

Missing months will be inserted later

KV.4/193

Liddell Diary, March 2 - December 30, 1944, CONTINUED

March 2, 1944: [The ETIENNE document] Robin Brook of SOE [. . .] evidently thinks that the document is basically genuine, although he doubts whether d’Astier is the author[. . .] The only possible motive for the document being planted would be to encourage SOE to let the French resistance movement have more arms. SOE have rather been taking up the attitude that as the French were more concerned about civilian matters, it was not much use sending them arms[. . .] TAR [T A Robertson] has been told by SHAEF about a rather serious French leakage. A short time ago d’Astier submitted to SHAEF a plan for the Second Front. SHAEF thought it was probably a *ballon d’essai* [trial balloon] in order to find out what our plans were. Something very nearly approaching this plan appeared in the *Evening Standard* on the 15th February with a statement to the effect that it had been considered by Eisenhower and Monty, who were examining the proposals.

March 3, 1944: LOUDSPEAKER reports that in the recent heavy RAF raid on Stuttgart [March 1–2] during which 4 bombers were lost, the target was missed by several miles and certain fires were started in villages which gave rise to the usual reports that fires could be seen many miles away[. . .] The Mustang was designed by the German Jew who was Willi Messerschmitt’s principal designer until he was kicked out by the Nazis[. . .] [Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur]

Harris's bombing operations on Berlin have been suspended for the moment and he has been forced to concentrate on aircraft assembly and manufacturing centres such as Schweinfurt and Augsburg[. . .] Mockler-Ferryman, Roach and TAR came to see me again about the French document. Robin Brook of SOE had seen it and was of the opinion that it was genuine and was being put about by Giraudists who did not approve of the policy[. . .] The *Abwehr* are speculating about the Second Front and are not very wide of the mark on present decisions.

March 4, 1944: [. . .] Gen. Crüwell retires to the lavatory when the [AA] barrage begins. Gen Cramer, who is being repatriated, made a very nice speech to the Commandant before his departure. he stated that now he was going he could reveal to the Commandant that he had 25% English blood[. . .] Every time he looked out of the window and saw his very smart guards, he was proud of his English blood. He then donated to the BAO in the name of all the officers of the Afrika Korps as a token of their gratitude for the British gentlemanly (sic). He then gave the BAO his armband Afrika Korps from his uniform with the remark that not even Arnim was entitled to wear that. Cramer was not at all looking forward to his interview with Hitler. He would however have to give a full report on the last days in Tunis and on his stay at No. 11 Camp. About the latter he could say nothing but good. He would however tell Hitler the truth about von Arnim, whose behaviour in the camp was the worst possible propaganda for the German army, and Cramer apologized for it to the BAO. [*Examples follow of Cramer's personal vanity and haughty manner*].

March 8, 1944: Kemball Johnston and Guy Burgess came to see me about ORANGE. Burgess has ascertained that ORANGE got his information about [Polish General] Kukiel from the Swiss M.A. who got it from the Polish M.A. Burgess raised the question of ORANGE's

future. He has the opportunity of becoming editor of the *Züricher Zeitung*[. . .] Dickson told me that he had just managed to get 6 fire-watchers into the Spanish Embassy. They ought to be quite useful if there is any trouble.

March 9, 1944: While we were talking [*with Orme Sargent about the Leukacevic case – Mihailovic*] Crow and Eden's private secretary bounced into the room, their faces wreathed in smiles, and said that they wanted to give Orme Sargent and me the latest tip about the Norwegians [*2,000 Norwegian refugees who were to be brought to the UK despite the security and espionage risk*]. They mentioned that the PM had lunched with the King of Norway, and had decreed that all the Norwegians were to be rapidly examined by the Security Service at a higher rate than 150 a week.' [*Impossible to do it faster than one per officer per day*]. I spoke to [Peter] Loxley afterwards, he said he thought that we should write a full-dress letter of protest to the S of S. It certainly is pretty futile sitting round a table for about 3 weeks to consider a lot of panic measures for the security of OVERLORD and then to have the front gate opened by the PM over a cup of coffee with the King of Norway. It is a great pity that this great man cannot keep his fingers off a number of minor problems with which he should never be concerned at all. C told me that the PM was very annoyed at the Cabinet meeting because the Security Service could not deal with the Norwegians[. . .] BRONX has just received her monthly payment from the Germans of £98. She has the plain language code on the Guaranty Trust previously mentioned. "Send £80 which I need for my dentist" means "invasion in a week's time Atlantic." £70 means N France, and Belgium, £60 N France and Bay of Biscay, £50 Bay of Biscay, £40 Mediterranean, £30 Denmark, £20 Norway, £10 the Balkans. In case of invasion at several places these sums added together are to be given, for example "send £30 plus £80 and the rest as soon as possible."

March 10, 1944: Warden and Buckmaster of SOE came to see me about GILBERT. Buckmaster is evidently at his wits end to know what to do with GILBERT who is bored to tears at Stratford on Avon and like[ly] to blow up at any moment. The proposal had been put forward that he should operate as an ATA pilot. I said that if we considered that he was too doubtful to be allowed to go back into the field, flying an aeroplane was the last job we should wish him to do in this country. I said that on the evidence available I did not see how anybody could possibly clear GILBERT although he might be entirely innocent. Personally I felt that LOUBA and ROGER were quite as suspicious if not more so. Buckmaster then said that LOUBA had been responsible for blowing up and seriously damaging certain factories I asked whether he was quite sure that LOUBA had committed the acts of sabotage. Were they not perhaps carried out by communists? Louba might well have cashed in on the incident in order to build himself up in the eyes of the British. I just could not believe in Col Heinrich and his relations with LOUBA and ROGER. At this stage Buckmaster said, "Presumably you do not think anybody ought to go into the field at all." I said, "Well, frankly, in the present circumstances I don't." I am sorry for Buckmaster who is obviously very overworked and harassed and I promised to do what I could to think up some job for GILBERT.

'Newsam rang up about the Norwegians. He has had a letter from Cadogan saying that at lunch with the King of Norway and the Norwegian PM and Foreign Minister on March 9, the PM said that he thought the rate of 150 a week for vetting Norwegians were not enough and undertook that arrangements should be made to increase it. He asked the Foreign Secretary to see that this was done.

March 11, 1944: I hear that the visitors' ban has at last been approved.

The question of diplomatic communications is however still in the air. [*Much data on reorganisation of Abwehr and SD in France and Belgium*].

[*Liddell gets flu, no entries until March 22.*]

March 22, 1944: [. . .] Cyril Mills is back from Canada on a visit[. . .] He seems [. . .] to have had no further trouble with Security Co-ordination[. . .] He told me that he had tipped off DSC about Sempill but had received a note from Dick [. . .] to the effect that Bill Stevenson knew Sempill well and thought him entirely beyond any subversive activity of this kind. This of course is not exactly the point, The trouble with [Lord] Sempill now is that he is grossly indiscreet[. . .]

March 25, 1944: I telephoned to Peter Loxley about a [. . .] report which indicated that Bailey had been talking to a Yugoslav official in Cairo and had expressed the view that the Cetniks were far superior to the Partisans. This is as may be, but probably Bailey, who would not have access to ISOS material, is in ignorance of details relating to Mihailovic's collaboration with the Germans. I gather that Bailey will not be returning to Yugoslavia. Meanwhile Leukacevic is being sent back at Mihailovic's request in order to facilitate the exit of 20 or 30 British liaison officers who are present at Mihailovic's headquarters. There is no doubt that the Yugoslavs situation is in a thorough mess.

March 26, 1944: I gather that Operation ANVIL was cancelled the day before yesterday.

March 29, 1944: [*Wiegand of Abwehrstelle Paris reports on visit to Berlin, end of Feb 1944*][. . .] I saw Tommy the night before last. He told me that Joe Stalin is being extremely troublesome and

has recently sent two very rude telegrams to the PM on the subject of Poland. This is rather a set-back, as it was thought that his manners had been improving lately. The PM is however said to have remarked that his belly was already red from crawling to old Joe. The question of paramount importance is that no possible excuse should be given to the Russians for making a separate peace. There is no special reason for thinking that they have intentions in that direction, but there is always a lingering fear. Personally I am inclined to doubt whether crawling to old Joe will ever do us much good but the question is obviously a very difficult and delicate one.

[Rumours that Eden will become deputy leader of House, Beaverbrook will take over FO. Not likely.]

March 31, 1944: [. . .] C visits[. . .] We then discussed then leakage case at Ankara. [*The CICERO affair.*] I asked what had happened. C said that all that Johnnie Dashwood had succeeded in discovering was that the Ambassador was extremely lax in his ways. He took documents home etc. It seemed likely that the papers had either been looked at in the train between Cairo and Ankara or that someone had a key to the Ambassador's box. Nothing definite however had been discovered. I took the opportunity of saying how ridiculous it was to send out people like Dashwood to conduct enquiries of this kind[. . .] The probability was that the leakage had been taking place ever since the subject was opened two years ago and we were still no further. C entirely agreed about this and said that he would speak to Loxley, but that he realized as I had that Will Codrington was the real snag.

C appeared to be very pleased with the way things were going and he said that MSS [intercepts] showed that probably a whole panzer division had been surrounded in the Ukraine, that the Luftwaffe

was stretched to its utmost limits, in fact to a point where bomber crews were being turned over to fighters owing to shortage of pilots. He said that according to the latest information, the Germans were intent to fight us on the beaches in the Second Front and not wait until we had effected a landing. The immediate counter attack would probably be in the hands of Rommel, although Rundstedt would be the supreme commander. [. . .]

ETIENNE has returned from Algiers and informs us that he showed the document reputed to have been written by d'Astier both to Giraud and de Gaulle. Neither of them appeared to like it and I gather that there has been a bit of a row. The general feeling is that the two brothers d'Astier and Passy appeared to be acting on their own and to be going rather further to the left than even de Gaulle would wish. Various changes are contemplated.

[. . .] We raided Nuremberg on the 30th and lost 95 planes.

[Liddell goes on leave]

April 16, 1944: [. . .] ARTIST has made it clear that he knows all about the GARBO set up and believes it to be a blind [. . .] Meanwhile ARTIST himself appears to be rather under a cloud as far as his own people are concerned. They think that he is being too inquisitive, particularly about the OSTRO organisation. The Germans are doing their best to isolate him from information of this kind. Whether this is due to jealousy or suspicion is not clear. It may be that they are nervous about his discovering that OSTRO's set-up is largely notional.

April 24, 1944: Victor [Rothschild] tells me that he has had a meeting with Air Marshal Peck, Gen Brunshill, and Pug Ismay [Sir Hastings Ismay] to discuss the future of the Bacteriological Com-

mittee. Victor said quite bluntly that the committee should not be in the hands of Ernie Brown but somebody like Sir Findlater Stewart. He had always regarded the committee's deliberations as Top Secret, but now apparently they were being discussed by all kinds of people and particularly by the Americans. Moreover at the PM's suggestion we had gone into production in the USA in order that we might be ready in case the Germans attempted any funny business. Nobody seemed to have taken any steps to see that these further moves were properly safeguarded from the security angle. Documents have been circulated to all and sundry. Victor has also seen C on this question. He said that the [*atomic*] bomb in which TUBE ALLOYS were interested might be in production by November. The problem had been solved but might just have a number of teething troubles to go through. The effect of this bomb will be devastating in the extreme.

