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FDR and the Holocaust; and should Auschwitz have been bombed?

(A 1997 historical debate)

 

24 Jan. 1997

Robert Michael

In preparing a Holocaust chronology, I have unearthed much material on the allies, as well as the perpetrators and victims of the Holocaust.

What is so annoying is that I keep coming up with material on FDR's morally disastrous involvement, or lack of involvement. Facts that I am concerned about are his choice of the apparently antisemitic Breckinridge Long as State's visa director, his choice of the apparently antisemitic Henry Stimson as a board member of the War Refugee Board, his consistent omission of Jews from mention both in his weekly news conferences and allied statements (with one exception in each, I believe), his damning and discriminatory anti-Jewish statements at Casablanca to [French generals] Noguès and Giraud, his conversations with Leo Crowley and Jan Karski.

Most recently, reading a book on Fr. Coughlin, I now find that one of FDR's statements in his first and second inaugurals, about chasing the moneylenders from the temple -- I was suspicious since this is a traditional anti-Jewish phrase -- was suggested to him by Fr. Coughlin himself. I am also aware of FDR's lack of support for the Wagner-Rogers bill and his support of, I think it was the Hemmings bill, that resulted in the rejection of Jewish children but the acceptance of non-Jewish children into the States.

At any rate, I was wondering whether listmembers are aware of actions FDR took, besides the creation of the WRB and his goal of winning the war, that would indicate he gave a damn about the Jews of Europe.

The other issue that puzzles me is how to square his antisemitic background with his Jewish friends. Were they friends or just political allies?

Thanking you in advance,

Bob Michael,
Prof. European History


Joseph Poles

In response to Professor Robert Michael 's inquiry, David Wyman's book entitled Abandonment of the Jews (1984) has taken FDR to task. He suggests that FDR placed "buffers" in the way of Jewish committees and dodged any action until he was forced, in January 1944, to allow the War Refugee Board to come into existence. Long was one such buffer as he was already in place in the State Dept. in charge of visas. It is hard to refute Wyman's conclusions. As a pragmatic politician FDR took the easiest path by dodging the "Jewish bullet." When the heat came down on FDR, he replaced Long.


25 Jan. 1997

Meredith Hindley

For answers to Professor Michael's questions, I would suggest that he look at Richard Breitman and Alan Kraut's "European Jewry and American Refugee Policy, 1933-1945" (Indiana, 1987). The book is useful because it does not make the obvious condemnations, but rather attempts to contextualize the course of events and FDR's reactions to them. They are critical of FDR's administration, but even-handed.

The problem with studying and writing about the Allied and neutral responses to the Holocaust is that we want a moral response from governments who had never demonstrated a tendency to act in a moral way, had never lent large-scale assistance to non-natives, nor, were in a position to do so, particularly once the war began. In doing my own research and writing on the subject, specifically the War Refugee Board, I constantly have to remind myself to use an interwar or war-time perspective before going for the easy condemnation. It's too easy to call leaders anti-semitic and blame the lack of action on that factor alone. The events are far more complex and our hindsight too clear.

Professor Michael's questions actually raise some broader issues that the list might consider:

  • What is obligation of a government to aid the population of another country(ies)?
  • How has the specter of obligation changed over time?
  • What types of criteria have been used in the past to justify intervention or non-intervention?
  • Is there room for humanitarian politics at the negotiating table?

Meredith Hindley, American University


27 Jan. 1997

Robert Michael

I have looked at the Breitman book and yes it does contextualize. But what I get from Wyman's Abandonment of the Jews and his multi-volume collection of documents America and the Holocaust is the double standard our nation used in judging when, where, and how much to help European dp's. The double standard is appalling. Our nation assisted with money, ships, food, etc., civilians and POWs. We transported people all over the world, when they were not Jews. We fed Greeks, even collaborating with the Reich government and the British in these efforts. Even the WRB used more than 90% American Jewish funds to support it, whereas the US government used its own funds to support help for non-Jewish refugees. It's the double standard, whether for child immigrants or shipping or getting around restrictive laws that so weigh upon the researcher.


27 Jan. 1997

Melanie Joi Feuerstein

I concur!! I had many of the same reactions in response to Wyman's indictment and evidentiary support. How about the War Dept. specious arguments against the feasibility of bombing Auschwitz? An interesting note indicative of my colleagues' response as well: after Wyman's visit, a significant portion of them felt necessary to expound on the "Breckenridge Long is a son of a bitch" approach to their essay treatment of Wyman's book.

Since you are at UMass, have you had the opportunity to engage him on these issues?

You may find complimentary significance in Dinnerstein's treatment of these and other issues of American anti-semitism, inclusive of the congressman from FDR's Hyde Park district mailing copies of the "Protocols" under congressional frank.


27 Jan. 1997

Michael Friedland

I read with interest Robert Michael's indictment of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his alleged anti-Semitism and lack of concern as to the fate of European Jews during the Holocaust. Recent postings to H-Diplo have mentioned scholarship debunking David Wyman's The Abandonment of the Jews , yet I remain convinced that Wyman's argument that FDR could have done much more on behalf of the Jews after 1941 is essentially sound. I am therefore not about to take issue with Professor Michael's claims that FDR's lack of involvement was "morally disastrous."

What should be kept in mind, however, is that Roosevelt was not acting in a vacuum. When discussing his role in the refugee crisis before the entry of the United States into the Second World War (or even before the outbreak of hostilities), consideration of the role of Congress is essential. When Robert Wagner and Edith Nourse Rogers introduced their bill in early 1939, providing for the admittance of German refugee children in the United States, many religious figures, labor organizations, prominent politicians, and editors supported it. Other restrictionist and patriotic groups, such as the American Legion, DAR, and the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies banded together in opposition to the Wagner-Rogers Bill, insisting that charity began at home, and criticizing the notion of separating children from their parents or guardians.

Throughout the criticism ran a thinly-veiled concern that the majority of children would be Jewish, which the bills supporters tried to counter by insisting that most would be Christian. In the end, the bill did not survive the amendments placed on it in the Senate. It is true that Roosevelt did nothing to support the bill; it is also clear that the majority of Americans were opposed to the bill. The State Department opposed it from the outset, and Roosevelt did not mention it at all in public. Wyman, no admirer of Roosevelt on this score, notes that "Fresh from the bitter battles of the 1938 election, Congress in 1939 had a more conservative complexion than before and was intent on asserting its independence from strong executive leadership. Political crosscurrents unquestionably made it difficult for Roosevelt to back this comparatively minor legislation which was very unpopular in some quarters and which Congress generally saw as too hot to handle." ( Paper Walls , New Yo! rk: Pantheon Books, 1985, p. 97).

