October 23, 2001
Could
Helicopters Have Saved People From the Top of the
Trade Center? By SCOT J. PALTROW and QUEENA SOOK KIM Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL WHEN a plane hit the World Trade
Center's north tower, Stephen L. Roach
phoned his wife twice from the 105th floor and got
their home answering machine. In one message, he
said he loved her. In the other, Isabel
Roach says she could hear the desperate shouts
of her husband's coworkers at bond-broker Cantor
Fitzgerald LP: "Try the roof! Try the roof!" Mr.
Roach shouted back to them, "There's no way out!"
If he was referring to a roof escape, he was
correct. The doors to the roof were locked.
Outside, hovering just a few hundred feet away from
hundreds of workers trapped above the inferno, were
New York police-rescue helicopters. Crews from the
Brooklyn headquarters of the police-aviation bureau
had scrambled at the first radio call of an
explosion at the trade center. Of the two choppers
that arrived within five minutes of the plane
crash, one was a Bell 412 equipped with a 250-foot
hoist and capable of carrying as many as 10
survivors at a time. The three-man crew was
specially trained for rooftop rescues. As the police pilots swooped in and peered
through a smoke-free area on top of the north
tower, however, they saw no one to save. People
were still alive on the top floors, according to
the New York Fire Department. But Greg
Semendinger, the first chopper pilot on the
scene, says, "There was nobody on the roof." Earlier
Rescue Dangerous as it sounds, this kind of airborne
mission can succeed. In 1993, Mr. Semendinger had
helped rescue 28 people from the roof of the same
north tower. A terrorist bomb had exploded in the
trade center's basement garage, sending thick smoke
up through the stairwells. That time, a police
chopper piloted by Mr. Semendinger had lowered two
men by rope to the roof. They cut down antennas to
clear a landing area from which the workers were
airlifted to safety. But rather than reinforce the life-saving
potential of rooftop rescues, the police
department's daring helicopter operation in 1993
had the opposite effect. After the garage bombing,
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
which owned the World Trade Center, and the fire
department made a deliberate decision not to plan
for future helicopter rescues, officials with the
two agencies say. The agencies rejected
recommendations from police pilots that an area of
the north tower's roof be kept clear for helicopter
landings. The antennas were put back up. And mostly
for security reasons, the
Port Authority kept the two sets of heavy metal
doors leading to the building's only roof exit
tightly locked -- as they would be on the
morning of Sept. 11. Part of the explanation for this decision in the
wake of the 1993 blast was an intense feud then
raging between the city's fire and police
departments over who had control at emergencies.
The fire department, which has no helicopters of
its own, dismissed the 1993 rooftop rescue as
grandstanding. Fire commanders said the mission was
dangerous and unnecessary. And they said any future
evacuations should be carried out by fire personnel
from the ground. Tough
Challenge On Sept. 11, a rescue from the north tower would
have been difficult but possible, Mr. Semendinger
and other veteran helicopter-rescue pilots say. The
first building hit by a hijacked plane, at 8:48
a.m., the north tower was the second to collapse,
one hour and 45 minutes later. Records of calls to
911 operators, first reported by the New York Daily
News, show that people on the top floors were
seeking help at least until 10:12 a.m., one hour
and 24 minutes after the strike. With fire raging
on the floors below them, they had no hope of
walking down to safety. Whether even a few of those lives could have
been saved by a roof rescue isn't clear. Climbing
staircases rapidly filling with smoke could have
been tough. The plane's impact might have knocked
stairway doors out of alignment, making them
impassible, regardless of whether they were locked.
The intense smoke and forest of rooftop antennas
made landing a helicopter impossible. Rescuers also
could have had trouble if a crowd of workers turned
into a desperate mob, competing to get off the
roof. But Mr. Semendinger says the wind that morning
did leave a corner of the tower relatively clear of
smoke, almost until the building collapsed. Using a
hoist with folding seats, rescuers could have saved
as many as a few dozen people, he estimates. NYPD Deputy Commissioner Thomas Antenen,
a spokesman for the department, confirms that the
police helicopters were on the scene. But he says
whether they could have rescued anyone "is a moot
issue." Helicopters couldn't have saved anyone from the
top of the south tower, NYPD pilots say. That
building's roof was completely obscured by a
100-foot layer of dense smoke blown from the north
tower by wind from the northwest. Port Authority and fire
officials, reeling from the combined loss of 417
people from their own ranks, understandably
bristle at any suggestion that decisions made
years ago prevented a helicopter rescue that
might have saved lives. "The people who were trapped above this fire
were trapped," says Frank Gribbon, the
department's spokesman. "Perhaps their only
recourse might have been to get to the roof, but it
might not have been likely that they [would
make] it either," because of smoke and other
dangers. Mr. Gribbon says the fire department did the
right thing by following its general policy of
getting occupants of tall buildings to move quickly
down stairways. He notes that an estimated 25,000
people from the two towers got out and lived. The FDNY's aversion to helicopter rescues is the
mainstream approach around the country. Fire
experts concluded long ago that if fires erupt in
tall buildings, and evacuation is necessary, it is
always best to send people down the stairs, not to
the roof. Smoke and flames tend to rise, and people
can get trapped at the top if weather or smoke
conditions make a helicopter approach
impossible. Curtis S. D. Massey, whose Massey
Enterprises Inc. is a leading consultant on
building-fire safety, says that the only major U.S.
