

KV.4/191 Liddell diary Dec 1942 – Jun 1943

January 5, 1943: [Peter] Loxley [*Foreign Office official, killed in plane crash on way to Yalta, 1945*] rang me up about five Polish agents who have been condemned to death. He wanted to know whether we had anybody we could possibly exchange. I said that apart from the principle involved which would be a matter of serious discussion, I did not think we had anybody who would not be able to give away a good deal of information if he were sent back to Germany.

January 6, 1943: [Vice Admiral Wilhelm] Canaris has had conversations with Wigon [Vigón?] and Jordana [*Spanish foreign minister who replaced Serrano Suñer*]. [*This is evidently based on intercepted German or Spanish diplomatic despatches*]. Wigon has made it clear that it is not possible for Spain to enter the war on either side. He did not believe that the Allies intended to attack Spain or Spanish Morocco. He pointed out however that an attack on Spanish territory would be rendered less likely if the army which was already mobilized was equipped with modern arms and weapons. It would be in Germany's interest to provide such weapons. [. . .] Canaris had discussions with Jordana who took an identical line to that of Wigon. One of the results of this exchange of views was that Canaris made urgent representations to Berlin that the sabotage which is being undertaken from Spanish Morocco

should cease, as it is placing difficulties in the way of Spanish acquiescence with German activities.

[. . .] There is a good deal of talk about the inefficiency of American troops in N Africa. The fact is that they had very little time for training. The current joke is that there is a new film just come out called *How Green is our Ally*.

January 14, 1943: Loxley spoke to me about the MANUEL case. MANUEL, whose cause had aroused a certain amount of suspicion in the RPS, had been sent on to the French for enlistment with a warning. They apparently gave him some very rough treatment at their establishment in Duke Street [*No. 1 Duke Street housed the interrogation and torture center of "Colonel Passy," De Gaulle's Intelligence chief*], and then told us that he had hanged himself. [Sir Bernard] Spilsbury [*Home Office pathologist*] who has examined the body was rather inclined to think that he may have been throttled. [*Spilsbury's report, to be found in US embassy files, RG.84, stated drily that since the cell concerned had a ceiling one foot lower than the prisoner's height, "He must have been a very determined suicide indeed."*] The Free French had got an idea that the methods we employ are no good. Certainly if the purpose is to extract the truth their methods are no better since a confession obtained under duress is in 9 cases out of 10 perfectly useless. Personally, I think it is time that Duke Street was closed down. There is certainly something fishy about the MANUEL case and there is no doubt that the French 2ème Bureau are extremely worried, as well they might be. MANUEL was supposed to have hanged himself with his shirt, and when Brooke-Booth visited Duke St he was shown a pipe from which he was supposed to have hanged himself. He asked where the shirt was and was told that it was on the man's body and that he could not therefore see it. When the police went to the cell, the shirt, or part of it, was hanging from the pipe.

January 17, 1943: According to a Jap BJ Dr [Richard] Sorge's spy ring consisted of 246 members, nine of whom are Soviet citizens.

Representatives of the *Abwehr* captured in N Africa report that the SD is taking over the functions of Abts II and III. In Paris, III is already in the hands of the SD. Canaris appears to favour this, and is said to be interested only in *Abt. I*. This is interesting in view of SD activities in Spanish Morocco of an *Abt. II* character and the presence of SD agents abroad. Canaris's character is given as follows: friendly, ice-cold brain, knows his subordinates intimately and addresses them as 'du'. Domesticated and entertains in Berlin but not Party officials. Intimate friends are [Field Marshal Wilhelm] von Keitel [sic] and [Field Marshal] von Brauchitsch [*retired C-in-C Army*], and particularly von Liss [*Ulrich Liss was head of German Army Signals Intelligence*]. In the *Abwehr* itself he seems to be on very intimate terms with Piekenbro[c]k, head of *Abt. I*. He is on bad terms with [Heinrich] Himmler [*Reichsführer-SS*] and [Joachim von] Ribbentrop [*Reich foreign minister*] and on no terms with Göring. With Hitler he is diplomatic. Hitler trusts him with diplomatic missions specially to Spain where his connections are excellent. Canaris has no known vices and shows no preference [to?] naval officers in matters of promotion. He despises the Party. This same representative of the *Abwehr* states that there is a W/T station in Zürich run by de COERDA, at he believes Neuhauser Str 43.

January 18, 1943: JANOWSKI has given quite an interesting story about the proposed invasion of this country in 1940. He himself was at the time with the Brandenburg Regiment waiting to come over. [. . .] The invasion plans were definitely cancelled at the end of October 1940. According to JANOWSKI, Rantzau's stock is very low. Canaris has been blamed for Germany being misinformed about Russia.

January 22, 1943: JANOWSKI has gone through to the Germans from Canada.

January 25, 1943: According to a Turkish BJ [*intercepted and decoded diplomatic message*] dated 25.1.43, Antonescu who has just returned from Berlin paints a gloomy picture. It seems to that everyone, from Hitler and Ribbentrop downwards, is obsessed with the idea of protecting Europe from Bolshevism. They are quite prepared to evacuate Europe provided they can keep some of the Russian territory. Hitler said: 'The revolution accomplished by Stalin in 20 years is greater than anything I have done. I look upon it with admiration and dread. It is not the Anglo-Saxons I am afraid of. It is the Russians. The countries which believe the Russian danger only exists for Germany are blinded by their immediate interests.'

In the opinion of Antonescu, Hitler has given up the idea of ruling over Europe and is beginning to be afraid of Russia. He will be satisfied with a peace of agreement, and Antonescu imagines that the Turkish Govt realised that if Germany is crushed Russia will be free to carry out her designs of invasion the next day. Whatever the military preparations of the Anglo-Saxons they will not be able to block Russia's path. The only counterpoise to Russia is Germany.

Doubtless all the above was carefully staged in order to keep Turkey on the path of neutrality, and incidentally to impress upon Antonescu that his only hope still lay in sticking to the Axis. The statements attributed to Hitler may have been sincere, but were quite obviously said with a purpose.

January 26, 1943: Wurmman [of the *Abwehr*] is giving us some interesting sidelights on past events. [. . .] *A rather bowdlerised but*

interesting version of the Mechelen incident of January 1940 follows, not transcribed here. . . .]

Leslie Burgin is fussing about LYNKE. The latter has already made certain demands which are quite sufficient in our view to keep him inside.

January 27, 1943: [. . .] since the basis of Vivian's complaint against Stephenson is that he has been co-operating with OSS in running agents in Hoover's area. [. . .] It seems that the FBI in spite of the stipulation of G2 and ONI are in fact getting BJs [*intercepts*] from G2 by a boot-legging process on the lower level.

January 28, 1943: [. . .] As from Tuesday last we have been getting German BJs from Dublin. These are likely to prove highly interesting and will fill in an important gap in our information.

January 29, 1943: Herbert has seen the DG. He [DG] has just returned from N Africa. He thinks it possible that the assassination of Darlan may have been planned by the de Gaullists in London. Enquiries made after Darlan's death showed that the assassin, who was a Monarchist, had obtained facilities in the matter of papers etc from a certain d'Astier, an official of the N African Govt. While Herbert was at Gib. waiting for his plane, he met d'Astier's brother, a member of de Gaulle's staff who was very secretive about his journey. He said he was going to Syria, but actually proceeded to N Africa. It was a few days later that Darlan was murdered. Herbert had an appointment with him [Darlan] which was to have taken place about four hours after the assassination. When he arrived he found officials carrying the body away. [*Website comment: Unlikely, as Darlan died an hour after the attack in hospital?*]

[*Not transcribed here: Material on the problem that Robert Murphy*

had had to allow arrest of his fifth column agents in order to placate the Darlan government.]

WURMANN [of *Abwehr*] [tells us that Prince [Max von] Hohenlohe was a highly placed agent of Canaris and used by him for important political objects. In the early days of the war he had visited Sam Hoare in Madrid. It would seem that Hoare, anticipating the possible invasion of Spain, had asked Hohenlohe to keep in touch with him. The motive of this arrangement was not clear.

February 4, 1943: Walter Bell [. . .] told me that Ellis had returned. Ellis says that Stephenson is fed up and likely to resign.

February 6, 1943: Plan MINCEMEAT is in the making. It involves dropping of a body off the Spanish coast, ostensibly that of a British officer [. . .] [*etc.*] The idea was conceived by Charles Cholmondeley and is being developed by him and Euan Montagu.

Victor has had a talk with Clark Kerr, our ambassador in Moscow, who gives a extraordinary account of Stalin. [*Lengthy, not transcribed here.*] Stalin began by asking him how it was that a man like [Kenneth] de Courcy who was opposed to the opening of a Second Front remained at large. Surely this meant that his views were supported by the PM. [*De Courcy, living in Gloucestershire, was a thorn in the flesh of the Foreign Office, and after the war too, with his regular publication Intelligence Digest; he was harrassed and imprisoned on various pretexts . . .*]

February 22, 1943: C is a little worried about the very close relations between the Czechs and Russians and asked me to let him have any information which had a bearing on this subject. [. . .]

C is worried about the arrangements between the Dutch and SOE

for the reception of agents. He thinks that things are going badly wrong. He told me that [Pierre] Laval's bodyguard [in Vichy France] was armed almost entirely with SOE tommy-guns.

The Americans apparently put up a terrible show in N Africa [*Rommel's counter-attack at Kasserine Pass*]. They did not seem able to stand up to dive-bombing. The Americans have been partially responsible for dealing with German BJs. C is still anxious to refrain from giving ISK to the Americans as it has so much important operational content.

February 26, 1943: A message has been received from Downing Street about the possibility of de Gaulle trying to get out of the country. It seems unlikely that an attempt will be made but if it is made, he will be stopped.

March 4, 1943: [*Interrogation of Abwehr agent Otto Witt with use of a stool pigeon, Haas; on which also see March 8, 1943, about interrogation methods of threat and bluff*]. [. . .] Kellar came to see me [. . .] [and said that?] J.C. had devised a plan whereby a blown agent can indicate that he is under control. The simple device is that he should begin each of his messages with a pronoun if he is under control and with a verb if he is not.

March 9, 1943: I gave a talk to the RSLOs. [. . .] We could not disregard B.1a sources unless we were prepared to disregard ISOS and this for many reasons was quite impossible. TORCH operations had largely borne out our conclusions since it seemed to be due to the control that we exercised over the enemy's organisation in this country that the details about the operation had not reached the Germans. I did not wish to be complacent since there were certain obvious gaps in our organisation. 19 out of [the?] 43 agents captured in this country since the outbreak of war had not been

reflected in Hart's sources. A certain number of unsatisfactory cases had to be passed through the LRC [i.e. *interrogation of incoming suspects*]. Wurmman's evidence showed that signal security was bad and that the enemy were well informed about the disposition of our units. [. . .]

Cecil and I dined with Walter Bell and Col Bruce, head of OSS in this country. Bruce is a very charming, cultured American.

March 10, 1943: The DG has had a letter from Duff [Cooper] who after consultation with the PM [Churchill] has suggested that we should furnish the PM with a monthly report. It should not be too long and should only include items of major importance. [. . .] Dick is going to get out a rough draft which we will then discuss. There are obvious advantages in selling ourselves to the PM who at the moment knows nothing about the activities of our department. On the other hand, he may, on seeing some particular item, go off the deep end and want to take action, which will be disastrous to the work in hand.

[. . .] I had a longish talk with PERFECT who is anxious if possible to attend the next course. He thinks it would be of great value to RSLOs to have as full a background as possible. He was a little hurt that he had not been told about the agent JOSEPHINE who is being run by Stopford at Dyce. [*Josephine was an agent by whom Hitler personally set great store, as much of his reporting was purposefully accurate.*]

March 11, 1943: Duff Cooper has asked us to refrain from sending [Cyril] Mills [of the circus family] to Washington until the position of Security Co-ordination is cleared up. For this we shall have to await the return of Stephenson. The delay in this matter is really intolerable. I have just had a long personal and confidential

letter from Commissioner Wood with a series of complaints against DS. It seems that Gooch was sent up from New York more than a year ago to enquire into Jap activities at Vancouver. For this purpose he recruited an agent named Allan Roesch. Roesch provided a lot of information which RCMP say was wholly unreliable and subsequently allegations were made in the press against the integrity of the RCMP. These it appeared were promoted by Roesch and possibly also by DSC [Stephenson].

A full inquiry was held by Judge Cameron who found that Roesch's information was based on hearsay, and completely whitewashed the RCMP. A great deal of money and time had been wasted, and the RCMP feel quite definitely that they have been double-crossed. Then came the incident of Port Security with an onslaught on Wood backed by the service Depts. This again caused grave irritation. Finally Stephenson sent Bavin to Ottawa as a Liaison officer with the Canadian Police. Bavin was an ex RCMP man who had been found unsatisfactory, Wood therefore refused to accept him. He had been sent to Ottawa with no previous warning by Stephenson. In forwarding me this information Wood said that "I prefer to write to you personally in this matter in the hope that some rectification can be made without an open clash which would mean action through official channels." I also got a long letter from Mills describing the lamentable state of affairs in the offices of DSC New York.

[. . .] Caroe went to see Witt today to give him a last chance to speak the truth before he is handed over to the Czechs ['for torture']. He broke down and said that he had been lying, and would now tell us the whole truth. Unfortunately before Caroe left he told him that he personally did not believe that Witt was a spy. We feel that it is now desirable to bring in some new military person to do the interrogation and have obtained the services of Major Scot-

land. [*Website comment: Colonel Scotland's methods were notoriously brutal. After the war he interrogated Hans Aumeier of Auschwitz, whose statements became increasingly lurid in consequence*]. We want if possible to carry out the interrogation at the London District P/W camp [*Scotland's outfit, in Kensington*], but this will have to be subject of HO [Home Office] approval. I saw Maxwell and asked him whether he had any objection. He said that as the man was a German detained under the Royal Prerogative, we could hold him where we liked. He was interested in the Witt case and would like to know in due course what we got out of it.

March 12, 1943: The Czechs were a little crestfallen about the Witt case being taken over by Scotland, but everything has been smoothed over to their satisfaction. Scotland will commence operations on Monday. When we have got a statement, the Czechs will be brought in to cross-examine.

We have decided to carry out if possible another DUCK operation. The [Spanish] ambassador is away this weekend. I had previously talked the matter over with Loxley who thought that the risk was worth taking, since it should give us the BJs for another three or four months. [*See March 16*]

[. . .] On the Allied alien side we have I gather been successful in persuading the Home Office to let us have an intermediary camp between the LRC and o2o. This will probably be at Emmanuel Schools, within a few hundred yards of the LRC.

March 13, 1943: [. . .] The Oratory School has been mentioned as an alternative.

March 15, 1943: Sneath came to talk to me about Witt. Scotland has

started his interrogation and has announced that Witt is an agent of some sort. He cannot however get him to come clean. [. . .] The trouble is that this case has been so messed about that he is now convinced that we have nothing on him and cannot bring him to justice. Scotland things that Wiesner should now return to the charge.

March 16, 1943: A. had a talk with Dick [White?], TAR [Robertson] and Hollis about the monthly report for the PM. They were all a little apprehensive about Hollis's contribution,. The PM might speak to the Home Secretary about it and if the latter was not also informed we should find ourselves in trouble. We eventually decided to draft something and see what it looked like. Dick will be editor of the B. Division material.

I had a talk with Hollis about doing something more about Soviet espionage. There is no doubt to my mind that it is going on and that sooner or later we shall be expected to know all about it. On the other hand if we take action and get found out there will be an appalling stink. Hollis and I are going to discuss the matter with Loxley on Monday. [*Website note: Hollis was for some time after the war suspected of being a Soviet agent*].

DUCK's operation [*evidently: a female agent stealing code tapes from Spanish embassy*] was successfully performed last Saturday and GC&CS [*Government Code & Cypher School, i.e., Bletchley Park*] will now be able to carry on for some months.

March 18, 1943: We have decided to liquidate the Witt case by sending him to Dartmoor. There is no doubt that he is a confirmed liar but it seems quite impossible to extract from him the real reason for his visit to this country.

March 19, 1943: I saw Duff Cooper. [. . .] He raised with me the question of DSC [Stephenson]. He told me that he had seen C and explained to him that the whole position was extremely unsatisfactory, the more so on account of recent communications from the RCMP about trouble between that organisation and DSC, It did not seem that we were getting on, We had had 3 or 4 meetings and each time had been told that no final settlement could be reached until Stephenson returned. C said that Stephenson was probably staying on on account of [Anthony] Eden's visit [to the USA in April] though neither he nor Duff could see what that had to do with him. [. . .] Duff urged C to press Stephenson to return forthwith. He had also heard from Dick [++++++] that Stephenson did not now intend to resign. Duff said he thought it would create an impossible situation if he did not and that we should then be forced to place our own representative in Washington quite independently.

March 20, 1943: I learn from FELIX [Felix Cowgill?] that Sir John Dashwood is going out to Lisbon to look into the [*convoy sailing*] leakages. [*An agent called RICARDO was the culprit*]. He suggests that this will meet our requirements. I am not sure that it will, since anyone going out there should have a full knowledge of what has transpired to date.

March 22, 1943: The DG has approved the appointment of [Geoffrey] Wethered to look into SOE and SIS penetration cases.

March 23, 1943: At the DG's meeting today Jim Hale told us about his meeting with the HO about the French interrogation centre at Duke Street where somewhat irregular methods are employed. It was decided that Newsam would advise the Home Secretary not to register any protest in view of possible adjustments which will be made if there is an amalgamation of the forces of de Gaulle

and Giraud. Newsam was a little offensive in suggesting that we might possibly have instigated the French to use improper methods. He also referred to a case where one of our officers had been dismissed for using third degree. There is no foundation whatsoever for either allegation, and in fact no necessity to make such a suggestion particularly in front of Desmond Morton [*Churchill's liaison officer with the Intelligence services and with De Gaulle*].

March 29, 1943: Vivian rang up to tell me that Stephenson had arrived. He had heard that Stratton was also in this country and was anxious that Stratton should be allowed to talk to C. [. . .] I warned Viv, however that I should not be prepared to accept all Stratton's views about DSC, I thought he was a good fellow but I did not think his judgment was always as sound as it might be. [. . .] Stephenson looked in for a moment and is to discuss DSC with the DG, Dick and myself tomorrow. He is still fighting for a united front in America and seems to be inclined to stress the growing importance of organisations other than the FBI.

March 30, 1943: The DG, Dick and I had a long set-to with Stephenson. Then DG made it clear that he wanted to have our own representative in the FBI and that only in that way can we hope to get their full cooperation. We also made it clear that if information was to pass through DSC, it would be useless for us to make the appointment. [*Stephenson said FBI had starved him of information for two years; he now had thirteen people dealing with the FBI on counter espionage matters.*] Stephenson said that [Canadian police commissioner] Wood had always been most cooperative and he seemed somewhat surprised to hear that DSC were persona non grata in Ottawa as well as in Washington. [. . .]

I like Bill personally and am rather sorry for him, because I think he has had a difficult time. On the other hand he has certainly

made some bad blunders and we shall get nothing out of the FBI as long as he is responsible for the liaison.

April 2, 1943: I saw Duff [Cooper] and took him the report for the PM. He seemed quite satisfied with its form and contents. I impressed upon him the degree of secrecy which should be attached to it and the necessity therefore of ensuring that it was seen by the PM only. At first he had thought of sending it to Desmond Morton. I said I thought it would be far preferable if he handed it to the PM himself. He would then be able to answer any supplementary questions and ascertain the PM's reactions. From what he said I do not think that he intends to leave the report with the PM. In any case he will ask for its return. I told him that if it went to Desmond Morton it was highly probably that he would take a copy and send it to 'C'. While there was no real objection to this it might possibly cause a certain amount of trouble.

[Not transcribed: Witt, in Sweden before his arrest, had offered anti-Nazi articles to Tennant the press attaché in Stockholm. Wife was employed in Stockholm.]

Duff [Cooper] showed me a commentary on a huge volume which he described as 'Stephenson's apologia'. The commentary had been made by Diplock [*later a famous judge*], who seems to have reached the same conclusions as ourselves. These are that Stephenson was badly supported by his own organisation and was for two years at least kept very much in the dark. He consequently lost credit with the FBI. Secondly he made a gross blunder in not handing over all his agents to Hoover when the Americans came into the war, and lastly his office is badly organised and over-staffed. We are now awaiting C's decision as to Stephenson's ultimate fate. I told Duff that I thought that Stephenson had done a good deal of extremely useful work in the early days of the war but that in the

present situation I did not see how he could continue as our representative, moreover anybody who represented SIS in the present atmosphere would be regarded with some suspicion, firstly because he would be a member of an organisation known to carry out offensive operations on foreign territory, and secondly because a suspicion would always remain that what he got from the FBI he might well pass on to OSS, G2 or ONI. For this reason I thought it better that we should have our own representative with the FBI and that if SIS felt they still wanted to maintain liaison with that body they should continue to do so. Our representative would keep in unofficial touch with their, but there would be no outward organic connection. I think Duff more or less agreed with this view.

April 3, 1943: Duff has returned our report for the PM with a letter saying that the PM would like to have further details about WURMANN. The PM has minuted the report in red ink: 'Seen. Deeply interesting. WC.' Duff seems to think it has been a great success.

April 5, 1943: Diplock and Wells came to see Dick and myself about America. In their view Stephenson had no intention of resigning. They thought therefore it was necessary to present some plan to the inevitable meeting at Kinnaird House which would probably take place next week. [. . .] It is inevitable in the present situation that Stephenson will be by-passed since much of Thurston's [US liaison officer's] work here is verbal and contained in his personal letters to the Bureau. [. . .]

April 6, 1943: MENEZES [agent] has been condemned to death on Friday last at the Old Bailey. BJs indicate that the Portuguese ambassador has been instructed to put in a special plea on the highest possible level for the man's reprieve. There is no death

sentence in Portugal.

