We do not recognise a separate Ukrainian nationality – The British Government’s response to a Ukrainian national identity (1908–1949)

Author: Dr  Marcus Papadopoulos

The British state’s current espousal of the existence of a Ukrainian race, and one which is distinct from Russians, is a relatively new phenomenon.

  Russia’s ongoing military campaign in Ukraine, which is as much to do with the Kremlin asserting control over territories and populations which it perceives as forming part of the “Russian World” than it is with safeguarding Russian national security against NATO aspirations in Eastern Europe, has been wildly and unashamedly exploited by the British state for geo-strategic purposes.  Specifically, the British ruling elite is promoting the notion of the existence of a Ukrainian nation to justify the unprecedented multitude of British taxpayer’s money that is being sent to the Ukrainian Government, so that attempts by the Western ruling elites – the forces which rule the Western world – to inflict a strategic defeat on the Russian Federation can be perpetuated.

  There was a time, however, when the British state was infinitely more rational, informed, and wise than it is today.

  British Government documents from 1908 to 1949, obtained and analysed by this author at The National Archives in Kew, London, demonstrate that the then British state was anything but accepting of the notion of a Ukrainian race and, furthermore, held grave concerns about Ukrainian nationalism.    

  By the end of the nineteenth-century, the concept of a Ukrainian national identity had emerged and was, in large measure, the product of Austrian malevolent ambitions in relation to one of the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s principal foes: the Russian Empire.  In spite of the emergence of a Ukrainian national identity, British officials did not consider this to be credible.  When they discussed Ukraine, they referred to it, as they had done centuries previous^[1], by using the definite article, “the Ukraine”, meaning a Russian region populated predominantly by Russians (akin to how the south-west of England is known as, “the West Country”).  Accordingly, in April of 1908, the British Ambassador in Vienna, Edward Goschen, described the inhabitants of Ukraine as “Russian Orthodox” who “speak Russian”.^[2]  Furthermore, in May of 1918, a memorandum for the War Cabinet, compiled by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, concerning the identity of the population in Ukraine, said that:

“The peasants [in Ukraine] speak the Little Russian dialect; a small group of nationalist intelligentsia now professes a Ukrainian nationality distinct from that of the Great Russians.  Whether such a nationality exists is usually discussed in terms in which the question can receive no answer.  Were one to ask the average peasant in the Ukraine his nationality, he would answer that he is Greek Orthodox; if pressed to say whether he is a Great Russian, a Pole, or a Ukrainian, he would probably reply that he is a peasant; and if one insisted on knowing what language he spoke, he would say he talked “the local tongue.” One might perhaps get him to call himself by a proper national name and say that he is “russki”…he simply does not think of nationality in the terms familiar to the intelligentsia…Even when going as unskilled labourers to the towns the Ukrainian peasants changed into Great Russians.  One can see in the novels of Maxim Gorki or of Kuprin how these men who move freely from Odessa to the Volga, from Rostof on the Don to Petrograd, are clearly conscious of the unity of All-Russia.”^[3] 

Thus, for London, “Russian” covered Great Russians (Russians), Little Russians (Ukrainians), and White Russians (Belorussians).  There was little to no distinction between the three, according to British officials.  Indeed, Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour said, in October of 1917, that Ukraine was “a question of internal Russian politics.”^[4]  Further to that, an official in the Foreign Office, by the initials H.G.N., commented, also in October of 1917, that the British Government considered the idea of Ukrainians deciding their own sovereignty to be an “impossible principle”.^[5]       

  What British officials did, however, differentiate from Ukrainians and “the Ukraine” was East Galicians and Eastern Galicia, a region comprising Lvov, Ternopol, and Ivano-Frankivsk and which is the heart of what we know today as Ukrainian nationalism, and whose populations, to a very considerable extent, have in their veins Polish, Lithuanian, Austrian, and Hungarian blood, and where Roman Catholicism is the dominant Christian denomination.  Thus, in October of 1918, against the backdrop of the Great War, and specifically the German and the Austrian occupation of Ukraine, the War Cabinet received a memorandum compiled by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, entitled, “The Ukrainian Revolt”.^[6] Whilst in places the memorandum referred to a revolt by “Ukrainian peasants” against Austrian and German armies in, for instance, Poltava, the focus is on “Galician peasants” taking up arms against the Austrians and the Germans in “East Galicia”.  What is to be inferred is that the memorandum distinguished between “Ukrainian peasants” and “Galician peasants”: the former being regarded as Russians living in a Russian region (no different to how Englishmen living in Yorkshire are referred to as Yorkshiremen), and the latter being considered as non-Russians residing in a non-Russian region.  In essence, it can be said that many British officials, when discussing Ukrainian nationalism, had in their minds Eastern Galicia, East Galicians, and Roman Catholicism, not Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, and the Russian Orthodox Church.  The memorandum noted how, in Eastern Galicia, the hatred felt by peasants there towards the Poles and the Austrians was “very much stronger than the hatred of the Russian government”.^[7]  Such an observation reinforced the view in Whitehall that East Galicians and Russians were, in cultural and ethnic terms, alien to one another.  Further to that, the memorandum, throughout, referred to Ukraine as, “the Ukraine”, a significant actuality which irks Ukrainian, or, more accurately, East Galicians, as it is deemed by them as constituting “Russian chauvinism” and, therefore, is regarded with offence.^[8]  In addition to that, it should be known that British officials would only begin referring to “Ukraine”, minus the definite article, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in 1991, when the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic suddenly, unexpectedly, and artificially became an independent country.  Even when the Soviet Union was on its deathbed, in 1990, officials in Whitehall still referred to Ukraine as, “the Ukraine”.^[9]

