Diary
of Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham,
1883-1963, C in C Mediterranean 1939-1942;
1st Sea Lord, Aug 1943 to 1946. [ diary
1944 | diary
1945 | diary
1946 ] 1944Sat Apr 1 1944 So many interesting things are
happening that I think it behoves me to
keep a diary.' (Details of Anvil). Sun Apr 2 (Refers to the delay of the
appointments of Somerville and
Frazer). Mon Apr 3 In connection with Bombing and
Overlord, at the Cabinet meeting Considerable sob stuff about children
with legs blown off & blinded old
ladies but nothing about the saving of (?)
to our young soldiers landing on a hostile
shore.' Tues Apr 4 C.O.S. meeting as usual nothing very
interesting but Crossbow reports show
progress by the enemy in his
preparations.' Thurs Apr 6 After lunch went to the A&N stores
& found they had a surprising amount
of fishing tackle. Found the CAS on the
same lay buying waders etc.' (Details of Mtg in PM's Map Room re
Fleet Train. Nothing decided). Mon Apr 10 (Re Greece) 'P.M. butting in and a (?
recommendation) to leave it to the man on
the spot, Rawlings.' (Re Anvil) 'The PM is however trying
once more to get agreement by a personal
signal to Marshall on the basis of the
battle for joining the bridgehead having
first priority then a look round & a
decision whether to carry out Anvil or go
on in Italy. The extra LSTs from the
Pacific to be sent to the head (MED?) in
the meantime.' (Agreement reached on 1944 building
programme and fleet train) 'The PM is
sound on the fleet train but wants the
Admiralty to surrender ton for ton given
for the F.T.' Tues Apr 11 (Shaved in cold water.) 'It's time they
renovated and brought up to date that
Chequers house.' Cabinet meeting 18.00 -- 'The Foreign
Secretary is away & the PM is doing
his job obviously with much enjoyment from
the flow of telegrams couched in melodious
language which we had read out to us.' (Did not think much of General
Alexander) 'I cannot believe that he is of
much use as a General.' Fri Apr 14 (Expressed the hope that he had
persuaded the PM to abandon ANVIL). Mon Apr 17 (CAS came in for criticism because the
CROSSBOW threat was of the same size as
last week). (Reference to Bombay explosion). (Re Greece) 'Some confused thinking on
the PMs part about maintaining discipline
as evidenced by his message to
Government.' Apr 18 (PM did not like Daniels and yet
Cunningham said he had no intention of
changing him). (With reference to Egypt) 'The PM as
usual out for the use of force regardless
of the fact that the necessary force is
not there. He also as usual said a few
hard things about the CinC.' (With reference to Somerville and
Frazer and CinCs in general) 'Presumably
if his strategical views do not coincide
with those of the PM he does not get the
job. This appears to be nearing a relapse
to the times when an admirals correct
political views were a better reason for
his employment rather than his
ability.' Sat Apr 22 (Re Greece) 'PM approved my signal to C
in C suggesting torpedoing of the
Haephestos & at the same time sent me
a very after lunchy minute about what the
C in C should do & what precautions he
should take.' (Cunningham ignored this
completely). Mon Apr 24 (NB written on
Thursday). PM much worked up about losses of
shipping in Bombay explosion & fire.
Demanded that I arranged a researching
enquiry.' Tues Apr 25 (Silenced PM on further naval
bombardment). (Dinner at 10 Downing Street) 'Rather
dull but PM in great form & showing
his extraordinary memory in talking of the
various invasions of this country', Apr 26 (Bombings in France, Cunningham
concerned that the French might end up by
hating us because of heavy losses.
concluded that there was both a military
and political angle to this matter -- the
former was that it would help Overlord.
His overriding feeling was that the
situation was the same as it had been
three weeks' ago). Apr 27 (In connection with OVERLORD) 'I
suspect the basis on which expenditure is
worked out is much inflated with many
margins for safety.' (Decision to stop bombing of France.