April 29, 1944: There has been considerable trouble in Egypt due to the King [Farouk] wishing to get rid of Nahas Pasha by unconstitutional means. He thinks that Nahas is too much under British influence. This has caused a crisis and the possibility of the King's abdication has been considered. This might lead to a revolt in the army. Gen Paget has become somewhat concerned, and has been asking for more troops to deal with the situation, The PM has been handling the situation. On the 24th April he told Paget, "You must not get disturbed by all this Egyptian chatter. If riots should occur you must not counter in battalions and VP's but in vigorous and successful use of tanks and armoured cars which will very soon change the face of affairs. Do not call the palace clique the forces of law and order. Here is a case of a King threatening to overthrow a lawfully constituted Government which has proved itself faithful to us in the months of crisis. If he abdicates or has to be deposed, we have Mohamed Alie, the heir apparent, and

other elder statesmen on which the Ambassador can count. We are absolutely determined to support the Ambassador in his wise and experienced handling of the matter. Don't diverge from these explicit instructions for which I take full responsibility. The ambassador is to be supported," This was followed by another telegram saying, "Let me know how many tanks there are in Egypt and Palestine, including the workshops. They need not all be battle-worthy, as in most cases the work they may have to do will only be street demonstrations. Three or four camps of about 50 each, adequately guarded, should come into being in the next week or so, say near the Pyramids, Abbassia and other places where they cannot fail to be noticed. Interested inquirers should be told that large-scale exercises are intended in the near future. Let me know what you can do. Please don't talk in terms of dozens of battalions. Let me know also about the RAF available. They will not be needed except to buzz around." By the 25th April the political crisis seemed to be over as the King had agreed to allow the Nahas Government to continue in power.

KV4/194: diary May 1 – Aug 31, 1944

May 2, 1944: TRICYCLE's latest reports have been treated very favourably in Berlin.

[*Free French, General Koenig*].

May 4, 1944: [*FF wanted right to communicate in their own cypher with Algiers, British insisted on British censor being present.*]

The whole position is complicated by the attitude of the PM and

the President. The PM says "Stop these people from oveing [sic. Moving?] and stop their communications." On the other hand when talking to [Desmond] Morton he seemed to realise that the efficiency of OVERLORD might be seriously jeopardised if the negotiations could not proceed.

[*Eisenhower could not go to N Africa as this would imply recognition of the French Committee which the President had so far resolutely refused to give.*]

We reviewed the position of clandestine French communications. These are all under control by C but there is a transmitter in Duke St. C says that this transmitter is not operating but that it is receiving instructions from Algiers. [. . .] I met Sir John Dashwood at the Club last night. I asked him to give me an account of his visit to Ankara. [*Security leakages there, leakage of our own Balkans plans*] the cover names of which had appeared on ISOS. [*Ambassador's poor security arrangements in his home* [. . .] Instructions are being issued that in future the Ambassador must study his papers at the Chancellery. [. . .] It was known two years ago that the Ambassador's safe had been opened.

May 6, 1944: I am rather worried by discovering that the Vermehrens are in this country under SIS control. [*Housed at Hampstead. Liddell considered they should be under MI5 control.*]

May 10, 1944: At the weekly meeting Miss Clay said that for the first time the training and instruction of SD saboteurs had included murder. The two SD saboteurs who had been captured at Anzio had said that one of their assignments was to murder Alexander and Clark.

May 15, 1944: I saw Tommy [Harris?] last night. He told me that the

PM had backed up Eisenhower's wire to Washington about disclosing the target and approximate date of future [cross-Channel] operations to Koenig. The president's replied giving his agreement to this and I think also to de Gaulle being told. I mentioned to Tommy the rather naïve idea about these sort of things being told to one person only. In a matter of this sort where the underground movements were concerned, obviously many more would have to be informed. The PM seemed to be under a similar delusion, particularly where people gave their word of honour. He did not seem to realise that in doing so to one person, it meant accepting the word of honour of at least 100.

May 16, 1944: An MSS appreciation up to 7th May shows that from W/T intelligence the enemy have a very good idea of the disposition of our forces and of our objective. The whole picture is being built up from a number of details. Agents' reports do not appear to play a very big part. These are the views of Rundstedt, on which he bases his demands for units to deal with the situation. It is not possible to say how far the OKW accept his appreciation or how far, if they differ, they would be able to impose their views. I cannot help feeling that the enemy, as in the case of ourselves, are more likely to rely upon "Y" information and W/T intelligence than on anything they may receive from other sources, when formulating their plans.

May 18, 1944: For his sources of information [Sefton] Delmer draws on foreign broadcasts and press, CX, reports and information from MEW, and on CSDIC reports. He never uses an CX report without permission but has a certain latitude as regards CSDIC reports. He sees nothing in the Top Secret category.

May 24, 1944: 'Findlater talked about the abolition of the diplomatic ban. He said that the PM had to some extent sold the pass

by telling the President and also de Gaulle that communications would open up immediately after D-day.

[Objection was that this would indicate to the enemy that Normandy was the only assault: it would destroy the cover plan.]

Personally I doubt the soundness of this view. I do not see how the Germans can draw any other inference than that D-day operation is the one and only one. [. . .] CX reports indicate that there is a sharp decline in German morale. Some 60% are said to be convinced that the war is lost, 25% believe that some miracle will take place to save Germany without actually wishing for the victory of Nazism. [. . .] I saw Walter Bell today with Cecil [of SIS]. We discussed the case of Marlin [of the OSS] in the light of the PM's directive that conversations with Americans were only to be conducted on special lines of mutual interest. [. . .] Walter Bell took the view that Marlin was considered to be rather a joke in his own organisation and we all agreed that it would be a mistake to get at loggerheads with OSS. We decided therefore to pursue the line that in view of the PM's directive we could not give purely political information [on Ireland].

May 26, 1944: A Jap BJ indicates that Ribbentrop proposes to attempt a peace deal with the Americans if our Second Front operations are not successful.

May 26, 1944: *[The Admiralty had ordered all units of the Fleet to open their sealed orders; alas one was the French destroyer Combattante, visited later that day by French Admiral Argenlieu.]*

All our efforts to prevent the French from knowing anything about the date and target would be nullified.

[*C was asked to do what he could to stop the French sending the facts to Algiers. A wiretap on all ten phone lines at the French naval office was ordered.*]

As far as I can ascertain all French communications are under C's control except certain individual messages which Koenig and Viennot have been allowed to send by the PM.

May 28, 1944: "Monty" [*a naval officer who was the spitting image of Montgomery*] left for Gib. and Algiers on Friday. [May 29: *His arrival in Gib was duly reported to Madrid and Berlin.*]

May 29, 1944: I hear that the Germans have staged an armed parachute raid on Tito's headquarters. Tito himself got away and so did the SIS representative, although he lost his wireless set and cyphers. Other officers were captured. [*Suspected this indicated what Germans planned for southern England during invasion time.*] In this connection I gather that the JIS paper has resulted in precautions being taken at 21st Army Group HQ. [. . .]

De Gaulle has said that he won't come here unless he is allowed to communicate in his own cyphers. This raises the question as to whether he should arrive before D-day or immediately after. [*The COS would have to decide the security risks.*] There has been an odd incident at a Claridges meeting in the suite of Col Stirling of the SAS regiment. A French agent, Lieut Rosenthal, of Duke Street, had drawn a semi circle on a map right behind the Normandy beaches as a point to use the SAS troops most effectively. His unauthorised knowledge indicates that Duke Street knew the time and place already. Mockler-Ferryman and John Senter visited SHAEF on May 26 or 27, to warn them [Gen Betts] not to allow any SOE French agents into the field before D-day.

[Diplomatic ban: Views differed, and widely: the soldiers at SHAEF wanted the ban extended to D+30; the diplomats und Eden wanted it lifted on D+1. Ike and Bedell Smith visited Eden. The result was a compromise. SHAEF now decided to lift the diplomatic ban D+1 or 2, but in fact to hold back all foreign embassies telegrams, bags and couriers until D+7 on various pretexts. Liddell was not convinced:]

As soon as the foreign govts are notified that the ban has been lifted, the information will reach the Germans via Madrid and Stockholm and they will immediately conclude that the OVERLORD operation is the one and only.

June 1, 1944: *[On May 27, Hitler talking with Oshima indicated that after diversions in Norway, Denmark and SW part of west coast of France and Mediterranean French coast, the Allies would establish their bridgehead in Normandy and Brittany and then see how things went before possibly launching 'a real second front' in the Channel. Agent GARBO's plan would therefore be to build up the idea that the second assault would be the real one.]*

Meanwhile the 21st Army Group are getting rather nervous about the number of divisions moving into the area south of the river [Seine] and are suggesting that we should put over some hot deception to get them out of the area.

[Hitler had told Oshima that fighter output would be 6000 by Sept and 8000 by Jan. Liddell thought he was exaggerating.]

The decision of the Chiefs of Staff is that de Gaulle is not to come before D-day.

June 4, 1944: I have seen the Press directives which are to come into force after the opening of the Second Front. There is one para.

which invites a certain amount of speculation about attacks elsewhere, I gather the PM is to throw out some veiled hint of this in his speech, This strikes me as being an extremely unwise move, I am convinced that it would be much better to leave the Germans guessing about attacks elsewhere, if they are hinted at by the PM and Press the natural inference will be that there are going to be no such attacks.

[*On the diplomatic ban:*] The latest information is that the PM has told Ike that he favours the Foreign Secretary's view unless Ike feels very strongly that the ban should be maintained.

June 5, 1944: The Dufours case [*he sued de Gaulle in the British High Court for torture and maltreatment by Gaullist forces*].

The French have always taken the view that they have a perfect right to treat their subjects as they wish[. . .] They were told that in this country British law has to be respected and that the Courts were supreme. It now appears the PM hearing of this case and realising how undesirable at this moment it would be for de Gaulle to appear as a defendant in any action of this kind, told Stafford Cripps and the AG to look into the whole question and see whether there was any way out.

[*British government proposed to pay off Dufours, £1,000. D asked for ten, settled for five. British government denied in court that it would be paying the money.*]

In fact the sum is being paid by the Secret Service vote.

[*Judge was told of the need to settle by afternoon of the fourth, because of the opening of second Front. Liddell found it distasteful as it violated the principle that British did not interfere with judiciary.*]

June 7, 1944: The PM has however written him [Eisenhower] a very strong letter urging that only in the case of extreme necessity should be ban be continued. The PM in his speech to the House said that the recent landing in France was only the first of a series of landings which would take place on the Continent of Europe, I cannot help feeling that this is a mistake. The Germans should deduce that this is the one and only landing.

[Reported to PM in May the case of Knut Broderson, mission to spy for the SS on invasion plans. Shortwave to Spain.]

His secret ink was concealed in one of the straps of his plus-fours and in a pocket knife. More material for secret writing had been hidden underneath his big toe nail and in his tooth. The former came out when he had a bath and the tooth broke off while he was eating.

June 11, 1944: *[Duff Cooper reports on dealings with de Gaulle. Problems with millions of leaflets issued by General Eisenhower to the French without de Gaulle's approval.]* More trouble has been caused by the notes printed in the USA which are to be used by our and the American troops in France. Firstly, no arrangements appear to have been made for any Government guarantee to back these notes[. . .] The PM was rather shaken when he was told that the notes had no backing. He pressed the button and said, "Send for the Chancellor of the exchequer." The reply came back that the Chancellor had left an hour ago for his country seat. The PM said, "Blast his eyes, what does he mean by deserting his post on a Friday afternoon?" *[Eventually a man called Fraser arrived from the Treasury who confirmed that the notes were not backed. And that they were in fact of an extremely indifferent quality. Moreover the 5 fr note looked just like the 50,000 fr note.]* The PM was rather inclined to brush this aside, but on being shown the notes and

having an eye for something that was not well done, was visibly disappointed at these cheap looking notes which were of a kind you would expect to buy at Hamley's [*toy store*]. The whole question is being further considered. The PM seems to have three bad bees in his bonnet, Firstly de Gaulle, secondly Ireland, and thirdly the visitors ban [*in invasion departure area*]. His good bee is the President, and anything that is contrary to the latter's wishes is liable to swept aside. Duff has made it very clear to the PM that he regards de Gaulle as the only person who cuts any ice at all in France and for that reason he should be supported.'