    That the Austrians had played a pivotal role in developing the concept of a Ukrainian national identity was apparent in the writings of British officials.  The Austrians, who, like Poles, had historically referred to the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia as “Ruthenians” or “Ruthenes”, aimed to create unrest in the Russian Empire by fomenting trouble in Ukraine.  Thus, in November of 1916, MI7, which was, in part, responsible for monitoring and countering enemy propaganda during the Great War, observed that “Ukrainian agitation is favoured by the Austrian Government in order to embarrass Russia.”^[10]  Adding to that “Ukrainian agitation”, officials in the Home Office noted, also in November of that year, a “surprising measure of evidence” of “Austrian sentiments” amongst “Ruthenes” in internment camps in Britain.^[11]  The British Consul-General in Odessa, John Picton Bagge, commented, in November of 1917, that Ukrainian nationalism was “engineered” by Austria.^[12]  Furthermore, the Director of the British Intelligence Division reported, in August of 1917, that he had received information pertaining to Ukrainian nationalist leaders secretly meeting with Austrian officials in Lausanne and in Lucerne, Switzerland, and that the Ukrainian delegation was headed by Andrey Sheptytsky, who was the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.^[13]   

  An affinity between Ukrainian nationalists and the Germans was observed by London in 1918, an observation which would come to be echoed time and time again by British officials during the inter-war period and the Second World War.  In May of 1918, the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office issued a memorandum to the War Cabinet titled, “The Revolt in the Ukraine”^[14], which partly assessed the working relationship between the Germans and Ukrainian nationalists in the Ukrainian’s People’s Republic, a short-lived entity which had been unilaterally declared by the latter in January of 1918, in response to the Bolshevik Revolution in October of 1917.  London was extremely alarmed at the German and the Austrian occupation of Ukraine, which had occurred at the behest of the leadership of the Ukrainian People’s Republic.   Addressing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, an agreement signed between the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the Germans and the Austrians in February of 1918, in which the former received recognition and support against the Bolsheviks from Berlin and Vienna in return for supplying the Germans and the Austrians with food, the memorandum noted that: The “[Ukrainian] Government has hastened to adhere to the Brest-Litovsk peace and to the arrangements concluded for supplies of grain to the Central Powers [Germany and Austria].  It has further declared that free commerce will be granted in favour of Germany and Austria, and that it regards it as one of its first and most important tasks to conclude a long-term economic agreement with the Central Powers.” The memorandum, having already commented that in “the Ukraine” peasants comprised “the overwhelming majority of the population”, opined that the peasants will “wage a ferocious guerilla warfare” against both the Ukrainian Government and the German and Austrian forces occupying Ukraine.  From that, Whitehall can only have concluded that Ukrainian nationalism was anathema to the population of Ukraine hence the willingness of Ukrainian peasants to take up arms against the Ukrainian Government.  

  Studying MI5 documents both from the 1920s and 1930s reveals that the British security service was paying close attention to the activities and movements of Ukrainian nationalists in Continental Europe and in Britain, believing that some of them were working for German intelligence.  Such surveillance by MI5 became more pronounced following the coming to power in Germany of National Socialism in January of 1933.  One particularly noteworthy case involved an individual by the name of Vladimir Kolosovski, whom MI5 devoted significant attention to.^[15]  A German of Ukrainian origin, who was thought to have been a Colonel of Artillery in the Imperial Russian Army, Kolosovski was ostensibly working as a journalist, though MI5 believed him to be a German agent and, previous to this, possibly a Soviet agent.  Kolosovski was recorded as having a profound interest in miliary matters and was a close associate of another Ukrainian living in Germany who was also judged by MI5 to be a German agent: Yevhen Konovalets, a prominent Ukrainian nationalist leader who was born in Lvov, Eastern Galicia.  

  The story of Kolosovski took on a new dimension when, on 29th January, 1935, he arrived at Dover, accompanied by a lady whom he claimed was his fiancé, a one Adolfine Senzig, and who would depart from the UK on 12th February, 1935.^[16]  Ostensibly in Britain as a journalist, though he also said that he wished to visit Dr. Volodomyr Lischewski of the Ukrainian Bureau in Grosvenor Place, London, and having requested that he be allowed to remain in the UK for at least six months, MI5 conducted surveillance on Kolosovski.  In a surveillance report dated 6th March, it was noted that Kolosovski and his “fiancé” stayed at the Somerset Hotel, Orchard Street, West London, from 29th to 30th January.  On their departure from the Somerset Hotel, they gave their new address as White Hall Hotel, Bloomsbury Square.  Intrigue and suspicion over Kolosovski and Senzig increased further when it was reported that: “There is no record of Kolosovski or Senzig having stayed at the Orchid Hotel, Portman Square, W., nor at Borer’s Hotel, 49 Cambridge Street, W., latter address being that given on aliens’ landing card and the names are not known at either place.”  Following on from the surveillance report, a letter, dated 28th February, by an MI5 official to Vivian Valentine, head of SIS’ foreign counter-espionage service, Section V, said “it would appear that Kolosovski is over here as an agent of the German Government”.  However, the letter added that it was not “impossible” that Kolosovski was a “Soviet double-cross”.  The story of Kolosovski’s stay in Britain came to an end when, after his application for a six months’ extension was refused, he left Dover on 5th April, 1935.  In a letter, dated 3rd May, 1935, to the Immigration Officer by F. Stovell, H.M. Chief Inspector, Immigration Branch, it was recommended that should Kolosovski return to the UK, “leave to land should be refused.”