Roosevelt was not particularly enthusiastic about the Hennings Bill, for he feared for the safety of children aboard ships steaming through submarine-infested waters, and knew that if children died, he might be held responsible. Throughout the deliberations in Congress, he made it clear that he did not want the bill to include provisions that would leave the decision to send such ships through the war zone to the executive, and supporters of the bill acquiesced. The responsibility was given to Congress, which passed the Hennings Bill and thus amended the Neutrality Acts, and the few British children who made their way to the United States were carried on commercial vessels, sponsored not by the government but by organizations such as the Women's Committee for Mercy Ships. In the end, once German submarines began sinking ships and killing children in the fall of 1940, the British government put an end to the evacuation. The Hennings Bill did not, as Professor Michael states, ! "result in the rejection of Jewish children but the acceptance of non-Jewish children into the States"; it was a bill targeted at British children alone -- to those children who, by the middle of 1940, still had a home to return to, and could be accepted under the terms of visitors' visas. It is doubtful whether FDR's support could have saved the Wagner-Rogers Bill, but to claim that he supported the Hennings Bill because it dealt with "non-Jewish children" is a misreading of the historical record. He supported neither, not because of any latent anti-Semitism, but because he had become politically cautious by the late 1930's, both on domestic as well as international affairs. I'm not sure that political timidity can be equated with anti-Semitism.

Although there is little doubt that Breckinridge Long was anti-Semitic (Wyman suggests that Long was more of a nativist than an anti-Semite, as "the record does not show him to be overtly negative towards Jews simply because they were Jews," (Wyman, Abandonment of the Jews , New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, p. 191) although I believe his statements single out Jews for opprobrium), he was hardly alone in his bigotry; indeed, in the 1930's, FDR would have been hard-pressed to find any ranking State Department official who was not anti-Semitic. Nativism and religious bigotry were rampant in American diplomatic circles in the United States and in American embassies throughout the world. I am not sure what Professor Michael means by Henry Stimson's "apparent" anti-Semitism, however; like other nativists in the Roosevelt Administration, he was concerned about an influx of refugees coming into the United States and how to get them to leave after the war, but there is little to sugg! est that he was anti-Semitic.

As to FDR's "consistent omission of Jews from mention both in his weekly news conferences and allied statements," the negative cannot produce the positive -- lack of discussion of Jews does not therefore prove anti-Semitism. Strong anti-Jewish sentiments were commonplace in the United States in the 1930's and 1940's, and Roosevelt was already faced with criticism from bigots that he was engaging not in a "New Deal" but a "Jew Deal" for his appointment of Jews to important positions in his government: Henry Morgenthau, Jr., as Secretary of the Treasury, being the most notable, but the ranks of advisors included Rose Schneiderman, Sidney Hillman, David Niles, and Ben Cohen. Whereas Jews only made up about 3 percent of the nation's population, they constituted 15 percent of the higher tiers of FDR's appointments. In such a climate, credit should be given to Roosevelt for his response to a question about his ancestry, in which he publicly stated that in "the dim distant past" they! "may have been Jews or Catholics or Protestants. What I am more interested in is whether they were good citizens and believers in God. I hope they were both." (Quoted in Geoffrey Ward, A First-Class Temperament , New York: Harper and Row, 1989, p. 254.)

It is doubtful that FDR used the phrase about driving the money changers out of the temple was directed at the Jews. In his second inaugural in 1937 (not to mention the entire campaign of 1936), Roosevelt had castigated Big Business, telling audiences that he was proud that it counted him as an enemy, leading several of his advisers to worry about his penchant for demagoguery and the possibility of stirring up class strife, but no one accused him of anti-Semitism. I would be very interested in learning the source for the information that Coughlin suggested that FDR use the phrase in his first and second inaugurals for several reasons. If the source is from Coughlin himself, it is highly unreliable; the "Radio Priest" was well-known for his tendency to prevaricate, especially when it came to his own sense of self-importance. Secondly, it's a pretty familiar biblical verse, and if Roosevelt, an Episcopal vestryman who was well-versed in the Bible, was looking for a choice bit ! of rhetoric with which to assail business and banks, he didn't need Coughlin's assistance.

Alan Brinkley has described in some detail in Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin & The Great Depression (New York: Vintage Books, 1983) how Coughlin had become something of a pest in the White House as early as 1934, and how FDR went out of his way to avoid him; by 1935, the break between the two men was clear, and this two years before the second inaugural.

As for Professor Michael's final question: "how to square [FDR's] antisemitic background with his Jewish friends. Were they friends or just political allies?" There may never be a way to prove it one way or the other. There is an overwhelming amount of evidence to suggest that FDR befriended people when they could help his political future, and/or when it was politically expedient for him to do so, and when their usefulness was over, so was the friendship. Such a cavalier attitude towards others was not confined to Jewish acquaintances; witness how he neglected his long-time aide Missy Le Hand after she had a stroke. This is not to suggest that anti-Semitism did not lurk in his background. Geoffrey Ward, in A First-Class Temperament , goes into considerable detail stressing that both Franklin and Eleanor were not immune to the anti-Semitism that circulated in their social circles, and provides disturbing examples of jokes and comments from their letters, which is particular! ly surprising given Eleanor's later humanitarianism. Despite Ward's explanation that FDR's anti-Semitism was more "jocular" than, say, his stepbrother's "viciousness," the fact is that Roosevelt was not against telling anti-Jewish jokes, even in the company of Henry Morgenthau (Ward, A First Class Temperament , p. 251). There is much evidence to suggest that the Morgenthau and Roosevelt couples were genuinely fond of each other, although it is not possible to separate the symbiotic political relationship of the two men from their friendship -- both were progressive Democrats, well-to-do gentlemen farmers from upstate New York, and both interested in political careers. His comment to Leo Crowley, a Catholic economist, that "this is a Protestant country, and the Catholics and Jews are here under sufferance," and that it was up to Crowley and Morgenthau "to go along with anything that I want" can be interpreted as a coarsely-worded comment on political and ethnic realities, cir! ca 1942, or as a prejudiced reflection on the status of non-Prot! estants in the United States. I'm not sure if this is the statement to which Professor Michael is referring, but if it is, it may reflect more of a coarsely-worded comment on political and ethnic realities, circa 1942, on the part of a scion from an established Protestant family than anti-Semitism (Quoted in Ward, A First Class Temperament , p. 255n48).

Professor Michael raises some interesting questions, and as someone interested in the vagaries of political reputations, I hope that other subscribers to H-Diplo will pick up the thread and run with it.


3 Feb. 1997

Brian Loring Villa
University of Ottawa

I just want to compliment H-Diplo, its hard working staff and particularly Michael Friedland for an exceptional posting on Franklin D. Roosevelt and anti-semitism. It is a long, thoughtful and carefully nuanced review of a difficult question. I thought I knew all there was to be said about this subject but I have profited , as I am sure many others have, from this posting. It is well worth filing for permanent retention.


6 Feb 1997

Robert Michael

I would like to thank Prof. Michael Friedland for his excellent comments on FDR in response to my queries. Of course the problem is not just with FDR, but with the anti-Jewish themes that run through both the Jews' friends and their enemies -- to this extent it is similar to Germany in the 1930s and 1940s.

Please accept my following comments in the collegial spirit in which they are offered.