Craven, an ex fascist who wrote to the German legation in Dublin, mentioning that he had formerly done work for the German Consul in Liverpool, etc. has been given a life sentence under the DRs [Defence Regulations?] by Mr Justice Singleton. The first I heard of this case was when I saw it in the papers. The letter had been intercepted by censorship and sent to the HO who on the instructions of the Home Secretary sent it to the DPP, and it was not until proceedings had actually opened in court that the matter was brought to our notice.

April 7, 1943: There has been another move to amalgamate all three [security] services. Duff [Cooper] apparently put up a memo to the PM sending copies to C and Selborne. The PM thought that any such move would be too dislocating, and Selborne clearly wants to hang on to his own show. It was therefore decided that a meeting should take place once a month between DG, C, Selborne, Loxley and Desmond Morton. Clearly this will be just one more committee, which will decide nothing and eventually peter out. It is to hold its first meeting on Friday, to discuss the American situation.

April 8, 1943: Quite clearly Stephenson does not intend to resign and the farce of Security Co-ordination will continue. It would be far better if they wiped the whole lot out and started again.

[Brian] Melland [*Cabinet expert on captured German documents*] gave an excellent lecture this afternoon to the Course on the German police system [. . .] Melland also stressed the brutality of the *Ordnungspolizei*, whose excesses had gone beyond almost anything committed by the SS [*the general point which Daniel Goldhagen also makes in Hitler's Willing Executioners*],.

April 9, 1943: As a result of the MENEZES case there have been 23 arrests in Lisbon including the head of the SD. Meanwhile Monteiro has wired to the FO with a plea for MENEZES' reprieve. Loxley is anxious that we should consider our attitude. Malkin, the FO legal adviser, is definitely of the opinion that a reprieve should not be granted on the ground that there is no death penalty in Portugal, since this might create an extremely awkward precedent.

The FO think however that a reprieve should be granted owing to the extremely cooperative attitude of the Portuguese, the insignificance of the information actually transmitted and the way MENEZES assisted the authorities after his arrest. MENEZES' solicitor has written to Monteiro and taken pains to impress upon the latter that he personally will be responsible for the execution, since it was on his recommendation that MENEZES was dismissed from the Portuguese embassy and deprived of diplomatic privilege.

April 10, 1943: [. . .] I said a few words afterwards about our recent discovery through WURMANN of the lack of Signal Security in this country [. . .]

April 11, 1943: We have now received the minutes of the meeting on the 9th at which Duff Cooper was in the chair, with Selborne, Hambro, CSS, DG, Loxley and Morton present. This was the first meeting of the Secret Service Co-ordinating Committee [. . .] It was agreed that [Stephenson] should cease to represent the Security Service [MI5] in the USA. [*Full details follow, not transcribed here*].

April 15, 1943: We now have 17 actual XX [double cross] agents and six notional.

April 18, 1943: Plan MINCEMEAT has been approved by the PM. I have seen the documents which are extremely well faked. [. . .]

[*Guy Liddell had jaundice from April 20, 1943*]

May 31, 1943: I returned from sick leave this morning. [. . .] Plan MINCEMEAT has been an unqualified success. It has been reflected both in ISOS and MSS [*intercepted Abwehr and other code messages. . .*] GARBO has had another great success. He has received a code which the GC&CS say is almost the equivalent of a one time table [. . .]. Also a complete table of call signs, time and frequencies up to Feb 1944. DUCK has succeeded in her special job of getting the Spanish tapes again. MENEZES has been reprieved.

Looking at the move of the dissolution of the Comintern [on May 22, 1943] from a distance, I came to the conclusion that probably it would constitute no real change but that firstly it would be a serious blow to Goebbels, secondly to the trade unions and labour parties which the Party was seeking to affiliate with, and lastly it would facilitate the rapprochement with the USA who had always been very apprehensive of Comintern activities. I cannot believe that the good work will not go on as before, and that it is far too valuable a weapon in the hands of Russia to be lightly abandoned. It seems that the Party here were taken by surprise. They had received no prior notification of the contemplated move.

June 5, 1943: GC&CS have given us an appreciation of GARBO's cypher. They say that it has three outstanding features, it is new, it is perhaps the highest grade cypher ever used by the *Abwehr* in their experience, and it is identical in principle with the cypher recently, since 1st May 1943, given by the Germans to their most important Spanish outstations, Huelva, Bilboa, San Sebastian, Melilla, and Tetuán. These cyphers have not been broken but with

GARBO's information it should be possible to deal with them within a period of 2–3 months. It would appear therefore that the Germans must have good confidence in GARBO and also in his immunity from danger of capture. At the same time the Germans may believe, and the belief is probably justified, that possession by us of this agent's cypher would not automatically 'blow' the cyphers of the Spanish stations. Each use of the cypher has a different key process and without a knowledge of this the cypher has a good claim to be considered insoluble. The *Abwehr* have begged GARBO to guard his code with the utmost care.

June 9, 1943: Dashwood has returned from Lisbon. I met him for a moment at the club last night but it is clear that he had made no sensational discovery about the Lisbon leakage. I should doubt very much whether he had had either the time or the requisite knowledge to go into the matter very deeply.

June 10, 1943: I had a talk with Adam and Stopford. The latter is worried about the liaison at Dyce between JOSEPHINE and MacRoberts. [. . .] The second part of Plan DREAM has been successful. £2,750 have been paid over today to GARBO's account. This brings his total up to something over £7,000.

June 11, 1943: [. . .] I saw Duff [Cooper] for a few minutes and gave him some more recent information about the subjects dealt without in our last MT5 report. He was going to see the PM at 4:30. I showed him a copy of the GC&CS report on GARBO which I think pleased him. If B.1A have done nothing else for the last three years they would certainly have justified their existence with this case. I also talked to Duff about Signals security and my talk with Peter Reid.

June 17, 1943: I have read an interesting report by [John] Wheeler

Bennett of our embassy in Washington on a visit that he has paid to [Dr] Brüning at the end of February. [*details follow at length.* Very anti Nazi but pro-German, saw himself as a German Talleyrand at the peace table.]

June 19, 1943: T-R [Trevor-Roper] has written an extremely interesting memo on the struggle between the *Abwehr* and the SD. Himmler is gradually muscling in on Canaris's preserves. [*Not transcribed: details follow at length.*]

June 22, 1943: There has been a crisis in the GARBO case. Mrs G is extremely homesick and jealous of GARBO who is completely absorbed in his work and has consequently to some extent neglected her. Her one desire is to go back to her home country. She thinks that as the whole of GARBO's network is notional, we have no further use for his services. It has been explained to her that he is a most active collaborator which of course she knew already. She now threatens to go to the Spanish Embassy if she cannot get her papers. She ought really to be locked up and kept incommunicado but in the state of the law here nothing of the kind if possible. TAR [Robertson] is going down to read her the Riot Act and to explain to her that she has already committed an act preparatory to an act by threatening to go to the Spanish Embassy. [. . .]. We have also thought of warning the Spanish embassy here anonymously that a woman of Mrs G's description is anxious to assassinate the ambassador. This would we hope, ensure her being flung out if she attempted to go to the Embassy. It would however result in the police being called in, which would be a bore. If we let her go back to Madrid it seems highly probably that she may talk. [*Website note: Talk? Talk? Scream! Instead a 'simpler' plan was devised:*]

[. . .] The plan to deal with the GARBO crisis has been changed. It is now proposed that [Chief Inspector] Burt [of Scotland Yard]

should take a letter to Mrs G after 5 p.m. when the Spanish consulate would be closed, telling her that her husband had been arrested and asking for his pyjamas, tooth brush, etc. Tomorrow if she appears to be in a repentant mood she will be taken to see GARBO either in a cell at Cannon Row or at Camp 020. GARBO will say that the authorities decided to liquidate the case and suggested that he should send one final message, that he thereupon blew up, became abusive and threatened to give the whole show away. He had thereupon been arrested It is hoped that Mrs G will then say that her husband is entirely innocent and that the whole crisis has been due to her stupidity.

June 23, 1943: The plan to bring Mrs G to reason seems to be going fairly well. She rang up Haines and Tommy Harris in a frightful state. Haines went and found the room full of gas. This was clearly a bit of play-acting for his benefit. He did however think there was a 10% chance of her doing something foolish, so Mrs Harris was asked to go and calm her down during the night. This morning she was interviewed by TAR who heard her plea and explanation. She has signed a statement saying that the whole of the incident was due to her fault and that on no account would she behave badly in future. She is to be taken to Ham in a Black Maria this afternoon where Tineye [*Lieutenant-Colonel —, commandant of Camp 020*] is staging an appropriate act. She will be allowed to talk with GARBO in his cell. GARBO will be released tomorrow when it is hoped that a reconciliation will take place and that he will fall into the arms of his ever-loving wife. Tommy Harris is to be notionally eliminated from the case. He will not see Mrs G any more but will continue to work with the husband.

June 24, 1943: Tommy Harris tells me that the GARBO crisis has now been liquidated, according to plan. The concluding scene was at Room 055 where Cussen in masterly style explained to Mrs G that

she herself had only missed being arrested by a hair's breadth. He has given an assurance that she will make no further trouble and she understand[s] that if there are any other incidents of the kind both she and her husband will be detained for the duration of the war. I think she is thoroughly chastened. GARBO, bearded from his prison life, is returning to her this evening. I gather that he is somewhat shaken by his experiences of the last 48 hours, and that although the plan was of his own making it was one of the most distasteful things that he has had to do in his life.

June 26, 1943: The Witt case had blown up in a rather unpleasant way. Maxwell has written a letter intended for the S of S for War in which the Home Secretary expresses his grave displeasure and concern at the treatment of Witt at the London District Cage [of Colonel Scotland]. Witt has made a number of allegations about ill-treatment which have been denied. The only admission is that Wiesner slapped his face. If the denials are accepted it seems an incredible thing that two secretaries of States should be drawn into a matter which involves a lying little Nazi having had his face slapped by a Czech.

[. . .] the DG feels rather hot about it although we are not directly concerned since the incident did not take place on our premises. At some stage in the proceedings it is alleged that Milmo or Sneath said that it was the British Govt's view that it was better than nine innocent men should be executed than that one guilty one should escape. This statement was merely made to frighten Witt, but it is argued that information extracted in fear is of no value. I rather wonder what Maxwell would say if he read all the o2o reports. I am quite convinced that no physical violence is practiced at o2o, but all sorts of threats are made without which in many cases one would not get at the truth. It all depends on the man you are dealing with. If the HO think that they can handle spies with kid

gloves on, it is about time someone disillusioned them. I am going to suggest to the DG that he should see [Sir P J] Grigg personally about this case and try and get it back on more sensible lines.

[. . .] JC came to see me about a talk he had had with Lord Cherwell. [*“Charwell” in original*]. On instructions from the PM, Cherwell has been going very carefully into the Do-Gerät scare [Dornberger-Gerät *mentioned by a prisoner; the beginning of the V-weapons inquiry*]. Cherwell says that the PM takes all these secret weapon scares very seriously. Cherwell himself does not believe in the DG [Do-Gerät] although he says there is a 5% chance that it is a feasible proposition. This led him [JC] to consider the possibilities of [using double cross agents] misleading the German scientists by suggesting to them that we had some particularly terrifying secret weapon. JV wanted to know whether he could encourage Cherwell to put up certain propositions.

June 29, 1943: [*Not transcribed, pages 329ff: popularity ratings of Hitler among prisoners of war, morale of prisoners in N Africa: ‘We were not defeated as soldiers, we were overwhelmed by material superiority.’*]

KV.4/192

Liddell diary July 1, - November 30, 1943

July 1, 1943: Duff [Cooper] seemed worried about the DG and wondered whether he would stay the course. If he did not, who was going to take over? Duff is apparently anxious to promote from within. Charles said that even if he wanted to he would be physically unfit to do the job. Duff had apparently mentioned various names including Lennox and Victor. [*Liddell’s diary shows that he*

secretly wanted the job of Director-General himself].

July 2, 1943: Brook-Wilkinson asked me to go up and see the Sherlock Holmes film, which I had seen some months previously. It has not been drastically cut and altered. The Chiefs of Staff Committee has now become the Security Council, which appears to be a largely civilian body [. . .] If there had been any question of showing it in 1940 I should have voted against it but in present circumstances I cannot see that it will do any harm.

I took over the MT5 report to Duff [Cooper]. He suggested that we might give the PM a 2 or 3 page report on the GARBO case, which he felt would arouse his interest.

Duff then talked to me about the office [. . .] worried about the succession problem [. . .] He had thought of Victor and others. He then said to me, "I suppose you would not do the job?" I said [. . .] I was not a very good organiser [. . .] [*Not transcribed: Two pages on this.*]

July 5, 1943: Stewart rang me up to say that there was a ZIP message indicating that the Swedish MA [military attaché] in this country had learned that we intended to make a concentrated attack on Sicily. The PM had seen this and was angry, and has asked Eden what use these foreign MAs are in this country and whether we get anything of a reciprocal kind from Sweden. [*Source was Cervell who had contacts with British air industry?*]

News has come through that Sikorski has been killed in an airplane accident at Gib. There is no news about the cause of the accident. The runway at Gib. is very short and it may be that the plane just failed to rise and went over the edge of the Rock. The incident has caused a serious flutter in the Polish political doves and there

are the usual cries of sabotage and treachery. It seems likely that the political and military side of things will be divided. Gen. Anders from Mid East is regarded as a possible military commander, and Zalewski as a politician and though conservative is more liberal minded than most and would not be too antagonistic to Russia.

The LRC have picked up an agent named Jacques Jansen. He is an isos character [*Abwehr*] but not very easily identifiable.

[. . .] I went on to see Duff [Cooper] and explained to him about the Zip message which had so interested the PM. I thought he should know about it since he was taking the MT5 report to the PM today or tomorrow.

[. . .] Going down in the train on Saturday for the weekend with Harry, I met [Edwin] Herbert of the Censorship. He had just returned from the USA. He said that Hoover was getting more and more difficult. He was now against everybody and was even refusing to pass his material to [the Bureau of] Censorship in case they should pass it on to OSS or some other department. Herbert who had evidently been in close contact with Viv [DCSS] thought that we should present a uniform front against Hoover.

When I saw Duff today he said that Herbert had been to see him and said much the same thing. I said I thought our problem was a simple one. We were two analogous bodies who wanted to talk to each other directly. This could easily be achieved if Mills were put into the Bureau as the opposite number to Thurston, and making him subordinate to Stephenson. The snag was that Stephenson and Security Co-ordination were *persona non grata*, and such an arrangement would therefore be bound to fall down. It was impossible to get rid of Hoover, and there was nobody other than the FBI who could deal with the CE [counter espionage] in N

America.

July 7, 1943: At the Wednesday meeting Hart stated that the man previously referred to as Jacques Jansen is Joseph Henri Pierre Janssens. This man had the same cover name as Steiner, both came from Antwerp and both with Einz [sic] Marine [*Abwehr I Marine*] agents and came through France, Spain, and Portugal. The result of this has been that the *Abwehr* have got them thoroughly muddled up. We have however been able to sort them out. Janssens is at [Camp] 020.

I have had a talk with TAR and Dick Butler on the succession problem. Both of them seem to think that I am the only person in the office to do the job and that I should take it if it is offered to me.

There are two rather good stories going round about the Americans in Tunisia. When the Americans were attacked at Gafsa they apparently ran pretty fast. A British General seeing an American general, asked if he could do anything to steady his troops. He replied, "Well, General, if you could have seen those fellows on manoeuvres, they were just dandy, but I guess that right now they are plumb scared."

The other story is an imaginary conversation between Eisenhower and Monty. Eisenhower told Monty that he was giving him 100,000 troops. Monty then enquired about the quality of the men and Eisenhower replied: "Well, general, I guess they are like a bunch of bananas." Monty asked exactly what this meant. Eisenhower replied: "Those who are not green are yellow, and those that are not yellow are rotten." I am not quoting these stories in any malicious sense but merely because they are rather funny. It does seem that the Americans regarded Tunisia largely as a training ground and it must be expected that you cannot build up a trained army

of 7 millions in 18 months. Everybody has to go through hell-fire and gain practical experience by their mistakes.

July 8, 1943: Duff asked me to go over this afternoon. He gave me back the MT5 report which the PM had read with interest. He said a word to the PM about the Stockman [Swedish military attaché?] case. The PM was horrified and thought quite definitely that something ought to be done. He wished to be kept informed.

I told Duff that I had been thinking a good deal about the succession problem. I had gone over all the people in this office and although I did not wish to appear conceited I was certain that if I did not do the job [of DG] there was nobody else.

July 9, 1943: TATE has now got a job with a Watford photographer.

General [Hans] Kramer [*Last GOC of the Panzer Armee Afrika, repatriated in May 1944 to Germany on a pretext*] in conversation with a British army officer, stated that the sector which he was to take in 1940 was Somerset. The main attack was to be made there and they were to advance east through Bath. The approach was to be made up the Bristol Channel [. . .] Kramer stated that the only warning the Germans had of the Dieppe attack was the one they received from the small convoy which some of our ships unfortunately ran into.

[. . .] I explained to him [Peter Loxley of FO] as definitely as I could what these commitments were likely to be, and the difficulties that we had had with SIS, particularly Felix Cowgill, who seemed more than ever determined to keep us out of the Second Front. I said that I was quite convinced that as long as he remained in SIS there would be no successful cooperation between the two organisations.

July 10, 1943: [. . .] I went over to see C about the suggestion that Haldane Porter should go with King Peter to Milicevic, the new Yugoslav security man, to the Mid East. Haldane Porter is on extremely good terms with Milicevic, who is regarded as one of the few reliable Serbs in this country. [*Not transcribed: One more page on this topic.*]

[. . .] This led me to a discussion about Felix's personality. I said that as long as he remained in charge of Section V, there was bound to be friction between our two departments. The fact was that the [MI] 5-6 complex had become a kind of obsession with him. [*Not transcribed: Two more pages on this topic.*]

[. . .] was one of the DG's most laudable traits that he invariably stood up for his own people when they were attacked, but in this case, as we all knew, [the] grounds put forward were not the real grounds. None of us, with the probable exception of the DG himself, ever felt that Webster was the right man for the job. He had knowledge of port security matters and had done very good work in that direction, but he knew nothing much about the intelligence side, and as far as I understood it, Vivian did not trust his discretion. C said that he would be quite ready to withdraw +++++ ++++++ if we could withdraw Webster and leave the whole business in the hands of Michael Ryde who had C's whole confidence. I gather that ++++++ had already written to say that he did not think there was a full time job in S. Africa for himself. It was quite clear that that he had been sent out there solely because C and Vivian did not trust Webster's discretion. I said that I was glad that he had confidence in Michael Ryde and I would try to get things moving on the right lines. It was not however going to be an easy job.

C then referred to America. He said that Bill Stephenson had de-

cided to remain there while his office was the subject of investigation.

From what he had heard C thought that Stephenson should go back and retain his position. He regarded him as a very great asset on the higher political plane and said that his views were shared by [British ambassador Lord] Halifax and others. He thought that the organisation of his office had improved and that his registry had been cleaned up. He did not however propose to come to any definite conclusion until he heard what Vivian and ++++++++ had to say.

I said I liked Bill Stephenson very much personally and had little doubt that he had done a very good job on the higher political plane. He did not however know much about CE nor did I think he was particularly interested in the subject. He had not therefore been able to give the FBI exactly what they wanted. His real mistake had been in not handing over his agents to Hoover when America came into the war, and in not refusing to play on the Tom Tiddler's ground between Hoover and Donovan in the shape of the Washington Embassies.

If we had [Cyril] Mills in the Bureau as an opposite number to Thurston we should be perfectly satisfied and we should not in the least mind his working to Stephenson if this did not prejudice his chances of getting information. Quite clearly at the moment it would.

C said that in the meantime he was having the most frightful trouble with the Americans, since all parties were at loggerheads. G.2 backed up ONI and said that on no account were OSS and the FBI to see isos except in a blanketed form. C did not quite know what he was going to do about this since both of them had been

seeing it in the raw for some time and OSS were ensconced at Glenalmond.

It seemed now that the G.2 were likely to have a certain measure of control over OSS. OSS had been running riot in N. Africa and Italy.

A Jap military message indicated that the Japs were worried about their cyphers being compromised through some actions of Americans. This was followed by the communication to Washington by OSS of certain information which corresponded exactly to the contents of a Jap BJ. G.2 had spotted this and asked C to use his influence to get the activities of OSS curtailed.

What has happened of course is that OSS being left in ignorance about Jap BJs, have been plunging about in the Jap Embassy in Rome trying to pinch the cyphers and had probably come pretty near compromising the whole business. This is a very good example of the dangers of caginess and having organisations engaged in unco-ordinated SS Work.

C to some extent blames ++++++++ for not having got together with OSS and the French in N. Africa. He is being withdrawn and ++++++ is being sent up from Mid East to tidy things up.

July 12, 1943: I spoke to the DG about Haldane Porter going to Mid East with Milicevic. He has agreed. There can be no decision however as regards his future or his joining the SI (b) unit. This depends on what the Jugoslavs intend to do. If they are going to transfer all their missions to Mid East and Milicevic goes too, it may be that Haldane Porter could be better employed out there, since there would be little to do in this country. Whether he should join the SI (B) unit or Maunsell's Balkan Section would be matter

for discussion.

July 13, 1943: Hollis told the DG's meeting that the woman Shehan had been given 3 months under Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act and that Springhall had been committed for trial under Section 1. [*See also September 8, 1943*] This renders him liable to a sentence of 14 years. It puts Springhall in a very awkward spot, The onus is on him to prove that he did not obtain the information for a purpose prejudicial. If he says that the information was for our allies the Russians, he will have to call witnesses to prove his point. It seems unlikely that [Soviet ambassador Ivan] Maisky or any of his minions will be particularly anxious to come forward.