city that requires high-rises to plan for aerial
rescues is Los Angeles. Convinced by experience
that helicopters can effectively evacuate trapped
people from burning high-rises, Los Angeles obliges
developers to build helipads on all buildings more
than 75 feet tall, or about seven stories. The Los
Angeles Fire Department has its own six-helicopter
rescue wing. Now, as safety agencies around the nation
analyze the Sept. 11 disaster, officials say they
expect that Los Angeles's approach may get
favorable new attention. Long-accepted fire-safety
practices "need to be reconsidered in light of
what's happened in New York," says Matt
Stuckey, a Houston Fire Department division
chief and a consultant with the Massey firm. On
Sept. 11, American Airlines Flight 11 gouged an
enormous hole in the trade center's north tower,
centered at about the 93rd floor of the 110-story
building. At least 700 people are thought to have
been trapped above the level of impact. Those
people included employees of Cantor Fitzgerald,
which occupied the 101st and the 103rd through
105th floors, and customers and workers at Windows
on the World restaurant, on the 106th and 107th
floors. Jules Roinnel, manager of the
1,100-member private club at the restaurant, says
the staff there knew the roof doors were locked. In
fire drills, Port Authority officials had
instructed the staff to gather in the restaurant's
entrance with customers and wait for instructions
from a lobby command center. If necessary,
occupants would evacuate down the stairwells. Mr. Roinnel, who wasn't at the restaurant on
Sept. 11, says that when the plane hit, dining-room
manager Doris Eng, who was on duty,
frantically called the fire-command center for
advice on what to do with the more than 70 people
trapped in the restaurant. It's not clear what Ms.
Eng was told, says Mr. Roinnel, who learned of the
call from a Port Authority official. Another
restaurant employee trapped above the inferno,
Christine Olender, called the home of her
boss, Glen Vogt, and said the group in the
restaurant hadn't yet received any instruction from
the fire-command center, Mr. Vogt says. Mr. Roinnel says he had long accepted as
sensible the building management's instructions to
stay put in an emergency, or head down. But now, he
says the doors to the roof should have been open.
"As long as it [a helicopter] could have
gotten close enough, some people probably could
have been saved," he says. The NYPD aviation
bureau, with six helicopters, became the main
air-sea rescue unit for the New York area in 1998,
when the Coast Guard moved its nearest chopper base
from Brooklyn to Atlantic City, N.J. On Sept. 11, a
total of four police helicopters ultimately flew to
the burning trade center, darting from one side of
the buildings to the other, scanning for signs of
anyone on the roof. Near
Miss One Bell 412, piloted by Det. Pat Walsh,
was so close to the towers that it was nearly hit
by the second hijacked plane. Police estimate that
the United jet came within 200 feet of the
helicopter before slamming into the south
tower. When the police pilots saw no one on the
north-tower roof, they called off other rescue
helicopters that were en route from Long Island. A
short time later, the south tower collapsed. Mr. Massey says he has reviewed videotapes of
the disaster and believes that if people had made
it to the roof of the north tower, they could have
breathed safely, despite smoke that blew across
much of the roof after rising from windows on the
north and west sides of the building. The roof can
be a good place to await rescue -- whether from the
ground or above -- because there is almost always a
layer of breathable air below the smoke. The people
trapped near the top of the north tower, however,
had no chance to reach the roof.
For decades, the Port
Authority says, it had kept the north tower's roof
doors locked. (A number of people did attempt to
reach the roof of the south tower, according to
recipients of cellphone calls they made as they
tried to escape. The doors to the roof there
were also kept locked, except when that
building's observation deck was open. The deck
hadn't opened yet the morning of Sept. 11.) Port Authority spokesman Allen Morrison
says the north tower's locked doors were necessary
to protect against vandalism to the building's
vital communications antennas, including the
360-foot mast that was the main television
transmitter for the New York area. The authority
also wanted to block from the roof people bent on
suicide or planning daredevil stunts. New York City's fire code
requires roof doors to be
unlocked or to have devices that allow someone to
open a locked door from the inside.