When thinking about FDR, the context of his behavior, I wonder where we should draw the line between explaining and explaining away actions. I understand something about Adolf Hitler and the context in which he lived and acted and thought. I understand something about the tradition of anti-Jewishness and antisemitism in European history, indeed almost two millennia of it. Hitler's attitudes toward the Jews reflect the attitudes of many, if not most, Europeans of the time. But Hitler also had a specific responsibility for his behavior within the context of his time.

One connection between AH and FDR, which I do not believe has been discussed up to now, are FDR's secret statements to Generals Giraud and Nogues while FDR was at Casablanca. He espouses, and he does it twice in one afternoon, discriminatory attitudes toward the Jews of North Africa that closely follow German attitudes toward Jews in the 1930s. Indeed, FDR even mentions that German discrimination against Jews was "understandable."

If this were the only evidence we had, well, perhaps it could be passed off as a momentary lapse. But are we not all responsible for even our prejudices? Are not we all, as moral human beings, high or low, obliged to become aware of our inevitable prejudices and refuse to act on them?

Of course America was antisemitic, climaxing in the 1930s and 1940s. But to perceive this situation in itself as relieving even our president of his obligations as a human being is wrong, in my view. I realize that probably no one on this list agrees with the antisemitic attitudes and behaviors of so many Americans during the Holocaust. But Prof. Friedland and I seem to disagree as to the individual moral responsibilities of our leaders during this period -- or do we not?

Of course I understand about the isolationism and antisemitism among many in Congress. The Wagner-Rogers Bill was minor, but symbolically very significant. That Roosevelt would abandon his fellow democrat, NY Senator Robert Wagner (of German Catholic background), and those standing for humanitarianism in this country seems cowardly at the least. The bill did have the support of many churches, humanitarian organizations, newspapers, and public figures. Yes, FDR was the most political of animals. Perhaps expecting him to follow his earlier humanitarian statements is simply too naive. Was FDR a great leader or not? Was he one of our greatest Presidents or not? Was he skilled only in following certain aspects of public opinion, or did he ever lead? Or was his feeling about it mirrored in the comments of his cousin, Laura Delano Houghteling, wife of the Commissioner of Immigration, "20,000 [Jewish] children would all too soon grow up into 20,000 ugly adults."

As to the Hennings Bill, I agree about FDR's escaping responsibility for any sinkings. What I meant by helping British but not German-Jewish children was that the net effect of FDR's role, active or passive, was to encourage the former and discourage the latter. Even though he may have been getting more politically cautious, as you write, nevertheless Roosevelt ordered Secretary of State Cordell Hull to award these Christian children the status of "visitors" (immigrants planning some day on returning to their native land) exploiting a loophole in America's visa restrictions never employed for Jewish refugee children. It still seems to me that FDR and others, esp. in State, certainly had a double standard.

FDR replaced the pro-Jewish Leo Crowley with the anti-Jewish Henry Stimson on the WRB. What suggests to me that Stimson was antisemitic is that as a member of the War Refugee Board he blocked a proposal for temporary havens for Jews in the United States. He argued that a "Jewish problem" disquieted the country, since the European Jews do not assimilate well, and so quotas on immigration have to take precedence over humanitarian considerations -- at a time when over ninety percent of immigration quotas from Nazi Europe were unfilled. In addition to blocking safe havens for Jews in the United States, Stimson helped kill a Senate resolution favoring a Jewish state in Palestine. And as secretary of state in 1929, he had argued that the Jewish *race* was alien and unassimilable and therefore Jewish immigration had to be restricted. Earlier in the war, he brushed off Jewish complaints regarding the Nazi death camps as Semitic grievances.

Granted, there were a disproportion of Jews in FDR's administration. Frankly, I don't understand how FDR could countenance this situation. Why was he willing to take risks in this area, but not at all for the Jews being murdered in Europe? Were these mostly secularized Jews, like Morganthau? The informal leader of liberal American Judaism, Stephen Wise, feeling duped, after the war I believe, distanced himself from FDR. Many anti-Jewish individuals still have Jewish friends, whom they see as exceptional Jews.

As to the money-changers, even if Coughlin were imagining that he actually suggested the phrase to FDR, the fact is Coughlin himself used it several times in his radio addresses just before the first inaugural and that Rep. Louis McFadden was using it before the 2d inaugural. FRD had to know this. Both Coughlin and McFadden (Republican from PA and chair of the House's Banking and Currency Committee) realized what FDR must have realized, that the phrase was traditionally associated with anti-Jewish attitudes.

As to FDR's comment to Leo Crowley that "this is a Protestant country, and the Catholics and Jews are here on sufferance" etc., I differ with Prof. Michael Friedland, who sees it more as "a reflection of political and ethnic realities" whereas I find it representing the anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish attitudes of a Protestant bigot.

Like Prof. Friedland, I hope other members of the list pick up on this thread/theme and "run with it."


6 Feb. 1997

Mark S. Byrnes

Regarding FDR's reference to driving the money changers out of the temple: I recently showed my Recent US class an excerpt from Truman's acceptance speech at the Democratic convention in 1948. He used the same turn of phrase, deliberately echoing FDR. Would he use such a phrase if he believed it would strike Jewish voters as anti-semitic? In the same speech, he denounced a Republican refugee bill as "anti-semitic and anti-Catholic," clearly trying to appeal to those key components of the New Deal coalition.


7 Feb. 1997

Robert Michael

As to Truman, I agree, he did not sense that the phrase was antisemitic. Indeed he must have consciously chosen to connect himself to the most popular president (?) we've had -- at least the only 4 termer. Truman was also kept totally out of it, I believe, by FDR and so I would separate his behavior from FDR's. I have not seen any ancillary evidence about Truman's antisemitism, so an isolated phrase does not prove anything. The point with FDR is that this is but one of many pieces of evidence.

Also, whereas Truman had an American icon to associate himself with, at the time FDR being considered the greatest, FDR followed Fr. Coughlin and Rep. McFadden, two outrageous antisemites who used the phrase.


7 Feb. 1997

Brad De Long

Robert Michael wrote lots of things that made me sigh. The paragraph that made me sigh the most was:

One connection between AH and FDR, which I do not believe has been discussed up to now, are FDR's secret statements to Generals Giraud and Nogues while FDR was at Casablanca. He espouses, and he does it twice in one afternoon, discriminatory attitudes toward the Jews of North Africa that closely follow German attitudes toward Jews in the 1930s. Indeed, FDR even mentions that German discrimination against Jews was "understandable."

The phrase "connection between A[dolf] H[itler] and FDR" is singularly infelicitous.

Placing too much weight on what a politician says alone in a room with others is also a mistake: good politicians -- and FDR was the best -- agree with whoever they are talking to on everything they possibly can, for they are focused on getting the other person's agreement on whatever is important to the politician -- and the best way to get them to agree with you on important issue X is to pretend to agree with them on all other issues in the universe.

And recall that Roosevelt was an extraordinarily effective anti-anti-Semite: moving heaven and earth and plotting most deviously over a course of years to get the U.S. involved in a European crusade against Hitler out of totally "humanitarian" motives, for the U.S. national interest was not at all at stake in WWII in Europe...


