Posted Wednesday, August 27, 2008 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE Claim No. HC08CO1250 CHANCERY DIVISION B e t w e e n:&emdash; DAVID JOHN CAWDELL IRVING Claimant -and- PETER LASKEY First Defendant -and- PETER LING Second Defendant -and- HOWARD KENNEDY, a firm Third Defendants PARTICULARS OF CLAIM 1. In or about the months of April and May 2002, the First and Second Defendants were practising in partnership with others as solicitors under the name or style of Amhurst Brown Colombotti ("the Firm") from premises at 2 Duke Street St James, London SW1Y 6BJ. They continued so to do until the dissolution of the Firm on September 1, 2003, at which time the firm's obligations were severally and generally taken over by the Third Defendants, the firm of Howard Kennedy, of 19 Cavendish Square, London W1A 2AW. 2. On or about April 23, 2002 a possession order first made in February 1992 against the Claimant's home and business premises at Flat 1, No. 81 Duke Street, London W1M 5DJ was received by mail at the Claimant's address during the Claimant's absence overseas. The premises had been the Claimant's family home for thirty-four years and he was currently paying the monthly amount agreed with the mortgage bank, most recently on March 24 and April 26, 2002. On May 8, 2002, an eviction date of May 24, 2002 having meanwhile been set by the Court, the Claimant urgently instructed the First Defendant to make proper and immediate application to the Central London County Court at 13&endash;14 Park Crescent, London, W1N 4HT, for an order to stay the execution of the possession order. The First Defendant accepted the retainer, and banked the relevant cheque for £2,000 drawn on the account of the company Parforce UK Ltd., cheque No. 189, dated on or about May 8, 2002, which cheque cleared the said company's bank account on May 13, 2002. 3. The First Defendant having agreed to act on behalf of the Claimant was bound in contract by the term implied into his retainer under section 13 of the Supply of Goods and Services Act, 1982. Additionally or alternatively, he owed the Claimant a like duty of care in tort. 4. In the premises the First Defendant was bound (1) to be skilful and careful; (2) to advise the Claimant on all matters relevant to the retainer, so far as might be reasonably necessary; (3) to protect the interest of the Claimant; (4) to carry out the Claimant's urgent instructions timeously and by all proper means; (5) to consult the Claimant on all questions of doubt which did not fall within the express or implied discretion left to him; (6) to keep the Claimant informed to such an extent as might be reasonably necessary. 5. On or about Monday, May 13, 2002 the First Defendant left England to travel to Moscow, Russia, on the Firm's business, as he previously advised the Claimant on accepting the instructions referred to in para. 3 above. He delegated responsibility for the conduct of the Claimant's matter in his absence to the Second Defendant (who was then an employee of the Firm), by reason whereof the Defendants are both liable to the Claimant in respect of the breaches of the retainer pleaded at paragraphs 8 to 9 below. 6. The Defendants (in breach of their duties to the Claimant both in contract and in tort) failed to execute the Claimant's instructions, namely to make due or indeed any application to the Courts for relief, namely the order sought by the Claimant, and furthermore failed to notify him in a timely manner of this omission which would have enabled him to take remedial action himself, until about five p.m. on May 20, 2002. By this time it was too late for him to rectify their neglect. 7. By reason of the Defendants' negligence and breach of contract and their failure properly to perform the retainer, the Claimant has lost the chance that execution of the order for possession made in February 1992 might have been stayed further on terms. 8. By reason of the matters pleaded at paragraph 7 above, the Claimant has suffered special damage in excess of a sum of an estimated five hundred thousand pounds being a reasonable estimate of the replacement cost of those contents of the premises which were lost through theft, removal, or destruction as a direct consequence of the defendants' negligence, both before and after the mortgagee had taken possession of the premises, namely the domestic chattels, personal properties and clothing, archives, library, unpublished manuscripts and work in hand, tools of the trade and other goods listed on the schedules appended to this Claim, given that the defendants were aware that the sole adult resident remaining on the premises in the Claimant's absence overseas was ill and physically incapable of acting to save them. 9. Further, the Claimant claims general damages to be assessed, including damages for the grief and distress that he has suffered by reason of the loss of his home of thirty-four years and its domestic contents and nearly all his personal and professional and domestic possessions. 10. The Claimant is entitled to and claims interest at 8 per cent. per annum pursuant to section 35A of the Supreme Court Act, 1981 on his damages from May 24, 2002 (being the date on which the warrant of possession was executed) to the date hereof, alternatively at such rate, on such sum, and for such period as the Court shall think just and equitable. AND THE CLAIMANT CLAIMS:&emdash; Damages to be assessed; Interest on damages under paragraph 10 above; Costs DAVID JOHN CAWDELL IRVING STATEMENT OF TRUTH I believe that the facts stated in these Particulars of Claim are true. (Signed)........ (Mr David John Cawdell Irving, the Claimant) SERVED this seventh day of May 2008 by David John Cawdell Irving, the Claimant in person, of ... Windsor, who will at that address accept service of all process   The Lipstadt Trial: index

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