  Before turning to the next case involving a Ukrainian nationalist who was of interest to MI5, it is important to know about the Ukrainian Bureau, which, as already mentioned, was situated in Grosvenor Place, London.  The official purpose of the Ukrainian Bureau was to serve as an information centre and press bureau for an independent Ukraine including Eastern Galicia, the latter, of which, from 1919 to 1939, was part of Poland.  However, in a letter by the Secretary of the Metropolitan Police, H.M. Howgrave-Graham, to an MI5 official by the name of Bamford, dated 26th June, 1940, the Ukrainian Bureau was referred to by Howgrave-Graham as a “German supported organisation”.^[17]  Furthermore, Brigadier O.A. Harker of MI5 wrote a letter, on 25th December, 1940, to Commissioner S.T. Wood of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, in which he said that: “The Ukrainian Information Bureau has always had a very dubious reputation.”^[18] 

  The case of Jacob Makohin constitutes intrigue at its most intriguing.  The founder and financier of the Ukrainian Bureau in London, and a naturalised American citizen, MI5 believed that Makohin was born in 1880, either in a village by the name of Czarnokonce in Ternopol, Eastern Galicia, or in Chorastkow-Kopyzcynce, also situated in Ternopol, Eastern Galicia.  Further, MI5 held the view that his proper name was Leon Razumowsky, though he was also known to have described himself as Leon Mazeppa, Prince von Razumowsky, and Prince Mazeppa.  Although Makohin was described in 1935 by MI5 as a “Ukrainian nationalist” who provided funds to Ukrainian movements in Britain, Continental Europe, America, and Canada, the British security service initially considered that he could have been working for Soviet intelligence in order to monitor anti-Soviet activities amongst Russian emigres in Europe, including in Britain.^[19]  However, Makohin was also suspected of serving his own interests.  As the head of MI5, Colonel Vernon Kell, said, in a letter dated 23rd October, 1936, to the Commissioner of Police, Major General J.H. MacBrien: “The man [Makohin] is an irresponsible adventurer whose services are at the disposal of almost any profitable cause.”^[20] 

  As time went by, however, MI5 began to suspect that Makohin, who spent considerable time in London, was working for German intelligence.  With the Canadian Legation in Washington having informed MI5 in a letter dated 21st April, 1937, that Makohin “represented himself as the leader of a movement for the establishment of Ukrainian independence” and “sought to enlist the support of wealthy members of the Roman Catholic Church” to accomplish this objective^[21], the British security service would learn of an event which, it would appear, constituted a turning-point in their deliberations over whether Makohin was working for the Germans.

  Acting on information stemming from one of its Polish sources, SIS reported to MI5, on 24th March, 1938, that Alfred Rosenberg, leader of the Nazi party’s Office of Foreign Affairs (Aussenpolitisches), visited Danzig in February of that year where he interviewed Makohin, who was believed to have specifically travelled from London to meet with the high-ranking Nazi official.  According to SIS, the meeting between Rosenberg and Makohin revolved around “the Nazification of the Ukraine”, and SIS believed that funds for Makohin would be “forthcoming from Germany.”  SIS added that several other of its sources commented that “the Germans regard Makohin as an important agent.”^[22]  A few days after the SIS report was received, an MI5 official wrote to Vivian saying that, “it is interesting to note that Makohin last left this country on 2nd December, 1937, so that at least he did not go direct from London to meet Rosenberg.”  The said MI5 official issued a caveat; namely, the alleged meeting between Rosenberg and Makohin “should be treated under reserve as coming from Polish circles” as the Poles could have been attempting to “prejudice” Makohin in British eyes.^[23]

  Suspicion over Makohin continued to increase.  In a letter to Vivian by an MI5 official with the initials “K.G.Y.”, on 2nd December, 1938, it was said that Makohin maintained “German connections” as did “other Ukrainian leaders” including an individual only referred to by his surname “Korostovetz” which, undoubtedly, was Vladimir Korostovetz, a Ukrainian nationalist living in London.^[24]  MI5’s suspicion was compounded further by an article published in the Daily Express on 5th December, 1938, in which Makohin, referred to in the article as “Leon Razumowski”, was reported to have told a journalist that a “new Ukrainian army” was being formed in “Ruthenia” (which was controlled by Poland at the time) and “elsewhere” and that Makohin was the “commander in chief” of this army.  The article went on to say that by June of 1939, Ukraine “will demand their independence” and that “this will be done with Germany’s backing both political and if need be military.”^[25]

  Uncertainty about Makohin’s true nature intensified following the outbreak of the Second World War, though reports continued to described him as a “genuine Ukrainian nationalist”.^[26]  In a striking resemblance to the alleged meeting between Makohin and Rosenberg, it was discovered that, in February of 1939, Makohin had been interviewed in London by a German called Franz von Gordon, who had arrived in Britain in October of 1929 and was subsequently found by the British authorities to be conducting Nazi propaganda in the UK.  After von Gordon’s departure for Germany in July of 1939, intriguing documents were found in his London flat, including his account of an interview which he conducted with Makohin.^[27] 

  In a letter, dated 18th January, 1941, to SIS by an MI5 official by the name of F.C. Derbyshire, the details of von Gordon’s interview were revealed.  According to von Gordon, Makohin was a “very competent man, well schooled in the work of espionage, ambitious and possessing good international connections.”  Von Gordon said that Makohin was keen to play a “leading part” in Ukrainian affairs and, consequently, he was “attempting to make contact with the German Government.” Furthermore, von Gordon was of the view that “good use” could be made of Makohin “in the interest of German politics in the Ukraine.” The German also noted that Makohin could have been working for Italian intelligence.^[28] 