9 Feb. 1997

Ryan Stanley
Department of History, Harvard University

And recall that Roosevelt was an extraordinarily effective anti-anti-Semite: moving heaven and earth and plotting most deviously over a course of years to get the U.S. involved in a European crusade against Hitler out of totally "humanitarian" motives, for the U.S. national interest was not at all at stake in WWII in Europe...

An "anti-anti-Semite." True, but the fact that FDR vigorously opposed the Jews' mortal enemy does not in itself prove that he harboured any great love for the Jews. I was under the impression that the primary objects of FDR's humanitarian concerns were the people of Great Britain, not the Jews of Europe. And "not at all" is a strong phrase -- I thought FDR saw the survival of Great Britain, America's staunchest ally in Europe and a leading trade partner, as very much a matter of national interest for the U.S. Whether we, in retrospect, might disagree is another matter. But it's been a while since I studied WWII -- what evidence is there that FDR considered the rescue of the Jews a principal reason to go to war?

In any case, I do concur with the general thrust of Mr. De Long's post, that historians sometimes seem inclined to hold FDR's personal character to unreasonably high standards. The possibility that a patrician U.S. leader born in the late 19th century might have been somewhat anti-Semitic does not arouse any great outrage in me.


9 Feb. 1997

Ross Mackenzie

Robert Michael wrote:

Prof. Michael Friedland and I seem to disagree as to the individual moral responsibilities of our leaders during this period -- or do we not? ...... Of course I understand about the isolationism and antisemitism among many in Congress. The Wagner-Rogers Bill was minor, but symbolically very significant. That Roosevelt would abandon his fellow democrat, NY Senator Robert Wagner (of German Catholic background), and those standing for humanitarianism in this country seems cowardly at the least. ... Yes, FDR was the most political of animals. Perhaps expecting him to follow his earlier humanitarian statements is simply too naive. Was FDR a great leader or not? Was he one of our greatest Presidents or not? Was he skilled only in following certain aspects of public opinion, or did he ever lead?

If I may take up Professor Michael's invitation to run with this thread: I feel that perhaps he is concentrating overly on one, albeit important, aspect of Roosevelt's actions. It must be stressed that in the two years between the outbreak of war in Europe and the involvement of the United States in that war, the President's attention was largely concentrated on two key priorities; his re-election and expanding American aid to Britain. Helping Jewish refugees at this point was simply not:

  • A particularly practical policy from a political point of view considering the strength of isolationist opinion exemplified by the America First organisation. FDR was, if nothing else, a consummate politician and as he had stated in a Fireside Chat to the Nation as early as June 28 1933; "I believe in practical explanations and practical policies."
  • An important enough item on his own internal agenda to warrant much personal time or attention, particularly since he could already rely on the important Jewish vote. This, in itself, is hardly an indication of anti-Jewish opinion, since the interests of European Jews were significantly enhanced by his support for greater American involvement in and support for Britain in the war against Fascism. It is, however, more an indication of the sheer weight of work with which FDR had to contend, and which was, undoubtedly, an important contributory factor in the collapse of his personal physical condition as the war progressed. Furthermore, it is perhaps best to note that, at the time, the extent of the Holocaust ultimately perpetrated in continental Europe was not as clear as it has since become and that it only became formally systematised in 1941 with the adoption of the Final Solution, by which stage FDR (newly re-elected ) was espousing considerably more interventionist! policies than he had done earlier.

FDR could and did lead the nation and manipulate public opinion to his advantage but he was skilled enough a politician to recognise when it was politic to do so and how to do it ( with the definite exception of his proposed Supreme Court reforms in 1937 ). His moral support for the plight of occupied Europe and its inhabitants was never in doubt, but he was determined not to let the handling of what he undoubtedly considered a less important matter affect his overall aims and objectives.

In 1937 the imprudent handling of the Supreme Court reforms had helped ensure that little domestic policy of substance received Congressional endorsement throughout the remainder of his second term. Now he was determined to ensure that Congress did not gainsay him again, and its more internationalist minded members were often the most socially conservative ( anti-Jewish ). The fight against Fascism had therefore to be avoid being couched as a crusade for the Jewish race.

Professor Robert Michael also wrote:

In addition to blocking safe havens for Jews in the United States, Stimson helped kill a Senate resolution favoring a Jewish state in Palestine.

This statement clearly infers that anti-Zionism equates to anti-Semitism, which I find difficult to swallow. A man may possess no prejudices against Jews in general, but still have objected to the idea of depriving a majority group ( The Arabs ) of control of their own territory in favour of a minority group ( The Jews ). It was simply undemocratic and why should the Arabs be persecuted for the actions of the Germans? One principle the Allies were fighting for was that of self-determination. Alsace-Lorraine was to be returned to France, after its re-annexation by Germany, because that was the will of the majority of its people, why should Palestine be any different?

Palestine was also a mandated territory of the League of Nations under British control. Considering that the United States was not even a member of the League, I fail to see, how its post-war status was ever anything to do with America at this point in time.

It is perhaps also pertinent to note that, despite Truman's protestations of support for the Jewish cause after the war, American immigration quotas remained at low pre-war levels. Truman merely passed the buck by directing Jewish immigration to where the Zionist elements wanted it - Palestine, and ignored Arab opposition. Lord Mayhew, then Bevin's Minister of State at the Foreign Office was later to recall meeting Ambassador Lou Douglas whilst Bevin was away. Douglas demanded an increase in the quota of Jews to be allowed to enter Palestine legally. Mayhew recalled that; "I replied in line with Bevin's thinking that this was just a prescription for war. Whereupon the Ambassador said slowly and deliberately that the President wished the Secretary of State to know that if we were able to help him on this point, this would enable Britain's friends in Congress to get through Britain's appropriation of Marshall aid." He thus faced Britain with a choice between supporting the cau! se of the Arab majority or starvation. How kind, and if we accept the broad definition of a Semite as a person of a race possessing a Semitic tongue ( e.g. Hebrew, Arabic, Aramaic, Coptic or Ethiopic ) how anti-semitic!


9 Feb. 1997

Robert Drake [email protected]

On 7 Feb. Robert Michael [email protected] wrote:

[here quoting Mark Burns:]

Regarding FDR's reference to driving the money changers out of the temple: I recently showed my Recent US class an excerpt from Truman's acceptance speech at the Democratic convention in 1948. He used the same turn of phrase, deliberately echoing FDR. Would he use such a phrase if he believed it would strike Jewish voters as anti-semitic? In the same speech, he denounced a Republican refugee bill as "anti-semitic and anti-Catholic," clearly trying to appeal to those key components of the New Deal coalition.

[Prof. Robert Michael:]

Thanks, Mark.

As to Truman, I agree, he did not sense that the phrase was antisemitic. Indeed he must have consciously chosen to connect himself to the most popular president (?) we've had -- at least the only 4 termer. Truman was also kept totally out of it, I believe, by FDR and so I would separate his behavior from FDR's. I have not seen any ancillary evidence about Truman's antisemitism, so an isolated phrase does not prove anything. The point with FDR is that this is but one of many pieces of evidence.