The DG, Dick [White] and I had lunch with Bill Stephenson. The future of Security Co-ordination was not discussed. Stephenson did let drop rather confidentially that [OSS chief Bill] Donovan might perhaps run for the presidency. This may be the key to quite a lot. It will be interesting to know Hoover's reactions to the possibility.

[. . .] ISOS discloses the whole order of battle in Sicily. It seems that owing to a breakdown in communications the responsibility for making such reports rested on the station at Taormina.

Old Panda has sent in an irate telegram protesting about Adam's mission to USA, the nature of which was not clear to him. He is evidently suffering from the heat.

[. . .] Victor returned from the Mid East [. . .] Victor had a fairly favourable impression of Maunsell, although he thinks that he is in some ways rather like a Mid East version of Bill Stephenson.

July 14, 1943: [Dick] Casey [British Minister Resident in Cairo] is having tremendous trouble with the French in Syria. They are entirely unco-operative and are obsessed with the idea that we want to get our hands on the country. Whenever they are asked to get rid of some pro-Vichy officer holding an influential position the French haggle for months and then do nothing. Casey is thoroughly disgusted and intends to say so in no uncertain terms, when he sees Massigli today. He thinks that de Gaulle should have had his head thoroughly washed by the PM over the whole business. It seems that the best qualification for any French official in the eyes of his superiors is that he should be thoroughly anti-British. [. . .]

There have also been difficulties with Palestine. It was recently discovered that the Hagana[h] which is under the control of [David] Ben Gurion had come into the possession of 60 rifles, a number of machine guns, trench mortars and explosives. The fact was discovered through two soldiers who got tight in a brothel. The arms had been drawn from depots in Egypt on presentation of bogus documents, and had been taken to Palestine in army lorries.

July 16, 1943: With reference to the ZIP message which reported on June 25, 1943 our projected attack on Sicily, the PM has now been informed by the FO that much of the additional information in the message was inaccurate. The PM, undeterred, has returned to the charge and asked the Chiefs of Staff what reciprocal advantages we get from having attachés, and suggested that they should be cleaned out of this country. The Chiefs of Staff passed his minute to the JIC who passed it to the ISSB who passed it to Lennox who passed it to me. Jolly good show.

We have reviewed similar messages over a period. Out of 9, only 3 contained information which was accurate and two of these were

based on information already made public. The situation seems to depend on the degree of reliability which the Axis attach to these reports, which they allegedly get from the Swedish Gen. Staff. If they are well-informed they will get discount the good as well as the bad or at least regard the good as unreliable. If they are ill-informed they may accept everything as being true.

We do not get the Swedish material so we cannot say whether they are made up in Stockholm. There are some grounds for thinking that they may have been made up in Stockholm since the Swedish Minister appeared to be of the opinion that the attack was coming in the Balkans and the Asst. MA [military attaché] thought that it was coming in Norway. In absence of any positive information we have to assume that anything picked up by the Swedish Service attachés reaches the Axis.

We cannot control Service attaches beyond a certain point. Therefore the only thing to do is to feed them with false information. This we are doing as far as possible through the Asst. M.A. on whom we have quite a good line. It is for the Service authorities to say what value they get out of their attaches abroad. I gather that C also will have views on this. The controller, to whom I have spoken, would not mind if all attachés were thrown out, but as long as they are allowed to remain he finds them useful as channels. We shall reply in the above sense to JIC.

The *Abwehr* man at Taormina has been given a raspberry for communicating the dispositions of the German troops in Sicily. He has been told that it is his business to report on his disposition of enemy troops and not his own. He intends to continue however but has asked Madrid not to pass the reports on in case he gets into further trouble. We are more than grateful to him for his excellent reports, which are of the highest operational value.

July 17, 1943: I saw [+++++] today [. . .] I said that while we all regarded Felix [Cowgill of MI6] as a loyal and hard worker, we found him an infernal nuisance and thoroughly unco-operative. I thought that in some ways he was quite pathological about this dept. [MI5] owing to some obsession that the MI5 Trojan Horse was always at work. [*Liddell mentioned Trojan Horse in an earlier entry in this volume also*].

July 19, 1943: The *Abwehr* in Rome state that the Italians have fought very badly in Sicily. It seems that the officer in charge of the guns at Augusta blew up his weapons and told his men to escape as best they could. It is said that a [sic] Gen [Mario] Roatta has been sent by the Duce on a special mission to the Führer to ask the latter to bring forces from the Eastern Front until the invasion in the West has been repulsed. This request will not come at a very opportune moment, seeing that the Russians have just taken the offensive in the vicinity of Orel. The view taken by Italian Intelligence circles in Rome is that unless the Germans sent [sic] assistance soon, the Italian troops are likely to collapse.

Rome was bombed today for the first time. Special targets were assigned and special instructions given that places of historic interest were to be avoided. Prior warning was given that the bombardment was going to take place and also that the Germans might bomb Vatican City and say that it was the allied air force who were responsible for the damage.

July 20, 1943: [. . .] Carlisle of MI(L) rang up just before two o'clock to say that Commandant Rouvier of the Giraudist Mission was with him and had recounted a story received from Admiral Muselier and Mons. Saurat about a plot to assassinate Giraud. [*Special branch officers are thereupon assigned to protect him on plane and in UK*].

July 21, 1943: ISBA [*intercepts?*] shows that the Germans are rather sceptical about TRICYCLE, and that they are inclined to think that BALLOON's traffic was being planted on them. Tricycle took the bull by the horns and asked them whether they were suggesting that his information was also a British plant. Von Karstoff is reserving judgment, but is flirting with the idea of using Tricycle's channel for bringing Yugoslavs out of Switzerland as a means of getting an agent here and also a wireless set. The whole matter is to be thrashed out in Madrid.

July 22, 1943: I saw Duff [Cooper] and handed him a copy of JC's excellent report on GARBO which is to go to the PM. I also showed him our memo to the JIC on the subject of alleged leakage of information, through the Swedish MA here, to the Japs [. . .]

July 23, 1943: Kenneth Younger has retired from Mid East. He seems to take a poor view of the organisation and in particular of Maunsell, whom he regards as an arriviste, incapable of organising a big show on the proper lines [. . .]

Mrs GARBO is still somewhat unsettled, although she no longer talks of returning to Spain. GARBO thinks that the only solution would be to bring over Mrs G's mother and older sister. I must say I feel somewhat reluctant to bring over any more members of the GARBO family. On the other hand it is vitally important to keep a case going.

Muñoz, the Spanish Assistant MA, has agreed to carry out another transaction for PLAN DREAM for £2,500 at the end of this month. The rate of exchange is to be 90 pesetas to the £.

July 25, 1943: [. . .] GARBO in one of his reports spoke of intensive exercises in Wales which had been made a prohibited area. He

said that he was unable to go into the area and suggested that the Germans might like to send over reconnaissance planes. Almost simultaneously OSTRO sent a far more alarmist report about concentrations in Wales and the possibility of invasion. The Germans did in fact send over two planes the night before last and took photographs by flashlight bomb and parachute flares.

July 26, 1943: On the 8 o'clock news this morning it was announced that Mussolini had resigned and that Badoglio and the King might be prepared to make peace, but these have been generally discounted by SIS who thought that Mussolini and that fascists were too strong. It is possible that there may have been some approach through channels of our own or through American channels, but at the moment I have no evidence on this point. I am inclined to think that there may be peace with the allies in a matter of a week or so. Mussolini's resignation would in any case be an essential step in that direction, and it may be that the resolution to carry on the war is only a temporary one to save Italy's face. There is the further point that the Italians may wish to prevent an extension of the invasion of Italy by German troops until we have a footing on the mainland.

A Jap BJ from home refers to the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini on 19th July in N. Italy. The meeting was attended on the Italian side by Ambrosio, Chief of the Gen. Staff, and on the German by Keitel and [Field Marshal Albert] Kesselring [C in C South]. Hitler and Mussolini had a meeting alone. This was confined to military matters. Mussolini spoke of the desperate situation in Italy, While Hitler spoke of the equally difficult situation on the Russian front, but promised to send what help he could. It was admitted that in Sicily the Italians and Germans were outclassed in the air and on the sea and that the British could move pretty well as they liked.

Information given by the Germans to the Japs in Berlin indicated that the Germans had expected that Italy would offer more stubborn resistance in Sicily. Control of the Straits of Messina had been lost and the Italians were experiencing difficulties in the matter of transport. Additional German troops are apparently to be sent from France to defend the mainland of Italy, since it was difficult to spare any from the Eastern front. According to Ribbentrop, the German plan of campaign against the USSR for this year is to inflict as many losses as possible on the Soviet Armies and sectional fighting without carrying out large scale encircling operations.

I saw Henderson from Trinidad this morning. He is doing a course here before going back. He has not finally made up his mind about Goodacre yet but, contrary to what we had always been led to believe, he said that [. . .]

July 28, 1943: WINDOW [known to the Americans AS CHAFF], namely the scattering of small pieces of metal during our bombing raids, was used with very great effect at Hamburg where we dropped 2,300 tons of bombs in the space of 50 minutes with the loss of only twelve aircraft. [*Not transcribed: more details*] Incidentally it was WINDOW that Springhall was trying to pass to the Russians. Information about it had also reached KOHOUT, who gave a piece of the metal to Jack to transmit to the Germans.

July 29, 1943: BJs show that the change of Government in Italy came as a complete surprise both to the German and the Japs. It was known that from the point of view of domestic administration Italy was in a critical position, but it was thought that Mussolini would be able to find a way out. It seems that important matters relating to the direction of the war were being discussed in the Fascist Senate on the 24th and 25th July, 1943, but as a differences

of opinion arose and no settlement reached, a decision by the King was considered. It was thought that the King would support Mussolini, but for some reason unknown the latter's resignation followed. There was no doubt that he had lost the whole-hearted support of the Party.

There have been considerable anti-Fascist demonstrations in Rome. Mussolini is said to be under the protection of the army somewhere in the suburbs. The Jap Ambassador in Rome saw Mussolini on the 25th. Mussolini thought that Japan, Italy and Germany should continue the war in close co-operation, but that hostilities with Soviet Russia should be brought to a close.

Mussolini in the meeting with Hitler on June 18, 1940 had urged the latter not to embark on a war with Russia but to concentrate his forces in the Mediterranean. This Hitler had refused to do. He said that the Italian war potential was low. If there was a landing on the mainland of Italy the whole country would have to be abandoned south of the Appenines. As long as the enemy did not advance to within 10 kms of Rome he himself had no idea of abandoning the capital. The morale of the troops was not good, particularly those who had been conscripted in 1935.

Italy suffered severely from air raid damage and there was a shortness of food. He could not guarantee that social disturbances would not arise with grave effects on the maintenance of law and order. Only with sufficient assistance from Germany could the situation be dealt with. He thought that even now the Germans could extricate themselves from Russia by going back to the 1939 line, Hitler had formerly said that he would overcome Russia in 10 weeks, but Mussolini had remarked to Goering and Hitler on several occasions: "How often do you intend to repeat actions which consist in advancing 500 kms and then retreating 500 kms?"

Mussolini thought too that the Germans were tired of fighting and would welcome peace with Russia.

Hitler was disposed to help Italy but could not do so owing to his Russian commitments. People therefore had the impression that fighting on the Italian front was only in order to postpone the day when she would shut herself up within her own frontiers. These ideas were essentially futile. Time was not on the Italian side and the deterioration of her industrial capacity on account of bombing was a matter of concern. The synthetic oil works at Leghorn could not be put on their feet for some considerable time and if the rubber went at Bologna, it would be an enormous military blow. Mussolini intended in the near future to suggest categorically to Hitler that he should stop the war with Russia, and he hoped the Japanese Government would assist him. [. . .]

Springhall was sentenced yesterday to 7 years under section 1 of the Official secrets Act. Platt-Mills, his communist Counsel, made a hopeless mess of the case. Springhall's defence was that he never had any information at all. He never went into the box and his accomplice let him down by saying that she was thoroughly sick of all this talk about armed revolution. The judge refused to allow Platt-Mills to turn the court into a political debating society, which he was rather inclined to do.

Vivian has written an extremely offensive letter to the DHG on the subject of Bill Stephenson's relations with the RCMP [Royal Canadian Mounted Police.] [*Not transcribed: details*] [. . .] This does not alter the fact that in the past Security Co-ordination have been a source of constant irritation in Canada.

July 30, 1943: The man who committed the act of sabotage in Gib which resulted in the burning of oil stores has been arrested and

has confessed. This action raises the question of summary prosecution by court martial in Gib which is at present being discussed by the CO [Colonial Office] with the AG [Attorney General.] The alternative is to bring the prisoner back here [. . .] There is no doubt that the execution in Gib would have a considerable effect in preventing further acts of sabotage.

I attended a meeting with the DG today at Kinnaird House on the subject of America. Those present were Desmond Morton, Loxley, C, Vivian, a representative of SOE, Herbert of Censorship, Welles and Diplock. [Much discussion on BSC and Stephenson [. . .].] Herbert [. . .] said quite emphatically that he though Hoover's one idea was to get everything into his own hands and to break up British Intelligence in the USA. Of we acquiesced in the dissolution of Security Co-ordination and the establishment of separate representation, we should play right into Hoover's hands.; He did not think that Hoover had a great deal to give and that his successes so far had been almost entirely dependent on British information [. . .] Vivian said much the same [. . .] C said that the investigation of ++++++ and Vivian had resulted in a unanimous view that Security Co-ordination had been run efficiently.

The DG said that if the view of Sir Edwin Herbert and Col. Vivian that Hoover was a tyrant, whose sole aim and object was to set up a world Intelligence system under his control and to break up British intelligence, was thought to be the explanation of Mr Hoover's present attitude, the best thing would be to get Denham back at once in order that the meeting might hear his views. The Chairman agreed and said that in meantime the meeting should express its confidence in Stephenson, without prejudice to any alterations in the organisation which might subsequently be thought desirable as a result of Denham's report. The DG said that jealousy of preserves seemed to be common to all Heads of

Intelligence Departments in the US and that the same might be said of ONI, G2 and OSS. I mentioned the General Strong was particularly difficult in this respect and particularly unreasonable, but that in spite of the attitude if heads, a great deal of cooperation went on the lower levels. We had only one object, namely to have somebody in the FBI who would be more or less an equivalent of Thurston over here. I recognised that the flow of information from East to West would always be greater than from West to East, but I thought that there was still a certain amount of information which could usefully be obtained from the FBI which we were not getting at present. This could only be done by someone in the Bureau whose organisation had the confidence of Hoover. We should not have minded in the least having Mills in the Bureau working to Security Co-ordination provided his position was not jeopardized by his connection with that organisation. We had also thought there was considerable advantage in having a coordinating authority.

The whole trouble was that for one reason or another the FBI did not wish to play with Stephenson. I thought that this situation had arisen on account of the lack of definition of the FBI and OSS. There was Tom Tiddler's ground in Washington on which both organisations thought they had the right to play. Had BSC, at the moment America came into the war made it quite clear that they would not poach on the preserves of one for the benefit of the other or keep off doubtful ground, the FBI would have had no complaint against Stephenson. There was no doubt in my mind that this was the fundamental cause of the trouble.

Vivian told me afterwards how much he wished I had gone out instead of Denham. I said that I would have been very pleased but had not been asked. I did emphasise to him very strongly that our best interests in the post-war period lay with Hoover. His

organisation would have to go on whereas the future of the others was problematical. Vivian had evidently had a very strenuous time. He told me that he had had a very severe headache for the last 4 days and was going away to try and get rid of it. This may account for the somewhat irresponsible letter that he wrote to the DG.

Japanese BJ from Berlin dated July 27th seems to indicate that the Germans are still in doubt about what really happened in Italy. Badoglio has apparently assured the Germans that there is no change of policy as regards continuing the war. Badoglio had received a letter from Mussolini thanking him for taking over at such a critical time and for having saved him from plans upon his life. He expressed the hope that Badoglio would continue to cooperate with the Germans to carry on the war with increasing confidence in Badoglio and gave him an assurance that he would not do anything to make his task more difficult and in case of necessity would not hesitate to afford him assistance. If Badoglio wished he was prepared to retire to his villa in Northern Italy.

Mackensen, the German Ambassador, says that the Fascist Party has collapsed completely with the resignation of Mussolini and that there had been no demonstrations in support of it. The Italian Vice Minister of Marine had given an assurance to the German NA [naval attaché] that the Navy will fight to the end. It was made clear to the Japanese Ambassador that while Germany still desired that Italy should continue the war at her side, they were anxious about the position owing to conditions in Italy which were worse than could be imagined.

Both the Germans and Japanese are concerned owing to the proclamations made by the King and Badoglio, containing no word about the Axis or the Triple Alliance. They regard this as some-

what significant and as implying a possible peace manoeuvre by Italy in the near future. If Italy collapsed Germany would be sorry to lose an ally but on the other hand she regarded Italy as something of an embarrassment. The fighting quality of her troops was bad, she had littler equipment, a considerable proportion of which had to be supplied by Germany in addition to considerable quantities of cereals, coal, steel and iron. It had been a matter of some concern to the Germans that the Italians had fought so badly in Russia and had been selling their arms in the Balkans to the insurgents. It would be a serious problem to Germany to hold down Italy and defend the defence line against the British and Americans. She had also formed plans to maintain order in Italy whatever happened. The Japanese pressed for increased German aid to Italy.

I dined with Barty Bouverie and talked about America. He evidently favours united command but thoroughly realizes the weaknesses of Security Co-ordination. He thinks that our problem would be solved if we had someone in the Bureau using the Washington office of BSC. He himself corresponds direct with London and only passes to BSC such information as he thinks may concern any of its other component parts.

August 2, 1943: Ploesti was bombed yesterday at 2 p.m. by about 150 Fortresses. According to ISOS considerable damage was done to the refineries and fires have been started. This makes me all the more apprehensive for Abadan. If the Germans had the sense to write off 25 planes and could hit the power station and in particular the turbines, they would undoubtedly cripple our war effort for many months. There are very few AA guns, practically no planes and no RDF.

[. . .] I saw Stephenson at Claridges. Although he implied that the

highest quarters intended him to remain as head representative of British Intelligence in the Western Hemisphere, he was I think a little nervous about his position and about what Denham would say when he returned. He repeated all the arguments that had been put forward by his sponsor[s?] at the meeting on Friday at which he was not present. He was quite convinced that Hoover was out to break up British Intelligence in the western Hemisphere.

He blames us for not sending him out an expert when he was given a mandate for the Security Service. I explained to him that I had been very keen to do so, but there had been constant opposition from SIS. They had in fact disputed our right to communicate direct with Stephenson on any matters affecting the FBI. The question of sending Mills to Washington had been raised. Some objection was always raised to this:

Many weeks passed while we waited for Stephenson to return and nothing could be done until he did, and we were told that Winant was going to solve the problem but that he had been held up in the States. So it had gone on, until the impasse was reached resulting in the meeting of the 9th April when it was decided to make a change and establish our own representation. I personally regretted the whole business and was heartily sick of the disputes that were going on.

All I was anxious to see was a representative of the Security Service who knew our work thoroughly co-operating closer with the FBI in Washington. If he were nominally under BSC and this was acceptable to Hoover, which is what we had in mind when we made Stephenson our representative, all would be well. Stephenson was very anxious that we should pay no attention to what Denham had to say when he came back, and that if it was decided to restore to him the Security Service mandate I should go out and

arrange for our representation. He did not think it would be a good thing to put Mills with the Bureau since Mills would now be tarred with the Denham brush.

I sensed very strongly that Stephenson has taken a dislike to Mills because he knows too much about BSC. He thinks therefore that it would be better to have him out of the way. I pressed him on this point but he refused to be drawn. He had Brendan Bracken with him and a number of other high spots in the American world.

The fact is that he has played his cards extremely cleverly. The trouble is that all his talents on the high level are not directed towards our particular line of business, in which he really has very little detailed interest. He admitted to me that he in no sense considered himself an expert in CE. He left on perfectly friendly terms. He told me that if we did establish our own liaison he would resign. I doubt it.

August 3, 1943: The DG's meeting took two minutes – nobody seemed to have anything to say.

I told the DG about my meeting with Stephenson.

I also told him about a suggestion from the ISSB that in order to prevent leakage of information about the German rocket gun if and when it fired, all traffic to Eire should be stopped for 48 hours. I had replied that as the burst of the rocket would probably be observed by reconnaissance planes I did not think any measures to prevent traffic to Eire would be of much use. Even if, as they suggested, traffic were reduced to official persons only, there were still the crews of boats and aircraft. Moreover the officials would probably be more likely to leak than the ordinary passengers. Quite apart from all this there was the coastal traffic. The whole idea

seems to me quite fantastic.

[. . .] I saw Duff and left with him the MT5 report. He thought it was a little dull this month, with which I agree. He has the GARBO report however to stimulate the PM's interest. He said, "I suppose you would not like him to take it with him to America?" I said no, because I thought it might be washed up on the shoes of France, which would be unfortunate.

We discuss the meeting about America. I gave my views, with which I think Duff more or less agreed. He seems to think that Stephenson has dug himself in so far that he will have to remain, but he is quite aware that the whole thing is to a large extent a ramp. I told him that I thought C's point about using the power of withholding information a bad one. It would be impossible to withhold valuable information which concerned an ally. It was in fact a bad principle to bargain and blackmail with information. Equally, I thought that we had to consider very carefully whether it was wise to antagonise Hoover, who would probably be the only investigating authority in the USA after the war.

August 4, 1943: I heard two rather good stories about the PM. After his return from N. Africa, Eden wrote a memo on the N African situation after [the fall of] Tunis [mid May 1943]. After reading it, the PM commented, "This contains every known cliché except "God is Love" and "Adjust your dress before leaving."