Cunningham felt that it had been the
indecision of three weeks ago which was at
fault) Tues May 2 Very little time left which I devoted
to watering down the statement made by the
PM yesterday that the anti U boat war was
won. I quoted some pretty telling
figures.' Wed May 3 PM in most genial & reasonable
mood.' (Reacted fiercly to news of a BBC
statement of MEW spokesman). Sun May 7 Pottered about.' this is the whole
diary entry for the day May 8 (Meeting 23.00) 'The Simalur project
trotted out & at last I had to say
quite plainly that I did not agree with
it. PM took it very well but moaned about
there being apparently nothing for the
British forces to do against the Japanese
this year.' Tues May 16 (Re Japan) 'We are quite hung up by
want of decision.' (Meeting at noon) 'PM had passed a
statement rather high flown & with
some statements of doubtful accuracy in it
particularly as regarded future
plans.' Winston for ? rather halting &
appeared to have difficulty in finding
suitable phrases. Perhaps the doubt of how
it would appear in the press was
influencing him.' May 17 (PM sent a severe minute to Percy Noble
about not leaving Washington) 'Some people
cannot keep their mouths shut. I suspect
it is the PM himself who has been
chattering.' (Refers to Somerville diary and
Criticism of Mountbatten). May 18 (PM carried through building programme)
'on his own' (was sound on this). May 29 Whit Monday Found another memorandum from PM
refusing to let James Somerville be
relieved, such stupid reasons -- he really
is quite childish sometimes.' May:30 (Discussion about CROSSBOW). May 31 (Re Brendan Bracken:) 'a nasty piece of
work . . . (reputed to be one of Winston's
bastards but I doubt it).' Fri June 2 (PM in worked up state. Plans to embark
in Belfast for OVERLORD. The King wrote to
him and seemed to have had some
effect). June 3 I told the others CAS Meeting of the
PM's movements. Hollis thought the King's
letter had done the trick. Personally I
believe it was all bluff & that he
never really meant to go. Mon June 5 (Downing Street) 'A good lunch & as
usual lots of wine. PM very worked up
about OVERLORD & really in almost a
hysterical state. Much conversation. He
really is an incorrigible optimist. I
always thought I was unduly so but he far
outstrips me.' 'PM very worked up about
him.' (This refers to General de Gaulle
whom Cunningham calls in the diary 'Prima
Donna de Gaulle.') Tues June 13 (Woken up by air warnings) 'So CROSSBOW
has come at last. The results from the Hun
point of view can hardly be considered
satisfactory as only one fell in the built
up area of London.' (Bethnall Green). (Meeting to discuss CROSSBOW, SHAEF to
attack the Supply and launching
sites). (Cabinet Meeting 18.30) 'PM looking a
bit sunburnt from his trip to the
beachhead was a bit childish at times. Wed June 14 To my surprise no CROSSBOW attack
during the night. Sat June 17 COS meeting as usual. Considerable
discussion over CROSSBOW which appears to
be more of a threat than was originally
thought. Mon June 19 (Meeting of CROSSBOW committee with PM
in the chair) 'He was at his best and said
the matter had to be put robustly to the
populace. That their tribulations were
part of the battle in France & that
they should be glad to share in the
soldiers dangers.' (Decided to sound
sirens as little as possible so that they
could all get a good nights sleep because)
'you either woke well rested or in a
better land. (Later cabinet meeting) 'First Lord
confronted by the PM saying he could not
visit the coast of France. Tue June 20 (Another bad night because of the
FBs). Much reduced effort by the flying bombs
during the day . . . The sites have I
think been heavily bombed today which may
reduce their activity. Wed June 21 (Operation CROSSBOW affected
Constitution Hill, St Georges Hospital,
Buckingham Palace Garden wall). (COS Meeting) 'PM has stepped in on
Admiral King's removal of the US naval
forces without consultation with us. As
usual without knowledge so we had to curb
him a bit. (Map Room Meeting with Smuts in
attendance) 'Then the PM who had lunched
well developed his ideas and altogether
the COS two good hours. Thurs June 22 (Meeting 22:30) 'I had some firm
exchanges with the PM about the bombarding
ships. He must poke his nose into what
does'nt (sic) concern him. However he got
little change out of me. He suggested that
I had made him complain to the President
about General Kenys(?) unilateral action
in removing his forces from OVERLORD. I
told him quite plainly that I had not
wished or asked him to signal to the
President. We closed down quite friendly