Also, whereas Truman had an American icon to associate himself with, at the time FDR being considered the greatest, FDR followed Fr. Coughlin and Rep. McFadden, two outrageous antisemites who used the phrase.

I think when it comes to FDR you need to look at his actions. Some of his closest advisors were Jewish. He appointed many Jews to influential positions in the Judiciary and the Administration. One of his closest friends and confidants was Rabbi Stephen Wise. Further, FDR was a Jewish hero. Father Coughlin was one of FDR's most outspoken critics just for this reason. Remember the "Jew Deal?" I do not defend all of the president's actions (or lack of action), but his actions should not be explained by antisemitism.


9 Feb. 1997

Robert Michael

To Brad De Long, thanks for your stimulating comments.

What other of my responses made you sigh and why?

As to your comments, sigh, as to politicians who agree with each other. Isn't it usually the weaker who agree with the stronger? Not the other way around? Did Alexander of Russia overwhelm Napoleon or the other way around? Did Daladier and Chamberlain overcome Hitler or the other way around? We are talking about the President of the United States, arguably the most powerful man in the world at the time.

Even if the Nogues and Giraud were arguing discrimination, FDR is going beyond agreeing with these French officials, if that IS what he was doing. He was agreeing with the German -- sigh -- policies of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s. What -- sigh -- side was he on, anyhow?

Your final paragraph, "And recall that Roosevelt was an extraordinarily effective anti-anti-Semite: moving heaven and earth and plotting most deviously over a course of years to get the U.S. involved in a European crusade against Hitler out of totally "humanitarian" motives, for the U.S. national interest was not at all at stake in WWII in Europe" is singularly infelicitous.

Surely you are being sarcastic. Or do you actually mean to say that FDR intended to involve this country in a war out of purely humanitarian motives? It seems to me that political power was at stake. Even granting that he had "humanitarian" motives (for whom? Americans, Europeans, which Europeans?), you really can't be arguing that they were aimed at the Jews of Europe, can you? After all the things that he did NOT do that he could have done to help the Jews of Europe without any damage to our war effort! Humanitarian motives for Jews, surely you jest.


9 Feb. 1997

Phyllis Soybel Butler
University of Illinois at Chicago

I agree with Brad De Long and others who point out that FDR really was a politician who knew the crowd with whom he was conversing. By this I mean, FDR in his actions showed himself to be less anti-semitic than most Americans of the time. They were his friends, his associates, his appointees. While he did little to advance the cause of Jewish refugees, let us understand he did no more and no less than others at the same time, including the Jewish community here in the United States. Why vilify a man for being human? In his "approval" if this is even correct to say of not bombing targets like Auschwitz, the military arguments that it did little to advance victory are sound, although personally saddening.

My two cents worth from the land of dissertators and Lincoln, University of Illinois at Chicago


 

10 Feb. 1997

Brad De Long:

Robert Michael wrote:

Surely you are being sarcastic. Or do you actually mean to say that FDR intended to involve this country in a war out of purely humanitarian motives? It seems to me that political power was at stake. Even granting that he had "humanitarian" motives (for whom? Americans, Europeans, which Europeans?), you really can't be arguing that they were aimed at the Jews of Europe, can you? After all the things that he did NOT do that he could have done to help the Jews of Europe without any damage to our war effort! Humanitarian motives for Jews, surely you jest.

I do mean to say that FDR tried his hardest to involve this country in a war out of purely humanitarian motives. Back before the atomic bomb (a big qualification), the national interest of the United States was all but unaffected by who ruled what chunk of Europe. Surely nothing was at stake for American national security that was worth spending 450,000 American lives. Better from the narrow perspective of the national security of the United States to spend the money beefing up the navy and the air force for home defense than fighting a war in Europe.

After the atomic bomb things are very different. But before the atomic bomb -- remember: in World War II American, British, and Canadian armies only got back onto the European continent because they had the industrial economy of Britain as an advanced supply base and because 2/3 of the German army was pinned down in Russia by the Red Army. Projecting military power across the Atlantic is -- even today -- a horrendous logistical exercise.

Now I think Roosevelt was a great man. But he was not great because his foreign policy was carefully tuned to advance the national interest of the United States -- he was great because his foreign policy had much wider aims.


10 Feb. 1997

[email protected] (Lou McDermott)

BOMB AUSCHWITZ! Right it is better for the US and GB to kill the concentration camp inhabitants than for the Germans. While we are on FDR, what about the controversy over the supposed lack of effort by the Zionists to do something about saving the Jews in the concentration camps? It seems to be a most divisive topic in Israel right now.


10 Feb. 1997

M. Paton Walsh [email protected]

On 10 Feb. Brad De Long wrote:

[quoting Robert Michael:]

Surely you are being sarcastic. Or do you actually mean to say that FDR intended to involve this country in a war out of purely humanitarian motives?

[Brad De Long:]

I do mean to say that FDR tried his hardest to involve this country in a war out of purely humanitarian motives. Back before the atomic bomb (a big qualification), the national interest of the United States was all but unaffected by who ruled what chunk of Europe. Surely nothing was at stake for American national security that was worth spending 450,000 American lives. Better from the narrow perspective of the national security of the United States to spend the money beefing up the navy and the air force for home defense than fighting a war in Europe.

The conviction that the national interests of the United States were "all but unaffected by who ruled what chunk of Europe" was not shared by the majority of the American public, 1939-1941. While the "what if" questions involved in any assessment of how damaging continued isolationism would have been, make the issue of what was *really* at stake hard to deal with, it is nevertheless apparent (from opinion polls, newspapers, radio debates, and so on) that a substantial number of Americans feared a wide variety of *direct* threats to U.S. security and interests if the Germans controlled the European continent and succeeded in conquering Britain, ranging from military attack to economic isolation, given Germany's autarkic economic policies. Moreover, given the very public debate over American intervention, this was a moment at which the American public was unusually well-informed about the issues and thus better equipped to make an intelligent assessment of the dangers, or lack! thereof. In addition, while horror at Nazi tactics was often a part of interventionist arguments, few advocates of aid to the allies or US entry into the war justified that advocacy without explicit reference to what they believed were very real threats to American interests and security.


11 Feb. 1997

Joseph H. Poles [email protected]

RE: Lou McDermott "BOMB AUSCHWITZ." The killing centers, i.e., gassing chambers and crematoriums were highly visible from the air and the bombing conditions were excellent over the target areas. Some of the prisoners may have been killed in the attacks but many more lives could have been saved.

The only ingredient missing was the desire of the Defense Department to initiate any non-military attacks.


11 Feb. 1997

Frank Kofsky [email protected]

Lou McDermott writes:

BOMB AUSCHWITZ! Right it is better for the US and GB to kill the concentration camp inhabitants than for the Germans.

The idea of having Britain or the U.S. originated with concentration-camp prisoners themselves, who smuggled such an appeal to the outside world. See David Wyman, THE ABANDONMENT OF THE JEWS.

