| Posted
Sunday, April 11, 2004 | Sequence
of some British documents leading up to
the raid on
Dresden
(sources: see
below).
| [On the evening of January
25, 1945, Churchill asked the air
ministry what the bombers were doing about
the German retreat from Breslau.] | January 26, Sinclair replied,
beginning: 'Prime Minister, You asked me last
night whether we had any plans to harrying
the German retreat from Breslau.' Wholly misunderstanding what underlay
Churchill's question -- those tempting
scenes of chaos as the refugees streamed
westwards before the Russian armies --
Sinclair explained that retreating enemy
forces were best attacked by the Tactical
Air Forces, particularly when, as now,
cloud cover made it impossible to bomb
from high level; there should be excellent
opportunities for 'ground strafing' by the
Russian fighter squadrons. Their heavy
bombers were best left maintaining the
attack on Hitler's oil plants. [1] | On January 26, there was a phone
conversation between Harris and Sir Norman
Bottomley, the deputy chief of air staff.
In this, the question of attacks on the
'industrial areas' of Berlin, Dresden,
Chemnitz, and Leipzig was discussed. Evill
afterwards sent by courier to Harris a
copy of the JIC Paper (45) 34(O) Final)
dated January 25, -- asking whether
conditions had now arisen to justify
THUNDERCLAP, a
four-day series of heavy air attacks on
Berlin, releasing upwards of twenty-five
thousand tons of bombs on the city, in
conjunction with the Russian
offensive. Evill advised Harris that Portal was
against
THUNDERCLAP, since
even if it was done on the heaviest scale
with resulting heavy bomber losses, it
would not in his view be decisive. 'He [Portal] agrees
however that subject to the overriding
claims of oil and other approved target
systems within the current directive,
we should use available effort in one
big attack on Berlin had related
attacks on Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz
or any other cities where a severe
blitz will not only cause confusion in
the evacuation from the East but will
also hamper the movement of troops from
the West.' Bottomley therefore
requested Harris, in the rather archaic
language of their relations, to
undertake 'such attacks' as soon as
moon and weather conditions allowed,
'with the particular object of
exploiting the confused conditions
which are likely to exist in the above
mentioned cities during the successful
Russian advance.'[2] | On January 26, Portal had sent a
lengthy and tersely worded minute to DCAS
ruling out thunderclap, as four
consecutive days were unlikely to come at
this time of the year. 'Subject to the
overriding claims of oil and such other
agreed targets as the rocket and jet
engine factories, submarine building yards
for marginal effort etc, we should use
available effort in one big attack on
Berlin and attacks on Dresden, Leipzig,
Chemnitz or any other cities where a
severe blitz will not only cause confusion
in the evacuation from the East but will
also hamper the movement of troops'
[from the western to the eastern
front. Page is torn] Portal concluded,
'I understand from you that Harris is
quite prepared to take on Berlin as soon
as the moon has waned a little and that he
can also take on any of the four
[sic] other cities named.' Evill,
the DCAS, informed Harris of Portal's
views n the matter on January 27.
[3] | Sinclair duly informed Churchill of
this on January 27, responding to
Churchill's minute M.115/5: "The Air Staff have now
arranged that, subject to the
overriding claims of attacks on enemy
oil production and other approved
target systems within the current
directive, available effort should be
directed against Berlin, Dresden,
Chemnitz and Leipzig or against other
cities where severe bombing would not
only destroy communications vital to
the evacuation front he east, but would
also hamper the movement of troops from
the west.[Explaining why this task
should fall to RAF Bomber Command
rather than to the Americans, Sinclair
continued:] "The use of the
night bomber force offers the best
prospects of destroying these
industrial cities without detracting
from our offensive on oil targets,
which is now in a critical phase. The
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber
Command, has undertaken to attempt this
task as soon as the present moon has
waned and favourable conditions allow.