The other one was that at the PM's meeting with de Gaulle when he found the latter rather more irritating than usual, he concluded with the words, in a villainous accent, "*Si vous m'obstruerez, je vous pulveriserez.*"

I now have some of the details of [Desmond] Orr's visit to Duff. He

told Duff that he was still worried about the succession problem, and he was quite convinced that Lennox was the man for the job [. . .] [Desmond] Orr did not think I was suitable and in any case my appointment would be undesirable as I was very much in the hands of [Victor] Rothschild.

Duff said that he gathered that [Desmond] Orr was anti-semitic. [Desmond] Orr said that he was not anti-Semitic and that in fact he had a certain number of Jewish friends whom he regarded very highly. Duff said that was the answer one always got from anti-Semites. [Desmond] Orr then said that he did not think I was suitable for other reasons, and that I would be quite satisfied if I were given a decoration. At some point or other during the interview Duff pressed his bell and asked his secretary to show Mr [Desmond] Orr out. Duff is quite clear in his own mind that [Desmond] Orr is more or less off his rocker.

[. . .] The German service in Madrid are still getting wild reports from what would appear to be imaginary agents in this country.

Bird mentioned the interception of letters which are passing between Mexico and Hamburg and which contain DUFF [*is this a cover name for microdots?*] It seems that the Americans have been substituting the DUFF and removing some which they thought objectionable. They have probably blown the case since there appears to be another cover address to which duplicate letters are probably being sent. I told Bird that if he would give me a note about this I would speak tactfully to Thurston. [. . .]

A Jap BJ shows that an interview took place between the Jap ambassador an Badoglio on the 31st [of July 1943] when the latter gave his assurance that there had been no change in his determination to continue the war. He said that though he was an old

man he was resolved to do everything he could and would be prepared to fight till he dropped. [. . .]

Three British ships have been severely damaged by bombs placed under the keel by the Italian sabotage organisation operating from Algeciras. One Italian prisoner has been captured [. . .] Examination of British merchant ships' hulls at Gib revealed two bombs attached to the keels of s.s. *Hartbridge* on July 7, 1943. These bombs were definitely of Italian manufacture. Attempted sabotage seems to be a combined effort on the part of the Abwehr and the Italian organisation at Huelva, where a bomb was put on. On May 8, 1943 explosions occurred in two British ships, the s.s. *Carmata* and the s.s. *Mahsud*, and one American ship, the *Pat Harrison*. All vessels had to be beached. All three incidents were certainly the work of the Italian organisation in Spain.

[. . .] The D.G. is extremely depressed about America and is writing a long letter to Duff which he has submitted for consideration. It needs amendment I think in a number of places.

August 5, 1943: At the 12 o'clock meeting today Hart mentioned a high level message from Rome to Berlin indicating a leakage about Fleet movements from this country. If the facts are correct, there are some indications that the leakage may be due to a cypher break.

[. . .] I saw Archie Boyle and discussed with him the case of [Colonel] Chichaev [*Beria's representative in the UK; see also August 14, 1942*]. I asked him pointblank whether [Colonel] Hill [of SOE: *see Oct. 5, 1943*] had spiked our liaison in Moscow. He said that frankly he did not think that he had, although he regarded him as a slick customer and extremely conceited [. . .] I told Archie that we had asked the Czechs to arrange the meeting with U.35, that our purpose was to feel our way with the Russians, with whom

we had no contact. We had no idea of the moment of keeping Chichaev under observation. If we intended to do anything of the kind we would certainly let him know and we would in any case take no such action before Hill's return, which is expected in the course of the next few days.

Archie wonders a little how it is that Hill has been able to establish himself so well in Moscow, after advertising himself as a British spy in Russia at the time of the Revolution. Tho' he did not say so, I do not think he would rule out the possibility that Hill gives more than he gets. Hill apparently has some Russian blood. He is extremely well regarded by the British ambassador [*Sir Archibald Clarke-Kerr, with whom Hill apparently has a sexual liaison: see entry for [. . .]•••*]

August 6, 1943: TAR [Robertson] came to see me about running JOSEPHINE for deception purposes. There is a slight rub between Antony [Blunt?] and Stopford. I said that as Stopford was running her as an agent and Antony only used her for +++ purposes I thought it better that she should have one master in her capacity as agent.

[. . .] At the 12 o'clock meeting Herbert mentioned that from reports he had seen at the LRC it seemed fairly clear that the Germans had only just got on to the SIBIRIL organisation in France which has been responsible for getting between two and three hundred people out of the country by boat. He thought that Lagalle's case ought to be reviewed in the light of this fact, since had he been acting as a German agent one would have supposed he would have given this organisation away. Stamp and Buster had various counter-arguments but are going to review the case.

I attended a meeting today at the War Office, Harry Allen in the

chair, to discuss security measures for ALACRITY [*British move into the Portuguese Azores*] [. . .] Occupation is to be by consent, but only one island, namely Terceira, is to be occupied, with the exception of a small naval contingent at Horta in the island of Fayal.

August 7, 1943: OSTRO has been asked to report about concentration on the south-east coast. From the point of view of deception this suits us very well provide OSTRO reports correctly. This however is doubtful, as his information which is alleged to come from civilian pilots is usually extremely poor.

[. . .] There has been a most interesting Jap BJ indicating a meeting between the Jap ambassador in Berlin and Hitler somewhere about the 30th July. The Ambassador explained the difficulty of consolidating their new gains because of shipping. He intimated somewhat optimistically that things were improving. It was Japan's policy to inflict blows upon the enemy wherever possible and to cause losses to their war potential. As regards the USSR, it would be unwise at this juncture to extend the war area and disperse Japan's military forces. Difficulties would moreover be intensified with the shipping problem. The Ambassador thanked Hitler for sending [Subhas Chandra] Bose to the Far East. He had been very busy with the organisation of the Indian Volunteer Force in the Singapore area, with plots against India, etc.

Hitler then spoke of the political changes in Italy. He found it hard to bear that Mussolini, his great friend, should have received the callous treatment of arrest. He said however that the incident was not entirely unforeseen and he was considering ways and means of meeting the situation. Hitler attributed Mussolini's downfall to the bad condition of the Army. He drew a contrast between Italy and Germany. In Italy the Army was the King's and the administration was Fascist, each separate entities, whereas in Ger-

many he had brought about unification of the country and the Party, and the identification of the Army with the State, building what he described as “one harmonious whole.” He took a poor view of Badoglio. When Italy came into the war he proposed that the Italian forces should enter France through the gap created by the Germans while simultaneously attacking the French with 4 divisions on the Franco–Italian border. This was rejected owing to the confusion that it might have caused. All 17 divisions had therefore been centred on the Franco–Italian border but had suffered severe losses. He had asked Badoglio to occupy the islands of Crete and Cyprus, but Badoglio had opposed this and instead had staged the disastrous attack on Greece. Hitler had no longer any confidence in the Italian army and he realised the possibility of the disappearance of their war-consciousness and even of a separate peace. If the allies landed on the Italian mainland, he would not commit the folly of fighting for southern Italy. He would take the Apennine range, the River Po and then the Alps as his defence lines. He intended to increase the number of troops in the Balkans, south of France, and Italy proper.

On the Russian front it was Hitler’s policy not to embark on a large offensive but to make the Russians wear themselves out. He thought they would start an offensive in May or June [1943] but they did not do so. Since Germany disliked the Soviet’s winter offensives, he thought it might be advantageous to forestall this by a local attack [CITADEL] beginning in July. This caused the Russians to embark on a frontal offensive which enabled the Germans to carry out their defensive operations which had been previously planned.

This seems to be a somewhat tortuous piece of argument. He thought the Russian infantry was not as good as it was, but that Russian tanks should not be despised and their numbers were

great. It was not an easy fight for Germany. She intended to make a gradual withdrawal from the Orel salient, inflicting heavy losses as she did so. By so doing Hitler would be able to withdraw 15 divisions who could be moved if necessary to other spheres. He hoped the Japs would not misinterpret this as a defeat for Germany. He intended to strengthen the European fortress and doggedly drive back Anglo-American landing operations.

The Jap said it was clear from what Hitler had said that the Soviet forces would not be rendered impotent by force of arms in the course of the present year. What were the prospects of defeating them in the future? Hitler said that Germany was considered the execution of a great offensive but that the moment would have to depend on the action of the US and Great Britain. The Jap then suggested that consideration should be given to coming to terms with the USSR and concentrating exclusively on the US and Great Britain. Hitler said that he was not entertaining any thought of making peace with the Russians. If he did so the Russians would undoubtedly join hands with the USA and intensify pressure against Japan, a situation which would be extremely difficult for the latter. This also seems to be a rather specious argument.

[Field-Marshal Wilhelm] Keitel, [Generaloberst Alfred] Jodl and the Jap MA [Oshima] then joined the conference. Hitler tried to impress upon them that the USSR was one of Japan's greatest enemies. At the same time the moment for Japan to attack Russia was for Japan to decide and he quite understood difficulties about transport. Germany had no intention to dictate Japanese strategy. It was moreover important to bear in mind that anti-tank guns were of vital importance in a war with the Soviets. He did not know how well the Japs were equipped from this point of view. It would, however, be a considerable disadvantage to the Axis if anything went wrong with an attack, once it was launched.

Ribbentrop then chipped in, saying that although Germany did not wish to make any demands as to the direction of an attack, they did wish for an attack to be made as vigorously as possible, whereupon Hitler turned immediately to Ribbentrop and said that such a request was unreasonable. It was impossible to undertake a major attack without time to prepare it. It should be for Japan to choose the most favourable opportunity. The Japanese Ambassador got the impression that while Hitler still entertained friendly feelings for Mussolini, he was incensed at the way the Italian army had acted. He thinks Hitler will make a show for a time of respecting Badoglio's statement for the war continues, but at the same time he will be completing preparations to save Mussolini and to create a new Italy with with him at its head. In the event of the Italians concluding a separate peace he will probably try and hold one of the lines previously referred to.

An SIS report dated 5th August says that the Hungarian Minister who has just returned from Budapest, has seen the Japanese Minister in Lisbon. The Hungarian Minister and the Japanese have advised the Italian Minister that Italy should not precipitate peace with the allies as very important negotiations were taking place between Germany and Russia with the Japs as intermediaries, which should have far reaching repercussions. This report is circulated under reserve as although their [sic] have been rumours in circulation about German-Russian approaches, the Italian minister was not necessarily being told the truth.

A Jap BJ of the 3rd August indicates that Hitler has been misinformed about Badoglio, and urges that Germany should give him full co-operation. He says that Hitler does not appear to realise that Mussolini's down fall was due to resigns within his own party and that the suggestion that the Army should take over came from inside the Fascist Party rather than from any intrigues by the Army.

[. . .] BRUTUS has been returned to his home, pending court-martial.

The Germans are still left in some doubt about TRICYCLE, but he has given them a categorical assurance that he is not working for the British. Jebson and Ludovico still believe in him but Heribert has his doubts; I think that TRICYCLE will probably get away with it but it may take a considerable time for him to re-establish complete confidence.

The Jap Consul in Hamburg reported on the 25th July that 80% of the Bluhm [sic. Blöhm] & Voss works were destroyed in the recent raid. Casualties were 40 killed, 600 missing and 5,000 injured. It is said that some 300,000 people are homeless. On the 27th July the central railway station and a number of factories were destroyed. The general opinion seems to be that Hamburg is out for the duration of the war.

The PM has got away successfully but the whole of Fleet St. is buzzing owing to a statement in the New York press that the President is having another meeting with Churchill. They have been round to Downing St and finding all the blinds down naturally concluded that there was something in it. I understand that certain members of the PM's staff left important papers in the train on the way to Glasgow.

August 9, 1943: A British ship called the *Fernplant* arrived at Haifa on 6th August with a bomb attached. The bomb has been removed without damage. It was presumably attached at Istanbul. This is the second case within the last few days.

At Dick's meeting today Stamp mentioned the arrival of Zech-Nenntwich @ [*alias*] BOETSCHER, a German officer in the

Todtenkopf [sic. Totenkopf] division of the Waffen SS. [*Z-N is later given the code name COLUMBINE*].* This man had got into

* CIA files on the “Intelligence swindler” **Hans Walter Zech-Nenntwich** (born July 10, 1916 in Thorn, East Prussia) reveal a very shady character. He joined the NSDAP before 1933 and the SS in 1938; he became adjutant to Hermann Fegelein in 1940 and served in the SS Reiterdivision in Poland and on the eastern Front. He was an SS *Sturmbannführer* (major). A German file relates: Seit der Wiederverheiratung seiner verwitweteten Mutter mit dem Polizemajor a D August Johann Zech nennt er sich Zech-Nenntwich. Doctors diagnosed Hysterie. SS *Untersturmführer* bei 2. SS-KH.2. Er befand sich wegen *Fahnenflucht, Vergewaltigung u a* 1943 in Warschau in Untersuchungshaft. Fluchtete in der Nacht 5.-6. April 1943 nach Schweden, dann England. Lying, he told the British he had fled because of utterances about an affair between Himmler and a Polish agent; he claimed to be involved with Strasser in an anti-Hitler plot, and was sentenced to death but escaped and deserted. In fact Himmler ordered his arrest for supplying weapons to the Polish underground. In Sweden he worked with Swedish Military intelligence, and was flown to London. He worked for the British (as the Liddell diaries show) as a “Dr Sven Joachim Nansen,” interrogating German prisoners, from January 1, 1944, and from Jul 1, 1945 as Chief of an Investigation and Location section.

In November 1945 his chief Colonel Kettler transferred to Cairo. Zech refused to go, and was flown to Bad Oynhausen, British HQ, on November 22. He worked for a while as political adviser to the Landesregierung Nordrhein-Westfalen, but fell out with his British masters and denounced a number of SPD and CDU politicians to the Bundeskanzler as British agents. His home at Schloßstrasse 11, Mehlem, was raided on Sept 24, 1952 by German Federal Court order, and a letter to DDR dictator Walter Ulbricht was found, asking for work. A report dated February 24, 1955 calls him “an alleged journalist but better knows as an intelligence swindler by the name of Hans-Walter Zech-Nenntwich.”

In 1964 justice caught up with him and he was sentenced to four years’ hard labor Monday; see *The New York Times*, April 27, 1964, for his part in the extermination of Polish Jews in 1941; he did not serve the sentence but escaped, as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung claimed, with the aid of Intelligence agencies, with girlfriend Miss Margit Steinheuer. – Data from RG 263, Records of the CIA, released under the Nazi and Japanese War Crimes Disclosure Acts, box 58. RG 263, entry A1-86, box 58.

some trouble in Poland and was to be transferred to some other front. He then fell ill or feigned illness and then deserted. He approached the British consul in Stockholm, stating that if he could go to England he would be quite ready to be interned. He is being put up in one of TAR's [Robertson's] houses and will be interrogated first by [Brian] Melland [of MI.14]. He served on the Russian front at Toropetz and received a decoration for gallantry. It was said that at one time he was Himmler's ADC. He is held under an RLL order.

TRICYCLE has apparently been accepted and we are awaiting developments.

[. . .] Plan BUNBURY is going on but there has been considerable difficulty about the publicity. The local CC [Chief Constable] is however trying to stir up the local press. Burt is on the scene and Victor [Rothschild] is going down tomorrow. [*There were several earlier references to BUNBURY, which seems to have been a fake explosion against a power station at Bury St Edmunds, staged by MI5, to put the complacent utility bodies on the alert against enemy sabotage: see Aug 14, not copied here.*]

[. . .] I saw Miss Mackenzie, a friend of Miss Sherer's. She went out to New York with Evelyn Baring on his second visit. Evelyn, finding that Security Co-ordination did not want him, returned and left her out there. She took over the Registry. She says the filing system was extremely bad. [. . .] Stephenson has a most secret registry of his own and does not always put a card in the main index. The same applies to SOE. The consequence is that to be sure in doing a look-up that all the ground is covered, it is necessary to consult all three registries. Miss Mackenzie cannot see that the uptown office [in New York] really has any function to perform. The S American stations have been taken away and are being con-

trolled from London. Wood, who sits in the uptown office, is responsible for policy or administrative matters in S America and he receives copies of the S American reports which are presumably embodied in the Bulletin. The Section V representation consists of ++++++, Gavin Young, Mrs Sylveton, Mrs Montagu and one other. Hyde works more or less on his own on MI5 enquiries. Pepper also works on his own. Ronnie Sinclair is dealing with Indian affairs [. . .]

August 10, 1943: At the DG's meeting the question of the internment of women in emergency was raised. There are some 500 [. . .] Robinson of the HO says there will be no accommodation in prisons and wonders whether women are really dangerous. The answer is that women are just as dangerous, and on occasions more so, than men.

[. . .] The PM has reached Canada safely. [. . .]

Hart has seen Zech-Nenntwich, the German Waffen SS man, and listened to his interrogation by Melland. Z-N has had an extraordinary carer. His father was a democrat in the police. He himself was also in the police and it was in this way that he was recruited into the Waffen-SS. He was several times wounded on the Russian front. He is about 26 or 27 years of age. Disgusted with Nazi atrocities, of which he gave a pretty lurid account [*but see footnote on page 55*], he became associated with what he describes as a fairly widespread movement in the SS which is opposed to the Nazis and are regarded with special favour by the Army. The idea of this group is to overthrow Hitler and the Nazis, to continue offensive warfare on the Russian front, and to let the British and Americans into Germany. His group have even established contact with certain Polish resistance movements, and it was in connection with certain Polish contacts that he had made that he was

imprisoned by the Nazis. His friends got him out of prison by means of false papers and took him to Denmark. From there he succeeded in getting to Stockholm and ultimately to England. He desires if possible to have his liberty in this country and offers his services in trying to help us exploit the pro-Wehrmacht faction within the SS.

August 11, 1943: I saw Duff [Cooper] and handed him a copy of my report on SS [security service] representation in the USA. The report gave the events leading up to the meeting of 30th July; the SS point of view; objections raised to separate representation for the SS; and possible solutions.

I began by saying that the liaison on CE [counter-espionage] matters had not prospered. The two principle reasons were lack of knowledge about Axis intelligence organisations and experience in CE work in New York, and the other was the action of BSC in running agents in Washington after America came into the war. Our sole object is to improve the established direct channel by placing an opposite number to Thurston in Washington. I criticized the argument put forward by Herbert and Vivian which struck me as being exaggerated; and emphasized the undesirability of antagonizing Hoover, who was likely to be head of the only investigating organisation in the USA after the war.

As a possible solution which might be acceptable to all parties I suggested the placing of an SS liaison officer in the RCMP in Canada with the right to visit the FBI, and the giving to the SS in London the right to send representatives to the USA for consultation with the FBI as and when the occasion arose.

Duff read the memo and said that he had not understood Herbert to imply that Hoover wished to turn British Intelligence out of

the Western Hemisphere. He merely wished to reduce it to impotence. I said that this was not my recollection of Herbert's views at the meeting and that he had in fact said in his memo that Hoover before getting rid of Security Co-ordination wished to establish an alternative channel through MI5, and that having done so, he would then proceed to get rid of MI5. This seemed difficult to understand if the argument of Herbert and Vivian that Hoover was dependent on British Intelligence sources was generally accepted.

Duff then went on to talk about the DG's letter, which had slightly irritated him. He seemed to think that the DG's telegram had caused Denham to move too quickly, and that his visit should have been of a more tentative kind. I told Duff that I had not incorporated any mud in my memo because I felt that things had reached a stage where mud-slinging did nobody any good. At the same time I thought that he should know something of the facts about the office of BSC in New York.

I said that what had really stuck in my throat was the unstinted praise by C, Vivian and +++++ of the efficiency of the New York office. It seemed to me that if an organisation called itself Security Coordination, its first consideration should be to coordinate its records. This was far from the case, since there were no less than 5 registries, uncoordinated. The card index system was not good and the files were worse. Likewise, there was little to commend itself in the organisation of the work, everybody seemed to be operating independently and there was no cohesion.

I had been able to see this for myself, and I had just first hand evidence from someone who had been given the thankless task of trying to put the registry on proper lines. She failed to do so because she got no backing. I had the impression that Duff felt that

it would be difficult to go back on the decision of the last meeting but that his mind was open until he had heard what Denham had to say.

I showed Duff the BJ between the Jap ambassador and Hitler, and I also told him about Zech-Nenntwich and about GARBO's latest effort in bringing two more recce planes over Peterhead at the request of the Controller.

At the Wednesday meeting it was clear from Hart's material that the quality of the *Abwehr* information about this country was steadily deteriorating. During the past week they had reported incorrectly on almost every subject. Indications are that the information is pure fabrication from start to finish. [. . .]

Milmo [of Camp 020] talked to me about Zech-Nenntwich. He is afraid that if it gets to the Poles there may be political trouble with the Russians. Personally, I think the risk is somewhat small but it would obviously be better to get him out of London. The best course would be to get ++++ to take him on for a week or 10 days in order to get the full story. We should then be in a better position to know what to do with him. Rawlinson says that the DPW will certainly refuse to take him. Ultimately therefore he will probably have to be interned as a civilian.

I lunched with Bouverie and Louis Frank, who has just taken over the Low Countries and France in SOE. he is evidently looking at everything with a critical eye, and has the impression that much of the SOE organisation on the Continent may very well be blown. I told him that we had a somewhat similar impression. In this connection he welcomes Operation STARKEY, [*a dummy invasion operation against Pas de Calais, designed to lure German fighter planes into wasteful combat: see September 6, 1943*] which he thinks

will give him a much clearer idea of where he stands. He seemed happy about his relations with us. I told him that SOE equipment had been turning up in Gib and elsewhere and suggested that it might be of value to his organisation to have this equipment secretly marked. He said that such markings would not necessarily prove anything of a very definite nature, since for various reasons canisters have been landed up to half a mile or more from the appointed spot, and naturally fell into the hands of the Germans. He agreed however with me that if canisters dropped in a certain area always seemed to reach the Germans some significance would be attached to this [. . .] Frank struck me as being very intelligent and thoroughly alive. He is 34 and has had a rapid rise in Montague's [*a law firm?*] where he is the only Christian partner.