-- Frank Kofsky


11 Feb. 1997

Brian Loring Villa

An excellent student of mine, Noel Bullock and I are collaborating on an article on the decision not to bomb Auschwitz which ought to liven the discussion up quite a bit, as it takes a rather different tack on the question. Noel did his work and it is my fault that it is not quite ready to throw into the pot for discussion just yet. It will suggest that the attack on the administration for that decision is really far off the mark.

But I do want to warmly compliment the enlightened, dispassionate and comprehending tone of Phyllis Soybel Butler's contribution which is definitely worth an awful lot more than two cents worth she claims. She has written:

"I agree with Brad De Long and others who point out that FDR really was a politician who knew the crowd with whom he was conversing. By this I mean, FDR in his actions showed himself to be less anti-Semitic than most Americans of the time. They were his friends, his associates, his appointees. While he did little to advance the cause of Jewish refugees, let us understand he did no more and no less than others at the same time, including the Jewish community here in the United States. Why vilify a man for being human? In his "approval" if this is even correct to say of not bombing targets like Auschwitz, the military arguments that it did little to advance victory are sound, although personally saddening."

If anything Roosevelt's political approach to the Holocaust problem can be viewed with even more understanding if not sympathy. It needs saying that the policy of unrelenting hostility to Nazi Germany which Roosevelt adopted, practically from day one, was the policy which American Jewry or at least its press overwhelmingly supported, and which he carried out if anything more militantly than was urged by some of his advisors who happened to be Jewish. He had also adopted the social and economic policies of left Jewish opinion, for his own reasons, no doubt, but they were associated with the openness of his administration to Jewish opinion. His Chief advisor on the large questions, it increasingly becomes clear was Felix Frankfurter, as much, perhaps more, than Harry Hopkins.

Noting all this, can one really say it was a practical possibility for Roosevelt also to have opened the flood gates to Jewish emigration to the United States, still reeling from the depression of 1937 ? I do not know myself what the right policy for Jewish groups to advocate might have been -- there was so much wrong with the world -- but I do know that in a pluralistic democracy no ethnic group can have it all or appear to have it all, and that in practical politics Jewish opinion, could choose the policy of war on Hitler or it could choose a policy of mass rescue of Jews. Urging both, without working out the problem of strategy and timing very carefully, was a formula for disaster on both the domestic and international plane. This of course is not to say that both causes were not absolutely right, only that to advocate them simultaneously required more careful thought than the anguish of the moment allowed. Roosevelt decided, in accordance, I think with a significant body o! f Jewish opinion, to settle first with Hitler as a hostile power, and then to deal with Hitler, the Nazis, the SS and German condoners of their crimes, next. For the programme of correction and retribution Roosevelt turned to his Secretary of the Treasury. And who can forget Roosevelt's stated reason for appointing Herbert Lehman to head UNRRA-that it was right that Germans should have to beg for a scrap of bread from a Jew ? And when it came to setting policy FDR forbade that UNRRA give even a scrap to Germans.

Roosevelt's ordering of priorities, of course, had terrible implications. It left European Jews to suffer terribly. But the reverse priority to rescue European Jews and then to try to wage war on Hitler did not seem like a practical programme. In fact, was there anyone with any political clout, Jewish or non Jewish, who advocated that ? The situation that obtained during the war, that we could have rescued significant number of Jews had we been willing to relent in the prosecution of the war, had always been the reality. Indeed what historian has ever been able to construct a counterfactual in which one could have opened the flood gates to the refugees and still have an American public opinion willing to go to war with Germany ?

To say that Roosevelt was closer to the practical than the noble is to simply state the obvious. But who on the American political scene would have done more ? With all his faults he stood head and shoulder above most of his political contemporaries. Given that American opinion was divided -- and unfortunately these issues tended to divide more -- Roosevelt, working in real time and space, had to pursue those policies which united Americans.


12 Feb. 1997

Phyllis Soybel Butler

On 11 Feb. 1997 Frank Kofsky wrote:

The idea of having Britain or the U.S. originated with concentration-camp prisoners themselves, who smuggled such an appeal to the outside world. See David Wyman, THE ABANDONMENT OF THE JEWS.

Still didn't mean it was right or strategically sound. In addition, it would probably have sent a message to the Germans that a) they had the right idea and b) that the British and Americans didn't care either.


13 Feb. 1997

Gerd Korman [email protected]

It would be helpful if this discussion shifted its attention to Governor Herbert Lehman. What do we know about him today? He had to make all kinds of choices in response to the Jewish events of the 1930's and 1940's. Some of these would have been heroic, and we should identify and analyze them.

For until we comprehend the risks facing the New York governor, had he chosen to go public in a sustained campaign to change administration policies, we cannot hope to understand FDR and the antisemitism of his society.


13 Feb. 1997

Robert Michael

Thanks to all who have contributed to this thread and to those who posted it to the H-DIPLO web site.

I have so much material to reply to, and to hone my thinking, that it will take a while before I can fully reply to the (mostly) thoughtful responses. Since our U. Mass-D mainframe was down from last Thursday to today, I am just catching up on all the posts.

The most recent communication by Ms. Butler begs an immediate response. She wrote quoting Frank Kofsky's post of 11 Feb.:

The idea of having Britain or the U.S. originated with concentration-camp prisoners themselves, who smuggled such an appeal to the outside world. See David Wyman, THE ABANDONMENT OF THE JEWS.

[Butler:]

Still didn't mean it was right or strategically sound. In addition, it would probably have sent a message to the Germans that a) they had the right idea and b) that the British and Americans didn't care either."

Reading this issue from the German side, it seems to me that just the opposite message would have been sent. That the Allies gave enough of a damn about the Jews actually to try to stop the slaughter. Certainly, the cc camps inmates seem to be unanimous on this matter.

That the Allies devoted an enormous amount of air power to helping the (non-Jewish) Poles in 1944, when this power could hardly be spared; whereas they never intentionally (once or twice they bombed Auschwitz BY ACCIDENT) bombed Auschwitz or the other 5 death camps confirmed what the leading Nazis knew and gave them all the more permission to continue the Holocaust at full blast. Such bombing of death camps and rail lines was never even a tertiary target for the Allies -- no way, no how. Asst. Secretary of War lied about the capabilities of our Air Force from mid 1944 on.

The lack of any sense of urgency, in my view, came from the top down. FDR again; also Stimson, Long, and a dozen other State Department decision makers. Second point, the Germans recognized for a long while that the Allies did not give a damn about the Jews -- both Goebbels and Hitler speak about this publicly.

Knowing that thousands of Jews were being massacred in the most despicable circumstances did not motivate the Allies to do a damn thing, even try to do much was beyond them.