This is unlikely to be before about 4th
February."[4] | In Churchill's absence at Malta en
route to Yalta, the Vice Chiefs sitting in
London had analysed the possible use of
chemical warfare by the Germans
[JIC(45)36(O) Final] and
Strategic Bombing in relation to the
present Russian Offensive
[JIC(45)31(O) and Bombing of
Berlin [JIC(45)34(O)
Final).] "The VCAS pointed that it
would be unlikely that weather
conditions at present would permit four
days consecutive bombing, so that the
THUNDERCLAP
attack envisaged by JIC was unlikely to
prove practicable; nevertheless, a less
severe attack might well assist Russian
operations by creating confusion in the
German rear." [5] | Meeting at Malta on January 31,
1945 to consider the JIC
recommendations (JIC(45)31(O) (revised
Final) -- assessing how their bomber
forces might now help the Russians - and
(45) 34(O) Final) -- asking whether
conditions had now arisen to justify
THUNDERCLAP a
four-day series of heavy air attacks on
Berlin in conjunction with the Russian
offensive - Sir Charles Portal had
suggested that if they could reduce their
weight of attack on the enemy
communications (railways, etc) 'it would
be possible to attack tank factories and
also to make heavy attacks on the four
cities Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig, and
Chemnitz, where the resulting confusion
was most likely to hamper enemy efforts to
transfer forces between the Western and
Eastern fronts.'[6] | The Vice Chief of Air Staff Douglas
Evill sent a note from London to the
chiefs of staff on February 1, 1945
(COS(45)92(O) recommending a modification
of the directive on bombing target
priorities sent to the strategic bomber
forces. Enemy oil and tank production
should continue to get top priority, but
then he mentioned specifically what he
called 'evacuation areas' - the big cities
like Berlin, Leipzig, and Dresden through
which 'evacuees' were streaming westwards
from the eastern provinces of German and
the Reich. The strain on the Germans of
handling the refugees fleeing westwards,
and moving reinforcements to the east for
the battle made these cities particularly
tempting targets. 'A series of heavy attacks by
day and night upon these administrative
and control centres is likely to create
considerable delays in the deployment
of troops at the Front, and may well
result in establishing a state of chaos
in some or all of these centres.' The strategic bombers should there be
turned against these 'focal points of the
evacuation area behind the eastern front.'
Attacks on the enemy's jet-fighter
defences and submarine yards should take
lower priority.[7] | February 1, 1945, typewritten
letter from Churchill to his wife
Clementine, aboard HMS Orion
[Malta] My darling Clemmie . . . I am free to confess to you that
my heart is saddened by the tales of the
masses of German women and children flying
along the roads everywhere in 40-mile long
columns to the West before the advancing
Armies. I am clearly convinced that they
deserve it; but that does not remove it
from one's gaze. The misery of the whole
world appals me and I fear increasingly
that new struggles may arise out of those
we are successfully ending. All the news from Magneto
[Yalta], our destination,
continues to prove that the Big Three in
their first and most important action have
managed to pick out the very worst place
in the whole world for their Meeting. Your ever loving husband, W | On February 5, 1945 Sir Charles
Portal, British Chief of Air Staff,
signalled from Yalta to London that the
Russians had again proposed a strategic
"bomb-line" running through Stettin to
Berlin to Dresden to Zagreb. "To enable me to argue against
this please send Most Immediate a few
good objectives against which we desire
to maintain our attacks until they
become involved in tactical situation
on land. Reply must reach me by 1000C
tomorrow 6th February." [8] In his reply on February 5, the
Deputy Chief of Air Staff sent to Portal a
list of good objectives for attack until
the tactical situation on land -- i.e. the
proximity of friendly armies -- prevented
them. - First priority, 'A', were Oil
targets like Pölitz, Ruhland, and
seven oil refineries in the Vienna
area;
- Second priority, 'B', were the only
two transportation and industrial areas
listed, which were Berlin and Dresden.
- 'C' and 'D' were factories making
tanks and self-propelled guns, and jet
engines.[9]
| Sources of the
above documents: - Sinclair to Churchill, Jan 26, 1945
(PRO file AIR.8/1745).
- Bottomley to Harris, Jan 27, 1945
(PRO file AIR.8/1745).
- Portal to DCAS, Bottomley, Jan 26;
and note by Bottomley, Jan 27, 1945
(PRO file AIR.8/1745).
- Sinclair to Churchill, Jan 27, 1945
(PRO file AIR.8/1745).
- Hollis to Ismay, FLEECE 12, Jan 30,
1945 (PRO file CAB.120/175).
- COS (ARGONAUT) 2nd meeting, Jan 31
1945 (PRO file AIR.8/1745).
- (COS(45)92(O) Vice Chief of Air
Staff Douglas Evill to COS, Feb 1, 1945
(PRO file AIR.8/1745).
- Portal to DCAS, JASON 139, Feb 5,
1945 (PRO file CAB.120/179).
- DCAS to Portal, FLEECE 178, Feb 5,
1945 (PRO file CAB.120/176).
| | 
. . .
on this website:
Index
to this dossier on Allied bombing
strategy
David Irving: Apocalypse
1945: the Destruction of Dresden
(free download)-
Sept 14, 1944: JCS
minutes that British object to Combined
Chiefs of Staff recording their
decision that Germany should be bombed
for morale purposes
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