at about 01 15. Fri June 23 (Details of flying bombs coming towards
Admiralty but which in fact landed on
Watneys brewary). Mon June 26 (COS 18:00. Called out by PM to deal
with Stark) 'PM handled this well & we
were all smiles. (Further meeting with PM to do
telegrams to US turning down ANVIL and
pressing for completion of N Italy
campaign). Tues June 27 (CROSSBOW, Duncan Sandys, the Professor
Lord Cherwell at the meeting. The
Professor trying to make out that all his
prophecies had come true) 'There is no
doubt we have been caught. (Cabinet meeting 18:00) 'discussion on
CROSSBOW initiated by Home Secretary by a
rather intemperate and overdrawn memo. I
think the PM and Air Ministry do take this
threat too lightly' . . . saw the
differences as political 'The Labour
members of the Govt tending to be
sentimental & the Conservatives taking
what they probably thought the robuster
line 'This is nothing we can take it' sort
of attitude. Sat July 1 (COS Meeting 10:30) 'Discussed PM draft
telegram to President. I do not at all
like its tone. I feel we should have done
better to give way more gracefully. Still
he knows his man and may well be
right. (Telegram amended and passed at a later
meeting). Slight discussion on the FB [flying
bomb]. I worked up the PM on the
subject of trying to abate the nuisance by
reprisals on small German towns. He is all
for it but says there must be some excuse
such as making parts of the machine
otherwise he will be right up against
Jesus Christ as exemplified by the
Archbishop of Canterbury!!. (Noted that the V1 launching sites
appeared to be lightly constructed &
can be run up in no time). Mon July 3 (Discussion of flying bomb). Tues July 4 (Bottomley talking about Cherbourg
peninsular sites. Refers to a draft
telegram PM wants to send to President.
Did not think that it would do good and
doubts the wisdom of sending it). Wed July 5 (Re telegram discussed at COS Meeting)
'The trouble is the PM can never give way
gracefully. He must always be right &
if forced to give way gets vindictive
& tries by almost any means to get his
own back. Thurs July 6 There is no doubt [that the] PM
is in no state to discuss anything -- too
tired and too much alcohol. But he was in
a terrible mood. Rude and sarcastic. I had
a couple of blows with him about the Far
East. The net result was that we sat from
22:00 to 01:45 listening to him talking
mostly nonsense & got nowhere (Noted that Eden, Cuttler ? and
Lyttelton were going against him) 'his
obstinacy & general rudeness may be
the last flurry of the salmon before you
get the guff into him. Sat July 8 (Refers to PM rather immoderate minute)
'He obviously had a bad day after his
statement in the House of Commons. Sunday July 9 There is no doubt the PM has got the
sticky end over these L.C. [landing
craft] Mon July 10 (Cabinet Meeting 17:30 re CROSSBOW) 'PM
in very sweet & chastened mood,
probably remembering last Thursday. (To do with L.S.1) 'PM obviously afraid
it would put CULVERIN out of court &
rather unwilling. Has sent a
memorandum. Thurs July 11 (CROSSBOW crash in Sweden) Fri July 14 (Far East Strategy) 'The attitude of
mind of the politicians about this which
is astonishing. They are obviously afraid
of the Americans laying down the law as to
what is to happen when Japan is defeated
to the various islands posts & other
territories . . . But they will not lift a
finger to get a force into the Pacific
they prefer to hang about the outside
& recapture our own rubber trees. No
decision of course though there are
indications that the 3 ministers are
starting to disagree with the PM. (Chequers dinner, with Henry Stimson as
guest) 'PM in great form & good
conversation at dinner.' Mon July 17 (Bomb details). Wed July 19 PM has gone over to France for two days
and is living on board Enterprise. It is
to be hoped that no one drops a bomb on
him. Mon July 24 PM full of his visit to France &
was more inclined to talk than to
listen. PM very polite about his living in
Enterprise at Arromanches. Wed July 26 (Cabinet Meeting -- PM tells COS that
their manpower requirements are ridiculous
for Japan). Thurs Jul 27 (Cabinet Meeting on the 'rocket'). Fri July 28 PM who apparently had lunched well in a
jocular mood so business proceeded
slowly. Sun July:30 Found a memorandum from the PM asking
what sort of fleet could on have on
4,000,000 men against the Japs. I hope we
shall be able to bring him down to
earth. Mon July 31 PM's minute on the study of retaliation
by gas was to the effect that he could do
nothing if the warriors as well as the
parsons were against him. (PM in good form in Cabinet Meeting.