August 12, 1943: [Victor] Rothschild and [Superintendent] Burt came to see me about Plan BUNBURY. Burt thinks it desirable to ease up the police a little, who are suspecting the Irish and the Poles. There is great activity in the eastern counties and I understand that guards at utility undertakings have been doubled. The local press have got the story but do not think it worth while sending to London, as they feel it would not be passed by censorship. We are doing our best to grease the wheels but cannot do this too obviously.

[. . .] I have had long discussions with Herbert Hart and Milmo about Zech-Nentwich [sic], who presents us with a very difficult problem *qua* internment [. . .] As a temporary solution we are sending him to ++++ for a week next Tuesday. He will be out of range of the Poles and ++++ will doubtless be able to extract a good deal of information from him, particularly relating to Polish underground movements. We shall then have to let SOE and PWE have a chance. Melland whom I saw today was very impressed by the information he has obtained. One fact emerges of

which I was not clear namely that Z-N had contact with the Polish MA [military attaché] in Stockholm. We may therefore get a request from the Poles to see Z-N. This would be extremely awkward if it came to the ears of the Russians who would be highly suspicious if they thought we were encouraging Polish underground movements against Russia.

[. . .] T-R [Hugh Trevor-Roper] has written an extremely interesting memo on *Abwehr* incompetence. He points out that in strategic matters the *Abwehr* record is one of failure. It failed to forecast the attack on Madagascar, it failed over N Africa and it also failed over the Casablanca Conference.

Since then it has sought early for Intelligence about the allied plans for a Second Front. It cannot distinguish between the good and the bad, the genuine and the tendentious. It was equally confused about the attack on Sicily. While Sicily was thought to be the target, so were many other places. Two agents, one in Melilla and the other in Lisbon, sent a warning about Sicily but they did not reach the *Abwehr* until after the landings.

The result of this has been that reporting routes have been checked up with the object of shortening them. Tactical reporting on the other hand has been bettered, the most important service being the reporting of Gib shipping movements. In Tunisia, valuable tactical intelligence was provided during the successful German attack on Gafsa, but since the destruction of the German army there has been a most notable blank in the *Abwehr's* intelligence organisation.

On the Russian front, MAX must be regarded as a success and to some extent MORITZ, IBIS, and PASHA. Max reports have been singularly accurate in forecasting Russian operations and the

theory that it is a Russian XX [*double agent*] rather goes by the board. It follows from all this that during the last 9 months incompetence by the *Abwehr* is only partially mitigated by the tactical successes. [. . . *Not transcribed here: more organisational details.*] Considerable changes have been made in the higher ranks of the *Abwehr*. Pieckenbrock at Abt. I, Gen. Major Oster, head of Administration, Capt. Mensel, *Abt I Marine*, Major Brede, head of *I Luft*, and Block, head of *Wirtschaft* have all been removed, with various other subordinates. It would be rash to assume too much from these changes but the cumulative effect is sufficient to suggest that the *Abwehr's* answer to the charge against the quality of its results has been a purge of its personnel.

August 13, 1943: [. . .] C came over to see the DG about Ryde's position in S Africa [. . .] C talked to me afterwards about America [. . .]. [*Not transcribed here: Stephenson, Herbert, Hoover, Thurston, etc.*] C seemed to be about as sick of the whole business as I am but he did not have any solution to offer.

He then told me about the American cyphers which were giving him a good deal of trouble. The Germans had already broken into their diplomatic and also into their naval [cyphers]. Cyril Mills returned from Canada.

August 14, 1943: BJs and ISOS and ++++ show that a report made by [the Duke of] Alba [Spanish ambassador] based on information received from Solbert, the American MA, has been passed on verbatim to the Japs and the *Abwehr*. C is going to take this up with Gen Strong, G.2. With his approval he proposes to send for Solbert and give him a warning.

I had a talk with TAR [Robertson] and Gwyer about the analine [sic. aniline?] pencil method of communication. This method is

in use by ourselves and by the Germans. There have been two cases of its being used by the latter. The method is to rub an analine pencil all over a piece of paper, to place this face down on the piece of paper to be use for secret writing and then to place another piece of paper on top. The message is written on the top piece and is impressed on the bottom piece in analine, which is not visible and will not react to any reagent. The only method of reproducing the message is by a sensitised paper, since the analine prevents the light from getting through. Specially selected letters are being submitted to a test with strips of sensitised paper,

August 15, 1943: An SIS report shows that according to the Swiss legation in Bucharest, 65% of the Ploesti refineries were destroyed in the recent raid. The American refinery was not touched. It is causing amusement, and a British raid to destroy American interests is expected.

[. . .] Jap BJ refers to a meeting between Guariglia and Ribbentrop. Guariglia deprecates German intrusion and presses for Italian troops to be returned from the Balkans. I got the impression that the Italians wish to keep the Germans out of Italy as far as possible and then make peace.

August 16, 1943: A fighter-bomber pilot P/W talks of a rocket plane with retractable wings which are withdrawn after take-off. This plane is said to do 1,300 kms an hour (810 mph).

So far BUNBURY has only got publicity in the *East Anglian Daily Times*.

[. . .] I dined with JC and Humphrey Clark. The latter is in charge of the security of all missions to Washington.

I had a long off the record talk with him about BSC [*i.e.*, Stephenson]. He clearly knew the whole setup and was well aware of the deficiencies of BSC. I particularly asked him about the high-level information which it is said makes Stephenson such a valuable asset. Clark told me that the Embassy never gave Stephenson any directives and as far as he knew they never received any reports. He thought that if there were any of high political interest he would be bound to see them. I said that there were times when I began to wonder whether in fact they existed at all since if such information was available surely the first person who ought to see them would be the Ambassador. Clark agreed.

Mills told me today that the FBI are undoubtedly out for Stephenson's blood. It is pretty clear that they have got all his telephones if indeed BSC is not miked [*bugged by hidden microphones*]. They are also running a file. They told Mills that they were convinced that Stephenson was carrying out commercial espionage on behalf of the British Government. Mills said that he thought this highly improbable. He did however think that Stephenson might be feathering his own nest in commercial circles with an eye to the post-war period.

August 17, 1943: At the Directors Meeting today the DG mentioned the DRs [Defence Regulations]. They are to be reviewed for cancellation (a) at the cessation of active hostilities in Europe (b) at the cessation [. . .]

BUNBURY has now appeared in the [London] *Evening Standard* in quite a lurid light. Mention was made of investigations by Supt. Burt.

August 19, 1943: Dick [White] told me about his meeting with C yesterday. He had to give Webster's opinion of [Malcolm]

Muggeridge [SIS agent in East Africa], which C accepted with good grace. [. . .] C then went on to talk about America. he thinks Stephenson's high-level information is valuable and he also said that ++++++ was thoroughly satisfied with the efficiency of the office. He could not understand ++++++ misleading him on a point of this sort. How ++++++ could possibly say such a thing passes my comprehension. Quite clearly he was sucked in by the very flap-catching and perfectly useless card index system.

C told Dick [White] that the difficulty in giving MAX material to the Russians was the fact that the Germans were reading the Russian cyphers.

I had a long talk with Marriott who arrived back from India yesterday [. . .] [*Not transcribed here: Shortages of manpower, difficult to get a car let alone a plane, a second-class war area.*] The officials are all doing their best, but there is clearly an atmosphere of, "Is this or that really worthwhile if we are going to give the Indians Home Rule." The distribution of food is not food and the situation is aggravated by the fact that Indians would sooner lie down and die of starvation than eat anything that they are not accustomed to [. . .] The Sino-Japanese war is regarded as something of a farce, nobody believes in great battles or victories, and there are grave doubts whether anything serious is going on at all. The general view is that Chiang Kai-shek is putting aside his lease-lend material for the war after the war. [. . .]

[. . .] When visiting SB [Special branch] Langdon was confronted by Foster, Gill and 4 inspectors with the announcement of Plan BUNBURY. They said, "Whatever your views about this case, we have come to the conclusion that it is either SOE or Lord Rothschild." I am afraid Langdon did not put up a very good show. Although he did not commit himself positively, I think he left

them with very little doubt about the origin of the outrage. Amongst other things he is reported to have told them to keep it to themselves, which is of course a complete admission of guilt.

[. . .] General Ame [sic. Amé] , chief of the Italian Intelligence in Rome, has asked the *Abwehr* in Rome to pass the following to its superiors in Berlin: “On the 9th August the German commander in the north ordered the local Italian commander (a) to give him two more routes into the north of Italy for German troops (b) the right to occupy Italian fortifications in north Italy with German troops (c) to withdraw to southern Italy all Italian troops which have recently entered the north of Italy.”

The Italian High Command has ordered that forcible attempts by the Germans to implement these demands should be forcibly resisted, Gen. Ame was anxious that the German should support the Italians in the south and do all they could to keep Italy in the war. This however was only his private and unofficial view. The above makes fairly clear I think that the Italians want to keep their country as clear as possible of German troops and then make peace as soon as we land. Whether the Germans will allow them to do this is another matter.

August 20, 1943: [. . .]. I dined with Peter Reid. He would welcome a representative from our office on his committee. He is almost violent about the stupidity in handling intercept material. He thinks that the general caginess of SIS in the control of GC&CS is a menace. They seem to forget, he said, that everybody is aware of the policy of intercepting signals. Even our own operators were being constantly told to guard against it. The thing that matters is not that we are like everyone else doing it, but the extent to which we do it.

August 22, 1943: Peter Hope has got a reaction from the Assistant Superintendent in Newcastle about BUNBURY. He has been told to stick to the line given to him for communication to the CC [Chief Constable].

Kesselring has been made C in C, Southern Italy and Rommel has taken over in Northern Italy. The Italians have been told that Germany has used her reserve army in Russia but considers that she has prevented the Russians from conducting a Winter offensive. They hold out no prospect of peace with Russia in the near future.

The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin has had a long conversation with [Field Marshal Erhard] Milch [*Staatssekretär* in the air ministry, and *Generalluftzeugmeister*]. Milch said that the Luftwaffe was in considerable difficulty as America was sending most of her planes to Europe. Germany's monthly output was 2,700 first-line aircraft but it was hoped through her expansion scheme to double this output in 15 months. American production was estimated at 5,000 per month, England and Canada at 2,000 and USSR at 2,000. These figures were thought to include every type of plane.

Clearly I should say the British figures are an under-estimate. The efficiency of Soviet planes had according to Milch fallen off. He admitted that our raids on the Ruhr could not be lightly dismissed, and had had a certain effect on production. To meet this Germany was trying to improve her AA defences and fighters, but the area was extensive and it was not an easy matter. Considerable damage had been done to the Messerschmitt works at Wiener Neustadt, due to their having no fighter defence. Production of bombers was not to be given priority at present. Damaged to factories was regarded as roughly 10% of Germany's total production.

The Japanese summarises the position by saying that the German Air Force was obviously very inferior to the Allied, and that Germany had great difficulty in the matter of defence. As no early improvement could be expected, it must be recognised that the conduct of the war for Germany for the time being would be difficult.

August 23, 1943: I had a talk with Dick and Dixon about the course of IB and G2. Major Charles of G2 has rung up to say that he would like 15 officers to attend and he would be glad if we could let him know when the course would open. We have got out the synopsis, and are only waiting for the final arrangement to be made as soon as Dixon takes over his job in COSSAC [General Sir Frederick Morgan, Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander].

Burt and Fish came to see me about the Harris case. We have got both Harris and his wife in letter check. Harris's telephone on the landing of his flat is also covered. We propose to interview Mrs Harris at High Wycombe where she is employed in some NAAFI for American troops. I have asked Courtney Young to try and square this with Mallet of the FO. It is very important that we should take over the investigation without any outside interference.

August 24, 1943: Lennox talked to us about operations. He thought that [Operation] STARKEY had got somewhat out of hand and that if we did not succeed in drawing the Luftwaffe the Govt. would have a good deal to explain to a public which had been worked up to expect a big Second Front operation this year. At the moment nobody appears to know what has happened in Quebec. There is apparently no explanation at the moment of the [Soviet] withdrawal of Litvinov and Maisky [as ambassadors from Washington and London] and their succession by two comparative non-

entities. I am inclined to think that Russia is not anxious to participate in conversation because (a) we entered this war on a guarantee of then integrity of Poland, and (b) we have signed the Atlantic Charter. We know that the Russians intended to violate (a) by re-occupying the Curzon Line after the war, and that they have no sue for the self-determination of small nations where the Baltic States are concerned. These matters are bound to come up at any conference and would clearly cause embarrassment to all concerned. Russian would therefore prefer to keep her hands entirely free.

August 25, 1943: I saw Ryner Jones, who is going out to do a job in the Palestine Police in conjunction with Saunders. He struck me as a sensible man. Kellar had a long talk with him in my presence about the present set-up in Palestine. There is no doubt that Kellar knows his job well. He rather anticipates the possibility of trouble in Palestine before the end of the war. The Jews are well armed and it is quite on the cards that they might try some sort of coup. This has caused anxiety in Arab circles which are again becoming active. It is difficult to find out what the CO [Colonial Office] policy is. The FO on the other hand seems to be tacitly supporting the Pan-Arab movement. Jones also had a word with Victor [Rothschild] who told him about the sabotage cases at Haifa.

[. . .] Milmo mentioned that Perez Garcia arrived last night at 020. He came by British warship from Panama.

August 26, 1943: A Jap BJ indicates that by the 21st August fifteen German divisions had entered North Italy. Some of them have apparently come from the eastern front but the majority are from south Germany and France. It seems that whatever arrangements are made about Rome being declared an open city, the Germans intend to use the railway through it. [. . .]

I had a talk with ++++ about Zech-Nentwich [*sic*]. He is quite convinced of the man's genuineness, he is appalled by the stories of German atrocities in Poland and elsewhere.

He feels that these have a very high significance as if we get into Germany we may expect the remnants of the Party to fight like wild beasts. He is getting out a full report which we shall have in a day or two. We shall then have to decide about the disposal of the body [*meant figuratively of course.*] Personally I rather feel that we should not judge German bestiality on the same lines as Russian bestiality. The Russians are a much more primitive and tough people, whereas the German is bestial when he is top dog, but when he begins to feel that he is beaten he is apt to cringe and become sentimental.

August 27, 1943: I showed Duff [Cooper] some interesting Jap BJs and also talked to him about the case of Zech-Nentwich in which he was very interested. I have promised to give him a report as soon as it is done. [. . .]

Victor [Rothschild] had lunch with the Prof. [Lord Cherwell] Today. They had a long discussion about the Do-Gerät [*secret weapon at Peenemünde named after General Dornberger*]. The Prof takes the same view as Alan that if cordite is the propellant so much would be required that it is bound to burn up the apparatus. He also thinks that the trials in the Baltic would have been bound to have been the subject of comment by the Swedes.

The whole thing looks to him somewhat phoney, particularly the evidence which has been supplied by SIS and P/Ws. Another point is that the nose of the projectiles according to the photographs taken from the air at Peenamunde [*sic*] is round. The Prof says that a projectile of this kind which has to travel 150 miles and

reach a height of 45 miles would have to have a pointed nose and be stream-lined if it was going to reach its destination. The point of the rocket is that it has no recoil, but if there is any propellant that can get it into the air without burning up the whole apparatus the only way out of the difficulty would be the catapult. This however would not be a solution since a catapult would produce a devastating recoil. [*Website note: In fact the V2 rocket or A4-Gerät was liquid fuelled: alcohol and liquid oxygen*]

August 29, 1943: Felix Cowgill has again distinguished himself by telling Curry that Soviet espionage is not his business. Curry has told him that he joined SIS on the understanding that he worked direct to Col. Vivian and that to try and make a hard and fast division between Soviet espionage and Soviet subversive activities is pure nonsense. His minute to Felix was in such terms that it even made ++++++++ [*a female*] a bit uneasy [. . .] Felix has also had a raspberry from ++++ herself. He told her that she should not on any account tell MI5 about the JOSEPHINE messages and the Goertz messages. Still less should she refer to the matter to Denniston [of GC&CS] without the Chief's approval [. . .] Some people think that Felix is going off his rocker. He wrote to Dick [White] the other day saying that "now that we knew that the Germans knew that we knew that DUFF is being used, would it not perhaps be a good thing to tell the Censorship?" As we told the Censorship more than two years ago there does not seem to be much point in his remarks.

August 30, 1943: [. . .] We have got Cimperman to wire the FBI about the blowing of the reagent to A.V. [*a secret ink*], and the blowing of GARBO's addresses. The fact is that certain of GARBO's letters have already reacted to the methelyne [*sic. methylene*] blue test. This is probably due to the fact that he is using too strong a solution, and that he uses a pen instead of the match-stick covered

with cotton wool. This test has been going on since the 19th of this month. We are letting one letter through with a slight indication which might have passed the eye of the censor that the letter contains secret writing. This may get us out of the difficulty of using tetra-base if the Americans do not want to blow this reagent. Tommy Harris thinks that whatever test we apply we ought to go on the assumption that certain of GARBO's letters have been read until the ink and cover address are changed. [*Not transcribed: more detail . . .*]

Marcus Heywood tells me that we are to land on the toe of Italy at Calabria and possibly other spots. This is being done with the knowledge and approval of the Italians [. . .] Fleet Street are of opinion that we are going to attack Naples tomorrow, though it is not clear precisely on what they base their assumption. They are somehow influenced by the fact that Winston has postponed his speech and that the Pope is speaking on Wednesday.

We have received information that the first escort group [sic] was attacked by 13 Do. [Dornier] aircraft at 12.52 p.m. on 27th August when about 390 miles west of Vigo. *Egret* blew up and *Athabaskan* was damaged but managed to steam at fifteen knots. The CO, four officers and 30 ratings from *Egret* were rescued by *Athabaskan* which herself had 17 casualties, two of whom were fatal. The projectile used for the attack is believed to be a rocket-propelled glider bomb [*probably either Schmetterling or Hs.293*] which is discharged 3–5 miles from the target at a moderate height, the flight being controlled by radio from the aircraft.

Some mention of this bomb has been made by P/Ws. They say it can be fired at a distance of 15 kms from the target. The aircraft has to be turned in the direction of the target at the moment of release. The observer keeps the bomb in his electrical apparatus

and steers it on to its target. The experimental flights were carried out at Peenemünde on the Baltic which was bombed the other day. Jamming is thought to be difficult as each bomb is steered on a different wave length. I believe that we ourselves have been experimenting with some similar type of glider bomb. RDF [*radar*] reflection is obtained both from the bomb and from the target. All that the pilot has to do is to keep the two super-imposed on his screen. Alan seems to think that jamming should be possible [...]

Joe Archer told me about the Möhne Dam incident [*May 1943*]. The bomb used [UPKEEP] is spherical and contains about four tons of HE. It is revved up by a special motor within the aircraft before release. [*Not transcribed: A page of further technical details.*]

August 31, 1943: TAR [Robertson] tells me that Johnnie Jebson and TRICYCLE have come to an understanding. Presumably Jebson is playing straight as ISOS shows that he is backing TRICYCLE. Jebson's idea is to go out to Lisbon and work there as an Abwehr official in touch with TRICYCLE and his gang.

September 1, 1943: Hart's material shows a steady flow of bogus information alleged to be coming from this country. There is not one word of truth in any of it.

September 2, 1943: I went over to see C about the case of Lecube, a Spaniard who was recruited by the *Abwehr* somewhere in 1941. He is an ex-international Soccer player, an ex-Treasury official and an ex-owner of a greyhound racing track [...]. In 1942 he obtained a mission from the Abwehr to report on the military forces in the Panama Zone. He was picked off at Trinidad and brought to this country [...]. He vehemently denies that he is a German spy and has written several appeals to the Home Secre-

tary [Herbert Morrison]. He writes in typical Spanish style, "From my microscopic insignificance I fling myself against the pedestal of your greatness," or words to that effect, with professions of his innocence [. . .] Unfortunately for Lecube however there were some 90 messages on ISOS some of which tally completely with his own statements of his movements and associates. In order to convince the Home Secretary it is necessary that he should be acquainted with the nature of the evidence. I explained this to C, who agreed.

I then told C about the Zech-Nentwich case and our views. He seemed to think it was quite possible in the light of other information that the man was genuine.

He then referred to the agent in Switzerland who had been handing out German BJs relating to Goertz, and also reporting on certain messages emanating from JOSEPHINE. It seems that this agent, who in the first instance made contact with an OSS representative, may be something in the nature of a XX [double agent], but it is not really clear at the moment. C was evidently not aware of the fact that we had no official knowledge about the JOSEPHINE messages. I said that we should be very interested to know precisely what these messages were. He said that of course we should be informed. Vivian was present and I think slightly embarrassed. The fact is that everything is being done by Cowgill to keep this information away from us. However, we now have an opportunity of taking the question up. [. . .]

I saw the Home Secretary this afternoon [. . .] Herbert and I discussed with him the case of Lecube and he readily agreed that the evidence was conclusive. He thought it quite clear that the man mentioned in ISOS as Espina and Gomez was identical with Lecube. [*Not transcribed: . . .*]

A further operation of PLAN DREAM by which we expect to receive £2,631 has almost been completed. [. . .]

I have read ++++'s report on Zech-Nentwich, which is extremely well presented. The key to the man's whole make up is that he is obsessed by his status as an officer [. . .] What he does not understand of course is that we are fighting German militarism just as much as Nazism. When this dawns on him a somewhat bitter disillusionment is bound to set in [. . .] At the moment SOE are having a look at him.