  In the interview, von Gordon noted that Makohin “continually” asked questions about Germany’s plans for Ukraine and suggested to the German that in Ukraine’s “interests” he “would be prepared to work on behalf of any power that would support him.”  In summing up his four-hour interview with Makohin, von Gordon commented that: “Makohin is a figure who can be used in a certain capacity in the framework of Ukrainian politics…In exchange for giving him our support, we could demand that he uses his whole influence in America to promote the German cause in that country.”  Reflecting on the content of von Gordon’s account, F.C. Derbyshire commented that “it confirms the fact that Makohin was anxious to cooperate with the Germans.”^[29] 

  Just prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union, MI5 received, on 20th June, 1941, details of an intercepted package sent to the office of the Ukrainian Bureau in London by the publisher of a Ukrainian nationalist newspaper in the US called, “Amerika”.  Inside the package were two editions of “Amerika”, dated 11th and 13th March, 1941.  The editorial in both editions discussed Ukrainians living in German-occupied territories in Europe, which, at the time, meant German-occupied Poland in particular, and called for “violent advocacy of isolationism and hostility to Gt. Britain”.^[30]  Given that Makohin was the founder and financier of the Ukrainian Bureau, the contents of the intercepted package will have raised MI5’s suspicions even further regarding his activities.    

  Shortly after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, which took place on 22nd June, 1941, and which resulted in an anti-German alignment between London and Moscow, MI5 received an extract from a report by the British Embassy in Rome.  It should be said that it was believed Makohin was, at that time, living in Italy and had arrived in Italy shortly after the outbreak of the war in Europe.  Entitled “German propaganda in the Soviet Union”, the report noted that the Germans were “apparently endeavouring to induce” Makohin to travel to Ukraine in order to “start an anti-Russian agitation”.  The report went on to say that Makohin’s wife had said that her husband was “still being urged to undertake this mission but was stalling for the time being.”^[31] 

  Assessments of Makohin by MI5 more or less ended in 1947 with a note on him written by a Ukrainian nationalist called Danylo Skoropadsky, someone whom the British security service took a profound interest in, as will shortly be seen.  Sent, on 2nd May, 1947, by F.C. Derbyshire to an MI5 official called “Mr. Irvine”, Skoropadsky said that Makohin “had some contacts with Mussolini and his government” and while there was “no definite proof” of Makohin having co-operated with German intelligence, this “possibility cannot be entirely excluded.”^[32]

  The case of the Ukrainian nationalist Danylo Skoropadsky, and his father Paul Skoropadsky, reveals as much about Whitehall’s awareness of the limited appeal of a Ukrainian national identity in Ukraine as it did about the traditional ties between Germany and Ukrainian nationalist organisations.  

  Paul Skoropadsky, who was born 3rd May, 1873, in the German city of Wiesbaden, was appointed in 1905 as aide-de-camp to Tsar Nicholas II. However, in April of 1918, following the establishment of the Ukrainian’s People Republic and the occupation of Ukraine by German and Austrian armies, Skoropadsky senior was made “Hetman of the Ukrainian Government” by Berlin, a position described by MI5 as “a puppet ruler of Ukraine under German protection.”  He fled back to Germany in November of 1918, following the German Army’s withdrawal from Ukraine.  Whilst in Germany, Skoropadsky senior established and led a Hetmanite organisation which, it was said, was financially supported by Rosenberg’s Aussenpolitisches.  It was also suggested that Skoropadsky senior developed relations with the Japanese.  In September of 1940, Skoropadsky senior ended his speech at a conference of the Ukrainian “Hromada” in Germany with the words: “Glory to Germany! Glory to Adolf Hitler!”  Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Skoropadsky senior issued an address to “Fuehrer, Sovereign Chancellor”, in which he and his Hetmanite organisation proclaimed support to the Wehrmacht’s in its clash with the Red Army, adding: “We implore you to give us an opportunity taking part in…the struggle for the well-being of the Germans and the Ukrainian people.”^[33] 

  Danylo Skoropadsky, the son of Paul Skoropadsky, was born 13th February, 1904, and inherited control of the Hetmanite organisation in 1945, following the death of his father.  Shortly before the start of the war in Europe, he came to Britain to live.^[34]

  The Northern Department, a branch within the Foreign Office which dealt with affairs pertaining to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, issued a periodical report, on 13th December, 1933, regarding the “Ukrainian Émigré Movement”.^[35]  Seen by MI5, the report stated that Ukrainian nationalist groups in exile “continue to derive a measure of German support” but that it appeared that none of these groups “wields serious influence in Soviet Ukraine, or can justifiably claim responsibility to any appreciable extent for unrest there.”  The report then turned its attention to Skoropadsky senior’s Hetmanite organisation.  It was said that the secretary to Skoropadsky senior, a one S.M. Shemet, admitted, during a private conversation, that the “activities” of the Hetmanite organisation were “confined almost entirely to Galicia, Czechoslovakia and Germany” and that the organisation’s connections inside the Soviet Union were “insignificant”.  Furthermore, the report added that “despite the claims of people like Makohin…evidence from other sources point to the emigres in general having little real influence in the Ukraine.”  The assessment of the Northern Department demonstrates that the British were aware that the notion of a Ukrainian national identity had very limited appeal in Ukraine and was overwhelmingly confined to Galicia.  Accordingly, the British were conscious that Galicia, or more precisely Eastern Galicia, was thoroughly distinct from Ukraine.  