[*The visitor ban had been enforced to make any parachuted spies stand out from day trippers who would have to have good documentation to explain their presence*].

June 12, 1944: The PM is proceeding to the beachhead today and de Gaulle has expressed the wish to go too. Duff thinks he ought to be allowed to go and if he is not given permission by Wednesday he will go back to Algiers. [. . .] On the other hand there is no doubt that de Gaulle is an extremely difficult and dour personality.

June 13, 1944: I saw "C" last night. He said that we were getting fairly near some of the CROSSBOW sites. Meanwhile he has heard that projectiles of some sort or other are being brought up. He was not very confident about this information which came from an agent and might or might not be confident. [*That night the first few V1 missiles arrived*]. The general impression is that the Germans are rushing things in view of the invasion and that in fact the apparatus is not really passed [*sic*] its teething troubles. C had had information that pre-fabricated sites were being erected in certain places. [. . .] It will be interesting to see whether we get any Stichling messages asking GARBO to report on where the air-

craft have landed. [. . .] MSS generally shows that the enemy is in fair state of confusion. There is a Degs message today indicating that the officer of the SD who was responsible for the kidnapping of Mussolini [i.e., *Otto Skorzeny*] is now in western France and recruiting some 100 men who have been specially trained in z.vb.V. functions. Teresa Clay has established that this same individual was recently applying for uniforms of the allies. It seems possible that we may expect an armed parachute raid on one of our headquarters. The matter is being considered by the JIS [sic] this afternoon. [. . .]

The SOE French section under Col Buckmaster have a circuit operating near the north coast of Brittany. A study of this traffic received from this circuit appeared to Warden to suggest the possibility of German control. This impression was verified by the report of an SOE officer who had been over in an aeroplane which was dropping stores to the organisation. This officer had had a conversation by means of an S.phone with the head of the organisation reception committee. He reported on his return that the voice of the latter individual had sounded extremely guttural and that he spoke neither fluent French or English. This was dismissed by Buckmaster as probably due to atmospheric conditions. Two days ago a surprising message was received from the wireless operator of the circuit, thanking SOE for the stores which had recently been delivered and stating that unfortunately certain of the agents had had to be shot but that others had proved more willing to do what the Germans asked them to do. So blatant did this message appear that at first it was thought to be some sort of hoax. Independent information was received however to the effect that the whole circuit had been under German control for some weeks. This circuit is dangerously near to the present operation. A list of the names of the people concerned in it has been sent to the LRC.

[*The diplomatic ban is definitely to come off at midnight Monday June 19.*]

June 15, 1944: On the 11th of June Steengracht, in talking to the Jap, said that the German military authorities had at first been anxious lest the British having failed in their first objective should break off the operations and switch the attack to another area.

[*Steengracht continued that the British had now been bringing up reinforcements and it would not be easy for them to switch. Germany's plan was to allow the Allies to complete landing their forces, then bring up a massive armoured counterattack.*]

I dined with the DMI and JC last night. The DMI was very complimentary about the work of this office both as regards deception and security. [. . .] He said that the JIS were writing a weekly paper on this particular point [*success of strategic deception*] and he thought that we ought to be consulted since the JIS might not be aware of the degree of confidence placed by Himmler and the *Abwehr* in GARBO's theory of a two-pronged attack.

June 21, 1944: [. . .] Niall McDermott who has been over to the beach-head. He gave me an account of the De Gaulle visit. De Gaulle took over with him on the *Combattante* a number of lower French officials who were supposedly to go to Bayeux in order to organise a *claque*. De Gaulle made a speech in the market square. He had previously declined to lunch with Monty, but was received by him on landing. After making a speech at Bayeux he went on to Issigny instead of returning to the boat which was scheduled to leave at about 4 p.m. When he got back from Issigny at about 8 p.m. certain members of his party were missing. They had in fact remained behind and in conjunction with the local resistance party removed certain collaborators from office and installed his own represen-

tatives. Civil Affairs had already started to work with the collaborators and were extremely annoyed. The de facto position was however eventually accepted by both by our military and by the Americans. In other words de Gaulle has presented the British and American govts with a *fait accompli*[. . .] Lennox mentioned that it was curious that immediately the diplomatic ban was removed the first German panzer division started to move down to the beach-head area.[[. . .] The total number killed by the bomb which fell in the Guards Chapel [*St James' Park, near Buckingham Palace*] is now given as 111.

June 23, 1944: On the 19th the Jap in Berlin was told that there were 23 divisions in this country under General Patton ready to carry out an invasion. For this reason the Germans had refrained from pouring their armies into Normandy. [. . .]

A propos of the sirens the PM has declared, "Let this something banshee sound only once a night," He has also ordered the removal of [sic. from] the London area of his private balloon called Lord Inskip. He is sick of seeing it bobbing up and down.

July 3, 1944: I saw "C" about my going to America [. . .] I mentioned to him that it seemed likely from a Jap BJ that the Germans were not contemplating the use of gas. He said he thought this was most unlikely neither did he think they would start bacteriological warfare, The general talk about gas was probably due to a German belief that we should retaliate for the DOODLEBUG with gas or some other weapon. He personally was in favour of retaliation, though not with gas or microbes. He thought we should bomb open towns and villages, and that this might even be forced upon the Govt. by public opinion. [. . .]

ANVIL is now definitely on again. This is probably due to American

pressure of a political kind[. . .]. This will mean a certain depletion of Alexander's forces and is of course contrary to Alexander's recommendation that he should turn right instead of left on reaching the north of Italy.

July 4, 1944: Apparently the question of ANVIL is not finally decided. 10 divisions would be required and these would have to be taken largely from Alexander's forces. The PM is opposed to this and is saying so to the president.[. . .] The total number of DOODLEBUGS launched up to date is 2,331. [. . .] Total casualties are 2,358 killed, 6,830 seriously injured, [. . .] The question of retaliation is under discussion. It is being opposed by Bomber Command who say that they are already using up 40% of their bomber forces in counter DOODLEBUG activities[. . .]

Fleetwood-Hesketh has done a note on deception in support of OVERLORD before and after D-day. The object was to contain German forces in the Pas de Calais (Plan FORTITUDE) and to a lesser extent in the Bordeaux area (Plan IRONSIDE.) The latter was not put into operation until the second half of May[. . .] The agents BRONX, GARBO, and TATE were employed in its execution. [E.g. GARBO through his position at the MoI had interpreted notional PWE directives in reverse. Brutus, another agent, was appointed by to an allied mission attached to Fusag on May 26 which had provided him with a comprehensive order of Battle. For Fusag. Tate had connections with a railway clerk at Ashford which let him see a schedule of troop movements. From ULTRA it was clear that up to June 11 at least Plan FORTITUDE was firmly in the minds of the German High Command.]

July 7, 1944: [Double-agent] ZIGZAG has started to transmit. At the moment it is intended that he should be stationed in London in order to carry out deception in connection with the flying bombs.

July 8, 1944: Charles Cholmondeley showed me some MSS today which indicate that on the 30th June Rundstedt still believed in an attack in the second half of July in the Pas de Calais by Patton's Army. This idea of Patton's Army has been entirely put across by GARBO. The fact is of course that there is no such army.

July 12, 1944: General Pile gave an off the record talk to the press on the flying bomb.

August 25, 1944: "C" was very pleased with his present set-up in France. He said he had 300 wireless sets operating from behind the lines. [. . .] He was getting 100 messages a day about German troop movements and general conditions. MSS [*codebreaking*] had proved invaluable during Second Front operations, although it had become far more difficult to deal with. He had in consequence asked for 500 more staff at GC&CS. It was doubtful whether he would get them. The Americans had been warned 48 hours before the German counter-attack at Avranches and had precise details of the German plans. When the German 7th Army HQ were captured copies of all these messages were found. GC&CS were congratulated on not having missed one[. . .] Hitler, according to MSS, has given orders that Paris is to be destroyed. [. . .]

The Germans [. . .] are also saying [to the Japs] that they intend to launch an offensive on a big scale in about 2 months time when they will have mobilised from 100 to 125 divisions

[In general, Liddell is scathing about the SIS and quotes every poor comment he hears about it.]

KV.4/195

Guy Liddell diary, September 2 – December 30, 1944.

September 2, 1944: [Ian] Wilson [assistant of Milmo at o2o?] has put up two very interesting reports based on information that he has received from DREADNOUGHT. They throw a particularly interesting light on the attitude of Mihailovic. If DREADNOUGHT's appreciation is correct, Mihailovic is really doing what he considers to be best for his country as distinct from the Allied cause. He dislikes both the Germans and the Partisans. He has collaborated with the Germans for two purposes: 1. to get greater freedom of movement and control over certain areas of the country, and 2. to get arms. He has not so far been in a sufficiently dominating position to come out into the open and deal with both Germans and Partisans, and continues his collaboration with the Germans in the hope that he will, as a reward for his apparent collaboration, be in a position to obtain such equipment as they will be forced to leave behind or be prepared to hand over to him. As far as Nedic is concerned, he is playing a somewhat similar game, fighting bogus battles in order that Nedic can have plausible excuses for losing equipment which comes to Mihailovic's headquarters.

September 3, 1944: On the 28th August the Jap Govt informed the German ambassador that the Supreme Council felt that the war situation was very serious. Things were going badly on all fronts and a restoration of the balance of fighting power to which the Germans were looking could not be expected to materialize at any rate for some time. Meanwhile on the diplomatic front Germany was gradually being encircled through the defection of her allies. In such circumstances was it was [missing word: mistaken?] of Germany to try to put an end to the war by force alone. Ger-

many should therefore try and reach a compromise peace with the USSR. The Japanese would be prepared to intervene with the USSR in this sense but would prefer the Germans to make direct negotiations.

September 4, 1944: On the 9th August a large amount of allied sabotage equipment which had been dropped by parachute was captured at the SD and Sipo headquarters at Rennes[. . .] A further attack by the KdK [*Kleinkampfschiffe?*] took place off Normandy on August 3 and although a certain amount of damage was caused including the sinking of HMS *Quorn*, the enemy lost at least 20 explosive motorboats and 20 human torpedoes. A further attack took place on the night of August 16–17th. On both these occasions the Germans sent over a few aircraft immediately prior to the attack, in order that the light from the British tracer flak and searchlights should assist the human torpedoes in finding their targets.

We have been asked what should be done with renegade or collaborationist British subjects who are picked up by the army who are in no sense public figures[. . .] P G Wodehouse has turned up in Paris and [Major] Cussen has gone over at the request of the Home Secretary to interview him. It might be that if he were sent back he would be the cause of considerable embarrassment through MPs wishing him to be imprisoned and brought to trial for treachery.

September 5, 1944: According to ISOS [*cipher used by Abwehr agents, cracked by the British*], FATHER was heard for the first time on 5.8.44 operating from India. No message was transmitted, but contact was made.

The German minister in Sofia was recently in Germany where he

had an interview with Hitler. The ambassador informed the Japs that Hitler appeared to be extremely calm and had foreseen from the outset that such a day as this would dawn. He said that within the next 3–5 months the effects of Germany's latest mobilization would become apparent, and the new weapons would all be in use so that Germany would go over to the offensive. The immediate necessity was to obtain time and to this end the shortening of the lines was inevitable.

[*Statistics on V.1 launchings, then:*] Further details are now available about V.2. Its length is 45 feet 10 ins, maximum body diameter 5 ft 6 ins, length of fins 11 ft 8 ins, all up weight including full fuel load and warhead 13½ tons. Full fuel load 9½ tons, war head somewhat less than one ton. Range 215–230 miles, representing an operational range of about 200 miles. According to P/Ws the rockets starts [sic] vertically and climbs at a steep angle to a height variously estimate 9–15,000 metres. During the climb the rocket is said to emit a loud roar but accounts disagree on the question of smoke and flame. [. . .]