September 6, 1943: TAR tells me that STARKEY is being taken rather seriously by the Germans. They have blocked Calais harbour with concrete ships and have laid extensive minefields outside Boulogne [. . .] There are a large number of fighter aircraft in France but so far it has been extremely difficult to get them up.

Joe points out that the fact that the Germans have gone over to fighters as a first priority gives them a certain advantage in production figures, Normally it takes 8,000 man hours to make a fighter as against 50,000 man hours to make a bomber.

I visited the American General Strong, head of G2, who is over here for a short time. He is a man of, I should say, about 65, no fool but filled with a tremendous sense of his own importance and very slow of speech. I should say that if his stenographer could do three words a minute, she would suit him admirably. [*Not transcribed: Three page account of their talk on Intelligence operations and deception in the coming year.*]

September 7, 1943: Lennox gave us the Quebec decisions [. . .] The Communists are preparing a second front demonstration for Winston's return. Steps are being taken to meet this situation.

[. . .] Roger [Hollis] tells me that there was a note in Springhall's diary on a certain date which said "See Ann Gresson and Ray Milne" [*both females*]. A look-up resulted in our seeing that we had vetted Ray Milne for SIS. There was nothing against her [Milne] except I think some vague reference to the fact that at some former date she had been connected with Peace Pledge Union activities. She was the daughter of a Post Office official. She was interviewed by Roger and Felix Cowgill.

She admitted that her friend Ann Gresson, who is of course a Party member, had introduced her to Springhall on one occasion [. . .] She admitted that she was a member of the Party herself, and that she had a dual loyalty to this country and to Soviet Russia. I gather she works in Section V [of the SIS] and is right in the middle of isos and everything else. She is regarded as an extremely efficient and hardworking girl. The dilemma is to know whether to retain her services or whether to kick her out, when she may do serious harm.

Victor tells me that in the [American] raid on Stuttgart, only 33 out of the 350 Fortresses reaches their target. 48 of them were brought down and 175 members of the crew were picked up in the drink. Fortress crews are extremely brave but their navigation is undoubtedly bad.

The Do-Gerät scare has been intensified owing to references to it on ZIPS. [*German police and SS intercepts*]. It seems that the Germans intend to clear an area in the Baltic for experimental purposes and that when the rocket guns are established on the coast they will be surrounded by a smoke screen to prevent them from being seen and bombed. [*Is this a mistaken allusion to the code name Nebelwerfer?*]

Italy has surrendered unconditionally, the armistice having been signed as early as Sept. 3rd. The delay in announcing the armistice was agreed between ourselves and the Italians in order to give us an opportunity of getting a firm footing on the Italian mainland before the Germans had a chance to occupy the whole country [. . .] I gather that in [Marshal of the RAF Sir Arthur] Harris's view the bombing of Germany from Italian airfields is not particularly favourable owing to the difficulty of getting accurate met. reports about the weather conditions over the Alps.

At the weekly meeting, Hart again showed the kind of false information circulated by the *Abwehr* from Lisbon and Madrid which purports to come from this country. All of it is fantastic and totally inaccurate.

A report dated 5th September was made by the SD in Rome to Berlin and stated that Badoglio had expressed the view that he would prefer a British landing to a German invasion. The Führer gave the SD six (seven?) hours to verify the information, which he evidently regarded as of the highest importance.

[. . .] TAR mentioned that GARBO had succeeded in bringing over another German recce plane to Scapa.

I saw Duff [Cooper] at 5 o'clock with the DG. He wished to discuss America. He was anxious that Mills should not return to Canada until the whole question had been settled. Stephenson is now coming over again ostensibly on a visit in company with Donovan. Clearly however he is afraid of what Denham is going to say when he reaches this country, and wants to be on the spot to deal with any counter-measures he thinks necessary. [. . .]. I warned him that Stephenson would probably make trouble about Mills because he is aware that Mills knows too much about BSC. I thought

however that it would be a great mistake to give way to him on this point since Mills had undoubtedly made a great success of his mission both to the RCMP and to the FBI. I said that I thought it was essential to keep Mills out of the general wrangle over America. He agreed. The DG said that the arrangement with Mills would be quite acceptable to him, subject to anything Denham might have to say on his return.

September 9, 1943: TAR [Robertson] tells me that STARKEY has been a complete flop. He has been up at Fighter Command. Although the visibility was not particularly good the Germans must have seen our barges which went in to within 3 or 4 miles of the coast. We had 250 fighters in the air but not a single German plane showed up. Presumably they have orders not to take the until we actually make a landing, or else they were already informed that the whole operation was a blind. This would not be surprising since the press were all given full details a few days ago.

[. . .] The Americans have landed at Naples and Leghorn. Our fleet is in Genoa. According to MSS [intercepts] the Germans are marching on Rome. The Admiral of the Italian fleet has given orders that ships are not to be scuttled, but those at Taranto should proceed to Malta while those at Spezia are to put to sea, German submarines are out to intercept them.

[.] I went [. . .] to see Duff Cooper and left with him the PM's report and the report on Zech-Nentwich.

[. . .] Duff told me that the original offer of peace had originally [sic] come from the Italians and that it had been an offer of a complete turnover and active assistance to the Allied armies. We had held out for unconditional surrender as a first step. Duff cannot explain precisely why we had let the Italians down by giving

away the fact that the armistice had been signed on Sept. 3rd.

September 11, 1943: Wells has raised the question of putting something in the monthly HO [Home Office] police report on the subject of BUNBURY. He is reluctant to do this because he feels it wrong that the HO should mislead the police in an official document. I pointed out to that that we had faced up to this question long ago and made up our minds that in spite of the difficulties the question of the possible leakage of the truth had to be the first consideration. [*Not transcribed: more details. . .*]

September 13, 1943: [. . .] Peter Reid brought Commodore Holland, head of Admiralty Signals, to see me. Holland wished to state that he attached considerable importance to the security of allied signals. [. . .]

I dined with Ned and Peter. Peter was quite interesting about the new glider bomb. He said that research so far does not indicate this new weapon is a particularly menacing one. It is not worked through any wire attachment. It is controlled from the aircraft but must be kept under visual observation through a sight. This has been fairly clearly demonstrated by the fact that it is not always accurate, sometimes falling short and sometimes going over the target. It could not be used at night like the apparatus with which we are at present experimenting.

September 14, 1943: News today from the Naples front is not too good. We are having a particularly tough time. Attempts are being made to put in fresh forces. The possibility is envisaged that we might have to withdraw from the Salerno front. Forces from the south are pushing on, but are till 130 miles from Naples.

[. . .] I attended the meeting of the RSC [Radio Security Commit-

tee] this afternoon. The following points emerged. Allied secret service communications are controlled by C except in the case of the Poles. Polish wave-lengths and call signs are know to C but he does not know anything about the contents of the messages. He is not anxious however about their security since he argues that if anything was going wrong there would almost certainly have been some repercussion on other services. This may or may not be so. [. . .] As regards the diplomatic communications of the allies there appears to be no real supervision. It was felt that to monitor and break these communications would impose too great a task on GC&CS who were already over-burdened with operational work.

[. . .] Victor [Rothschild] lunched with Carton de Wiart [sic. Wiart]. He was imprisoned in some castle by the Italians, together with Generals O'Connor and Neame. All three attempted to escape. With knives which they managed to purloin from their meals they dug a hole 12 ft. deep and then burrowed their way out of the castle grounds. While doing this they kept fit by climbing the stairs of the castle to the tune of 2,000 steps daily. They had saved up a large amount of food which they carried with them. Each pack weighed about 40 lbs. They went over the Apennines and reached the valley of the Po before they were caught. They were challenged twice previously but managed to get away with it.

In August Carton de Wiart was told that his presence was required in Rome. He had no idea of the reasons, all news having been kept away from the prisoners. On arrival he was told that his services might be required in connection with certain negotiations regarding Rome being declared an open city. He accordingly agreed to do what he could. He was extremely well treated, getting large meals with champagne and red wine. It was impressed upon him that the mission would be a secret one and that he would therefore have to change into civilian clothes. A tailor was

summoned and the clothes were ready within 24 hours. He left by plane for Lisbon with Gen. Castellano. He was told on the way by the General the real nature of his mission, which was in connection with peace proposals.

While on the plane Castellano nudged him and pointed out the presence of a curious passenger who was apparently traveling for personal reasons. This was [Dino] Grandi, with his beard shaved off, [who] was on his way to Lisbon. On arrival in Lisbon Carton de Wiert was given permission to approach the British Embassy. They were astonished and pleased to see him and learn of the Castellano mission as another Italian general who had already been in Lisbon and had been given peace terms had apparently not yet arrived in Rome. For some reason this emissary, carrying the armistice terms and a wireless set, had thought fit to return to Italy via Germany. There does not appear to have been any sinister motive in this rather stupid move, and he did eventually reach Rome safely. The British embassy were pleased to see Castellano since they wished to make certain alterations in the terms. These were handed to Castellano who was sent back via Gib direct to Eisenhower in Sicily. De Wiert was allowed to proceed to England.

[. . .] TAR tells me that TRICICYCLE has arrived. There seems to be a tacit understanding between him and Johnnie Jebson, though nothing has been said in positive terms. He has brought a wireless set, £2,500 and \$2,000, in 3 Yugoslav diplomatic bags. We shall have a full report before long.

September 15, 1943: I saw Zech-Nentwich with Dick [White] at +++++'s last night. I am absolutely convinced of the man's sincerity but he is undoubtedly fanatical in his outlook. +++++ introduced as Col. Elphinstone and Capt. Mallaby-Deely. After we had got over this the meeting became quite informal and Zech,

otherwise Nansen, gradually got into his stride. [*Not transcribed: Relates his war career in detail, four pages, including a lurid account of being wounded and left for dead in No Man's Land*]. He showed us his wounds at +++++'s special request, he had one on his forehead, one in his neck, 5 or 6 on his back, one on his hip and the remainder on his legs. It seems almost a miracle that he could have survived for 3 nights and 2 days lying on the ground during a Russian winter. [. . .]

Zech talked a certain amount of Himmler [*whose adjutant he was claiming once to have been*]. He regards him as a sadist and slightly mad. He is not intelligent and can easily be bowled out in argument but he has a great deal of peasant cunning. His father was the principal of some school and he himself received a very good education. Zech has heard him talk about the English and their colonial policy. He paints the English as people who walk about cracking whips and referred to an incident in India where it was alleged that an Indian had struck a British subject. All local inhabitants had apparently been made to crawl on their hands and knees through the village. These incidents are held up to the Germans as something to be learned from the British as the correct method for the Herrenvolk to treat an insubordinate nation.

[. . .] He was convinced however that if we treated Germany too leniently all those people and also the army would make preparation for a war of revenge. The whole country needed re-educating from top to bottom, otherwise the glorification of war and prowess on the battlefield would once more recreate a German Army or movements which would be as bad as that which had been experienced during the last ten years.

[. . .] Zech himself is only 27 but he sees all this quite clearly, and is ready to do anything within his power to put it right. [. . .] Zech

was extremely impressed by the treatment he had received from Sutton-Pratt, our MA [military attaché] in Stockholm. It took him some time to get accustomed to the fact that a lieutenant in the German army could speak on equal terms to an officer of the rank of Lt. Col. This was something which he had never experienced.

[. . . *Later*] I had a talk with Duff about Zech-Nentwich. He felt that if possible some use ought to be made of him.

[. . .] Bill Stephenson arrived at Prestwick this morning. He is well ahead of Denham and having got his views will doubtless be taking the necessary counter-action before his arrival. I have got out a note for the DG on what I think should be our objective at the next conference. We should aim at getting [Cyril] Mills established in Canada with the right to visit Washington whenever he wishes under the auspices of the British Embassy.

[. . .] The news is not frightfully good but not as bad as it might be. We have a good bridgehead immediately south of Salerno. Our right has however gone back almost to the beaches. The Germans are said to have driven a wedge between ourselves and the Americans which runs right down to the coast. The Americans are back on the beaches. We have succeeded in landing a certain number of reinforcements. Meanwhile Monty is pounding up the boot of Italy and is about 65 miles from Salerno. If we can hold out for the next 3 days we shall be all right.

[Guy Liddell then went on two weeks' leave]

September 27, 1943: I gather that the DG was expecting me to return on Sunday night, and was rather worried that I was not avail-

able for consultation today before the meeting with Duff Cooper and C on the question of America. [Dick] Butler has shown me the decisions which are the outcome of this meeting:

1. In future there will be no special representative of MI5 in Washington.
2. Mr Denham will complete his tour in the Caribbean and then return and report.
3. Mr [Cyril] Mills will return to Canada on special MI5 work.
4. MI5's relations with FBI will in future be restricted to communications through Mr Thurston [US embassy, London] and, possibly, to special visits as in the past. Such visits will only take place with the knowledge and agreement BSC.

Butler went over again to see Duff this afternoon in order to get the correct interpretation of para. 1 which seems somewhat ambiguous. Duff however assured Butler that it meant our representation by Security Co-ordination had ceased.

As regards the last para. he said that he had complied with the DG's wish that it should not be stated that we could only visit the FBI with Stephenson's knowledge and approval, and had substituted the word "agreement.": If Stephenson did not agree, Duff would want to know exactly why. He thought it better to leave the wording as it was, as he anticipated that C would have considerable difficulty with Stephenson. Personally, I think it is a pity to have resolutions which are ambiguously worded and are open to the most convenient interpretation by either party which has to work on them. As they stand Stephenson may well claim that he is still our representative in New York. Some colour will be given to this by the statement that we cannot visit the FBI without his knowledge and agreement.

While I have been away Denham has seen Duff and C. C I think was somewhat shaken when Denham showed him a copy of his first letter to the DG in which he spoke of Viv in glowing terms. C also admitted that when he came to the second meeting under Duff's chairmanship he had not read the resolutions of the first meeting, whereby it had been made perfectly clear that we [MI5] were to establish some sort of separate representation in the USA.

Meanwhile I gather Duff has spoken to Cadogan who is very surprised to hear that Stephenson had not been sacked eight months ago. He said that he knew nothing about his high political reports. Even if they existed at all, Cadogan does not appear to attach much importance to them. It would be interesting to know who does.

September 29, 1943: Penetration of the Services by the CP [Communist Party] is becoming rather serious. Ray Milne has been sacked from SIS and it has now been discovered that she has a man friend in SOE in the Balkan section who is also a member of the middle-class communist group. He has admitted firstly that Ray Milne told him she was indexing all the members of the German IS [Intelligence Service] and secondly that having been approached by Springhall he told the latter about the organisation of SOE and about the attitude of the British Govt towards various irregular forces in Yugoslavia. He will probably be prosecuted and tried by court martial. There is another case of an officer who has given information to the Russians through Springhall and has in fact been in touch with the Russians himself. This is under investigation.

[. . .] Bavin of Security Co-ordination came to see me. I think the real purpose of his visit was to explain to me about his dismissal from the RCMP. He took over intelligence from Rivett-Carnac

and had a row with Asst. Commissioner Tate as a result of which he was sacked by [Canadian Police Commissioner] Wood. [*Not transcribed: Three pages with more detail on this and on Stephenson's 'extremely cunning game.'*] Duff's position however is a difficult one since he has no real authority over C. He is merely a negotiator and therefore has to work for the best compromise.

[. . .] Duff mentioned that the JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee] were preparing a paper in which they express the view that the war in Europe would be over within the next three months. I said I felt this view was a bit sanguine, although a sudden collapse was always a possibility.

Sefton Delmar [sic. Delmer] is very impressed with Zech. He is going to put him on the air for a series of talks alleged to be coming from a foreign country. He will speak to the German army and will open with the words, "Here speaks the German officer."

September 30, 1943: A scheme has been put forward by Byron of the ISSB advocating that all communications should be severed for 3 days before OVERLORD. The purpose is to prevent leakage of information after the troops have been told about their objective. Apart from the impracticability of the scheme it obviously pin-points the whole operation.

We have now been asked to put forward our views as to how security can best be obtained, Byron's scheme having been turned down by the Chiefs of Staff. [. . .] Personally I think we should rely very largely on our powers of deception.

October 1, 1943: C told me very confidentially that from his best source [not identified] he learned that there was a definite move within the [German] Army to take over control. Something might

have happened a few months ago had not the bombing of Berlin led to the decentralisation of a number of ministries. He is replying that he has heard a great deal about a coup d'état in the army before but that nothing happens. If they are really genuine they should get on with their dirty work as a proof of their bona fides. He particularly does not want a word said about this as previous attempt have always been frustrated by newspaper publicity which has made everybody very nervous.

He mentioned the JIC paper [*see Sept 29 above*] but said that he had not as yet seen it. He did not quite know on what they were basing their extremely optimistic view though he felt that things in Germany were undoubtedly serious.

I had a talk with him about the TRICYCLE case. He told me he had been extremely interested in the reference to the information which the Germans were obtaining through our army signals. He said he was quite convinced that this was true and that Travis had told him that army signals security was absolutely rotten.

October 2, 1943: Hansen has arrived [*a Norwegian parachuted in on October 1, near Frazerburgh, with two wireless sets*] and a statement taken from him by Cookie. He came absolutely clean and there is no question of a prosecution. His spare wireless set has been found in a tree.

October 3, 1943: Stephens rang me up to say that Nikolai Hansen's cover name is HEINI. This definitely identifies him with an ISOS character. [. . .] His case is not quite so good as it originally appeared. He was asked whether he had brought any secret ink. He said that he had but that he could not remember where it was. Finally he said that it was concealed in one of his teeth. He was then asked whether he had any cover addresses to which he re-

plied in the negative. It was pointed out to him that if he had secret ink obviously he would have an address to which to write. He then said that he would be given the address only after he had got into wireless communication. The argument was then advanced that his sole purpose for carrying secret ink was to use in the event of the wireless set being damaged. It was suggested that he should think again.

He finally produced an address in Stockholm to which he said he had been given instructions to write. His excuse for not giving this information before was that he was afraid we should make a mess of things and that his wife would get into trouble.

[Camp] o2o are not quite certain at present whether this excuse can be accepted. I have so informed Cookie. The secret ink which was in a little rubber cover was placed in a hollow tooth and cemented over. Hansen had been instructed to pick it out himself, extracted by a dentist. Having got him to sign a statement to the effect that he was willing to have the secret ink extracted from his tooth by a British officer, Wynn of o2o who is a qualified dentist, removed the cement and found the rubber casing with certain crystals inside.

October 4, 1943: At the daily meeting today Herbert mentioned a character named PALO, an *Einz [sic] Marine* agent being prepared for this country. There was some indication that he might have made his departure about Oct. 1st. Our view about the parachute spy Hansen is that his explanation about not telling us about his secret ink and cover address is probably a genuine one. It would be difficult to prosecute him as not only has he told us that he is a spy but he has also told us that the Germans told him to tell us he was a spy. I do not think that we shall use him. His case will probably go to the DPP as a matter of routine, but will not be recom-

mended as one suitable for prosecution.

October 5, 1943: Col. Hill of SOE who is in a visit from Moscow called and was seen by Dick [White] and myself. He brought with him John Senter and two other members of SOE who presumably deal with Russian affairs. [. . .] He said that he worked on a very high level his contact being [Lavrenti] Beria who is head of that section of the NKID [sic. NKVD?] which deals exclusively with SOE matters.

Like ourselves, all these various departments are inclined to work in water-tight compartments and to some extent in an atmosphere of rivalry. Beria's representative over here was Chichaev. Col. Hill however did not think that he would be qualified to speak outside the scope of purely SOE activities. Even if we did establish a liaison with him with the approval of Moscow we should not stand to get very far. [. . .]

Dick expressed the view that in addition to Chichaev's SOE work, he was engaged in maintaining contact with the Czechs, possibly in order to obtain information as to Polish movements. I explained to Hill that the Russians with their long record of collaboration with the Germans going back 20 years should have a great deal of information about German intelligence matters. We should if possible like to tap this information. Dick pointed out that the Russians were very slow and unsatisfactory in dealing with questions affecting the identification of their prisoners who arrive in this country from time to time. [. . .] We told SOE that our contact would not go further than a purely social one.

October 8, 1943: A Jap BJ shows that the Jap ambassador in Berlin has been told by the Germans that the rocket gun is likely to come into action about mid-December. It is said to have a range of 400

kms and to be able to shoot within a km over or short of the target.

[. . .] I dined with Dick Ellis, Hoare and Walter Bell. [. . .] At 10:30 p.m. I said that since I was under the impression that we had met it discuss the sordid subject of our [MI5] relations with the USA perhaps we had better get on with it. [. . .] I said that for 4 years we had somehow not been able to arrive at a satisfactory liaison with the FBI [. . .] Stephenson had asked me why we had not given him 2 or 3 first class officers to conduct the liaison when we appointed our representative. I explained to Ellis that we had never been able to get the agreement of SIS to our corresponding direct with security Coordination on matters which affected the FBI. They had insisted that we should correspond via Section V before a final decision had been reached Thurston had arrived. [*another page of detail*].

October 9, 1943: An Italian tanker named the *Oltorra* has been lying at Algeciras for some time. The chief engineer has now informed the British authorities that this ship is specially equipped for sabotage activities and has been responsible for some of the outrages committed at Gib. At the moment it is trying to efface all traces, and if unsuccessful may scuttle itself. There is a Spanish crew on board. Both ourselves and the Admiralty are anxious to get this ship to Gib.

October 11, 1943: Cookie's blood lust has been aroused by the Hansen case. He thinks that we should prosecute and wants to interview certain of the officers at Ham. Stephens is breathing fire. We have however tactfully persuaded Cookie that before he does so the question of principle must be decided.

October 13, 1943: Canaris has been down to Madrid again where he

has seen both Vignon [Vigón] and Jordana [foreign minister]. The question of British protests about German SS [security service] activities in Spain was discussed. It was agreed that while certain outward adjustments would have to be made the work would go on as usual.