Officials at several companies that manage large
numbers of tall buildings in Manhattan say their
buildings provide roof access in an emergency. But the Port Authority's Twin Towers had the
status of state government property and therefore
were legally exempt from the fire code, according
to both the Port Authority and the city's building
department, which oversees enforcement of the fire
code. The fire department, consistent with its
focus on getting people to move down during fires,
went along with the authority's policy of keeping
the trade center roof exits locked, Mr. Gribbon,
the department spokesman, says. Tough
Locks People who needed access to the roof, such as
window washers and technicians who serviced the
antennas, were issued electronic-key cards and also
had to be buzzed through by security guards who
monitored the doors by closed-circuit television
from a 22nd-floor office, according to Alan
Reiss, who until July was the Port Authority
official responsible for the trade center. On Sept. 11, falling debris knocked out the
22nd-floor security center's equipment just after
the plane hit, says Mr. Reiss, who is still with
the Port Authority and was helping with the
transition to new management that took over the
complex in July. The guards, who had to be rescued
themselves, couldn't have buzzed anyone through to
the roof. Even after the building's electricity was
cut off, internal batteries in the electromagnetic
locks would have kept the doors closed for several
hours, Mr. Reiss says. To many people who saw the shocking events of
Sept. 11 on television, a helicopter rescue amid
the flames and smoke might seem improbable. But
Richard Wright, director of safety and
flight operations for the Helicopter Association
International, a trade group in Washington, D.C.,
says that as he watched on live TV that morning, he
recalled rescues he had made during his 25 years as
a helicopter pilot for the Coast Guard and Marine
Corps. In 1988, he helped lift oil-rig workers from
the burning sea around the Piper Alpha rig, after
an explosion destroyed the North Sea facility, Mr.
Wright says. Such oil-rig rescues have been made in
the middle of fierce storms and at night, he
says. The February 1993 attack on the World Trade
Center had led to another notable chopper rescue.
That day, a terrorist bomb exploded in the garage,
killing six people, injuring 1,042 and sending
smoke up through both towers. The bombing was far
less severe than the Sept. 11 attack and caused a
fire that was much smaller and containable. Two police helicopters, including one piloted by
Mr. Semendinger, scrambled immediately after the
1993 bombing. As the choppers approached, the
pilots picked up radio traffic among emergency
personnel on the ground, indicating that stairwells
were filling with smoke and some occupants of the
north tower were having medical problems, Mr.
Semendinger recalls. Despite the antennas on the
roof of the north tower, the pilot says, he decided
to try to land his Bell 412 on that building. There was no one on the roof waiting to be saved
that day either, he says. But the roof was clear of
smoke, and two of his crew members climbed down a
rope from the chopper, cut down some of the
antennas and dismantled rooftop floodlights to
clear an area for the helicopter to land. (On Sept.
11, there would be too much smoke to send rescuers
down to the roof, so the police only contemplated
trying to save victims with the hoist.) In 1993, the doors to the roof were locked, too.
But because there was relatively little smoke on
the roof, police Sgt. Timothy Farrell was
able to use tools he brought with him to break open
the doors and get down the stairs. A number of
people who had tried to walk down from upper floors
through smoke had suffered asthma or heart attacks,
among other problems, according to a report
published in 1994 by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. The helicopters evacuated 28
people with medical difficulties from the roof. The fire department was officially in charge of
the 1993 emergency and oversaw the evacuation of
tens of thousands of people from the entire
trade-center complex, including the two towers. But
some press accounts gave prominent play to the
police-helicopter pilots and their rooftop heroics.
Top fire commanders, who had never authorized the
helicopter landing, were furious. Angry
Letter A month after the bombing, the New York City
Fire Chiefs Association sent a letter to
then-Mayor David N. Dinkins, denouncing the
police-helicopter rescue as "a cheap publicity
stunt." The people removed by helicopter "were in
no danger until the police department arrived and
gravely jeopardized their safety by this stupid
act," the letter said. The helicopters could have
crashed and caused injuries or deaths, the letter
added. A helicopter crash could have ruptured the
building's water line, leading to an uncontrollable
spread of the fire, the letter said. The ferocity of this reaction can only be
understood against the backdrop of a long-running
feud between the police and fire departments over
who should be in charge at fire and accident
scenes. Since the late 1980s, there had been
repeated episodes of
arguments, shoving matches
and even fist fights between personnel from
the two services at emergency sites, according to
press reports at the time. Less than two months
before the 1993 bombing, there had been a physical
confrontation between police and firefighters at
the scene of a serious car accident in the Park
Slope section of Brooklyn. In its 1994 report reviewing the response to the
trade center bombing, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency obliquely criticized the fire
department. FEMA said the department ought to
conduct joint drills and planning with the police
department for possible future helicopter rescues.