  Continuing with the Northern Department report, it said that there was “good information” to demonstrate that “contact” between the Germans and Skoropadsky senior and his organisation was “being maintained” and that he was “in receipt of a small subsidy from the Nazis.”  The report also said that the previously mentioned Korostovetz was Skoropadsky senior’s “agent in London”.  Furthermore, the report noted that the already cited Konovaletz carried out, with German support, anti-Polish activities in Eastern Galicia and that he was “in the pay of the Germans”.^[36] 

  That Roman Catholicism was central to the concept of a Ukrainian national identity, thus making it anything but Ukrainian given that the vast majority of the population of Ukraine were members of the Russian Orthodox Church (as, incidentally, they are today), was further confirmed in the minds of the British when it was revealed that the Vatican was aiding Ukrainian nationalism.  In a letter, dated 8th August, 1933, to Guy Maynard Liddell, who was MI5’s director of counter-intelligence and a specialist on Soviet espionage activities in Britain, Vivian said that, “our representative in Rome reports that enquiries made from various sources in the Vatican, Ukrainian and Russian circles confirm that the Vatican gives contributions to Hetman Skoropadsky [senior], who, it is believed in Rome, is also receiving funds from Berlin.”^[37]

  Following the outbreak of the war in Europe, MI5 began affording attention to Skoropadsky junior.  A minute by F.C. Derbyshire, on 13th November, 1940, commented that Skoropadsky junior’s Hetmanite organisation, which he was the heir to, had “always received active support from the German Government”.  Derbyshire noted that an intercepted letter by Skoropadsky junior to his followers in America revealed he and Korostovetz were “actively engaged in keeping up old connections and establishing new ones.”  The MI5 official requested permission that he be allowed “to keep closer observation” on the “activities” of Skoropadsky junior and Korostovetz.  Minutes by MI5 officials reveal that during the entirety of the war in Europe, Skoropadsky’s letters were intercepted by the British security service.^[38]

  Despite surveillance of Skoropadsky junior, MI5 found no evidence that the Ukrainian nationalist was a German agent or engaging in malignant activities.  Nonetheless, there were senior officials in Whitehall who maintained suspicion and unease regarding the presence in Britain of Skoropadsky junior, especially following the German invasion of the Soviet Union which, as already noted, resulted in London and Moscow fighting side-by-side in an anti-German coalition.

  Thus, on 6th September, 1941, Roger Hollis, an MI5 officer who monitored the activities of the Communist Party of Great Britain, wrote a letter to Peter Loxley, Private Secretary to Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, expressing serious concerns about Skoropadsky junior and Korostovetz.^[39]  Whilst acknowledging that there was no evidence to substantiate the claim that the two Ukrainian nationalists were German agents, Hollis, nevertheless, warned that their “friendship” for Britain was “governed by circumstances”.  He elaborated: “As ardent Ukrainian nationalists, their sympathies will be pro-German or pro-British as the political situation suits them and the country which is prepared to sponsor the movement for an independent Ukraine will have their support.”  Hollis went on to say that whilst there was no justification for interning Skoropadsky junior and Korostovetz, he would continue monitoring their activities.  

  A particularly intriguing interaction involving senior British officials, concerning Skoropadsky junior and Korostovetz, began on 4th June, 1942, when Stafford Cripps, Leader of the House of Commons and Lord Privy Seal, wrote to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden about a conversation he had had with Bernard Pares, a specialist on Russia who advised the British Government on Soviet matters.^[40]  In the note, Cripps noted that Pares informed him of the presence in Britain of the “anti-Russian and German inspired so-called Free Ukrainian Movement” and that it was “still allowed” to carry out its activities on British soil.  Cripps named Korostovetz and Skoropadsky junior as the “protagonists” of the movement, describing the latter’s father as a “Ukrainian quisling” resident in Berlin.  Cripps went on to say that: “These people are at least potential, and almost certainly actual Axis Agents, and second it must be distasteful to the Russians – or would be if they knew it – that such persons should be at large continuing with their hostile work here.”  Upon reading the letter, Eden wrote a comment on it in which he asked: “Do we know anything of this?” Cripps’ note, and Eden’s comment, made its way to the Northern Department where its head, Christopher Warner, responded, in a minute, by saying that the Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, had “never raised the matter” of Skoropadsky junior and Korostovetz and that he undoubtedly would have had he “considered it of importance”.  Eden’s response, in the form of a minute, expressed concern at the possibility of having “Axis agents at large” and added that he had “confidence” in the “judgment” of Cripps’.  A minute by an unknown official reassured Eden that MI5 was monitoring Skoropadsky junior and Korostovetz and would continue their “vigilance”.  To that, Eden minuted: “Very well”.^[41] 

  On 13th June, 1942, Eden wrote to Cripps regarding Skoropadsky junior and Korostovetz, in which he said that MI5 had had both individuals “under observation” since the start of the war but found “no reason to suppose that they are enemy agents or are engaging in undesirable activities.”  However, Eden informed Cripps that as a result of the Leader of the House of Commons’ note, he had asked MI5 to “continue their vigilance”, adding that unless MI5 “report any fresh development”, he was “inclined to leave things as they are.”^[42]