The *Oltorra* has been brought to Gib with the agreement of the Italian authorities. It is suggested that Victor [Rothschild] and Lewes should go to Gib and assist in the interrogations. It is possible that the evidence obtained may provided the basis for a first class protest to the Spanish Govt.

October 14, 1943: ISOS shows that one Helmuth, who is connected with Ramirez's government in the Argentine, is going on a secret mission sponsored by the SD to see Himmler. It has been suggested that he should be taken off at Trinidad.

October 16, 1943: Cussen and [Desmond] Orr came to see me to discuss the case of corruption with which [Desmond] Orr has been dealing at Room 055. [. . .]

[Desmond] Orr then went on to talk about certain information which had come to his notice about Duff Cooper. He said that Duff's ATS chauffeuse was extremely incensed at being asked to drive Lady Diana [Cooper] and her boy about London and then to take Mr Duff Cooper and his mistress to shops in Bond Street.

[Desmond] Orr was asked to let us know if there was any chance of the chauffeuse blowing up and lodging and official complaint, as this would clearly be undesirable and we should want to do something about it, by way of dropping a hint in the right quarter. There was of course no evidence that what the chauffeuse said was true.

[. . .] The FO have agreed that he [Helmuth] should be taken off at Trinidad. [. . .] Difficulty arises owing to the fact of the source of the information being IZAK [intercepts]. IZAK should have been passed in camouflaged form to the FBI who by order of G.2 are not allowed to see it in the original. We should like to say to Thurston that on the basis of the information controlled by G.2 and by ONI we know that Helmuth is on his way to see Himmler and that we propose to take him off at Trinidad. [. . .]

October 19, 1943: We had a meeting on Censorship, to which Briscoe, Collins, Grogan, Dick, Milmo, TAR and Bobbie Mackenzie came. [*Not transcribed: Discussion of which methods to disclose to the Belgian Congo and North Africa* [. . .]]

Briscoe said that Censorship now had about 35 reagents or methods of throwing up SW [secret writing]. Seven of these were he thought highly secret but were more in the nature of technical processes which had thrown up one particular ink and might quite possibly throw up others about which we at present knew nothing[. . .]. There were one or two which, either because they disclosed our own offensive inks or indicated our superior efficiency, it might well be wise never to disclose to anyone. Those left numbered 28. Twenty of these had already been handed to the French at the beginning of the war, and were probably already in the hands of the Germans.

October 20, 1943: At the Wednesday meeting Hart mentioned that a certain difficulty was being experienced in getting Helmuth back to this country. If we can get him to Bermuda he can come on a British warship. Unfortunately there is no plane available from Trinidad to Bermuda unless we get a Catalina sent down to fetch him. Efforts are being made to arrange this. [. . .]

[Desmond] Orr rang me up to say that a photographer named Nigel Lawrence on the *Daily Mirror* had called to say that he was being sent to Cardiff to get into touch with local *DM* representative who would indicate to him where Rudolf Hess took his walks in the vicinity of Abergavenny. The camera had a telescopic lens and presumably the photograph would be taken at a considerable distance without anybody's knowledge. I spoke to C who said that Hess was no longer under his charge and he suggested I should have a word with Loxley and then with DPW [Directorate of Prisoners of War].

I spoke to Loxley who agreed it was undesirable that the photographs should appear. I then talked to a Major Crawford in the absence of Col Evelyn Smith, who I was told had Hess's case in hand. I told Crawford the story and of Loxley's suggestion that the best move would be to keep Hess in barracks for a week or ten days until the incident had blown over. I should probably be in a position to let him know when the coast was clear. After the whole incident had died down we could then consider the issue of a D-notice, since it was the intention of the *Mirror* to publish the photograph without reference to Press and Censorship. Hess is at present detained at Abergavenny.

October 21, 1943: I talked to Duff [Cooper] about [army] signals security and told him precisely what I had done about TRICYCLE's report. I asked him whether, when he saw the PM, and handed him the MT5 report, he could draw his attention to that particular item. I thought that it could do no harm and might do good. He said that he had tried to see the PM but he is apparently very busy and so he was thinking of sending the report instead of delivering it in person.

[...] We are getting a stream of reports from SIS on the state of

morale in Germany. There seems no doubt that all but a small minority have given up hope of winning the war. [. . .]

There is a great fear of the Russians. Rumours are still current about Russo-German peace moves, There does not however seem to be any real evidence. The Japs, Turks, and Spaniards are undoubtedly anxious to get peace negotiations between Germany and Russia started. Ribbentrop would I think like to do the same.

Hitler on the other hand is opposed to anything of the kind and there is no indication that the Russians view such a proposition with favour. Turkey is anxious about the conference between Molotov, Eden, and Hull in Moscow. She thinks that Britain, America and Russia may come to some agreement about concessions in the Mediterranean at Turkey's expense. and wonders whether it would not perhaps be worth her while to try and settle any outstanding points with Russia direct before the conference comes to an end. This is only the idea of the Turkish minister in Washington, and may not find favour in Ankara.

Forty-three German agents have been brought to this country during the last year, but only 15 were to operate in the UK. The total number of agents sent to the UK is now 75. According to Hansen, the latest arrival, the Germans are training others. We must therefore expect an increase which is probably due to the enemy's anxiety about our invasion plans.

October 22, 1943: Last Sunday's *Sunday Chronicle* has raked up Plan BUNBURY again.

[. . .] I gave a lecture to the LRC this afternoon. After referring to my first lecture, when I went over the pre-war ground, I explained that I would try and tell them firstly what we believe to be the

enemy's sources of information in this country, and organisation, secondly what the German I.S. thought of us, and lastly what we thought of the German I.S.

As regards the enemy's sources of information, I said that they were (1) what we give him, (2) what he gets through neutral embassies, neutral journalists working to their embassies, and neutral missions, (3) what he gets from our lack of signals security (4) what he gets from P/Ws and captured agents (5) what he gets from Eire (6) what he gets from seamen and pilots plying between this country and the Peninsula. (7) penetration of official or non-official British agencies abroad (8) what some of the more dubious members of the Abwehr in the Peninsula or elsewhere invent. (9) what they get from our Press (10) photographic reconnaissance.

What the German IS [Intelligence Service] think of us: (a) he considers the FBI a far more formidable obstacle than the British SS [Security Service]. This is probably due to the policy of the FBI which is inclined to work on a smash and grab basis with huge headlines in the press. (b) he seems fairly satisfied with his performance here, probably because it is our policy to keep him as far as possible in the dark. (c) the enemy has sent over 15 agents during the last year and 75 altogether.

Apart from the 135 [*number probably wrong*] that had been executed since the beginning of the war he is generally speaking in ignorance of what has happened to the remainder. He may speculate (1) that they have come here solely to get out of his clutches, (2) that having come here with good intentions they found matters difficult, got cold feet and did nothing, (3) that circumstances had made it impossible for them to operate or (4) that they have gone over to our side. (d) he must think that our powers of detecting an illicit transmitter from this country are strictly limited since as

far as we can see he has confidence in 20 XX agents who have been working over a long period. (e) owing to lack of wireless discipline in the army, he cannot have a very high opinion of our military security. (f) he has a considerable respect for the LRC which he regards as a difficult barrier to pass. (g) in some quarters the *Abwehr* is inclined to think that the British IS is ubiquitous.

What we think of the *Abwehr*: (a) They made a bad start by not preparing the ground sufficiently before the war. (b) While their organisation is sound and logical on paper, and in this respect has many advantages over our own it seems to fall down on matters of detail. (c) The quality of many of the agents is not good, vide the recent case of Hansen. The training varies according to the district from which the agent comes but is on the whole not of a particularly high standard. (d) The cover stories are often weak. (e) Cover addresses show a lack of system involving grave risks to agents. (f) There does not appear to be any really careful scrutiny of an agent's work. There are times when his reports if looked at with a critical eye and compared with reports from other agents should lead to the conclusion that the individual is in our pay. Only high-grade technical information would seem to be the subject of careful scrutiny. (g) There are definite indications that certain sections of the *Abwehr* or agents working for them are fabricating entirely inaccurate information, which it should be impossible for any responsible person to swallow. Nevertheless the information is accepted not only locally but also in Berlin.

(h) It follows that certain representatives of the *Abwehr* must be regarded as, consciously or unconsciously dishonest. In this connection certain factors should be taken into account: (1) if personal relations are good there is a tendency among spy-masters to regard their agents as infallible, or at any rate as honest reports.

(2) Even if a spy-master became reluctantly to the conclusion that he has been having his leg pulled, it is difficult for him, particularly in the German Service, to admit to his superiors that a large expenditure of money has taken place over a long period on reports which have been largely misleading. There are undoubtedly cases where *Abwehr* officials who have come to this conclusion have deliberately continued to furnish false information or tried to sell out. (i) The enemy has failed to exploit to any degree the immensely advantageous position in the neutrality of Eire. (j) He has also failed to exploit a certain percentage of disloyal elements that are known to exist in this country. (k) He has failed in his attempts at sabotage in the British Isles although he has had some successes in Gibraltar. (l) It is probably true to say that the *Abwehr* have failed to obtain any reliable information of strategic importance. They had no clear conception of the nature of our operations in North Africa, they got no advance information about the Casablanca Conference, and they were muddled about our attack on Sicily. Tactically however they have had certain successes outside this country, particularly with regard to ship reporting in the Gibraltar area and also to some extent in North Africa where they carried out their successful attack on Gafsa. (m) *Abt. III F.* work has been good. (n) There seems little doubt that the OKW share our views about the inefficiency of the *Abwehr* since certain important members of its personnel have recently been removed from office, and considerable encroachments on its preserves made by the SD. It is difficult therefore for us to say what weight is attached to reports received from the *Abwehr* and how far strategic and tactical moves are based on them. There has been some change in the manner of their distribution and the onus of assessing them has to some extent been decentralised on to local commanders in the field. In Berlin they pass that section of the OKW known as *Fremde Heere*, where they are presumably collated with information from other sources.

In conclusion I complimented the LRC [London Reception Centre] on the excellence of their work and said that it would be dangerous, even if we thought that the *Abwehr* was not particularly efficient to relax our vigilance in any way. We knew that it was the enemy's intention to increase the number of agents he is sending here and presumably to improve his methods. He anticipated that we should invade the continent and he therefore was anxious to obtain as much information about our intentions as possible.

After the lecture I spoke personally to heads of sections about the interrogation of unaccredited agents. I explained to them that cases had been brought to my notice from time to time by CSS which were in the nature of complaints. It was said that agents were interrogated about their work for SIS and there was a lack of security.

In each case the matter had been gone into very carefully as a result of which it had been found that no fault lay with the LRC. I had explained that it was necessary to interrogate an unaccredited agent both on his movements and his contacts. If this were not done it was impossible to conduct a security examination.

We as a service could not waive our right unless SIS could assure us that an agent was accredited and known to them to be of proved reliability. There was however a psychological aspect to this whole question. Some of the examiners may in their time have run agents themselves. If so they would know it was extremely anxious work and that it was a natural inclination to safeguard such an agent from any possible risk of leakage about his work.

I thought therefore that it was important that officers at the LRC should do their utmost to meet SIS's requirements in this respect even if they felt that the precautions were unnecessary or exag-

gerated. What was even more important was that the Section Heads should establish personal contact and obtain the confidence of SIS. I had made strong representations to CSS that P Officers should visit the LRC and satisfy themselves that the business was conducted with the utmost discretion. I found everyone very responsive.

October 25, 1943: The DG called a meeting morning to discuss our recommendations on OVERLORD not the ISSB, with particular reference to the establishment of a fifteen mile [no-visitors] belt from the Wash to Penzance.

October 26, 1943: I attended a meeting at the JIC at which the future of that organisation was discussed. [. . .] The JIC then discussed a paper put up by DBI suggesting that a small committee should be formed on a low level of workers from the three Intelligence services who were concerned with German affairs. [. . .]

If I were the DMI I should see [Brian] Melland for quarter of an hour every day since from the MI point [of] view he is handling by far the most vital material in the WO [War Office]. In fact the DMI has only seen Melland once, and that by accident. C, who was present at the meeting, spoke about a meeting of the Defence Committee which he had attended.

The subject was the rocket gun. There was a number of eminent professors present including Lord Cherwell. The latter maintained his view with considerable force that the rocket gun was either a hoax or a cover for something else. He did not think that it was scientifically possible to throw 75 tons on the rocket principle. This was not however the view of other prominent professors. The meeting was finally swayed by [Field Marshal Jan] Smuts, who said that whatever the facts he thought there was sufficient

evidence to regard the whole matter as extremely grave. He thought that every possible counter-action should be taken.

I gather that the Air Force are going into action shortly on the various emplacements on the continent, the existence of which is known. C was very emphatic that no further publicity should be given to this matter and no indication that HMG were in any sense alarmed by what had appeared in the Swedish press.

If the Germans thought that we had the wind up, it would be increasingly difficult to sort out the facts from scare propaganda. The JIC take the view that if they had to make a bet they would come down on the side of Lord Cherwell, but they think that every possible counter-measure should be taken. Regular meetings are to be held by the Sand[y]s Committee and the PM is to be kept constantly informed.

October 27, 1943: Wethered reported a rather bad case relating to Free French resistance movements. An SOE agent reported a number of arrests. On enquiry it seemed that a list of the cover name soft the agents had been sent out to the head of the organisation in France, who was subsequently arrested, interrogated and released. It must be assumed therefore that he divulged the real names of the individuals on the list.

[. . .] There is confirmation of the MEDERIC story in certain messages which are being handed out by a representative of the German legation in Berne to a representative of OSS. It was from this source that the Goertz telegrams which are undoubtedly authentic were received. Other messages which apparently come from Stockholm are signed HECTOR and do deal with MAP [Ministry of Aircraft production] subjects, although the information so far received is totally inaccurate.

It is a somewhat high level kind referring to conversations between [Sir Charles] Portal [Chief of Air Staff] and [Sir Arthur] Harris [C in C Bomber Command] in [Sir Stafford] Cripps's ante-room. I am inclined to think that this line for what it is worth has little or no connection with the documents found in North Africa [*referred to in an earlier entry, not transcribed*] giving performances and production figures of our aircraft.

[. . .] ARTIST has put in an extremely interesting report about recent changes within the Abwehr. Owing to demands by ["*Heldenklau*"] General von Unruh that everyone of the 1908 class or younger should be called up and that 50% of the remaining *Abwehr* personnel should be replaced by wounded men from the front, Canaris reluctantly agreed to a cut of 25% if eligible *Abwehr* personnel, provided it was left to him to decide who could be dispensed with. [. . .]

Instances have come to light of the expenditure of large sums of money on seven Jewish families which were got out with Canaris' connivance to Switzerland. Ostensibly the payments were made to them as agents, but of course they have produced no information except a certain amount that was made. Piekenbrock, the former head of *Abt. I* resigned, firstly because he did not like the Nazi regime and did not wish it perpetuated through the victory of Germany, and secondly because he did not feel that as an officer he could take active steps to bring about Germany's defeat. But is generally believed that he asked for a transfer to the eastern front on the assumption that he would probably be killed. [*He was taken prisoner by the Russians, made handwritten statements for them: see Nuremberg exhibit files*].

In spite of his ability he tolerated extreme inefficiency in the *Abwehr*, and since the arrival of his successor [*Oberst i G*] Hansen many

subordinate officers in responsible positions have been dismissed. ARTIST mentioned that the director of *Einzel Luft* refused to assess TRICYCLE's reports from America since in his opinion it was impossible for anyone to transmit from that country. He took this view because his own W/T agent there had proved to be a XX.

Hansen is a staff officer but much younger and more energetic than Piekenbrock. He is not a Nazi but is determined to prevent Germany's defeat at all costs even if this involved coming to terms with Russia. He was formerly in *Fremde Heere* and was in charge of S E Europe. There is no doubt that he means to reform the *Abwehr* completely although he is having very grave difficulty in getting suitable personnel.

It is to be expected that traffic will be scrutinized with greater care and that certain XX agents now employed may be eliminated. ARTIST believes however that until *Abt. I*, besides vetting reports for their value from the point of the armed forces and asking for criticisms from the *Fremde Heere*, makes a practice of passing them to *Abt. III* for assessment as to the bona fides of the agents supplying them, the *Abwehr* will not work really efficiently. He states that *Abt. III* is not as a rule consulted when agents are recruited.

This is an interesting conclusion and had the practice which ARTIST now suggests been adopted by the offensive sections of SIS and SOE many disasters might have been avoided. ARTIST recommends that all material fed to the Germans should be as in great detail as possible. This of course has both advantages and disadvantages since reports in detail can be more easily checked.

On the other hand vague reports do not carry much weight and are regarded with suspicion. The maxim is "If you lie, lie well and thoroughly and see that you do not get found out". ARTIST does

draw attention to the fact that the *Abwehr* tests its agents by asking them to give the location of divisions in the UK.

They are believed to do this as they get a lot of information regarding dispositions of our units through W/T intelligence and low-grade cypher breaks. To sum up, the new officers appointed by Hansen to the *Abwehr* have no experience of intelligence work nor in most cases of life abroad. They are lacking in technique and in many cases instances the knowledge of foreign languages, but they are keener and more active than their predecessors and will probably succeed in tightening up the organisation.

October 28, 1943: [. . .] John Booth called at the flat and stayed till about 1.30 a.m. talking about the N African campaign. [. . .] he was employed in N Africa in a special unit for the interpretation of photographs [. . .] The Americans have no such unit. John's account of the Americans is most depressing although he thinks that possibly they may have gained experience and improved during the Italian campaign.

The difficulty in N Africa was to stop them from running. The Grenadier Guards took Longstop Hill three times; each time the Americans took over from them while they advanced on the next objective, and each time the Americans were driven out of their positions and the Guards had to reoccupy them. At Gafsa, where they had about four divisions, they took over from what was little more than a battalion of Frenchmen.

These Frenchmen had been holding the Germans back with considerable success, but immediately the Americans were attacked they decamped. More or less the same thing happened at Kirouan [sic. Kairouan?] Here the Guards were ordered to take one hill on the north side of the ravine, and the Americans on the south side,

in order that the armoured units could go through between the two hills. The purpose of this operation was to cut off Rommel's retreating forces which were being subjected to frontal attack by the 8th Army.

The Guards reached their objective on time but the Americans who had more than double the number of troops, did not move. British general went round to see what was happening and received the reply that "my fellows are doing fine." When it was pointed out to him that they had apparently not started, the American general said that things were very tough. Asked whether he had any casualties, he replied no.

In the end, the Guards had to go through the American division and captured the other hill. By that time it was too late for the armoured divisions to cut off Rommel. In spite of these incidents the Americans appear to be entirely without shame. John's G.2 met a coloured driver going full out along the road to Bône. He stopped him and asked him what he was going. The nigger replied, "I'm retreating. I'se not stoppin' till I sees the seas."

[. . .] One of the great faults in the American army is that they do not appear to have any leaders. They are so obsessed by what they believe to be democratic principles that the right man never seems to get to the top. John is now a strong supporter of the Old School Tie. It is not infrequent to find three NCOs and a squad of six men, with no one really taking command. [*Follows with comments on tanks, not transcribed: Sherman, good; Tiger, too heavy; Churchill, did well; and on Montgomery and Alexander*].

October 29, 1943: Frost attended a meeting of the junior JIC at which Signals Security by the Allied Govts. was discussed. Apparently Arnold-Foster and Cavendish-Bentinck were very much opposed

to the granting of One-Time Pads to the Allies, since they felt that this would cut us off from valuable intelligence.

November 1, 1943: Uren, the SOE communist who gave information to Springhall, has been tried and court-martialled and received a sentence of seven years. He divulged complete lay-out of SOE's organisation.

November 2, 1943: [*Not transcribed: Long account of the operations of Franz Mayer, German sabotage agent arrested in Persia. Four pages*].

At the DG's meeting we discussed the PM's memo which asks all departments to review their position as they imagine it will be during the transition period from war to peace, The document is somewhat woolly and there seems little for us to say beyond the fact that we shall be doing precisely what we are doing now, though the incidence may be more on subversive and political movements than on espionage.

[. . .] I saw Duff [Cooper] in the afternoon and left with him the MT5 report, I told him that we had tried to write it up in a slightly different form as I understood that he had re-hashed the previous report, he gave me copies of his draft. He said that generally speaking the PM could not consume more than a very limited amount.

I said that we should be very pleased to try and write up the material in a more concise form but that I fully realised that he, knowing the PM's wishes, would undoubtedly be able to do it far better than we could. If therefore he preferred this method perhaps it would be better for us to give him the facts and leave the rest to him. He seemed quite satisfied.

November 3, 1943: At the Wednesday meeting we discussed the case of HELMUTH. He was arrested at Trinidad and taken to Bermuda by air and is coming thence by cruiser. He is due to arrive in about a week's time. The case is not a very easy one since HELMUTH is technically an Argentine diplomat on his way to Barcelona to take up a position as Argentine consul. In fact we know him to be destined for Berlin where he is to discuss with Himmler the question of getting arms into Argentine. If he has no incriminating documents on him and sticks to his statement that he is going to Barcelona, it will not be very easy to decide how he is going to be disposed of. [. . .]

I later discussed the HELMUTH case with Dick, Herbert, and Stamp. We decided that the best technique would be to send +++++ down to the port to meet him when he might ascertain something more about HELMUTH's character and whether he had talked at all during the voyage. This would give us an indication as to the best method of breaking him. We all agreed that ultimately he would have to go to o2o and that he would have to be detained here for the duration of the war. I felt that it was important that we should state the case with all its difficulties to the FO and make quite sure that if we sent him to o2o they would not press us for confessions, visits by Argentine diplomats, etc. This is being done.