I had a talk with Findlater Stewart. He told me that while I was away he saw Sir John Anderson. Anderson is strongly opposed to a complete amalgamation of SIS and ourselves [MI5]. His reasons are of course the old political ones. He thinks that there should be two organizations, an offensive and a defensive, with possibly an exchange of personnel[. . .] He is going to have some similar conversations with [Sir Edward] Bridges. This should effectively block the way to any hasty action through the PM. He then told me that some time ago he had been asked to arbitrate between SIS and SOE. Nothing had materialized however as they settled their own differences themselves.

September 7, 1944: I saw C this morning and told him about Plan Z

[*not identified*]. He was particularly interested because he said that he had just got in from SIM in Italy information that they had been inside our Embassy for years and had bought up all the Italian staff. They had been reading all our ciphers. He said that he thought the job we were going to perform was an important one and would be extremely useful. [. . .]

I then went on to see [Colonel] Vivian [*deputy to C*]. I told him about my visit to American and that I had not been able to intervene on behalf of Evans simply because it was clear to me from the general atmosphere that Hoover would not pay more than lip-service to any arrangement with SIS until BSC [British Security Co-ordination] and all its works were removed. I said that even then I thought SIS would have quite a lot of trouble in establishing really useful relations with Hoover. [. . .]

Giles, head of the CID in Palestine, came in for a talk. He seemed fairly confident that we were in for trouble in Palestine. He is clearly for a Joint Legislative Assembly with an equal representation for Jew and Arab. He thinks that if the British Govt imposed this it would, after a certain amount of trouble, be accepted by the majority. Jewish immigration which he feels has reached saturation point would of course have to cease. The urgent necessity is that the government should make up their minds and that some plan should be put through. Giles thinks that Palestine is extremely important to the Empire and should remain under its protection. He said that if we left the Jews to govern Palestine and defend themselves they would be ousted by the Arabs within two years. Although Giles did not say so, I gather from R.J. that he dislikes the Jews. I talked with him about the Arabs. He says that if they do not get equal rights he is convinced that we shall have the Moslem world against us. This view is somewhat contrary to the views expressed by Teggart, who is inclined to say that they are

only a set of Bedouin Arabs who are of any account and in so far as the rest are concerned the Moslem world would not be particularly interested. [. . .]

During the afternoon Lord Gort came in to discuss [+++++] the representatives of the Hagana who are coming to this country. He said it would be of considerable importance to him to know about their deliberations with [Moshe] Shertok. Armed with this view we are approaching the H[ome] O[ffice] for the usual telephone [-tapping] warrant.

Isos discloses that [Walther] Schellenberg, an SS *Brigadeführer*, is responsible to [Ernst] Kaltenbrunner and Himmler for security and policy of Amt 6 [VI] and the *Militärisches Amt* of the RSHA. Hansen was arrested at the time of the putsch of July 20th [*and executed*]. Amt 6 has absorbed the economic section of the *Abwehr*, namely *Eins Wi*. The section is jointly under Schmeed and Col Focke, the former chief of the *Abwehr* section. It is possible that Schellenberg may be interested in the *Abwehr's* contacts in the commercial world, not as sources of intelligence valuable in winning the war but as channels for communication after the war and also before defeat. [. . .]

September 8, 1944: [. . .] I told the DG about Plan Z and he seems fairly satisfied, and prepared to leave things to me.

September 9, 1944: Last night while I was still in the office there were two explosions in fairly close succession about 6:45. We learned today that two V.2's have landed, one in Epping which I do not imagine could possibly have heard, and one in Chiswick which obviously we did hear. It sounded very much nearer. Probably the second report was something in the nature of an echo. In

Chiswick I believe about three houses were demolished and three people killed. A hole has been made about 16 ft deep and 20 ft broad. An examination seems to indicate that the projectile is a rocket. It is believed to have come from Holland. [. . .]

I saw Nevile Bland today and told him that I knew about his committee which had been discussing the affairs of SIS[. . .] Bland [. . .] was not apparently shocked by the suggestions that we [MI5] should have some sort of representation abroad. I explained to him exactly why this was necessary and why we should be called in on security cases by the Embassies abroad. In particular I mentioned the Ankara [CICERO] case. [. . .]

I have spent most of the rest of the day going through in very great detail the Plan Z arrangements. There has been a slight hitch however. The clerk who was to be specially housed in the country has been kept at his desk, presumably getting out wires about V.2.

September 10, 1944: The final ruling of the Chiefs of Staff about entering diplomatic and consular establishments in territory being reoccupied by the Allies[. . .]

A German officer P/W of considerable education and intelligence [. . .] states that the invasion of Normandy came as a complete surprise. To illustrate this he says that on the night of the invasion a meeting of all Division commanders of the 7th Army was called at Rennes to discuss operations in case of an allied air-borne landing.

On the 4th Sept Hitler had an interview with the Jap ambassador and Ribbentrop. Hitler asked about the situation in the east said that at the moment things were very critical in the west so that he could say nothing definite until he saw how things went there. He

thought however that Germany would have to fight another round with the Soviet armies in the east. Ribbentrop speaking in front of Hitler said that if Japan sounded the USSR views about peace directly this would be interpreted by the enemy as having been done at the request of Germany and as revealing her weakness. He trusted therefore that this subject would be avoided. The impression given by Hitler was that his views regarding victory over the USSR had undergone a complete change. He made no denial about Russo-German rapprochement but said that at the moment there seemed to be no starting point for negotiations. Both Hitler and Ribbentrop seemed to agree on this point, and thought any direct attempt would be a sign of weakness.

The Jap ambassador is therefore advising his government to sound the views of the USSR in a manner which will not embarrass Germany. Hitler spoke of the attempt on his life on July 20. He had been disappointed by events in the west but indicated that this was in part due to confederates of those responsible for the attempt on his life. This is probably nonsense and merely an excuse for the German breakdown in the west. Hitler however expressed his intention of liquidating everyone who had the slightest connection with the affair.

He said that the British forces' left wing was at present on a continuous front which they had formed and that on the right wing the Americans were moving in 5 or 6 columns which were each composed of 3 or 4 divisions. His intentions were to strike at these on the flank; forces were being concentrated SE of Nancy for that purpose. He estimated the present strength of the enemy in N France as 50 divisions. His offensive would be carried out with the sole object of stabilizing the front. With the million new troops now being formed together with the detachments withdrawn from various fronts supported by the replenishment of the Air Force

he intended to undertake a great offensive in the west, probably in November. The Jap appeared to be somewhat sceptical about the possibility of mounting such an operation, and still more as to its success. Hitler expressed his intention of retreating from the Balkans and Greece and proposed to occupy a line extending from Transylvania and the southern Carpathians to the boundary of Yugoslavia to the southwest, but it might be a line westwards from the old Hungarian frontier. In Italy he proposed to retire to the Alps.

He could not withdraw his forces from the Baltic coast since this would have the disadvantage of leaving the Baltic entirely exposed to the enemy. Neither could he withdraw from Norway owing to the loss of the submarine bases in France. He had a stock of the principle raw materials which would last him about 2 years. Against a possible enemy aerial bombardment he would have anti-aircraft units withdrawn from all the various fronts.

It is somewhat significant that on the 7th Sept Steengrachts [*sic*], Ribbentrop's vice-minister, made a special approach to the Jap ambassador. He had been instructed on the 4th that in their interviews on the 4th neither Hitler or Ribbentrop wished to convey the idea that a Russo-German separate peace had been turned down flat. The Jap said he had examined every aspect of the question in his conversation with H and R and thought that he had succeeded in understanding both of them and what they had in mind; he realised that they were in a position which precluded their making a definite statement on a question of this sort. He had therefore read between lines and in telegraphing to his Govt. had added his own interpretation. This he conveyed to Steengracht. The representative of the Jap Minister of the Interior in Berlin held the view on 6th Sept that the collapse of Germany was only a matter of time. He therefore proposed to remove himself

to Switzerland.

September 11, 1944: [. . .] I had a talk with Burt [Scotland Yard], Stopford and Courtney about Saturday's operation [*evidently a burglary of a London embassy?*] We decided to find out more about the character of Petersen and in future operations to obtain better control of telephone lines and also of the movement of anyone who might embarrass us.[. . .]

It is said that the [V2] fragments found at Chiswick were in part so hot you couldn't touch them and in part coated with ice. The rocket is supposed to have gone 38 miles high. [. . .]

I had a talk with Arnold. He told me that we had used our jet-propulsion planes [Gloucester Meteors] with great success in knocking down the DOODLEBUGS. So far there were only nine of them but they are in full production. With the present engine they can do 450 and are extremely manoeuvrable. They have an almost unlimited ceiling and of course can operate faster in the stratosphere than at lower altitudes[. . .] Our machines are superior to the Germans because they suck in their oxygen as the[y] go[. . .] The Germans are not supposed to know that we used jet-propulsion against the DOODLEBUGS, but it was discovered recently that when pilots were talking to each other the particular hum of the jet-propelled plane could be heard through their conversation. [. . .]

I saw C this evening. I told him about our little exploit on Saturday night [*burglary of Spanish(?) embassy?*] in which he was much interested. I also asked him whether there were ways and means of getting GARBO a decoration without being published in the press[. . .]

September 13, 1944: Musso[lini] has had two conversations with the Jap ambassador in Vienna on 22nd and 28th August. Musso was very bitter about the way the Germans are treating the Italians in N Italy[. . .] Their action against any recalcitrants were [*sic*] extremely drastic. Musso had complained to the German ambassador but without getting much redress[. . .] the Germans were requisitioning all kinds of commodities and means of transport in N Italy. They took foodstuffs and live stock, machine implements, typewriters, handcarts, clocks and even motor-horns. Reprisals against banditry and acts of terrorism were extremely severe and the Germans carried them out indiscriminately, even against Party members and government officials. [. . .]

As the reprisal for acts of terrorism in Milan, fifteen corpses had been left all day in the public square. Such things excited popular feeling and furnished the enemy with excellent propaganda material[. . .]

Subsequently the Germans asked Musso to issue orders to them [*troops being rounded up for action in German service*] but as he was required to tell them to swear allegiance to Hitler he had felt bound to refuse. Even Musso's Finance Minister had his car commandeered by the SS, though they knew the identity of the occupant. Musso himself was determined to carry on in spite of these difficulties, even if it meant a dramatic trial and an end by shooting. He apparently made this statement with an extremely pathetic expression. Musso referred once more to the advice he had given Hitler on the Brenner Pass, on no account to go to war with Russia. He felt this had been the cardinal blunder.

Lord Swinton came in to see us all today. He seemed extremely full of beans. I told him something about our work in connection with the Second Front. He was extremely interested to hear about

the work of B.1a, the major outline of which he seems to have learned from the PM. The PM said that the operation would probably not have succeeded had we now been able to keep the Germans from committing themselves for a matter of 2–3 weeks. I also told Swinton about what we had done for CI [counterintelligence] planning and the provision of staff for SHAEF and subordinate formations.

The attitude of the Russians at the moment is quite interesting. It would seem that they have almost deliberately left the resistance movement in Warsaw in the lurch. They have refused to allow our planes to drop arms[. . .] It seems to me that their policy is to occupy such territory as they intend to hold after the war, namely the Baltic states, east Poland and Bessarabia and to extend their forces over such parts of the Balkans as they consider to be within their sphere of interest. [. . .]

Numerous memos are being produced as to what the Germans are likely to do when we occupy their country[. . .] My own view is that when the Germans have collapsed the majority of them will become abject. [*etc*].