Discussion about bus drivers and air raid
warnings.) 'He had to set down any
passengers that wished to be set down
& that it was at his discretion to
continue the journey. The judgement of
Solomon!. Wed Aug 2 PM speech on the wireless. Sounded not
too bad but it was made to appear that the
army had landed themselves in France
without any help from anyone. Aug 3 It appears that the PM wishes to go off
to Italy for a rest taking CIGS
[Brooke] & CAS
[Portal] with him. Mountbatten's
arrival should put him back to the 10th. I
can understand him wanting a rest. He
wears himself out concerning himself with
details & other people's business. Aug 4 (PM insisted that the cuts be made to
the Navy and Air Force of 200,000
and:30,000 from the Army for the Japanese
war. Discussion of offer made by Petersen,
head of Swedish Secret Service, to swap
details of V2, V3 and V4 for GB's plans
for the invasion of Norway. GB wanted this
information for nothing and it was
suggested the following tack be used:)
'The First Sea Lord was inexpressibly
shocked that he should try & bargain
over information which had to do with the
lives of innocent British women &
children.' (Also bad effect that this
would have on Anglo-Swedish relations.
Decided though that the information would
be given as a last resort.) (Rumour that Churchill had sent a
telegram to Eisenhower
[recommending] changing ANVIL to
Brittany).[True: see Churchill to
Eisenhower, Aug 4, 1944 (DDE
Libr.] Tues Aug 8 I had two tit ups with the PM. One when
he said no information had been procured
about Northern Australia to which I
replied we had plenty of information &
the delay in receiving it was entirely due
to his want of decision in sending party
to collect it. The other he tried to
compare the casualties of the FAA
[Fleet Air Arm] with those of the
Bomber Command which he said were 7,000
out of 10,000. I disputed this figure,
which of course is entirely fallacious. It
is more like 7,000 out of 40 -- 50
thousand. No decisions were reached, in
fact a thoroughly wasted day. What a drag
on the wheel of war this man is.
Everything is centralised in him with
consequent indecision & waste of time
before anything can be done. Wed Aug 9 (Cunningham and Churchill both produced
papers on the Japanese war and Ismay was
given the job of producing one paper
embracing the points of both papers)
'Ismay produced the combined paper at
22:30. It had been ready at 16:00 but the
PM had given him orders that he was not to
circulate it to the Chiefs of Staff before
the meeting. Thus are we governed!! I
presume he himself has such a crooked mind
that he is suspicious of the COS . . . The
first four paragraphs devoted to the
subject on which we were to approach the
US COS [i.e., the Joint Chiefs]
& the way it was to be done & the
5th arranging to doublecross them. I often
wonder how we expect the US COS to have
any respect for us we allow our opinions
to be overridden & ourselves to be
persuaded against our own common sense at
every turn.' Thurs Aug 10 (Message to US Joint Chiefs of Staff by
the PM) 'As usual full of inaccuracies,
hot air & political points. Not the
sort of businesslike message we should
send to our opposite numbers. One good
political point he wished to make. He
wants to be able to have on record that
the US refused the assistance of the
British Fleet in the Pacific. He will be
bitterly disappointed if they don't
refuse!!! Fri Aug 11 (Re COS telegram to US Joint Chiefs)
'We discussed PM's amendment to our
telegram to [US] COS. In a closed
session Ismay told us that he was just
raving last night & absolutely
unbalanced. He cannot get over having not
had his own way over ANVIL. To my surprise
it was Portal that suggested we should
have to have a show down with him before
long if he went on as he is now. I have
long thought it. He tries now to dictate
to the COS what they shall say to the US
COS. We decided to alter the message to
some extent to meet his views & hold
it up for 24 hours to let him recover his
balance a bit. Sat Aug 12 The Chiefs of Staff decided that after
their exhausting week with the PM the Vice
Chiefs could take the Saturday meeting
while they had a day off. Mon Aug 14 Cabinet meeting at 17:30. Such a change
with Attlee in the chair. Everyone who
wished to gave his opinion & yet
business was expeditiously
accomplished. Tue Aug 15 (Some discussion on CROSSBOW and BIG
BEN, the German rocket threat). Wed Aug 16 Wife wanted him to interview a gardener
'He wants a good wage, £3--5 a week,
but we will see.' In fact the gardener
never came. Sun Aug 27 1st Lord [A V Alexander] rather
sad as he had one or two rather sniffy
messages from the PM about his trip to the
Med. PM terribly small minded &
selfish about it. I urged 1st Lord to
stand firm & go on with his
arrangements. Mon Aug 28 Went to bed with the prospect of having
to be at Northolt at 07:00 to meet the
PM. Tues Aug 29 PM's trip put off 12 hours on account
of weather so there was no early rising. .