I have read the JIC paper on the probabilities of a German collapse, based on the experiences of 1918. There is no doubt that the parallel is a very remarkable one. Emphasis is laid on the fact that in 1918 we were taken unawares because our calculations were based almost entirely upon Germany's military power, whereas in fact the collapse was due to other causes. It is felt that if it were not that the political situation in Germany today was very different from that in 1918 the JIC would unhesitatingly predict that Germany would sue for an armistice before the end of the year. Today

however the Nazi regime has had 10 years in which to destroy all traces of democratic ideas and institutions and has during that period been training the nation to endure great suffering; Police and Party control over all phases of the life of the country is very much more effective than anything that existed in 1918 and has so far been strong enough to make impossible anything in the way of organised opposition. Moreover Germany today is faced with the demand of unconditional surrender to the United Nations, including Russia, instead of President Wilson's comparatively mild Fourteen Points. Finally, the fear of retribution, particularly among the leaders, is this time far greater, These views of the JIC are dated 9th September but they saw no reason to alter them on the 21st October.

November 5, 1943: I saw Stopford who has returned from the Azores. Apparently the [British] landing was conducted in an atmosphere of considerable confusion. Things were left behind that were wanted, important stores which were to have been landed first were landed last, etc etc. The Portuguese however gave valuable assistance both in lorries and personnel. [*Not transcribed: More details, two pages*].

[. . .] I saw C this evening when I asked him about MSS messages relative to the disposition of our troops in this country. He said that there had been one or two such messages, which he had in fact shown to the Controller who had been much concerned. [*Not transcribed: More details, on double-cross problems.*]

He told me that MSS recently had been extremely illuminating, particularly on the air side. There were clearly grave shortages of all sorts of material. People were being told that they could not have this or that, that old planes were to be put into commission again, that Italian planes were to be used, etc. Thirty Me's had

even been sent from the North of Denmark to Roumania, presumably to deal with a possible attack on the Ploesti oil wells. There was clearly a shortage of petrol.

On the other hand MSS had confirmed the use of the rocket. C himself is convinced that the rocket will be used sometime during this winter. Probably during a foggy day when its flashes will not be able to be detected. Opinions still seemed to vary as to the efficiency of the weapon, The probability is that certain types will be used at short range and others at long range. I understand that we are producing a ten ton bomb [*Tallboy*] which will be in operation by mid-December. It is I think to be used in mining districts with a delay-action fuse which it is thought will break up the mines and cause them to be flooded. It can be lifted by the Lancaster.

November 6, 1943: [. . .] position to divulge information about other “rayons”. If Bonnefusse at any time had reason to suspect that somebody was being unduly inquisitive about the work of these agents he would ask for our assistance.

We then discussed the arrival of the French pilots, and General Cochet agreed that this was a serious matter and that they should be very carefully vetted. Brook Booth pointed out that even the officer in charge of the party which has just arrived had said that he was not at all happy about certain individuals. We explained to the General that we were going to examine roughly 100 who had succeeded in getting out of France after the total occupation. He agreed that this was sound precaution. It has not been possible to get a Spanish visa for TRICYCLE which is perhaps a good thing since it is preferable that his contacts with the Germans should be limited to Lisbon. Information has been received from Lisbon that Hamlet has received assurances from the Germans that all is

well and that money for PUPPET is on the way. A member of Ast Brussels called Werner has got in touch with him from the Spanish frontier and arranged a further meeting. It appears probable that the Germans still believe in this case in spite of the evidence to the contrary.

The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin [General Oshima] has been told by the Germans that the reverses on the eastern front are due to the unprecedented good weather. The Germans have been relying on the rains to give them breathing space. The Russians, taking advantage of this situation, had sent up their Winter reserves. Consequently they had a temporary superiority. It was the thought, however, that they could not maintain their offensive throughout the Winter. The Germans were counter-attacking with vigour and success in the region of Krivoi Kog.

In Italy the Germans had 10 divisions which they intended to use in the frontline in the defence of Rome. They were faced by 10 Anglo-American divisions who had a certificate in air superiority. The Germans have another 13 divisions in reserve. They believe that an attack in the Balkan has not been abandoned and that the next move will be against France, for which the British and Americans need at least 50 divisions. If these divisions were defeated it would probably be the turning point of the War. It was therefore doubtful whether we should embark on so hazardous a venture unless we were forced to do so as a result of the Moscow Conference.

Germany was trying to achieve the 3 following objects in her prosecution of the War. First to stabilise the Eastern front, secondly to use Germany's new weapons for attacks on Britain and thereby make it impossible for the Anglo-Americans to bomb German industry. Thirdly to deliver a crushing blow to the Anglo-Americans somewhere in Europe. Of these 3 it was thought on balance

the probability is that the second project would be put into operation speedily.

The question of the wireless set in the German Legation in Dublin has again come up for review in the light of Overlord. [British ambassador] Sir John Maffey, who was present at a meeting at the D.O. took the view that if we made a request to the [. . .] *rest not copied*].

[. . .] We are sending back to Italy the Italian Generals Messe, Orlando, and Berardi, and also a Major Bouderia, The theory is that they are going to cooperate as co-belligerents. This is being kept very quiet for the moment.

November 8, 1943: Hart and Milmo came to see me about the HELMUTH case. A letter has come in from [Peter] Loxley [of the FO] which does not give us an absolute guarantee that we can hold Helmuth at all costs. The indications so far are that he is likely to break fairly easily if subjected to the normal [Camp] 020 treatment; we think therefore that the best thing is to send him to 020 but to segregate him from the other prisoners. 020 are to be very carefully briefed in order to protect IZAK.

November 9, 1943: I dined with Victor, he had had an extremely interesting time at Gib looking into the case of the *Olterra*. There is no doubt that all the operations from this tanker were conducted with the connivance of the Spanish authorities and we shall probably be able to make out a good case for the FO to put over in Madrid.

November 10, 1943: Wethered spoke about the unsatisfactory arrangements of SOE for the despatch of their agents. These agents are apparently never searched before their departure. It should of

course be a normal precaution.

There have been a number of new arrivals, MOMPEAR, ELFERINK, and BERTRAND. There is now conclusive evidence about HOPPE, who still remains adamant in o2o, Elferink has so far disclosed nothing. Stephens thinks that it may take some little time for him to appreciate the atmosphere of o2o.

November 11, 1943: The PM is off tomorrow by the *Renown* to Gib, Malta and Cairo [. . .]. Cairo does not strike me as being a particularly good spot for such a meeting, since from the point of view of leakage it is more or less wide open.

[. . .] Tangye tells me that there is a great deal of gossip in Fleet Street about the rocket gun. The press, having been left in rather a state of uncertainty are surprised that no precautions have been taken to evacuate hospitals or children, and that no instructions have been issued to police or civil authorities, he thinks that if a rocket bomb does land up here and nothing has been done, the government will be in a somewhat awkward position. One of the difficulties is of course unknown to Tangye. If we show any signs of alarm there is no doubt that the Germans will pile it on good and proper. There will then be increased difficulty in sorting out what is propaganda and what is truth.

Tommy Harris has made a very good report on GARBO's secret ink operation. [*Not transcribed: Three page account follows, of a very elaborate operation designed to dupe the Germans into cancelling scores of their agent addresses in Lisbon and depriving them of one of their best secret inks.*]

Tangye tells me that Duff [Cooper] has resigned and was later to take up some important post abroad.

November 12, 1943: Duff's resignation is reported in the press today. His post abroad is connected with the invasion of France. He [is] apparently to be Minister Designate. This fact however is not to be made public. Dick Butler has been over to see [Sir Herbert] Creedy. It seems that Duff will remain in charge of the Security Executive for the time being. The future of that organisation is as yet undecided. Duff is seeing the PM today about the future executive head of this office. He thinks that he should not have a successor but that the department should from the ministerial point of view come under the Minister of Defence, at any rate during war time.

November 15, 1943: Dick Butler has seen Duff. Duff saw the PM on Friday in his bath. He was at that time somewhat harassed (a) because he had just been injected for typhoid and had a temperature of 100 with a possible 101 the following day, (b) because of his impending departure for Cairo, and (c) owing to the dispute with the French over the Lebanon incident.

The PM said that he had seen Duff's memo about the future of the Dept. and had written to Ernest Brown telling him to take over the Security Executive and that he would also be Minister for MI5. Duff replied that this was quite impossible, since this meant that Brown would have access to all Most Secret material produced by SIS, apart from our own highly confidential reports.

The PM, eventually rather under protest, pressed his bell and cancelled the letter to Ernst Brown and sent for Eden and Bridges. Duff then discussed the matter with them, after which it was decided that in future our representation on the ministerial level should be Dick Law of the FO.

This is I think quite a wise decision, Dick Law is very much a com-

ing man and the fact of our now being under an FO Minister will torpedo any objections that have formerly been raised to amalgamation on the grounds that we could not operate abroad because we are not under the FO. We shall of course continue to be responsible to the HO for such matters as concern them. Creedy is to be head of the Security Executive, which will clearly on this account lose a certain amount of its force. It will really be little more than a forum for discussion of inter-departmental matters.

[. . . *passage not copied.*] come into operation at Stage A. It was agreed that the basis of this Black List should be the second front documents, Purple Primers, and the like, which had been compiled by SIS. It was also agreed that a special list of people of international importance likely to travel from one area to another should be compiled. The responsibility for this list would be ours and the names would be submitted to Passport Control in the form of special circulars to their representatives abroad, instructing them to report back any applications.

I had a word with Horrocks afterwards. We are not very sanguine about the basis for the first list since we had doubts about the reliability of the information compiled by SIS. Horrocks will decide how the second list is to be compiled and who should be responsible for it. He will subsequently issue a circular.

Dick [White] had a meeting with Felix [Cowgill] last week when he explained to him the part that he is playing in Cossac. Felix was inclined to take the view that in so far as the dissemination of information to IB staffs was concerned, this had already been arranged with Army Group. Dick said that Army Group were subordinate to COSSAC and whether Felix liked it or not the juggernaut of COSSAC would pass over him. He would therefore be well advised to come in with us and join in some sensible form of

planning. Rather reluctantly Felix agreed to do this. Dick is having a frightful time with Cols. Black and Blakeney, who, with their American AT secretary, commonly known as "Butterfly", are a knockabout turn of the Marx Bros variety. Their knowledge of IB matters is zero and since they are at the moment in charge of that side of I work at COSSAC, the position is really rather serious. It is hoped that before long some responsible IB officer will be appointed G1, IB.

Dick seems quite worn out with the "Butterfly" atmosphere and the whole set-up. In the middle of a serious conversation Blakeney suddenly remembers that he has a date, rings up on the telephone and holds a long, frivolous and sexy conversation with a girl, with asides of "How I am doing, Butterfly?"

An important document relating to IB staff matters was required, but needless to say nobody could find it. Butterfly on being somewhat harassed tells the assembled Company not to razz her. She also alludes to her senior officers as "the boys". Something will have to be done about the situation soon.

November 16, 1942: I went to the JIC today to discuss the paper recommending that the visits of Service and Civil Attaches to places of importance should be curtailed. The meeting was held late unfortunately, and I had to leave at the critical moment to attend the decoration of Colonel Bartik and Major Slama by General Grasset at the WO. This event seems to have been an unqualified success. The DG made an excellent speech. Brigadier Vale, Rupert Speir, Dick, Charles, ++++ and myself were all present. There is no doubt that the whole proceedings including a slap-up lunch at Manetta's when Bartik made a very good little speech, will be most beneficial to the continuance of the good liaison with the Czechs.

November 17, 1942: I discussed with Caroe the question of the W/T in the German Legation in Dublin. I drafted a letter to Archer of the DO [Dominions Office] agreeing with the contents of the note for Sir John Stephenson, but pointing out that the actual date of the demarche did not appear to have been decided on. I suggested that if it were made 4–5 weeks before the operation it would not give the Germans much time to get a new set going, and would not as far as I could see pinpoint OVERLORD since aerial reconnaissance would by that time have made clear that operations were impending. I also suggested that to cover ME's point about the possibility of a reserve transmitter the Eire authorities should be induced to ask Hempel for both his wireless sets or alternatively for his wireless set and any other wireless equipment in his possession.

At the Wednesday meeting Mrs Spring said that ISOS disclosed that at the request of the BOT [Board of Trade] a man called BASTLER is being sent to this country. The LRC have found a character called Gondra from Bilbao who is coming to see the BOT and seems to fit the bill. He appears to have in his possession a cover address which has been given to LIPSTICK.

There is the usual flood of totally inaccurate reports from Lisbon and Madrid alleged to be received from this country.

Hughes came to tell me that Frost is telling his staff that the whole organisation at Barnet is being liquidated by Horrocks and that they had better look round for other jobs, and that he will be notifying all concerned. I think at this stage Frost is merely talking. I have spoken to Horrocks who tells me that his recommendations will be coming up to me tomorrow. He thinks it may be possible to bring the personnel up to London or at the rate the majority, but he agreed that no liquidation should take place un-

til TAR has had an opportunity of looking into the department, and the liaison with RSS has been given a chance of developing.

Dixon came in to tell me that he had spoken to Whiteford who was expressly sympathetic. Dixon told him quite frankly of his difficulties with the Americans and said that he would be well-advised to arrange that his new GI had direct access to higher authority and did not operate through Cols. Black and Blakeney, who had no knowledge of IB matters whatever. Whiteford had apparently been unaware of the fact that Dixon's memo had been put in the wastepaper basket by these two mountebanks.

Dick also saw him today and rubbed the point in.

November 18, 1943: Helmuth has broken entirely and given us particulars about his relations with the SD and his mission to Berlin. This is fortunate, as the case was rather an awkward one from the political angle. The Argentine ambassador was already intervening on his behalf.

November 19, 1943: GARBO asked [his German controller] a short time ago what steps he should take in connection with the rocket-gun scare. Should he move his wife and children out of London, and report on the results of the rocket, by wireless, correcting errors of fire etc. On November 18, 1943 he received the reply [from Germany]: 'In reply to the rocket-gun, there is no cause for you to alarm yourself.' This seems to fit in with the theory that although the Germans may have a rocket-gun its claims are grossly exaggerated.

November 20, 1943: [More about HELMUTH affair, and repercussions on FBI and IZAK secret source] Reggie Gibbs told me about his conversation with Vivian. He is very worried about the latter

who he thinks is suffering from persecution mania and from an obsession about the whole American business. He cannot stop talking about it and goes round and round like a squirrel in a cage.

Gibbs discussed with him first the reasons why the FBI are inclined to gravitate to this dept [MI5] rather than to Ryder Street, and secondly our reasons for wishing to discontinue the automatic sending of copies of all our correspondence with the FBI to SIS.

He pointed out to Vivian that in almost every letter sent by the FBI they made a specific request, adding that they would be grateful for any other information in our possession "along similar lines". SIS might or might not deal with specific questions but when they see "any other information on similar lines" they find themselves in something of a difficulty since as an office they are sending out and receiving wires all day with rarely any opportunity of digesting the material and considering the best use to which it can be put on a long term basis.

We on the other hand made a careful study of all the material we received. 020 cases were thoroughly sifted, information distributed to all concerned, old cases were re-sifted in the light of further information etc. We were therefore better constituted to supply the "information on similar lines."

This was a point which did not seem to occur to Vivian but he admitted that it was a point of considerable importance. As regards sending copies of our information to SIS Gibbs said that in future we proposed to ask Thurston to indicate on any items of information submitted to us whether or not he had passed a copy to SIS. If he had done so we should automatically send a copy of our reply to SIS.

For the rest, Gibbs suggested that we should be allowed to use our discretion as to whether a matter was or was not of interest to SIS. He made it clear that Thurston was to an increasing extent obtaining his information by word of mouth and occasionally we followed up a conversation with an item of information in writing.

Divorced from its context, such a letter would have no meaning for SIS at all and only lead to confusion. Vivian has apparently agreed to this arrangement.

C and DB came to see me after lunch. I showed C the note of Garbo's traffic relating to the rocket. C thought it is in a sense somewhat reassuring. He thinks it quite possible that the claims b P/W in connection with the rocket may well be exaggerated and that its primary use is for anti-invasion purposes. It is by no means certain that the emplacements in France are to be used for the installation of rocket apparatus.

Meanwhile other German experiments are going on with something in a nature of a Queen Bee [pilotless aircraft] carrying a heavy load of explosive, but the indications are that nothing is likely to come into production before the new year. The whole business seems to be still to a considerable extent in the experimental stage, although every possible effort is being made to get this new form of glide bomb into production.

C told me that [French Colonel] Passy [Dewavrin] is leaving here to take over command of the Intelligence services in N Africa. In fact he is more or less to take Cochet's place, the latter having been sacked, although he did not know it, before he arrived here. What is extremely unfortunate is that Rivet and Paillol have resigned. C gathered that Passy was going to do all he could to re-

tain the services of Paillol. The tendency of the French is to try and run the whole of the show from N Africa.

November 21, 1943: +++++, who has come out through Gib, is to arrive at Ham tonight. I had a word with Stephens [of Camp 020]. I told him that [. . .] therefore in the early stages it would be better not to treat him too rough.

In the property of HELLMUTH, [sic], who has completely broken, was found a piece of paper with the following words written under each other: "Sigismundo, Panadera, Principal, Temporal, Conductor." +++++cas worked this out as follows: Sigismundo is Sigismund. Panadera is the Spanish for Baker and means Becker. Principal means "Haupt", Temporal means "Sturm," and Conductor means "Führer." Hence Sigismund Becker, Hauptsturmführer, who is the principal SD Representative in BA [Buenos Aires].

November 22, 1943: I spoke to Fergie [Ferguson] about HELLMUTH. He asks not to tell Thurston that a copy is being handed to G.2 of our interrogation report. I said that the only purpose the action suggested would serve would be to build up G.2 at the expense of the FBI. [more details[. . .]]. Fergie told me that SIS had already notified G.2 that HELLMUTH had broken on the lines of the information contained in Most Secret material and had advised them to approach the FBI and if necessary the State Dept. with a view to preventing any precipitate action by the FBI which might lead to a discontinuance of IZAK. [. . .]

It was agreed that we would simultaneously hand a copy of the report to Thurston and to SIS and that Thurston would receive no covering letter at all.

JOB has challenged his watchers [*i.e. shadowers*]. This means that

there is no object in continuing the observation and that we shall have to pull him in. It is proposed to arrest him under [Defence Regulation] 18(3) and send him to the Oratory Schools.

November 23, 1943: Dick [White] tells me that his meeting at Cossac was quite successful. Felix [Cowgill] is ill and was represented by Vivian and a fellow called +++++. Dick had the feeling that Vivian was wandering rather, and indulging in a certain amount of sentiment about Felix which could not be appreciated either by those who knew him or by the majority who did not.

[. . .] JOB was arrested on the 23rd. He was interrogated at the Oratory Schools and confessed. So far I have no details but I gather that TAR [Robertson] proposes to run him [as a double agent]. He had some secret ink concealed in his razor handle and in a key, but so far had not made use of it. He intended to hang on to the jewellery [*Not transcribed: which he had been given to "pay" another agent with.*]

I heard a rather good PM story which I am told is absolute true but not for repetition. A propos of Eden's visit to Mid East he said, "The Foreign Secretary has asked me what he is to say to Turkey. I am of the opinion that he should remind Turkey that Xmas is coming." He longed to send this message but refrained from doing so as he thought that Eden might take him too literally.

There was a lively discussion [where?] about Ireland's neutrality. [David] Gray, the American ambassador, drafted rather a good letter to Dev [de Valera] urging Eire to join the Allies. When on leave he showed it to the President [his uncle?] who showed it to Winston at the time of the Quebec Conference. Winston referred it back to the Cabinet, who pronounced against any move of the kind. The case was very ably argued by Cranborne The PM is not

however satisfied. He takes the view that if Eire does not come in with us during the war the prospect of a solution as between north and south will recede even further than it is already.

Everyone will argue that had it not been for our hold upon the north the Germans might well have invaded Ireland with disastrous results to ourselves. If on the other hand Eire joined in with us and became a real part of the Commonwealth, some kind of solution might be possible. In the present state of the game, the naval authorities do not regard the Irish bases as of any great importance. [Charles] Maffey [British ambassador to Dublin] and the DO I believe opposed the move as they thought it better to let Ireland stew in her own juice and discover for herself how she alienated opinion both here and in the USA.

I gather that there has been some tentative approach by both the Scandinavians and the Low Countries to Gen. Smuts to be brought within the orbit of the British Empire. This is an extremely interesting move and one which, if the Irish only knew, might make them think quite a lot.

November 29, 1943: Returned to work. [*Not transcribed: Three page passage about Charles Bedaux, US citizen of French origin, trading in petrol, oil, iron and steel.*] Unfortunately for Bedaux, ISOS and HARLEQUIN show that he has told only the half-truth, interspersed with a few lies. [*Not transcribed: ISOS shows he conferred in Berlin October 1941 with Abwehr chiefs about the protection of oil refineries in Persian Gulf from British sabotage in the event of a withdrawal.*]

TAR is not quite so certain about running JOB and is even contemplating the possibility of sacrificing DRAGONFLY and putting JOB on trial. JOB when first arrested still denied that he had been work-

ing for the enemy. After 24 hours at the oratory Schools in solitary confinement he confessed that he had secret ink in the handle of his razor and in a key. He did not however say anything about the jewellery. When asked about this, he denied it was for that purpose. It was only when he was shown the address to which he was to send it that he finally collapsed. His excuse for not mentioning it before was that he had intended to keep it for his own use.

November 30, 1943: Jock Whyte came to tell me about a character called Stiles who has been acting as a stool pigeon in various British P/W camps in Germany. Stiles has just turned up in Stockholm and relates that he has made a sensational escape. It is proposed to give him an opportunity of telling his story on arrival. There is considerable evidence from clandestine letters from P/Ws about Stiles's activities but we may have some difficulty in producing witnesses who are at the moment in Germany. We shall probably have to intern Stiles under 18B pending Court Martial.

[Website: *Rest of 1943 excerpts are to follow*]