September 14, 1944: Stephens came to see the DG and we had a discussion about the proposal that he should set up an o2o [*interrogation centre*] in Germany. The DG in a letter to [Brigadier] Maunsell has laid down the conditions that Stephens should have a certain independence in the running of o2o and should employ to some extent the same methods that he has been employing here. In particular the DG wished for an undertaking that he would not be asked to use any third degree methods [*torture, physical coercion*]. o2o had a perfectly clean record in this respect and it would be highly undesirable from the point of view of our dept. and the country as a whole if such methods were used. The DG

had in mind that Maunsell's record in this respect was not altogether clean. There had I think been a case of his sandbagging somebody in the Mid East and one of his employees there had ideas about the use of Evipan, the drug which is supposed to make people talk. In fact Evipan is quite useless and in any case it would be undesirable to use it. Equally third degree was just as likely to produce bad results as food; apart from the moral side, it never pays. [. . .]

Louis de Bray, the notorious character who penetrated our escape routes on the Continent and has been instrumental in denouncing a large number of Allied subjects, has been captured and is being sent back for interrogation.

September 15, 1944: [*Much detail on Australian security service, Ogilvy, Caulfeild, Long, etc. Then several pages on Japanese espionage in and infiltration of India pre-war and early war years.*] In all, up to April 1944, no less than 2,575 [Japanese] persons are known to have been dispatched on various missions or to be in training[. . .] The Japs have in Subhas Chandra Bose an Indian leader of outstanding ability and not lacking in personality. [. . .]

V2 continues at the rate of two or three per 24 hours. The remarkable thing is that the explosions are heard quite definitely even when the rocket falls at a distance of up to twenty miles away[. . .] I had a talk with Brooman-White about V2. The only reason for not publishing is that the Germans have said nothing about V2 and may therefore be in some doubt as to where their rockets and landing, whether on British territory or in the sea. On the other hand there is some indication that the Spaniards may have been passing on information[. . .] the Press are apparently anxious to get at Duncan Sandys, whose statements regarding V1 and counter-measures have rather given the impression that the government

was slow off the mark but that everything was now over. The result has been that families are pouring back into London, when they had much better remain outside for the time being. The authorities still seem to think that V2 is radio controlled[. . .] There has been one case of a rocket bursting in the air, probably due to overheating. This has I believe been one of the main troubles which the Germans have had to content [*sic*] with.

September 16, 1944: *The Times* today published the figures of bomb damage done since the beginning of the war and by flying bombs and air raids generally. In air raids 1940-44, 84,000 houses were destroyed; 142,000 houses are still to be repaired of which 42,000 are not fit for occupation. In the flying bomb attacks 1944, 23,000 houses were destroyed; 1,104,000 houses were damaged although in a large proportion the damage is slight[. . .] V1 has started up again. 13 were launched early this morning, [. . .] it is not known at the moment whence they came.

September 19, 1944: Cussen has seen PG Wodehouse in Paris. He says that he is a stupid old man who has made so many blunders that he has brought himself perilously near the clutches of the Treachery Act. For the time being he is to remain in Paris. It is hoped that there may be an opportunity later of interrogating the Germans who handled his case. [. . .]

Hart is proposing to stop issuing a weekly isos summary as the reports are now quite worthless.

September 21, 1944: The DG has had a letter from Duff [Cooper] I think inspired by Victor suggesting that Cussen should go over to Paris to discuss the security of the PM's visit there some time next month. I pointed out to the DG that [. . .] the protection of the PM was essentially an SB responsibility. If the PM or the King

and Queen were visiting Paris in peace time it would be for Canning to get into touch with the Prefecture and Sureté in order to make the necessary arrangements[. . .] The DG thoroughly appreciated this point.

September 25, 1944: Briscoe and Jimmy Dickson had their party over the weekend. [*Another embassy burglary?*] It was suggested to the victim who was to assist in picking apples that he would be well-advised to put on an old pair of trousers. This he accordingly did. Meanwhile Briscoe did a bit of high-precision work [*probably measuring safe keys: see Oct 23, 1944*] which should give us all the data that we require.

September 26, 1944: Lord Gort came to discuss ISPAL I [*evidently a Hebrew cypher being used by Zionists*] with [Alec] Kellar. He was anxious that one of his PAs should be put into the picture. I said I thought this was highly desirable but since we had had so much trouble about this [*decoding*] project of which C was the custodian I felt that it would be as well for [Lord] Gort to take up the matter up [*sic*] himself direct with C. Gort said that he would be going back to Palestine shortly. He was only held up on account of the PM's absence. Before leave he was anxious to know whether any matters relating to the future of Palestine had been agreed on at Quebec. [. . .]

[Werner] Naumann, Vice-Minister [i.e., *Staatssekretär*] for Propaganda in Germany, has had a conversation with the Jap on the various problems with which Germany is now faced. It was made clear that while peace with England or America was out of the question, Germany would not be averse to peace with Russia if a favourable opportunity had occurred. It was mentioned that Hitler had specially refrained from putting Vlasov's army into the field as he felt that once he had done so he would be unable to get rid

of these people if the situation suddenly underwent a change. Naumann said that Goebbels, Himmler, Speer and Bormann were now in complete agreement as regards the conduct of the war and were the persons mainly responsible for its prosecution. Himmler and Goebbels both were anxious to see Naumann[. . .]

Horrocks, Bird, [Alec] Kellar and I had a discussion about the post-war Black List[. . .] [Alec] Kellar had in mind certain types which might be found in the Mid East, such as Persians acting for the Russians, Arabs, and Jews. They should be listed on a highly selective basis. We all agreed that important international communists or communists likely to travel should also form part of the list.

September 27, 1944: Hungarian representatives have arrived in Italy to discuss armistice terms. By request, we are sending assistance by air to the Slovak army and partisans in Czechoslovakia who had risen. It is I gather being done rather secretly without the knowledge of the Russians, who are very touchy about our having anything to do with Czechoslovakia. [. . .]

At Brest all unloading facilities are unusable. There is a 400 foot gap in the harbour. At Boulogne 26 craft were sunk and all the berths fouled by cranes etc. It is estimated than only 1,200 fit men are left out of the 8,000 odd of the First Airborne Division [*which had been decimated at Arnhem. . .*]

I dined with Noble and Sloane [*a Russian émigré?*] last night. Sloane seemed in very good form and was clearly looking forward to returning to his native land. He talked a great deal about Russia[. . .] Sloane was sorry for the Poles and he thought that they were extremely *ungeschickt* [*German: clumsy*] in all political matters. They always seemed to say the wrong thing at a critical mo-

ment. Whatever the facts of the Katyn murders might be, it would have been much better if the Poles had kept silent.

October 2, 1944: [*A rather melodramatic account by General von Choltitz of his last interview with Hitler.*]

October 3, 1944: I saw [+++ +++++] last night at the club. [*Evidently some sort of deputy or assistant of Sir William Stephenson in New York . . .*] We then talked about Australia. I told [+++++] about Ogilvy and asked him about Kendall. He said that Kendall had as far as he knew endeavoured to run a few agents into the islands from Australia but as far as he knew these ventures had been unsuccessful. He then mentioned a fellow called Gerald Wilkinson, who is now in New York and had some time ago been attached to Gen. [Douglas] McArthur. He had been reporting back to C on what was going on at Gen McArthur's HQ but copies of all his communications had been obtained by some girl who had been planted in his office. This had led to a scandal and to Wilkinson's removal. [+++++'s] views about Broadway [SIS headquarters] are absolutely unprintable. He says that there is no semblance of organisation, and almost all the people there are totally unfitted for their jobs.

Bill Stephenson is apparently winding up his show but may stay on to conduct any high-level liaisons with OSS and to look after SOE's interests. Nobody seems very clear what SOE are doing. They were going to wind up their organisation in S America but they have now decided to hang on to it.

October 9, 1944: [*details on wireless deception, OVERLORD, NEPTUNE, and the use of 'fingerprinting' of certain units and their radio operators in this connection.*] For the purpose of NEPTUNE two entirely bogus assault forces V and W with their associated ships

and craft were created by wireless in the Clyde area in April and were maintained there until the end of May. As the result of this manoeuvre not only did the enemy retain his forces in Norway but actually reinforced them. [*For the Pas de Calais deception a bogus force F was created by wireless on the east coast, training with elements of the First Army Group.*] A special broadcast consisting entirely of dummy traffic was initiated from Chatham [. . .]

There has been a broadcast on the 22nd Sept by Columbia Broadcasting Coy with some interesting evidence of the effect of our deception for OVERLORD. Matthew Halton, of CBC, had been studying the captured transcripts of telephone conversations between the German generals during the first month of the invasion. [*A page of details follows*].

October 10, 1944: I dined with Tommy [Lascelles, the King's secretary?] last night. He was going to Eindhoven with the King today, where they would be the guests of Monty. There has been quite a fuss on the part of the Air Force who were worried lest there should be any mishap. Monty on the other hand takes the whole thing very light-heartedly and says there is not a German plane in the sky. Winston told Portal to make the necessary arrangements. This resulted in the production of a bright blue plane which has since been changed to something less obvious.

Winston is determined to show the world that Stalin is being kept *au fait* with everything that is going on, in spite of his reluctance to come to another meeting. On the other hand I gather that the PM is a bit bored with old Joe's constant pleadings of ill-health which will not permit him to leave his country.

If a split comes in the Coalition, there will not necessarily be a General Election. Winston will resign and the King would therefore

naturally send for the head of the largest party and ask him to form a government. This may well happen before long. [. . .]

I saw [+++++] at the Club. He says that a tremendous mess has been made once more over Security Co-ordination[. . .] SIS cannot break up BSC because it is not under their control. All they can do is sack Bill [Stephenson] in his capacity as 4800 [Director of Security Co-ordination?]. He still remains as head of BSC representing the interests of SOE and the Home Defence Executive.

October 11, 1944: T A R [Robertson] has just got back from France. He and Tommy went for a meeting with Wild and Co. They both describe SHAEF as bedlam. Hundreds of officers, very few of whom seem to know what they are doing, no communications and no security. Wild's outfit is in the Crillon and entry can be obtained to their place by almost any waiter in the hotel. SHAEF Forward plans for the next three months are roneo'd in large quantities and distributed to all and sundry. Telephones are insecure and transport facilities between Versailles and Paris are lamentable. Clearly it would have been far better for SHAEF to remain at Bushey[. . .] The whole situation is complicated by the presence of "Comm.Z" (pronounced Zee) a unit under General Lee which has occupied Paris with 30,000 men[. . .] It arrived in Paris with a mobile regiment of 5,000 jeeps, 150 miles of lorries, an equivalent number of bulldozers, tank carriers, Negroes, locomotives, gasometers and electric generating sets. Everything else, including of course the Parisians, has been swept into the gutter. Comm.Z has evidently been too much for Old Ike, who has doled out an almighty raspberry to Gen. Lee, on the behaviour of his officers and on the undesirability of his having established himself in Paris[. . .] This order [. . .] having undergone the usual roneoing process is in the hands of almost every clerk.

A Professor Doktor Wachsmuth who was captured in Holland [. . .] [*brought over to UK . . .*] has met Hitler once. [*Fanciful details follow*].

October 13, 1944: I understand that about two weeks ago a representative of OSS and Bill Donovan's secretary were captured by the Germans while sight-seeing on the western front. This is an unfortunate incident to say the least since they may both well be conversant with ISOS.

October 14, 1944: Anthony [Blunt] came to see me about a good piece of work by DUCK [a female agent] who has got all the latest instructions from the new Spanish foreign minister as to how Spanish affairs are to be conducted here. Anthony took these to special examiners for translation and found that the document had [*already been intercepted and deciphered? – one or two lines are blanked out*]. Seeing that we have produced with the greatest regularity copies of all Alba's dispatches which have been circulated on an SIS ticket it seems a bit thick that a document of this sort should not have been passed to us a matter of routine.