The British in the Foreign and Colonial offices said it much better than our State Department antisemites:

  • H. F. Downie, Head of the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office, the official principally concerned with Palestine, wrote on 15 March 1941 also about Jewish complaints, that "one regret[s] that the Jews are not on the other side in this war." He was also quoted in 1941 as saying that the Jews were "enemies just as the Germans are, but in a more insidious way."
  • J. S. Bennett, Colonial Office official, on l8 April l94l, noted that "the Jews have done nothing but add to our difficulties by . . . unscrupulous Zionist 'sob-stuff' and misrepresentation, it is hard to bear." On 6 May l94l, Shuckburgh wrote, "I can think of nobody who would be in the least likely to take them in. . . . We cannot be deterred by the kind of prewar humanitarianism that prevailed in l939."
  • On 23 September l942, Herbert Morrison, Home Secretary and Minister of Security, wrote that "any relaxation of immigration policy could lead French Jewish children "to be dumped here" by Vichy."
  • Osbert Peake, Under Secretary of the Home Office, spoke for the British delegation to the Bermuda Conference, when he stated that any successful rescue attempt of Jews, especially old people and children,"would be relieving Hitler of an obligation to care for these useless people."
  • A. R. Dew, head of the Southern Department of the Foreign Office, stated on l September l944 in response to the British Jews urging help for Jews in Hungary and Rumania: "A disproportionate amount of time of this office is wasted in dealing with these wailing Jews."

What was true of British attitudes also characterized Canadian ones.

  • Charles Blair, Director of Canadian Immigration during the war -- "a religious man, . . . precisely the man the ruling Liberal government wanted" -- felt that all Jews were "utterly selfish," alien beings who had to be kept out of Canada at all costs. When asked how many Jews would be allowed to immigrate to Canada after the war, a senior official summed up the Allied position neatly: "None is too many."

This material is just a small sample of the litany of hateful responses by Allied leaders on the matter of the Jews of the Holocaust.

Bombing the camps, indeed. Not to worry, no Jews would be directly killed by Allies (except occasionally in Palestine). We killed by omission.

On May 12, 1943, Shmuel Zygielbaum, Jewish Bund representative on the Polish National Council killed himself and left this suicide note:

"From the latest information from Poland, it is evident that the Germans, with the most ruthless cruelty, are now murdering the few remaining Jews in Poland. . . . The responsibility for the crime of murdering the entire Jewish population of Poland falls in the first instance on the perpetrators, but indirectly it is also a burden of the whole of humanity, the people and governments of the Allied States which thus far have made no effort toward concrete action for the purpose of curtailing this crime.

"By the passive observation of the murder of defenseless millions, and of the maltreatment of children, women, and old men, these countries have become the criminals accomplices. . . .

". . . By my death I wish to express my strongest protest against the inactivity with which the world is looking on and permitting the extermination of my people." Zygielbaum's death is widely reported but his motives are ignored.

Robert Michael, Professor of European History, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth


14 Feb. 1997

[email protected] (Mike Benninger)

On 11 Feb. Joseph H. Poles [email protected] wrote:

RE: Lou McDermott "BOMB AUSCHWITZ." The killing centers, i.e., gassing chambers and crematoriums were highly visible from the air and the bombing conditions were excellent over the target areas. Some of the prisoners may have been killed in the attacks but many more lives could have been saved. The only ingredient missing was the desire of the Defense Department to initiate any non-military attacks.

It might be interesting to add the comments of David Wyman to this debate, for in his "Abandonment of the Jews", he states directly that not only were the military means available, but that in many cases, non-military logistical support for other ethnic groups was often available and regularly used...


14 Feb. 1997

Phyllis Soybel Butler

From the personal standpoint, as a descendent of European Jews, I am disturbed but hardly shocked at the attitudes of Foreign and Colonial Office officials.

Perhaps I should be, but history tells me differently. And I concur that the failure of countries prior to WWII, like the United States and Great Britain, to take a string and uncompromising stand against the discrimination and dehumanization of peoples, like the Jews, and the inability or lack of desire to much during the first 2 years, before I might add the systematic killing of Jews in death camps took place, is immoral and reprehensible.

HOWEVER, from a strategic and military standpoint, bombing Auschwitz made no real sense. The railroad lines led into camps which seemed to produce little going out, they did not really seem to come from anywhere but cities.

In short, I still am not convinced that the American and British decisions to not bomb Auschwitz and the other camps was wrong in a practical sense. Nor looking at FDR, do I believe it was religiously or racially (depending one's classification) motivated.


15 Feb. 1997

Brian Loring Villa

I continue to find myself in broad general agreement with Phyllis Soybel Butler on this subject, including her post of 14 February. But it is open for some debate whether the United Nations by their declarations beginning in 1942 did not take a "strong and uncompromising stand against the discrimination and dehumanization of peoples." There were a number of clear unequivocal statements. The question of just how shrill they should have been must be viewed broadly in context. Discussions about the moral condemnations required rarely note that it was also necessary to make like statements about the suffering of Japan's victims, about the immorality of collaboration, about the brutality of the Occupation etc. etc.

In short, just how much shrillness could the public stand, could governments utter without beginning to lose credibility ? These are questions, I believe, that are best answered by those with knowledge or experience of psychological warfare during World War II because they actually are very technical questions, on which very careful polls and studies were made. I do not claim expertise in this area but I remember reading one psy-ops expert saying that too much shrillness could compromise the ability of the political leadership to lead. That always struck me as insightful.

As to the bombing of Auschwitz, I am grateful for the spur for me to finish up the article on which Noel Bullock and I have worked for nearly two years.

It will be interesting to see reactions. It is very different from the discussion that has occurred hitherto.


16 Feb. 1997

Adam M. Charney

On 14 Feb. Phyllis Soybel Butler wrote:

In short, I still am not convinced that the American and British decisions to not bomb Auschwitz and the other camps was wrong in a practical sense. Nor looking at FDR, do I believe it was religiously or racially (depending one's classification) motivated.

Your argument seems to me to be the traditional one - that there was no strategic value to bombing those lines and that therefore doing so would have constituted a waste of military resources. While I take no position on the anti-semitism of FDR (he was likely no more or less anti-semitic than others of his socio-economic class). The point is, that resources were not terribly scarce, certainly after the US entered the war and that the diversion of small amounts of resources could have saved many many lives.

The pro-bombing argument does not approach it in military or strategic terms - there was little benefit in that regard.


16 Feb. 1997

Robert Michael

In response to Prof. Butler's most recent assertions re bombing:

Flying missions to help the Warsaw Poles in Fall 1944 made no sense. Almost all the material we dropped was picked up by the Germans and used against us and the Poles. We took losses and kept on flying.

Compare these actions, and the sense that the Allies were on their side indicated to the Poles, with whom the U.S. had NO alliance that required such voluntary actions, with the Allied attitudes and behavior in regard to the European Jews.

The Allies knew why not many products left Auschwitz -- though the satellite camps sure produced goods -- that's why they were bombed. The Allies knew, and we have evidence that they knew, the Auschwitz II (Birkenau) was primarily a death factory.

If a double standard does not seem evident, well, look again.

I also don't understand what difference being a descendant of European Jews makes. If one is, or is not, the issues still stand.