. . PM was hurried to his car by
[Lord] Moran [Churchill's
doctor]. He certainly looked ill . . .
two nurses & a specialist had been
sent for. I hope it is only wise
precautions. It would be a tragedy if
anything should happen to him now. With
all his faults (& he is the most
infuriating man) he has done a great job
for the country & besides there is no
one else. Thurs Aug 31 An infuriating telegram from the PM to
Alexander just in. Alexander has been up
to his old game of complaining about the
navy to the PM. I will have it out with
the CIGS tomorrow. Mon Sep 4 (Very busy preparing for trip to Quebec
and turning over the business to
[Admiral] Syfert). Tues Sep 5 (Talk with PM) 'If he keeps up his
present attitude things should go well in
Quebec & it will be what the Americans
call a 'love pact.' (LOVE FEAST?) But it
takes little to lose his vengeful temper
& he will do anything then to get the
better of our allies. He sent for me at about 17:00 to tell
me there was a rumour that Germany has
capitulated. Also to say that if true he
must remain in England & what was to
happen if we were two days out & it
proved to be true. I said the only thing
to do was to turn the ship round &
come back. Wed Sep 6 The PM persists in thinking that Italy
is one of the main theatres whereas as
things are going in France & Russia it
really has become a theatre of little
importance. No meeting with PM today. He
is very flat probably as a result of M
& B. Thurs Sep 7 The COS lunched with the PM. What a
lunch. A whole dressed crab each, curried
chicken with all sorts of trimmings, &
some sweet & cheese. I am still
feeling the effects. The PM still very
flat, not much sparkle about him. Sep 8 Now in the Gulf Stream He was in his worst mood. Accusing the
COS of ganging up against him &
keeping papers from him & so on. Would
not see that Italy after Kesselring is
again defeated becomes a secondary front
& that the real work is on the Russian
& Western fronts. Wants at all costs
to keep Alexander's army up to full
strength even though there are more
divisions than Alexander can use. Is
determined to have an amphibious
operation, to take Istria even though it
is of no military consequence & so on
& so on. The worst of it is his
feeling against the Americans whom he
accused of doing the most awful things
against the British. There is no question
he is not well & is feeling this hot
sticky weather. . . . PM sent for the
commander & tried to get him to alter
out of the Gulf Stream. As this would take
him over the Newfoundland Bank he rightly
did'nt [sic] like it. Together we
went & convinced the PM. Sun Sep 10 Lunched with the PM as we were entering
Halifax [Nova Scotia]. Half
lobster & a lamb chop brandy &
cheeses!! . . . My compartment had a
double bed!! . . . During daylight crowds
at the stations to see the PM. Tues Sep 12 [At Québec] Had a
meeting with the PM at 18:30 & found
him in a mood of sweet reasonableness. Wed 13 Sep PM upset our meeting at 10:30 with
American COS by sending for us at 10:30.