A Jap BJ of the 18th Sept indicates that the Japan ambassador in Moscow has been able to get the Russians to maintain their neutrality, thus giving the Japs the opportunity of devoting all their efforts to the southern front. He is convinced after talks with Molotov and after Hoshima's [*sic*] talks with Hitler, that both Russian and Germany have rejected any efforts by Japan to bring about a German–Russian peace.

October 20, 1944: Toby Mathews has been made DPP, a somewhat novel appointment since he is (a) a solicitor and (b) a Catholic [. . .].

Sir John Anderson has announced that so far the war has cost us £24,000,000,000. [*This figure presumably included the cost in human lives, Your Majesty: with apologies to Anatole France.*]

October 21, 1944: A CX report states that the Nazis are making out lists of non-Nazis which they would see reached us as lists of Nazis. They hope that this will lead to the arrest of a large number of innocent people and that those who propose to make trouble in the future will be left at large. [. . .]

The 9th US Army has reported an incident involving the capture of three German soldiers wearing US uniform and driving behind our lines in a US jeep. One wore an American Army Captain's uniform with a First US Army patch and the other two were in war-enlisted men's uniforms. They stopped another American jeep carrying two Lt Cols. The latter did not notice any irregularities until after getting out of their jeep and surrounding the Americans the Germans began talking in German, In the ensuing fight, one American officer and two Germans, one of them the pseudo-captain, were killed. The latter was wearing a German CO's uniform under his American one, but carried no identification papers. [. . .]

I saw Denniston today about getting Lewis and Stalbo, who are working on ISPAL, 1 and 2, to read back some Hebrew records for us relating to the activities of [Zionist leader] Shertok and others. Denniston was quite prepared that they should do this work and regarded them as 100% reliable. He thought however that as they both worked so closely together it would be a mistake to employ one and not the other. I said I would consider the position and let him have a final answer.

October 22, 1944: Moffatt and Wolsey of the RUC [Royal Ulster

Constabulary?]) came to have a talk with me. They are seeing Halland, who is to take over from Himmler in Germany. [*sic*]. I told them all I knew about the present set up in Germany, which in the present state of affairs is somewhat vague. [. . .]

Slight danger to the case of BRUTUS has arisen in so far as VIOLETTE, his late mistress and sub-agent in France, has been arrested by the FFI on a charge of collaborating with the Germans. Unfortunately the Germans allowed VIOLETTE to learn that BRUTUS was was [*sic*] working for them in England and VIOLETTE is therefore in a position to compromise the case. A full report on the circumstances of VIOLETTE's arrest is awaited and meanwhile a scheme for providing BRUTUS with the necessary safeguard is being devised.

October 23, 1944: [Lord] Gort came to see me about the security of his safes in Palestine. Both of them have been in use since about 1937. I said that if this was so he must take it that the keys may possibly have been compromised. The only thing therefore was to have two new safes. I said that some people kept their safe keys always in their left hand trouser pockets. He said, "Yes, that is just what I always do."

I replied that other people might not have been so careful and that in any case there came a moment when he would have to have a bath. I said that we could say from practical experience [*see Sept 25, 1944*] that we had taken advantage of situation of this kind to obtain high precision measurements and to manufacture a facsimile key down to half a thousandth of an inch. Gort seemed very impressed by this and has quite made up his mind that he is going to have two new safes.

I told him too that we would get our experts on to devising some means of knowing whether the safe has been opened without this

coming to the notice of the culprit. I thought that if we were successful in this, he should test this safe at least once a week.

[Alec] Kellar seems to have established a complete bond of confidence with [Lord] Gort who is popping in and out of the office every day. He even rehearses with [Alec] Kellar what he is going to say to Shertok. Gort is quite determined to get about the place and see everybody. I am afraid that those who are responsible for his security will have a pretty anxious time.

October 24, 1944: [*Two page transcript of an inauspicious wedding-morning phone conversation between Nashat Pasha and his British bride, Miss Priest . . .*]

I attended the investiture at Buckingham Palace where I met [Brigadier] Tiltman of GC&CS [*where he was now chief officer on cryptography. Talk about how they both inspected a Hollerith machine in Southampton Row years before the war.*] He did not know what future there would be for GC&CS but he could not help thinking that the difficulties of the work might become insuperable when foreign governments realized the mistakes that they had made during the war.

I spoke to 'C' on the telephone. He said that he was open-minded about turning the Japs out of neutral countries. [*Down side: that would lose GC&CS the window the Japanese code communications, so useful from Berlin. . .*] 'C' does not place a very high value on GC&CS products after Stage A [*Victory day in Europe*] but points out that it is only through neutrals that we can hope to get much out of Tokio and that from time to time something quite useful comes along. There is in fact a Portuguese BJ in today indicating that morale [*where?*] is very low and that the recent exaggerated claims by the Japs to have sunk many American ships in the vi-

cinity of the Philippines had been put out merely to boost up public morale. [. . .]

I spoke to C about the cases of Ledebour [*sic.* Ledebur] and Otto John [*later head of the Germany's Verfassungsschutz cum Soviet agent*] the two Abwehr or SD officers whom SS wanted to get out of Spain and Portugal. I said that certainly we were not very keen about people of this sort coming over here, since we had to look after them from the security point of view and they eventually became a charge on our organizations. From the information point of view there was nothing to be gained since that had all been sucked dry before they started. We could not very well detain them after their past services, and if we did we had to put them in different houses. They could not obviously be put into the Nazi camp in the IoM [Isle of Man.] C said that he would speak to Felix [Cowgill]. [*More on the German traitor Otto John, not transcribed here, Nov 24*]

October 25, 1944: Shelford said, with reference to German broadcasts, that it was essential that records of renegade broadcasts should be seized as evidence when these people are brought to trial. Records of the Joyces [William Joyce and Mrs] were found at Luxembourg as well as many other documents including receipts for payment for the broadcasts[. . . etc.]

I asked the DG's permission to employ Lewis and Stalbo on [Alec] Kellar's special work. [*Evidently translating Hebrew intercepts of Zionist leader Shertok's messages.*] He has agreed.

Capel-Dunn called here yesterday to start an enquiry into the work of this dept. he said that he had been charged by the JIC to investigate all the sources of intelligence and their distribution. The DG asked him for his credentials, which he had not got. The DG

very politely told him that he would like to have a letter from somebody before allowing such an enquiry[. . .]

Field-Robinson came to see me about a man called 'Engenfeld' who had formerly been serving in the Adolf Hitler SS Division. This man is apparently prepared to bump off Himmler, though personally I think he is a bit sanguine. The question arises of course as to whether this is not merely an attempt to get back to his own lines. I told Field-Robinson that I did not think that o2o or LRC could express a very good opinion. The best plan would be to get [Brian] Melland [MI.14] or somebody in MI.14d who were the experts on the SS to express their view and it might also be worth asking COLUMBINE [Zech-Nantwich] whether he knew anything about 'Engenfeld.' I undertook to get in touch with Melland.

October 27, 1944: [Alec] Kellar and I saw Stalbo and Lewis in Denniston's office. They have agreed to work for us.

[Alec] Kellar tells me that [LOrd] Gort saw the PM yesterday. He only spoke to him for about two minutes after the lunch part. His [presumably Churchill's] parting words were, 'Look after our friends and see that they are treated well. The Jews have rendered us great service in this war.' Gort has no firm indication of British policy in Palestine and clearly feels that he is in for a difficult time. He also resents not being taken into the full confidence of the government.

The RSIC report states that DA [*double agent*] traffic must be increased to effect a break. [*Details follow of the Mil Amt wireless network within Germany.*]

October 28, 1944: [. . .] I had a talk with Melland today about Wengenfeld [sic]. He has seen Capt Gache of MI.14d who took

over his work. Gache thinks the story more or less plausible[. . .]

October 30, 1944: The SIS representative in Stockholm, a Major Cross, has been blown [*i.e.*, *unmasked*] according to a Jap JMA [military attaché report].

November 2, 1944: The subordination of various aspects of the conduct of the war to the American [presidential] elections is becoming more and more irritating. Following the joint declaration of the PM and Roosevelt at Quebec about the reinstatement of the Italians and the granting of diplomatic representation with cipher facilities[. . .] Lastly Morgenthau's suggestion that Germany should have her machinery removed and be turned into an agricultural country is presumably a manoeuvre to obtain the Jewish vote.

November 5, 1944: There have been interesting developments in the case of one Chris Lindemans @ [alias] KING KONG. An agent sent back from the from [*sic.* front?] named Daman denounced a Dutchman called Verloop. The latter when questioned gave information to the effect that Lindemans in order to get his brother released from prison had offered his services to the SD and had in all denounced some 267 Dutch, Belgian, and French agents working in the resistance movement. Lindemans was one of the leading lights of the Dutch resistance and has been appointed by Prince Bernhard much against the advice of our old friend Pinot who is now on the Prince's staff, as liaison officer between Dutch resistance and the Canadian Army. Orders were sent to the field for Lindemans' arrest and he is now at o2o where he has made a confession. An ISOS trace shows almost undoubtedly that he attended a meeting where agents from this country disclosed to the Dutch resistance movements the possibility of parachute landings in the Maas area. This was fairly late in August and was probably part of

the plan to seize the Arnhem bridgehead. The SCI units could apparently get nothing out of Lindemans who had several epileptic fits. He has had another since he arrived at 020. TinEye's report about his confession opens with the words, "This obstreperous giant."

Under date 16th Oct the JIC issued a paper on German strategy and capacity to resist. The only exception to the general decline in the flow of production has been the production of single-engine fighters[. . . etc. *Three pages of summary.*]

November 6, 1944: Bridges [. . .] mentioned that he had heard that there was certain friction between ourselves [MI5] and the SIS and said that it had been decided that a high-level committee [*the Nevile Bland Committee*] should investigate the affairs of both departments. The DG suggested that possibly one single individual of sufficiently high standing might be better than a committee. Bridges seemed to think that this was a good idea and also that Findlater-Stewart would be a suitable person to undertake the job [*and see more on Nov 8, 13, not copied*].

November 8, 1944: Noakes said that Naujocks, the chief thug in the Venlo incident [November 1939] was now at [Camp] 020. He had come as a member of the Austrian resistance movement, but so far his story appears phoney. [. . .]

I took Jenkins and [Alec] Kellar to lunch. We discussed Jenkins' political reports[. . .] There is no doubt that [Lord] Killern's [sic. Killearn's] reputation in Egypt is pretty bad. It is more or less common gossip that he made £1,300 last year from his duckshoot. Everyone is asked to buy his cartridges through some official who acts for Killearn. These are paid for at a prohibitive price. Each person then asked to the shoot is allowed to take away two ducks.

The remainder is sold at a considerable profit. Killearn also has the reputation of being a heavy gambler. Officials in Egypt are apt to criticize him for his attitude towards the King. They think that he should support the King, even though at times the later may attempt to act in an unconstitutional manner.

November 13, 1944: TAR, Herbert, Buster and I had a meeting about the future of the [CI] War Room. T-R [Trevor-Roper?] who had been over to see me earlier today, said that he [. . .] thought that we should be making a mistake if we do not give nominal control of the War Room to C. He argued that ultimately isos was the only sure source, and that its security was in the hands of C backed by the PM. Any attempt therefore to lessen C's control over Most Secret Sources is probably doomed to failure. T-R thought that while making the gesture to C somebody from our dept should be placed in charge of the War Room. He told me privately that he thought Buster would be the person. Personally I do not agree with T-R's view that the only sure source of information is isos. In fact we had through interrogation of large numbers of people established beyond doubt almost all the facts relating to the organisation and personalities in the *Abwehr* and SD. [. . . etc].