17 Feb. 1997

Meredith Hindley
American University

After reading Prof. Michael's post listing the anti-semitic views in the FO, I question the productivity of such an exercise. I don't see how a discussion on whose government was more anti-semitic than the other gets us very far. The bottom line is that the Allied response to the Holocaust was less than stellar for a very complicated set of reasons, of which anti-semitism is one. For the British, the Jews and their claims of Palestine threatened attempts to preserve British colonial order in the Middle East. Had America been in the same position, I anticipate that sentiments like those expressed by the FO would have been found in abundance in the State Department.

As far as Hitler and Goebbels noticing that the Allies didn't give a damn about the Jews, let's consider the mindset of the two men under discussion. Hitler launched the war with two guiding principles in mind: race and space. The destruction of the Jews for Hitler was central to his planning and actions. Goebbels spent more than a decade dishing out anti-semitic trash to the German populace. For both of these men, the destruction of the Jews was a POLITICAL issue and central to the maintenance of the German state and Germany's war aims.

The Allies, on the other hand, fought first for survival and then to prevent the reemergence of Nazi Germany. For them the war was about defeating fascism. In *Jews for Sale,* Yehuda Bauer pointed out that the Allies did not grasp the political importance that Hitler placed on the destruction of the Jews. Instead, the Allies regarded the plight of the Jews a HUMANITARIAN issue, and therefore a secondary (or even lower) concern of the war. Restoring governments, like that of Poland, received a higher priority because it was considered a political issue. In a sense, the Allies just didn't "get it." They didn't understand how the Jews fit into Hitler's program and didn't make providing assistance a priority.

This split in thinking is not particularly satisfying explanation, but it does go some way towards explaining why the camps weren't bombed. The Allies didn't understand that bombing even one camp would send a strong message to Hitler and set him on notice as to the immorality of his actions.

I'd like to ask a very practical question: how does one propose to get the Jews held by the Nazis out of Eastern Europe? The area fell under the sphere of the Soviets and they were even less concerned about the Jews than the western Allies (i.e. it was a non-issue for Stalin). Bomb the camps, the Nazis would have diverted the Jews to other camps either on trains or by forced marches, which would have yielded deaths also. Hitler was so devoted to the Final Solution that even in the darkest days of the war, trains carrying Jews received priority over military troops and materiel.

Any discussion on the Allied response to the Holocaust is ultimately dissatisfying because moral indignation and practicalities cannot be reconciled. In the end, I agree with Gerhard Weinberg who argues that the best thing for the Jews of Europe was for the Allies to achieve the quickest victory possible. The quicker the victory, the sooner the Nazi killing machine could be stopped.


17 Feb. 1997

James G. Cassedy

I'm a short time lurker without the credentials of most individuals on this list, and a little free time this Holiday afternoon.

When we attempt to judge those who didn't bomb the Nazi extermination camps, I can't help but think that perhaps we are people throwing rocks in glass houses.

Since learning of the extermination of millions during World War II, we have permitted the extermination of hundreds of thousands of Cambodians. After the somber Holocaust Museum in Washington was open we permitted the extermination of hundreds of thousands of Africans, and thousands of Muslims in the heart of Europe, before we chose to do anything. I'm sure others can think of other horrific crimes against mankind, and I'm sure others can provide excuses justifying why we did nothing.

I suspect that other future horrors will take place, and we will do nothing. Perhaps inertia in the face of horrors which do not directly effect us is part of our being. I leave that to brighter individuals. But to condemn others in the midst of our own failures seems a little much.

Jim Cassedy, Center for Electronic Records

National Archives and Records Administration (Opinions, written on President's Day, do not reflect those of NARA).

 

 

17 Feb. 1997

David A. Welch

Those interested in this topic should keep an eye out for the forthcoming NASM-Holocaust Museum book called (I believe) THE BOMBING OF AUSCHWITZ: SHOULD THE ALLIES HAVE ATTEMPTED IT? -- especially the essay by Tami Davis Biddle.

David A. Welch

 

24 Feb. 1997

Robert Michael

In reply to Meredith Hindley:

I was not playing a comparison game. This would have been foolish since both sides were morally culpable, hypocritical, consciously ignoring facts in favor of the Jews at the same time as they favored non-Jews. Yet comparing is heuristic in that we can better examine the different capabilities, concerns, and responses to the Holocaust of each nation. Antisemitic sentiments were quite common among both U.S. State Department and British Foreign and Colonial Offices.

What you write about the centrality of the Holocaust for Hitler and Goebbels is true. But I think you are quite wrong in narrowing it to only a political issue. For them, it was an ideological-psychological-moral issue with political ramifications.

If Bauer said that the Allies considered the Holocaust a humanitarian issue, his evidence differs from mine. The Allies privately and the Nazis publicly indicated clearly that there was no longer any room for humanitarianism when it came to the Jews. I distinguish here the Allied public claptrap from their private words and actions.

There were several opportunities to get Jews out of Europe. The evidence is quite overwhelming on this point. Not all the Jews, of course, but hundreds of thousands more than actually escaped. But the Allies consistently refused to follow up until too damn late; whereas at the same time they were helping non-Jews consistently. I could recite the evidence but I don't think that would be of much help in terms of the responses I have been getting from citations of evidence, at least from many of those who have replied on this list. But suffice it to say that dozens of opportunities arose that members of our State and the British Foreign and Colonial offices not only refused to do anything about but sought to head off, at the same time they were acting to help millions of non-Jews. Their attitudes were, as Pehle, Paul, and DuBois indicated, pretty much like the Nazis.

You ignore the differences between bombing railway lines in the Balkans versus Poland and the West and the psychological effects of doing this on those in neutral, occupied, and axis satellite nations.

Why was winning the war the best way to stop the slaughter of Jews, but spending billions of dollars for aid, and thousands of hours of effort and negotiations while at the same time prosecuting the war the best way to help non-Jews?

Reply to Brian Loring Villa: Who is demanding "shrillness," whatever that is? Of the many Allied declarations, only one included Jews. The Allies could have done so many things they refused to do, and for complicated reasons, one of which was, according to my reading of the evidence, the clear role that antisemitism played in the U.S. State Department and in the British Foreign and Home and Colonial Offices.

To all: I am an outsider in the sense that I am neither an Americanist nor a diplomatic historian, and I thank you all for giving me the opportunity to read your perspectives; it has been most enlightening. I have had more food for thought from members of this list than from the other lists (which I co-edit) on which I have raised these issues. I thank you for helping me understand the counterarguments and alternative interpretations of the facts involved in this enormously sensitive issue. Furthermore, I have been helped to become aware of the circling-of-the-wagons movement that occurs when icons are attacked. When my book is finished, I will be sure to take into consideration all that I have learned from the debate on this list.

We point out:

Dear Robert Michael

you may not welcome a message from me right now(!), but here goes:

You'll find one or two items on FDR and the Jews on my website under

http://www.fpp.co.uk/History/Antisemites.html

If by way of thanks you could email me the text of the Nogues item, which I found myself in State Dept files and the FRUS many years ago but can no longer locate in my papers, I would be grateful. I was shocked when I first read it, then realised it was par for the course among politicans at that time.

Read FDR's conversations with Morgenthau for more hints at where his sympathies lay!

David Irving

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