  After the end of the war in Europe, MI5 continued to retain an interest in Skoropadsky junior.  Derbyshire compiled a report on his meeting with the Ukrainian nationalist which occurred on 19th April, 1949.^[43]  During their meeting, Skoropadsky junior informed Derbyshire that when, in 1948, he had visited Germany to see his mother there, he met with Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which, it must be said, collaborated with the Germans following their invasion of the Soviet Union and whose military wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), carried out massacres and other crimes against humanity during the German occupation of Ukraine, including the mass murder of approximately 100,000 ethnic Poles in Eastern Galicia and in Volyn.  Derbyshire was informed that Bandera was in hiding, just outside of Munich “with the knowledge of the Americans.”  Skoropadsky junior relayed to Derbyshire that he was “favourably regarded by the Bandera adherents in the UK” and that he and Bandera talked about “possible co-operation” between themselves in the event of a war between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union.  Derbyshire concluded his report by referring to Skoropadsky as a “useful contact”.  It is, in fact, the case that British intelligence had come to regard Ukrainian nationalism as a weapon with which to use against the Soviet Government, and from 1944 onwards, when the defeat of Germany became assured, SIS began assisting Ukrainian nationalists fighting the Red Army in the westernmost part of Soviet Ukraine; namely, Eastern Galicia (Lvov, Ternopol, and Ivano-Frankivsk), Volyn, and Rivne.  The involvement of SIS in Soviet internal affairs was a major factor which contributed to the deterioration in relations between London and Moscow from 1944 onwards and the eventual collapse of the Grand Alliance after 1945.^[44]   

  Returning to the immediate period before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Northern Department received, on 8th May, 1941, a secret report from Czechoslovakian sources in Constantinople concerning Ukrainian nationalists in Germany and in German-occupied countries.^[45]  An official in the Northern Department minuted that: “This is no doubt in the main correct.  We have ample evidence that the Germans are training Russian emigres and especially Ukrainians for use in the Soviet Union.”

  The Czechoslovakian report began by noting that: “If the Russian emigres have found the support of Nazi Germany, the Ukrainian emigrants receive this support in double measure.  They are the bearers of the German campaign for the liberation of the Ukraine and the establishment of a Greater Ukraine under German protectorate.”  According to the report, the “chief attention” of Skoropadsky senior’s Hetmanite organisation was the establishment of “military units which would take part in an attack on the USSR in the framework of the German Army.”  The report noted that the general staff of the “Ukrainian Legion” was based in Vienna and that one of its members was a General Kurannovich, a former general in the Austrian Army who was from Eastern Galicia.  The Legion was to be made-up of Ukrainian prisoners of war of the former Polish Army who were in German camps, and the number provided for this was 250,000.  Furthermore, the report said that plans to recruit parachutists were underway.  

  The presence of Ukrainian nationalists in German-occupied Prague was then detailed in the report, noting that their task was largely one of “carrying out propaganda” for a “Greater Ukraine”.  Furthermore, the report noted that the “propaganda organ” for that task was a publishing company called “Nastup”, which was headed by a Dr. Rozsak from Uzgorod, a city in what is today the westernmost part of Ukraine whose population, at the time, was predominantly ethnic Hungarian and adherents to Roman Catholicism.  Finally, the report referred to a Ukrainian nationalist pamphlet, printed in Prague, which agitated in favour of the “liberation of the Ukraine” and which had been printed with the secret support of the Gestapo.  

  Considerable attention was devoted by the Northern Department to the activities of Ukrainian nationalists in America.  Diplomats were conscious that a heavily German-influenced network of Ukrainian nationalist organisations stretched from Nazi-occupied Europe to Britain to North America, and that the groups which comprised this network were working in tandem.  The fear of the Northern Department was that Ukrainian nationalists constituted a fifth column in the UK and also in the US and in Canada.  Upon request from the Northern Department, the British Consulate-General in Chicago compiled a memorandum dated 7th May, 1941, with the title, “The Ukrainian Community in America”.^[46]  The memorandum noted that a “National Ukrainian Church” had emerged in German-occupied Poland and in other German-occupied territories of Europe, and that this church was “sponsored” by Berlin and endorsed by Skoropadsky senior’s Hetmanite organisation, the latter, of which, was described as “the most reactionary of all Ukrainian groups” in America and was “semi-officially” recognised by Berlin as the “only legal Ukrainian Government in posse”.  The memorandum went on to say that the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was represented in America by roughly 600 churches, while approximately 450,000 Ukrainians in America, out of a total Ukrainian population of about 800,000 in the country, belonged to it.  According to the memorandum, members of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church who disapproved of the German-backed National Ukrainian Church withdrew their support for the Hetmanite organisation and, instead, realigned themselves with the Organisation for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODWU) in America.  The ODWU was described in the memorandum as having “fascist tendencies”, while its president, a one Professor Alexander Granowsky of the University of Minnesota, was referred to as an “avowed Nazi”.  

  The view in Whitehall that Ukrainian nationalism was almost exclusively confined to Eastern Galicia and therefore distinct from the rest of Ukraine, was reinforced by a captured Red Army regimental order, which had been issued during the Soviet liberation of Ukraine, a campaign which commenced in the late summer of 1943.  Sent by the War Office to the Northen Department, the translated order was issued on 14th January, 1944, to the 258th Khabarov Rifle Regiment by Chief of Staff Major Kharlamov and bore the title, “Defensive and counter-espionage measures against the Bandera Movement”.^[47]  The order began by saying that, “with the entry [of the Red Army] into the Western regions of the Ukraine the regiment may come into contact  with anti-Soviet elements, the bands of Bandera, and must be prepared in the near future for acts of terrorism.”  Soldiers were ordered not to go out alone and not to go out unarmed and, rather tellingly, acceptance of alcohol from the “civil population” was “strictly forbidden”.