The [Zionist] murderers of Lord Moyne are Eliahou Hakim and Eliahou Tsoury. There has been discovered in a Cairo hide-out two British uniforms, two A.B.64s, one Navy pay-book, 6 blank leave passes, and 14 cubes of cordite, 6 cases of TNT and 612 rounds of Luger ammunition. The two men were seen in uniform on Oct. 27th. Other members of the Stern Gang are said to be still at large in Egypt. I believe that the PM has been considerably moved by the assassination of Lord Moyne, and that in consequence he is not quite so favourable towards the claims of the Zionists as he was.

The *Tirpitz* has been sunk and is lying on the bottom with her keel out of the war [*sic.* water] some 4 miles north of Tromsö. She has been hit by three 12,000 lb bombs dropped by Lancasters. [. . .]

A V2 burst at about 8.30 p.m. on the twelfth, about 20 miles up over Westminster. Pieces fell in Camberwell, Paddington and Victoria.

November 18, 1944: Capt Gache of MI.14d, Brian Melland and Field-Robinson are continuing with the case of Wengenfeldt, whose story has recently been studied by COLUMBINE [Zech-Nantwich]. COLUMBINE has pointed out several discrepancies and thinks that the whole plan is impractical. It would be quite impossible for Wengenfeldt to gain access to Himmler's office. COLUMBINE thinks it possible that Wengenfeldt may have invented the plan to win sympathy and pose as a hero.

[*Follows then, not copied, a history of the pre-war Überseedienst, industry-financed forerunner of the German Abwehr.*]

November 21, 1944: The French have arrested P G Wodehouse and his wife, and Cussen is to go over to Paris to sort things out. This will precipitate some decision in the HO as to how these characters are to be dealt with in future. [*Wodehouse was living at the Hotel Bristol; Paillol who had protected him had just been forced to resign*].

November 22, 1944: Noakes tells me that Wengenfeldt has been broken by COLUMBINE. COLUMBINE says that the man is not an officer at all and that his whole project was merely a blind in order to get back to Germany.

November 24, 1944: [Alec] Kellar has had a talk with [Oliver?] Stanley and is to see him again after he returns from Mid East.

Stanley is apparently giving us full backing in the work that we are doing in Palestine. Apparently he is making good use of the material which we have given him and has binged up the PM to make the statement he did the other day about terrorism, and its effect on any Jewish settlement. He is working to get the President to make some similar statement.

November 25, 1944: Rymner-Jones of the Palestine CID came in today. He seems very pleased that his force has at last got the order to go ahead and clean up the terrorists. His only trouble is shortage of men[. . .] He expects trouble but appears fairly sanguine about being able to deal with it.

GARBO has received the MBE from the King, who having read the story was apparently very much intrigued. The actual presentation will probably be done by the DG. The King was anxious to know what the word 'notional' meant. This was explained to him by Tommy Lascelles.

Alec Kellar is off tomorrow to the Mid East.

November 28, 1944: The Govt have announced that up to the end of June 1944 this country provided her allies with goods, service and capital facilities amounting to £1,079,648,000. USA £604,730,000; Russia, £269,457,000; Poland, £12,000,000; Czechoslovakia £18,629,000; France, £13,600,000 up to June 1943 only; Greece £12,368,000[. . .] The remainder cannot be expressed in terms of cash value. It includes such factors as the lives of our fighting men, technical information, which has been one of the major contributions, for example radiolocation, which we were the first to apply in the practical way to war and which we gave freely to America, penicillin, jet-propulsion, which we gave without thoughts of patent rights to the USA. [*My comment: and cav-*

ity magnetron, atomic diffusion process, etc. etc.]

ZIGZAG has left London and there is some suggestion that he has gone to consult Compton Mackenzie about writing his memoirs. [is ZIGZAG *Stefan Osusky* therefore?]

November 29, 1944: There have been 40 V2s in the last week. A bad incident had occurred at Deptford when a Woolworth's was hit at midday and 157 people were killed and 130 seriously injured.

Chamber told me that the Germans had now given up trying to jam the BBC and had concentrated all their efforts on [Sefton] Delmer's black senders. He felt that this was a very sincere tribute to Delmer's work.

November 30, 1944: Briscoe came to talk to me about some devices for ensuring that a safe had not been opened. He thought that the best thing was to put a paper weight on top, and take high precision measurements which can quite easily be done. Alternatively he thought you could put 3 sheets of paper and draw some lines across in saliva across the overlapping edges. These could be brought up by iodine and would show if they had been moved.

December 4, 1944: Tangye [TinEye?] came to tell me that [Felix] Cowgill had approached him some time ago to find a job for Vermehren in some press office[. . .] Apparently it is proposed to put V. as a kind of adviser on German affairs to the *Daily Mail*. This arrangement seems to me most peculiar and most dangerous. There is no earthly reason for thinking that V is anti-German. What sort of advice therefore is he going to give the *Daily Mail* and in a year's time he will probably have very different views about this country and its attitude to the German people. [. . . etc].

Signs of increasing activity in all German SS work under Himmler and new leaders. Attempts are being made to ascertain Allied weak points particularly communist activities including Spanish, *maquis* in France, dissatisfaction among workers and relations between French and allies.

[*Sabotage, naval espionage, penetrating resistance movements, Skorzeny's increasing plans for sabotage and subversion, units for use behind Allied lines*

[*Summary of captured document, not copied, a report on meeting at The Hague, Jun 26-1942, of Abwehr officials, addressed by Kriminalrat Klemens, Bentivegni and others.*]

December 5, 1944: I discussed with Brock and Jenkins our responsibility for the security of VIPs in Egypt[. . .] This whole question has arisen over the assassination of Lord Moyne and his refusal to accept protection.

December 6, 1944: I dined with Anthony [Blunt] and Padgham [*German born, naturalized British? Escaped from The Hague 6 weeks before the Venlo Incident*]. He is horrified at [what] Germany has done and thinks that he like all Germans must take his share of the blame. He was often in the presence of Hitler and could had he been sufficiently courageous have bumped him off[. . .] He had known [++++] [=U35] from very early days and established close touch with him after he [U35] arrived here in 1934.

December 7, 1944: Herbert wants to drop censorship to Eire and proposes to have a conference with [Colonel] Viv[ian] and myself on this subject. It will mean a saving in man-power of some 3,300 people. [*Cf Dec 12: '3,200 people.'*]

December 9, 1944: Brock showed me some ISTRIA indicating that SNAKE has given the Palestine Police over 500 names and addresses of terrorists and dumps of arms. The police have already made over 250 arrests. There is no doubt I think that the more moderate elements in the Zionist Movement are afraid that the actions of the extremists may jeopardize the whole future of Zionism.

Arnold-Forster rang me up about my letter to C concerning the German agent alleged to be on his way by submarine to Canada. He wanted to know how we had got on to the source. I said that we had rung up the Admiralty[. . .] The source of the information has been seriously jeopardized. I gather that this particular form of ULTRA is high-speed Morse. This means that a whole message can be included in what sounds like one dot of a Morse code.

The Germans are now using a new device on their submarines [*Schnorchel*] which makes ASDIC extremely difficult. [. . .]

Some time ago we made arrangements for a Palestine policeman named Catling to go to the USA where he would make contact with a man associated with the Bergson Group. This group from which radiated a number of committees has been collecting funds for the Irgun Zwei Leumi, and transmitting them to Palestine for revolutionary purposes. It was said that Bergson was to give a signal for revolt before very long. We gave Catling introductions to the FBI but he seems to have seen the State Dept G2 and almost everybody in the USA including Security Coordination. He made contact with the agents whose story prima facie is quite plausible[. . .]

Gort now suggests that we should get Bergson and all his associates arrested. This seems impossible since I gather from the FBI that

he has not committed an offence. He may be expelled by the Immigration authorities for having overstayed his permit, but this is subject to every sort of appeal and intrigue which may take months. On the other hand Bergson might join the American forces which would give him American citizenship within six weeks. I doubt however whether he would do this as it would prevent him from carrying out his present task[. . .] Meanwhile we should get some checks going on the various committees in the USA and also should get [+++++] on one Halperin, said to be the representative of the organisation here.

On Halperin's arrival in Palestine on some future date it is said that the balloon is to go up. We may have some difficulty with the FBI as I understand that Bergson's affairs are technically regarded as a religious matter and therefore come within the sphere of the State Department. There does not seem to be anything particularly religious about Bergson's present intentions.

The prices of certain commodities have reached a fairly high level. A suit from a West End tailor now costs £23, hand made shoes £10. A sponge of moderate size £5. This includes 100% luxury tax though what luxury there is in having a sponge, I don't know. An old second-hand Gladstone bag in good condition is £23. Antiques have risen to enormous prices. It is nothing to pay £20 or more for a small card table, which before the war could be got for £4 or £5. Small cars are being sold for as much as £2-300 after considerable wear.

Some Russian named Sokholine is resident in Switzerland and is apparently a kind of unofficial Soviet representative. He has told the Chinese charge d'affaires in Berne that Krauel, former German consul at Geneva, called on him and stated that Himmler had recently sent one of his intimate associates to Switzerland

with the intention of discussing an armistice with a responsible Soviet personage. Himmler has requested Krauel to find out whether Sokholine was an accredited Soviet representative and whether he could undertake the first steps in negotiations[. . .] [*etc. more, speculation, not copied.*]

December 12, 1944: Bill Stephenson has telegraphed to the DG saying, "I shall probably be bringing Hoover to London shortly. Will you send me and time you would wish to have him on anything you desire other than meetings with the Cabinet which I am arranging." [*sic*] The DG has drafted a fairly polite reply but makes it clear that he expects to hear from Mr Hoover either direct or through his representative[. . .]

Bill Stephenson is obviously trying to impress everyone over here that he has got Hoover in his pocket. It may well be that he has; on the other hand he may merely be angling for some wires from prominent people in this country in order that he can wave them in Hoover's face and suggest to him that as everybody wants to see him in London, a visit should be arranged.

December 12, 1944: continued[. . .]

Herbert has put in an excellent report on the SD in Belgium. The two questions involved were: (1) Have we the measure of the stay-behind organization laid down in Belgium before the German withdrawal. (2) Have we made appropriate security dispositions to counter SD plans made since the withdrawal? [. . .]

As regards (2) he [Herbert] concludes (a) We must expect an attempt, probably on a large scale, to insert into Belgium, both as line crossers and parachutists, agents of the organisation working under Skorzeny for the purpose both of physical sabotage and

preparing and directing violent disturbances – possibly on a large scale[. . .]

I saw U-35 [*a four-letter name*] today. He had just arrived back from Lisbon, where he has evidently been enjoying himself. He has been concerned with running the agent ECCLESTIASTIC, a Czech girl who is the mistress of Kosich, the ITL representative in Lisbon[. . .] U-35 is also feeding information to an American agent and has weekly meetings with Kramer and other members of the GIS [*German Intelligence Service*]. His main line is to disrupt the Abwehr and the SD, to cause suspicion of their bona fides and to give them all the jitters[. . .] Meanwhile he tells me that Kim Philby and [+++++] are anxious to discuss long term plans with him.

December 13, 1944: In the evening I attended a meeting at the Colonial office with Brock. Eastman was in the chair. Kim Philby, [++++++], Tony Rumboldt [*sic*], Harrington, Rymer Jones and MacPherson of the Ministry of Supply Office in Washington were present. The meeting wish to discuss the running of the agent [++++++.] Rymer Jones have the history of this man; he was a member of the Irgun and had given information to the Palestine Police. For reasons of personal safety application was made to the Americans to a visa for him to go to the US. He had been sent there by the FBI, who passed him on to Major Snyder of G2, who was interested in Palestinian affairs.

