler 'summoned' Himmler to his
headquarters and 'obliged' him to telephone to
Heydrich an order that Jews were not to be
liquidated." 73. The sequence of events established by
Himmler's agenda and telephone log is as follows.
Himmler went to Hitler's headquarters in East
Prussia on the morning of 30 November 1941, and
"from the bunker" spoke at 1.30 p.m. by telephone
to Heydrich, forbidding the liquidation of the
trainload of Jews from Berlin. Himmler certainly
saw Hitler either before or after this telephone
call. Evans's claim at 5.104 that there were
"several" bunkers at Hitler's HQ was refuted on the
spot by Irving: Evans admitted that his map of the
HQ was from 1944. Gray J makes no reference to
Evans's poor methodology on this issue. 74. As Irving has recorded in many books, the
trainload of Berlin Jews had however already been
liquidated on arrival in Riga at around 9 a.m. on
the morning of 30 November 1941. The culprit, SS
Obergruppenführer Jeckeln, was severely
criticised by Himmler (in a message intercepted by
British codebreakers on 1 December 1941) for
arbitrarily and disobediently exceeding the
guidelines laid down by Himmler and the
Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Heydrich):- "SS Obergruppenführer Jeckeln. The
Jews being out placed to Ostland [the Baltic
states] are to be dealt with only in
accordance with the guidelines laid down by
myself and/or by the Reichssicherheitshauptamt
on my orders. I would punish arbitrary and
disobedient acts. (sgd) Himmler." See Day
3, 13 January 2000. 75. That same day Himmler summoned Jeckeln to
East Prussian HQ by a second code signal; Jeckeln
presented himself at HQ on 4 December 1941, and was
reprimanded. The killings of German Jews
immediately stopped for several months. All the
expert witnesses agreed that this was the
documented sequence. 76. It is accordingly the primary and most
reasonable inference that there was a very direct
connection between Himmler's arrival at Hitler's HQ
and his sudden telephone call to Heydrich, ordering
a halt to the liquidation of the Berlin Jews. 77. As to 5.94, Irving was entitled heavily to
discount Wisliceny's ex post facto guess work.
Wisliceny (a mass murderer, who was hanged after
the war for his crimes) is speculating when he
expresses his conviction that in late 1941, Hitler
had "ordered the biological annihilation of
European Jewry". 78. 5.120: Here the mathematics are out. As
Irving stated in evidence, and Evans agreed, a pit
of those dimension, would hold at most 1,500
corpses (not 7,000). Bruns
stated there were "two or three" such pits. A
pit three metres wide cannot be dug deeper than two
metres, unless shored up, which these pits were
not. 79. At 13.24 Gray J says of Irving's treatment
of Bruns' evidence:- "An objective historian is obliged to
be even-handed in his approach to historical
evidence: he cannot pick and choose without
adequate reason." 80. Leaving aside the conduct of the Defendants'
experts, who throughout dismissed whatever they did
not like as euphemism, falsehood, forgery,
self-serving or neo-Nazi, etc., the reason (which
Gray J does not state) was simply that for the
first part of Bruns's statement (mass shootings are
to stop) there was contemporary corroborative
evidence, for example the
signal from Himmler, and the fact that the
shootings did stop for many months. For the second
part, the suggestion that: "the shootings are to
continue more surreptitiously", there was not a
shred of corroborative evidence. 81. As to 5.126, Irving's translation is taken
word for word from the original Weidenfeld edition
of Hitler's Table Talk (ed. Hugh Trevor Roper).
Irving pointed out to Gray J that the Trevor Roper
edition was not a slavish translation of the
original German text, which only became
available years later. The last sentence of this
paragraph should be read in this context. 82. At 5.148 Gray J observes:- "But he accepted, with some reluctance,
that it does establish that Hitler authorised
the liquidation of Jews in the East as if they
were partisans." 83. This is a seriously inaccurate summary of
Irving's evidence. Irving adhered to the view that
the correct rendering of the German wording was
that (certain unidentified) Jews were to be
liquidated as partisans, not like or as if they
were partisans. 84. Re 5.185: Hitler's adjutants was
interrogated in 1945/46 et seq. on precisely this
knowledge by the Allied interrogators, and their
response was the same. 85. Re 5.193: Gray J fails to take into account
the compelling argument that in his own private
notes Himmler had no need to use euphemisms. Goebbels' Diary entries for 27 March
1942 86. 5.150: Gray J's summary, viz. "Irving
regarded Goebbels's diary entry for 30 May 1942 as
constituting 'acres of sludge' not worth including
in his book." is to be contrasted with what Irving
actually said on Day
5 at page 54: "Acres of sludge, is it not? If I
had to put all that into a book, the book would
sink under its own weight." 87. That sets out the position of any author;
Irving had to produce a book of economic size and
readability. Gray J has omitted these overriding
economic and publishing reasons for shortening a
text. 88. 13.37 Gray J says:- "I have concluded without hesitation
that the manner in which Irving deals in
Hitler's War (both editions) with Goebbels's
diary entry of 27 March 1942 is misleading and
unsupported by the circumstantial evidence." 89. These observations should be compared with
Gray J's approach to the Schlegelberger Memorandum,
which was dictated or typed by a lawyer and
minister, Schlegelberger, at Lammers' (the head of
the Civil Service's) dictation: that is "hearsay"
(13.33). The Goebbels diary is a private diary note
typed by junior civil servant Richard Otte at "Big
Lie" propaganda minister Goebbels' dictation of
alleged remarks by Hitler. Yet it is suggested that
Irving ought to have quoted the diary at greater
length, even though Goebbels himself uses the word
wohl (omitted by Evans, who castigates Irving for
selective quotation), stating that liquidation is
probably happening, i.e. it is not a statement of
fact, but of belief.
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