  Returning to the already mentioned submission that SIS, towards the end of the war, established connections with the OUN and the UPA as a means to attempting to weaken the Soviet Union from within, the Northern Department received, on 13th December, 1945, from the War Office a study on “Ukrainian Nationalist Movements”, which had been largely compiled by German military documents.^[48]  The document said that Ukrainian nationalists, who, it was reported, were “uncompromisingly hostile” to Poles living in Ukraine, were “willing to negotiate” with the German and Hungarian armies in their pursuit of an independent Ukraine.  Further, the document noted that the only non-Ukrainian body with whom the OUN appeared to have been on “good terms” with were certain elements within the “Serbian national partisans” – Chetniks – though which Chetnik groups exactly the document did not specify (it should be noted that the Chetniks were a loose grouping of Serbian royalist and nationalist guerilla fighters in Axis-occupied Yugoslavia, some, of whom, collaborated with the Germans, while others did not).  What is most striking about the document, however, is that it noted that when the defeat of Germany became assured in 1944, there were reports of the OUN “seeking support” in Britain and “vice versa”.  Indeed, it was reported that Mykola Lebed, a senior OUN leader who was instrumental in the Ukrainian nationalist massacre of approximately 100,000 ethnic Poles in Eastern Galicia and Volyn between 1943 and 1945, was believed to have traveled to Britain via Spain in April of 1944 to “canvass support”.  

  Following the end of the war in Europe and the subsequent division of Germany into zones of occupation between the Allies, a matter emerged in the British zone which categorically demonstrated Whitehall’s stance on a Ukrainian national identity.  

  A memorandum, dated 1st August, 1945, by the “Ukrainian Relief Committee in Belgium” was sent to the headquarters of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery in Germany, petitioning for special provisions to be made for displaced Ukrainians in the British zone.^[49]  The memorandum was duly forwarded to Cecil Edward King of the Political Division of the Control Commission for Germany in Lubbecke.  In a letter dated 31st August, 1945, to I.T.M. Pink of the Political Division of the Control Commission for Germany in Berlin, King said that he recommended the Ukrainian Relief Committee and the Ukrainian Red Cross be “put out of action” in the British zone because both organisations were “more or less” controlled by “professional anti-Soviet agitators” and that their existence would be the “cause of constant complaints from the Russians.”  King then wrote something that emphatically corroborates this article’s contention.  He said: “We do not recognise a separate Ukrainian nationality.  For us a Ukrainian is either a Russian, a Pole, Czech etc., or a stateless person.”  He added: “For these reasons we cannot segregate “Ukrainians” in the British zone into separate groups, nor can we recognise specifically Ukrainian associations, even if their objects are purely humanitarian.  Nor can we allow them to establish contacts with Ukrainian societies etc. abroad, or to receive Ukrainian newspapers from e.g. the United States.”^[50]  King’s letter received a response dated 13th September, 1945, in which Pink said that he agreed with King’s views and that the British Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons Division in Berlin also concurred with King’s proposals.^[51] 

  Montgomery’s headquarters received another memorandum from another Ukrainian organisation; this time, from the “Ukrainian National Federation” in Goslar, dated 22nd August, 1945, requesting that displaced Ukrainians in the British zone not be returned to the Soviet Union.^[52]  The memorandum was forwarded to King, in Lubbecke.  His response was, again, unequivocal.  King wrote, on 15th September, 1945, to his equivalent in Berlin, that: “H.M.G. regard Ukrainians who were resident in Soviet territory on 1st September, 1939, as Soviet citizens who must be repatriated under the terms of the Yalta agreement.”^[53]  He added that “steps are being taken to dissolve Ukrainian organisations” in the British zone and that the Russians were informed of this.^[54]  King ended the letter by saying that, “for these reasons I consider that no reply should be sent to the memorandum in question.”^[55] 

  SIS was also clear in expressing the British Government’s stance on displaced Ukrainians.  In one instant, on 12th October, 1946, John Court Curry, a senior MI5 officer on loan to MI6, wrote to Hollis on the potential settling in Canada of displaced Ukrainians, saying that Ukrainians should, like Russians, be “treated as belonging to the USSR”.  He added that, “this applies equally to Ukrainian emigres or those in this country opposed to the regime in their own country.”^[56]   

  This article ends with an issue which triggered a major discussion within the Home Office.  In 1947, approximately 8,000 Ukrainians of the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Galician), more commonly known as the Galicia Division, were transported to Britain by the War Office, with the consent of the then Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee.  The decision by the Atlee government to transfer to Britain Ukrainians who had been members of the SS violated the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in 1946, which declared the entire SS to be a criminal organisation (lest us forget that this tribunal was established by the Allies and comprised a British judge, along with judges from America, France, and the Soviet Union).  Those Ukrainian Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEPs) had surrendered to British forces in Austria, after which they were transferred to camps in Italy.  The Galicia Division perpetrated numerous war crimes, including massacres of Polish and Slovakian civilians.  The reason for the transfer of the Ukrainian SEPs to Britain was “an alternative to being sent back to such fate as might await them in Russia.”^[57]  Furthermore, the Ministry of Labour in Britain intended to requisition some of the Ukrainians for the labour market, such as for the agricultural sector.

  Home Office officials were aware that newspapers and public opinion alike in Britain took a dim view, to say the least, of the presence in the UK of Ukrainian SEPs.  One newspaper clipping, entitled “Shelter for Brutes”, contained a letter published on 4th June, 1947, in the Evening News where the author, a British serviceman who had been a prisoner of war in various camps in Germany, recalled that he was guarded by “Ukrainian volunteers”.  He elaborated: “Without exception these guards were all brutal, uncouth, and bloodthirsty, using the butt-end of their rifles, or their bayonets, on helpless P.o.Ws at the slightest pretext.”  The author was vexed that Ukrainian SEPs were to be transported to Britain.  He said: “Who in the name of heaven is responsible for this?”^[58] 

  Beryl Hughes of the Home Office was ardent in her opposition to the presence in Britain of the Ukrainian SEPs.  In a minute dated 15th December, 1947, Hughes expressed concern at the prospect of relatives of the Ukrainians being brought to Britain.^[59]  She said: “There remains…the vexed question of dependants…if the Ukrainians are to be accepted as permanent residents of the United Kingdom we shall have to consider the admission of some classes of dependants.”  Hughes then turned her attention to the mental capacity of the Ukrainians, noting that they were of “a rather low mental grade”.  Commenting, in a rather worrying manner, that approximately 1,300 Ukrainians had entered Britain in November of 1947 alone, Hughes argued that: “We must think very seriously of the desirability of adding another 9,000 to the permanent alien population of the United Kingdom.”