He had subsequently been approached by the Bergson group, and had become associated with a good many of its members. In this way he had discovered that there was to be a plot for an uprising [*i.e. a Zionist uprising*] in Palestine immediately after the cessation of hostilities in Europe. He had therefore got into touch with Snyder who, through the State Department, had placed him in touch with MacPherson of the Ministry of Supply Delegation,

MacPherson having been formerly a CO official in Palestine. It was in this way that [+++++], known as Y-32, came into touch with MacPherson, who has since been conducting the business from the US end, MacPherson, at Y-32's request, got Catling of the Palestine Police to come to the US. Little transpired for this visit except that Y.32 wanted \$2000 and \$500 a month in order to continue his enquiries through Ruth Kaplan, secretary to Merlin, who is Bergson's deputy. The meeting had to discuss whether this money should be paid, and how, in future, Y.32 was to be operated. [*Liddell suggested they ask the FBI to check Y-32's bona fides.*] Harrington thought that it might be a good thing if the payments were made by the Americans. This would forestall any suggestion that might subsequently be made that we had been trying to run agents in the US.

December 14, 1994: I have seen an interesting pamphlet with photographs of the MULBERRY. There is a facsimile of the PM's letter to the Chief of Combined Operations or his deputy which is dated 30.5.42 and says, 'They must float up and down with the tide. Let me have the best solution worked out. Don't argue the matter. The difficulties will argue for themselves.'

Bronx is leaving for Madrid on the 19th on a Peruvian Diplomatic passport with a Spanish Diplomatic visa.

The Germans have now disclosed the location of the hidden transmitter in Belgium which was intended for SNIPER. This has been passed to Harmer who dug it up in a graveyard at dead of night.

December 15, 1994: I saw Joe Lynch this morning and gave him the details about Y-32[. . .] V.2 is coming is [*sic. in*] at about 40 per week[. . .] A case has come to notice of a P/W splitting a postcard and writing in secret ink inside.

December 16, 1994: SHAEF CI [Counter Intelligence] telegram of today's date indicates that special attention should be paid to line crossing activities. The SD have been trying to recruit and train some 8,000 pro-German Luxembourgers who fled before the Allied advance. Francists and Miliciens are under training for work in France. Commando 130 [*is that Skorzeny's bunch?*] are preparing parachute and line-crossing operations. GIS Northern Italy are planning line-crossers by mountain routes into France. Uniforms and identity papers both Canadian and American are being distributed to various GIS control posts. Security points requiring emphasis are that agents have been lifts in service vehicles, that there has been an outbreak of telephone table cutting, and many attempts at telephone tapping, and that three enemy agents have recently been discovered in confidential positions with Allied military units. [*more details. . .*]

The number of Frenchmen estimated as being in Germany on the 30th Oct is 2,655,000.

[*No entry for December 17, 1944; there is nothing in the Liddell diary about the Ardennes offensive and Intelligence failures there, until December 21*]

December 18, 1994: Curry talked to me about his memo on ISCOT [*a cypher used by the secret Comintern?*] He is going to see Arnold-Foster to tell him that the matter should be drawn to the attention of higher authority. He thinks that it is specially significant in view of the Polish debate. I said that I did think that anybody was under any illusions about the Lublin Committee. The only thing therefore that his report would contribute would be the wider issue. The information however on the existence of a network on Comintern lines was at the moment rather fragmentary and might be more effective if presented later on. I told Curry

that if his memo was presented to [Sir Alexander] Cadogan he would not be likely to read it. Loxley would probably read it and pass it on to the department. This would lead to considerable spreading of the knowledge of the source. It was for consideration whether this was worth while at the moment.

A MARITA report shows that [William] Strang [*of the FO: papers are in Churchill College*] has been in close touch with Tamara Wilson Crowe. It looks a little as if he may be having an affair with her. He has told her about his visit to Moscow, about Stalin's refusal to join in the Tripartite Conference, and about a secret mission which he is now about to undertake to Brazil. He did not give the nature of this mission, He was derogatory in his views about Stalin and conditions in Russia I do not see what I can do with this information without jeopardizing the sources.

I have read the case of Henrik Mierseman. This man, who was connected with the Germans [*sic*] GC&CS has given information showing that the Germans have been running about 10 SOE transmitters for 18 months between August 1942 and Feb, 1944. Before closing down, the officer in charge of the German stations sent a message to Majors Bingham, [Anthony] Blunt & Co. "Thank you for your long mutual co-operation. In case you should come to the Continent, I shall receive you with the same care as your agents."

At the Wednesday meeting Sclater said that he had learned that French press station had broadcast in English Morse the complete order of battle of the Allies on the western front, stating that the information had been received from SHAEF. A short time later the same day a further communiqué was issued stating that this information should not be published anywhere. Sclater has taken this up both direct with SHAEF and through the War office.

December 21, 1994: At 12 o'clock today the DG in the presence of Dick Butler, Tommy Harris, TAR [Robertson]. Marriott, J.C. [Masterman], Buster, and myself, presented GARBO with the MBE. The DG made a nice little speech. Later we lunched at the Savoy when GARBO responded to the toast in halting but not too bad English. I think he was extremely pleased.

News about the German drive, which started on the 17th [sic] is a little better today. Monty has now taken the 9th and 1st US Armies and is concentrating in the Louvaine [Leuven] area for a southward drive. Penetration has gone fairly far. No publicity is being given to the fact that Monty has taken over. He thinks that he will be able to restore the situation within 48 hours.

Five of the parachutists who have been captured reported that sixty Germans, dressed as American officers complete with Chesterfields, Lucky Strikes and Jeeps, are heading for Paris where they intend to assassinate Eisenhower. They are said to be led by Skorzeny himself. This may be true. On the other hand it is not altogether unlikely that it is part of a jitter campaign.

[+++++] has left SIS and the liaison officer with the Americans is now Bill Dunderdale. Walter has joined Dickie Coit. They have taken over Lunn's travel agency and are also going to market a new fountain pen invented by Miles of the aircraft company which holds enough ink for a year and will not blow up in the air as many pens do.

An entertaining German document captured in Belgium at the headquarters of the *Abwehrstelle* [Ast] and dated 28th December 1941 gives an account of a lecture delivered by Canaris to the assembled controllers of Asts on the 10th December 1941. It was emphasised that poaching by the Gestapo was continually being

countered by all available means. The use of Gestapo officials as *Abwehr* agents was strictly forbidden because a case had occurred where a Gestapo official was used by a certain Ast as an agent and paid out of a special fund. Messages were passed under the cover-name of a non-existent subagent. Case had also occurred of agents being given top secret documents and having access to safes. In one such an agent had been found to be working for the enemy intelligence services. No women employees are allowed to have safe keys. Military intelligence only is the job of Asts, hence reports on politics and morale are strictly forbidden.

The *Abwehr* has nothing to do with the persecution of Jews. Ast duties are to be carried out in a humane, respectable, correct and cultural manner. Activity against Jews is to be avoided but not criticised. The strength of the service is estimated at 2,026 officers, 931 officials [*Beamte*], 18,251 employees [*Angestellte*] and 287 workers. Expenditure was now about 1 million Reichsmarks a month. No excessive luxury or entertainment should take place.

Canaris was angry about an expensive entertainment given to him by one Ast. Modesty is the way to good fortune. Caution and moderation are also necessary over the consumption of alcohol. There is to be no excessive spending or celebrations. Only nonsense is to be talked after 10 p.m. As regards the supervision of women employees, it is mentioned that there is to be no excessive dressing up, painted lips or finger nails.

December 22, 1994: I saw Marriott, TAR, and JC about BRUTUS. SHAEF have intimated that they want either GARBO or BRUTUS to be on the air within the next few days. The trouble is that on SHAEF's own request we put them both off the air. Presumably there is something brewing in the way of major deception for a

counter-attack. So important is this, according to Wile [Wilde?] that it is worth sacrificing one of our agents. In Wilde's view it is the last occasion on which they can be used with real advantage.

This is all very fine, but it is still important to preserve GARBO as we are intending to use him exclusively to smoke out the Nazis after the armistice. We have therefore decided to put BRUTUS on the air. This means that we have got to bring him back notionally to London. We propose to do this tomorrow so that he can have time to settle down and pick up a certain amount of information. We do not know yet what SHAEF want us to put across. We have warned them that BRUTUS's return is not very plausible and that there is therefore a certain risk in using him. [. . .]

I dined with GARBO, Mrs GARBO, Tommy and his wife [and?] Miss Bishop at the Dorchester last night. Mrs G was in tremendous form and related to me in animated and broken English the part that she had played in the early days of her husband's DA [double agent] career. It is fairly clear that if at one stage she had not stimulated the American Asst, MA [military attaché] Rousseau at Lisbon the case would never have got on its legs. GARBO was completely in despair and was intending to go to Brazil. Mrs G mystified the American and finally whetted his appetite by faking one of GARBO's communications from the Germans and thereby indicating that agents were going to the USA to commit acts of sabotage. GARBO, looking rather like Lenin in his new beard, is by contrast quite a placid character. Both a very likeable characters.

December 27, 1994: According to the French ambassador in Moscow, de Gaulle did not go there to conclude a treaty. His aim was to ensure that France's foreign policy should not rest exclusively on her relations with England. He also wished to dispel the anxiety caused in Russia by the idea of a bloc of western states. The

French and Russian point of view is that in the past they have had to bear the brunt of the early German attack because England had never been in a position to put a big army into the field in the early days of a war. It was consequently necessary for France and Russia to have some closer arrangement in dealing with the German menace. As a matter of consequence in this identity of interest the French gave assurances that they would not be a party to a policy directed against Russia within a block of western states.

It was only later that the Russians asks the French whether they wanted to confirm the points mentioned in the treaty. Upon de Gaulle consenting in principle, the British stated that they were pleased with the idea of a Franco-Russian alliance because they considered it would be a factor in completing and strengthening the Franco-British alliance. Churchill suggested that a treaty of alliance should be realized as a 3-power British-Franco-Russian treaty of alliance, but it was thought better not to lose time waiting to transform the 21-power alliance into a 3-power alliance.

Agreement was reached about the Rhône frontier for France, and the Curzon Line including Vilna and Lwow as the Soviet-Polish boundary, Poland to be give compensation up to the Oder.

The Russians tried to suggest that the French should recognize the Lublin Committee as the Polish Govt. The French temporised. The stubborn attitude of the French held up the signing of the Treaty so much that at the last farewell banquet talks lasted till 3 a.m. when de Gaulle and Bidault made their farewells, leaving only the French ambassador with Stalin and Molotov. At 5 a.m. de Gaulle was roused and called to the Kremlin when the Treaty was signed. Presumably however the French had compromised on sending representation to the Lublin Committee and allowing the Committee to have its representative in Paris.

It is difficult to say how far the above account is really accurate. It may well have been put out by the French ambassador for foreign consumption.

December 30, 1944: [. . .] I gather that the lack of intelligence about the German concentration on the Luxembourg front before their sensational attack was due to two main reasons. DEGGS [*sic. Als DEGS. Is it a cipher system?*] had for some time been referring to the area as a rest and refitting area.

GC&CS had not tumbled to the true meaning of this phraseology, and SHAEF, thinking that the Germans were using that area for resting their troops had used that part of the line for doing the same thing with the American troops. The result was that the Americans in the line were thin and tired and that in their rear their vehicles were being refitted. The German concentrations had been carried out in the wooded areas and no recce had been possible for nearly 4 days owing to foggy weather. In any case there were very few aerial photographs available. This does not however excuse the Americans for failing to dig in properly and establish road blocks in the rear. I gather too that vast quantities of petrol and other stores have been established in the vicinity of Stavelot. Luckily however these did not fall into the hands of the Germans.

C called this morning to see the DSG and to inform him that Felix [Cowgill] had resigned that that his resignation had been accepted. It had been brought about in connection with the War Room but the actual issue is one of administration. Apparently Felix felt that he ought to have control over both Section 9 and 5 personnel in the field and switch them about as he liked. This power was taken from him and handed to [Colonel] Vivian.

