FROM CHAPTER
25 OF DAVID IRVING: CHURCHILLS WAR, VOL.
II
THERE WAS one problem of
coalition war which neither Churchill nor his
cabinet had foreseen: he had discovered that by an edict
of General Marshall ten per cent of the American
troops coming over were to be Black; that was far too
many. The United States were shipping tens of thousands
of Negro troops into the southern British Isles which had
hitherto been almost entirely white. Nor had the British
received, as they had silently hoped, the upper ten per
cent, the elite of those Blacks; one-third of those GI's
currently in British prisons were Black. The cabinet was
united in recognising the problems, chief among which was
the over-friendly response by what they considered to be
an ill-informed British public to these newcomers.
At
one meeting Anthony Eden
(right) articulated fears
that American troops would be offended to see certain
sections of the British people displaying 'more
effusiveness' to the coloured people than they
did.[94] While the wealthier classes kept the
Negroes at the same healthy distance as did the White
GIs, observed Eden, the frustrated and man-starved
English country girls, lacking the same racial
consciousness, saw no reason not to fraternise, and
frequent affrays between American and British troops were
the result.[95] One Member of Parliament told
Lord Halifax on July 23 how difficult things were,
what with the factory girls in his constituency throwing
themselves at the Negro troops; it was, he added, in no
way the fault of the latter.[96] Many other
Members also wrote anxious letters to the war office
about the arrival of Negro troops. Several ministers
expressed disquiet, among them the Colonial Secretary and
the Lord Chancellor. All told, there was a risk that this
war might change the fair face of England for a long time
to come.
Churchill had assured Sulzberger that he fully
understood Eleanor Roosevelt's well-publicised
concern for the Negroes' status; he observed that
American politics were now bedevilled by race, as each
side pandered to the Black vote. His motives for saying
this were, it seemed, of deeper root. Twice during their
luncheon at Chequers he remarked to Sulzberger that there
were depraved women who lusted sexually for Blacks -- 'It
makes them feel something they have missed for years,' he
said.[97] Sulzberger told Lord Halifax on his
return to Washington that the prime minister had been 'a
great deal concerned about Negro troops and how they
ought to be used, and saw very clearly the dangers of
quartering them in areas where nobody had seen a coloured
man before.'[98] 'The fact that the English treat
our coloured people without drawing the race line,' he
told Henry Stimson, 'was sure to make for trouble
in the end.' When Stimson admitted that they were
encountering difficulties everywhere on that score, the
newspaper publisher suggested that they concentrate the
Negroes in the crowded English ports rather than in rural
areas, where they were more likely to get into
trouble.[99] The syndicated columnist Walter
Lippmann made substantially the same recommendation
after visiting England.[100] Recognising
how sensitive the race issue was, Stimson asked
Roosevelt to persuade Eleanor not to interfere
during her forthcoming trip to England.[101]
In fact Churchill had already raised the matter with
Harry Hopkins and General Marshall during July,
stating that there had been serious racial disturbances
involving Negro troops in Londonderry in Northern
Ireland.[102] His own views on the coloured
peoples were robust, if primitive. At a cabinet
discussion on July 27 on the disciplinary powers to be
exercised by Indian army officers he let fly a flood of
'childish' objections to allowing the poor, harassed
British soldier to be bossed around by 'a brown man.'
'Except Grigg,' noted Amery, 'nobody really
agreed with him, but they none of them will speak out
when Winston is in a tantrum.'[103]
IT WAS a serious dilemma and
Churchill's government, unlike its successors, tried to
face up to it. Washington ignored all hints that it
should adjust the coloured influx. At the end of August
1942 Eden regretted to the cabinet that 'the United
States authorities were still sending over the full
authorised proportion of coloured troops (about 10 per
cent),' and that given the likely problems they should
again press the Americans to stem the flow.[104]
The cabinet agreed that they should do what they could to
keep English women -- and White soldiers -- away from
this dusky newcomer with 'his good qualities and his
weaker ones.'[105] At Grigg's advice the cabinet
decided on October 13 that it was desirable that the
British people should avoid becoming 'too friendly' with
the Negro American troops. Their own troops should be
lectured by senior officers -- putting nothing on paper;
chief constables should be alerted to the problem; and
selected newspaper editors should be supplied with media
packs enlightening them on the colour question in the
United States.[106]
The problem grew more acute as more Blacks arrived
over the next two years. They were mustered into
segregated units, mostly engineering and labour, housed
in segregated camps, and provided with equal but
segregated facilities like Red Cross Clubs.
The British population, unfamiliar with the problems
of race experienced by the United States, saw no reason
either to differentiate or to segregate. Editors at The
Sunday Pictorial and The Sunday Express published
unhelpful editorials clamouring that the colour bar
operated by the Americans must go. Their officers -- who
were almost all White -- were again shocked by the loose
behaviour of the British women, who actually seemed to
single out the downtrodden Blacks for their sympathies.
The women were however not the only ones blamed. Once,
when American military police tried to arrest Negro
troops, British civilians intervened shouting, 'They
don't like the Blacks,' and 'Why don't they leave them
alone?' A Black mutiny resulted, with court-martial
charges.
By late October 1943, 38,179 Negro troops had arrived.
Putting his finger on what he saw as the real problem,
the secretary for war [Grigg] wrote to
Churchill: 'I expect that the British soldier who fears
for the safety or faithfulness of his women-folk at home,
would not feel so keenly as the B.B.C. and the public at
home appear to do in favour of a policy of no colour bar
and complete equality of treatment of Negro
troops.'[107]
Churchill
expressed his anxiety to Grigg, and asked for the
relevant figures.[108] Providing to No. 10 the
requested statistics on murder, attempted murder, 'carnal
knowledge,' and rape committed by these Negro troops, the
Duke of Marlborough, attached to the office of the
U.S. Army's provost-marshal, urgently counselled taking
preventive action before it was too late. Local people,
he said, were now frightened to go out after dark where
these troops were stationed. The figures showed that five
times more Black than White troops had contracted
venereal diseases, the curse of every great war.
Moreover, 'The existence of the drug marijuana (a form of
hasheesh) has been found in the possession of coloured
troops' -- they believed that the drug if given to
unsuspecting women might 'excite their sexual desires.'
The trickle of mulatto children on its way into England's
ancient people was about to become a
tide.[109]
Churchill was shocked, and passed the figures on to
the war office, while asking them to keep the Duke's name
out of it.[110] Grigg discussed the behaviour of
the American Negro troops with General Jacob
Devers, the theatre commander. Devers assured him he
had the situation in hand. Writing to the prime minister
Grigg blamed the high incidence of crime and V.D. on the
Americans having deliberately selected the worst elements
among the Negro troops for the European theatre, and on
their 'exuberance . . . on coming overseas.' The
statistics showed that Negroes were committing twice as
many sex offences as White troops, and five times as many
other crimes of violence. In both cases, lamented Grigg,
the root cause was 'the natural propensities of the
coloured man.' Since there was going to be a vast
increase in the number of Negro troops based in England
in the spring of 1944, there were no grounds for
complacency.[111]