FEMA didn't contradict the mainstream thinking on
moving people down the stairwells of a burning
high-rise. But it did say, "The fire department
does not operate in a vacuum." When the Port Authority
sat down with the fire department to discuss
improving fire safety at the trade center,
however, the department adamantly opposed making
arrangements for helicopter rescues, says the
Port Authority's Mr. Reiss. "I remember lots of
anger" within the fire department over the
police-helicopter rescue, he says. "I wasn't
going to get in the middle of that," he adds.
The fire department's wishes meshed with the
Port Authority's desire to keep the roof locked
to prevent vandalism and suicides, he
says. "The fire department thought their people on the
ground should handle evacuations, and basically
there was an agreement that you don't use
helicopters to do rescues," he adds. The fire
department's Mr. Gribbon confirms this account and
says the FDNY considered the authority's security
worries sufficient grounds for locking the roof
exits. Mr. Antenen, the police spokesman, declines to
comment on the 1993 rescue, its aftermath or on any
controversy between the police and fire departments
years ago. When Mayor Rudolph Giuliani took office
in 1994, his administration quelled the police-fire
feuding. The two departments agreed on a protocol
for using helicopters in major fires. But the
agreement closely followed the fire department's
preferences. Helicopter rescues are to be attempted only if
the fire department calls for them "as a last
resort," explains Edward J. Dennehy, a
deputy fire chief. Police helicopters aren't
allowed to fly directly to burning buildings and
attempt to rescue people. The protocol requires the
choppers to land at designated Manhattan heliports
and wait for firefighters to meet them there. The
police helicopters then are supposed to ferry the
firefighters to the building to carry out the
rescue. Mr. Gribbon says that as far as he knows the
plan has never been used. It would be "something of
a lengthy process for
us to enact this procedure," he says. On Sept. 11, the fire department never called
for a helicopter rescue, Mr. Gribbon says. The
disaster "occurred so rapidly and was so severe
that fire department resources were committed to an
internal evacuation of people," he says. Commanders on the scene, many of whom were
killed, didn't anticipate that the twin towers
would collapse as quickly as they did, he adds. If
those commanders had had more time, Mr. Gribbon
says, "I'm certain that at some point, helicopter
operations would have been a consideration and
probably would have been implemented." Police pilots say they perform helicopter
rescues with some regularity, although they rarely
receive the sort of notice they got in 1993. Only a
few weeks before Sept. 11, an NYPD helicopter had
used its hoist to lift an injured boy and his
mother from a cruise ship about 10 miles outside
New York Harbor. The NYPD helicopter teams are limited when it
comes to fires, however. Unlike firemen, they don't
carry the sort of breathing apparatus that allows a
rescuer to penetrate a smoky building to search for
survivors. Under the New York rescue protocol, the
firefighters whom the police choppers are supposed
to ferry to burning buildings would have the
breathing equipment. Things are different in Los Angeles. Paul
Shakstad, chief pilot of the Los Angeles fire
department's air-operations division, says his
helicopter-rescue teams carry the breathing
apparatus and are self-sufficient. The division was
launched in 1962 to help battle brush fires. In the
mid-1980s, the fire department began using its six
helicopters for rooftop rescues from skyscrapers,
as well. The strategy has paid off several times -- most
notably in 1988, when a raging fire in the 62-story
First Interstate Bank tower destroyed four floors.
Rescuers delivered to the roof saved eight people
trapped above the fire, who were carried down by
helicopter. The fire ignited late at night, so few
people were in the building. On Sept. 11, the FDNY didn't have a plan for
dealing with a disaster in which intense flames
engulfed multiple floors of a skyscraper, Mr.
Gribbon says. "Up until now, we've never really had
more than one floor burning in a fully occupied
high-rise building," he says. Referring to Sept.
11, he adds: "Did we ever plan for something like
this, of this magnitude? No." Mr. Antenen of the
police department says he doesn't see a need to
review the city's policy on rooftop
rescues. Mr. Gribbon says the fire department "will
probably look at a lot of the things we do." But
such a review won't necessarily lead to changes
that would encourage rooftop rescues, he
says. -- Ann Davis,
Aaron Lucchetti and Gregory Zuckerman
contributed to this article. Write to Scot J.
Paltrow at scot.paltrow@wsj.com
and Queena Sook Kim at queena.kim@wsj.com The
above news item is reproduced without editing other
than typographical; it represents the views only of
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