He had absolutely nothing to say & we
wasted an hour of our time. Plenary
meeting at 11:30. PM led off & gave
quite a good review. He offered the
British main fleet for operations against
Japan in the Central Pacific & it was
at once accepted by the President. Thurs Sep 14 In the afternoon with the PM we met the
Canadian War Cabinet. PM did'nt
[sic] give much away but we
arrived at what Canadian forces were to
take part in the war against Japan &
where they were to be employed. Fri Sep 15 (Meeting at 18:00) 'PM then proceeded
to run through the CCOS final report to
him & the President & tried to
amend it. We pointed out it was our report
agreed with US COS & as far as we were
concerned not susceptible to
amendment. He was just at his worst & Brooke
was very patient with him. He would'nt
[sic] argue with the agreed
directive to Mountbatten & was quite
impossible & looked likely to wreck
all the good that had been done. Finally
we left him as he had to see General
Marshall but we briefed Eden to talk to
him. Sat Sep 16 (before final plenary meeting) 'We
first had a meeting with the PM when he
read out a document he was putting in
about Burma. Very inaccurate & rather
off the point, . . . (PM wanted a meeting when they
had arranged to go fishing) Portal wrote
him a note pointing out all the
arrangements he was wrecking & he gave
way. He really is a most selfish &
impossible man to work with. Wed Sep 20 Lunched with the PM who seemed well
& pleased with himself. The usual
heavy lunch. Soft shelled crabs &
large steaks. I found the former a much
over rated dish. Leathers, Ismay, PM &
myself talked till 16:00. He told Leathers
that the fleet train must be done on a
handsome scale & that if we
wanted:30-40 more ships we must have
them. . . . The PM told us that Eisenhower
had sent a message to the President
telling him that he thought a German
collapse was not far off. Sep 21 A signal from the Cabinet to the PM
saying that all is agreed about the pay
question for those taking part in the Jap
war but also saying that it is quite
impossible at this stage to guarantee
security of employment for the men taking
[part] when they come home again I
am glad to say the PM has taken exception
to this. Dined with the PM Leathers &
the M & B doctor, Martin &
Colville present. The usual rich food.
Caviar, Lamb chops, sweet & cheese
(Stilton) Vodka, Champagne, port, brandy
& whisky & soda. PM in excellent
form & most interesting about his time
at the admiralty in the last war. Talking
about Jackie Fisher, Dummy Oliver &
Knyert Wilson. He holds himself blameless
over the Coronel battle but if my memory
serves me he was anything but. Sat Sep 23 (Parliament speech) 'I was given the
military bit to vet & for once it is
fairly free from exaggeration. But he has
a habit of making out that the army &
no one else are doing any of the fighting.
This I altered & I hope he will accept
it. . . . Dined with PM. Much conversation
ranging from the next League of Nations to
the South African War. Mon Sep 25 Lunched with the PM who was a bit
annoyed at not getting on shore at
Fishguard. I had a minor ? tirade with him
over Alexander & Wilson's positions
respectively in the Mediterranean. He has
always held that Alexander is independent
of Wilson. Wed Sep 27 (Re food for the Channel Islands) 'PM
decided to tell the Huns that they were
responsible for feeding the civilians
& if they could'nt [sic] do it
they had better surrender. In any case of
starving or illtreating the civilians they
would be held responsible. Thurs Sep 28 Moth brought up a false alarm from B.W.
that a cow had died in our meadow from
anthrax. I rang up Mona & found the
cow had died from being choked by an
apple. Mon Oct 2 (PM informs him of his intended visit
to Moscow -- Cunningham not to go because
he had no military knowledge according to
Churchill. He replied no point, as Stalin
has no naval knowledge). 'He did'nt
[sic] mean to be rude but just
was. There is no question that a visit by
him to Moscow will be valuable. They may
settle the Polish question & perhaps
come to some arrangement in the Balkans
& about Greece. Wed Oct 4 I find that in the Cabinet paper giving
the minutes of the PM's meeting with
Mackenzie King all I said about the
Canadian ships taking part in the Pacific
war has been left out, whether by intent I
know not,* but I must see to it as it was
of value to the Canadian CNS. [*
Pencil note:] On purpose, dirty
work. Sun Oct 8 Left at 14:10 & arrived London at
19:00. A wet & misty drive. Sun Oct 15 Spent the day very pleasantly picking
apples. Or rather shaking them into a net
spread under the tree. . . . PM has hung
up appt of Commander in Chief Ceylon. He
must have his finger in every pie. Mon Oct 17 (Re suggestion that more troops to
Italy was not such a good idea) 'It will
probably cause a storm when the PM sees
it. Tues Oct 18 PM's return now billed for early Sunday
which is a d-d nuisance. Sun Oct 22 Left at 15 45 to meet the PM arriving
at Northolt 17 40. In the event I arrived
at the aerodrome half an hour early &
the PM 40 minutes early so missed him. Had
a very bad tummy. Too much fruit I
expect. Mon Oct 23 Cabinet meeting at 17:30. PM obviously
in robust form. He got on to me about FAA
doing nothing but I got back to him as I
don't believe there has been a week they
[could] have done more. . . . Had a talk after dinner with
First Lord & Secretary. Former much
disturbed by the way the Prime Minister
treats the navy in discussion & hinted
at leaving the Government &
campaigning politically on behave
[sic] of the navy. He said he
would have the support of a large section
of the working people. Personally I thing
the PM says these things to try &
annoy us. He certainly would not stand up
to a pro navy campaign. Fri Oct 27 PM rang me at lunch time to ask for
news of the battle & to ask if it was
safe to send a congratulatory message to
the President. I assured him it was. Sat Oct 28 (At Bishops Waltham) 'Strolled round
the garden & did a bit of sawing which
definitely upset my tummy. Mon Oct:30 (Cabinet meeting) 'It was amazing to
hear the PM using the arguments that I
used last time & which he then scoffed
at . . . Staff meeting at 22:00. The PM
the very essence of sweet reasonableness.