  In another minute, Hughes expressed anger at the resettlement of the Ukrainians in Britain on account of them having fought for the Germans.^[60]  She contended: “On principle I dislike buying a pig in a poke and, as far as I am aware, no Home Office representative has ever seen these Ukrainians.  What we know of their war record is bad.”  Hughes added that to admit to the UK “undisputed volunteers to the Wehrmacht seems to me the height of absurdity.”  

  By the end of 1948, momentum had shifted in favour of sending most of the Ukrainian SEPs to Germany.  In a letter, dated 20th December, 1948, by W.S. Murrie, Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office, to Ivone Kirkpatrick, a senior official in the Foreign Office who had considerable experience and knowledge of Germany, it was said that: “We are prepared to make arrangements to retain in this country those who are permanently disabled and therefore unfit for any work, and I now hope that, thanks to your intervention, we shall be able to get the others out of the country before 31st December.”^[61]  Murrie cited a figure of 83 Ukrainians who were “long-term sick” and who would, therefore, remain in Britain.^[62]

  On the same day as Murrie’s letter to Kirkpatrick, the War Office issued an urgent memorandum to the headquarters of the Northern and Eastern commands of the British military, stating that all Ukrainian SEPs, except the long-term sick, “will be repatriated to Germany.”^[63]

  However, following protests by Ukrainian SEPs and some British charities, the Atlee government decided that the Ukrainian SEPs would be allowed to remain in Britain.  Accordingly, approximately 8,000 SS men were granted the right by the British state to live and work as free men in the UK, in spite of the Nuremberg ruling regarding the criminal nature of the SS.  What could encapsulate more that the Cold War was alive, while London’s wartime alliance with Moscow was dead?    

  This article demonstrates that the response of the British state, from 1908 to 1949, to the notion of a Ukrainian national identity was reasoned and, ultimately, correct, demonstrating the high-level education, intelligence, and experience of British officials at the time.  That is not to say, of course, that British officials in that period were always reasoned and correct in their judgments of matters.  However, there is no denying that Whitehall’s officials then were men (and women) of stature – and in many cases, immense stature.  Were they susceptible to preconceptions about Russia?  Yes, especially in the case of military and intelligence officials.  Were they inclined to use Ukrainian nationalists as pawns against Russia when it became clear that Germany would be defeated in the Second World War?  Yes, though, again, more so officials from the military and the intelligence community.  Were they susceptible to the claim that Kiev, Odessa, and Kharkov were not Russian cities but, instead, Ukrainian whose populations were Ukrainian – a race distinct from Russians?  No.  Did they understand that Eastern Galicia was distinct in terms of ethnicity and religion from the rest of Soviet Ukraine?  Yes.  Were they aware that that distinctiveness was due to Eastern Galicia having been controlled by the Poles and the Austrians for centuries?  Yes.  Were they conscious that anti-Russian sentiment in Soviet Ukraine was almost exclusively confined to Eastern Galicia?  Yes.  And did they believe that a Ukrainian national identity had appeal outside of Eastern Galicia in Soviet Ukraine? No.  Whilst many British observers had no love for Russia, and virtually all had only contempt for Bolshevism, they did not attach their names to the folly that is a Ukrainian national identity.  

  The difference in stature between Whitehall’s officials in the period 1908-1949 to today’s officials could not be starker.  Indeed, can the word “stature” be applied to contemporary officials in Whitehall?  The answer is nay; it is simply not plausible to apply that word to the people occupying senior positions in government in modern-day Britain.  One need only listen to their spoken English, or read their written English, or consider their ‘knowledge’ of history to make that deduction.  

  Stemming from that, a question surfaces:  Does dissent exist today behind closed doors in Whitehall pertaining to a Ukrainian national identity?  The answer must surely be in the affirmative.  However, until the twenty-year rule on releasing government papers to the public has expired, no definitive answer can be given.

  This article will conclude with the actuality that Whitehall’s awareness of the limited appeal of a Ukrainian national identity in Ukraine did not end in 1949 and was present even when the Soviet Union began to fragment in 1990, as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev’s calamitous leadership and catastrophic policies of glasnost and perestroika.  In a letter dated 4 April, 1990, Susan Miller of the Soviet Department in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) wrote to Nigel Broomfield, Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the FCO, in which she said that: “There is no single will for independence in Ukraine, but there have been signs recently of an awakening of nationalist tendencies.  For the moment, this movement is limited to a small core of intellectuals and has not spread to the masses.  Nor is there widespread anti-Russian feeling in the Ukraine.”^[64]  Further, in 1990 Whitehall was aware that a Ukrainian national identity was almost exclusively confined to Eastern Galicia.  In a letter, dated 4 April, 1990, by P.S. Roland of the Soviet Section, Research Department, FCO, to a Mr. Strang at the Soviet Department, FCO, the possibility of the emergence of an “independent Galicia” was discussed, in which Roland said that, “Ukrainian nationalists might begin pressing for independence for the West of the [Ukrainian Soviet Socialist] republic”, which he described as, “traditionally the nationalist stronghold.”^[65]