All telegrams were passed & he agreed
to Sait's (??) appointment as Commander in
Chief Ceylon . . . Answered the PM's
minute about wishing to know more about
Power before appointing him Commander in
Chief East Indies. Gave Power a good write
up which he richly deserves. Tues Oct 31 Anti U boat meeting at 18:00. PM in the
chair. Rather a knock-about turn with all
sort of wild ideas floating about. . . .
At one point the PM told the S of S for
Air Sinclair that all he was doing was to
show the impotence of his bombs. Thurs Nov 2 Lunched with the PM. . . . PM told us
that following to discussion of giving
Alexander, 2 extra divisions that it was
thought at the US HQ that it would be
cheap at the price providing Montgomery
accompanied the two divisions to Italy and
Alex came in his place. I have always
thought that the Americans would never
like Montgomery. . . . During lunch the PM declared that
history would pronounce on the DRAGOON
operation (taking of Toulon Marseilles
etc) & rather implied that the verdict
would be unfavourable. I suggest that it
would depend on who wrote the history. To
which the PM replied that he intended to
have a hand in that. Fri Nov 3 When at the hairdressers rung up &
told PM wanted to see me. Met him &
Ismay in the small room at the back of the
hall. The President has arranged with
Stalin for a meeting between Nov 15 &
Dec 15. Sat Nov 4 (COS meeting) 'In closed session I told
the other two about the suggested
arrangements for the next meeting & my
minute on the subject to the PM. CIGS told
us that PM has now completely changed
round & decided to send Jumbo Wilson
to relieve Dill. Of course the only reason
for this is to get Wilson out of the way
& appoint Alexander Supreme Commander
Mediterranean a post for which he is
totally unfitted. We balked this in Cairo
last year but it looks as tho' CIGS &
PM have agreed on this together. I may
however be maligning Brooke. This is a
good example of the way things are now
run. The COS are just told what to do. Mon Nov 6 PM still determined to send Wilson to
relieve Dill and yet in Nov 5 there was an
entry to the effect that John Dill had
died last night at Washington & have
Alexander as Supreme Commander
Mediterranean. All three COS realize that
this would be a bad appointment. CIGS
hesitates to tell PM so as he is accused
of jealousy. He asked me to tell the PM
what I thought & I will if I get the
chance. . . . Cabinet at 17:30. It started with
a row. The PM drew attention to a
statement in the press about the Indian
Budget made by the Viceroy Lord Wavell.
The PM made the usual nasty remarks &
finally said the Viceroy had probably made
these remarks to popularise himself with
the Indians. This was too much for Leo
Amery who told him not to talk damned
nonsense. This shook the PM considerably
& there was no end of a row. Amery
withdrew the actual words but not the
sense of what he had said. John Anderson
also took exception to some of the PM's
remarks & the PM said he was ready to
go etc, etc. Tues Nov 7 Heard that the 12 15 cabinet was put
off till 17:30. This effectively stopped
my going to see Richard III. (Several remarks about the
unsuitability of Alexander & command
organisation as proposed by the PM.)
'Staff meeting with the PM at 22:30. I put
forward my objections to Alexander as
Supreme Commander Med. These were received
calmly by the PM who merely said he
recognised my right through knowledge of
the personalities to criticise the
appointment, but that he disagreed with
me. He was not to be moved though I rubbed
it in again later. The tragedy is that CAS
& CIGS agree with me but decided to
take the line of lease resistance. The
upshot was that the PM had his way. . . . PM wants Admiral Ramsay away from
SHAEF! Why?. Wed Nov 8 Wed Nov 8 (COS meeting and Alexander's
appointment) 'I fear they are a bit tired
of standing up to the PM. It may have done
some good. Thurs Nov 9 (Lord Mayor's banquet) 'PM made a
speech, good in parts, but I thought the
best came from the retiring Lord Mayor
Newcomb. Fri Nov 10 PM has I believe flown over to France
today to be present in Paris at the
November 11 celebrations. Sat Nov 11 Drove down to BW & had lunch on the
way -- rotten weather. Employed myself
pruning roses in the garden and got
soaked. Mon Nov 13 Cabinet at 17:30. Business went briskly
with Attlee in the chair although the COS
were kept to the very end. Wed Nov 15 (COS meeting) 'It came out that the PM
was carrying on a signal correspondence
with Alex behind Wilson's back & in
his signals to the PM criticising Wilson's
set up. I was almost too disgusted to
speak. Portal came out with that it showed
Alexander's complete unfitness for the
post of Supreme Commander. It is all so
dishonest. . . . I am disgusted over the state of
impotence the COS committee is reduced to.
Here we are -- all three of us know that
Alexander is unfitted to be Supreme
Commander Mediterranean & yet we are
allowing ourselves to be bullied into it
by the PM. I made my protest but was not
supported & can do nothing more. Fri Nov 17 (Meeting with PM nothing particularly
interesting meeting put off until January
with President & Russia. Molotoff to
come instead of Stalin. Difficulty with
Ernie King and the line taken by
Cunningham). Mon Nov 20 (COS meeting) 'The principal business
was Ismay producing a brace of pheasants
for each of the COS. He had been shooting
with Lord Portal who sent the birds. Tues Nov 21 (Cabinet meeting) 'The rocket was
discussed and the PM said that although we
should all be prepared to meet our Maker
we should remember that the chances of it
happening was [sic] 600,000 to
1!!. Thurs Nov 23 [Thanksgiving Day,
USA] ('Thankyou America' celebrations)
'Winant made quite a good speech & the
PM who was very well received a for much ?
not very good one. Mon Nov 27 (Cabinet meeting) (S of S for Air and
first Lord said they had not been
consulted on the treatment of deserters
put in by S of S for war) 'A justifiable
complaint. PM tried to take the line that
the Air & army should do what the army
wanted as their numbers were so much
greater. Wed Nov 29 Meeting with PM at 18:30. Jumbo Wilson
present. A completely wasted hour and a
half. PM appeared to have forgotten all
that had passed in the last 10 days.
Nothing settled except that a rude signal
was to be sent to Tito. Sun Dec 3 A bag from the Admiralty at 18:00. The
PM rather surprisingly fully concerned in
delay to Pacific fleet. Mon Dec 4 Brooke told us he had spent an hour on
the 'phone with the PM about Eisenhower's
meeting with Montgomery & their
discussion of the command question. He was
seeing PM again at 15:15. PM was objecting
to being left out of the discussion. He
will not realise it is none of his
business. . . . Cabinet at 18:00. PM attacked me
about the Marines & appears to think
we have 80,000 of them just engaged in
sitting around. . . . The Board of Admiralty dining the
PM in celebration of his 70 birthday. PM
sat between First Lord & myself. He
was very cheerful & amusing. First
Lord spoke well & PM replied &
gave us a hopeful outlook for the navy's
future but warned us that we must take the
air into account. To my horror he finished
by proposing my health in very flattering
terms. So I had to reply. I quite forgot
to thank him for proposing my health -- a
bad & stupid omission. I thanked him
for the encouraging things he had said
about the navy's future and assured him
that in spite of his sometimes bad remarks
I had always known that he was basically
sound. . . . We were on 'Andrew' terms at
the end of the evening. Tues Dec 5 PM had been busy in the night. Several
telegrams to Wilson & Scobie rather
urging them to drastic action in Greece. .
. . Long telegram to the President
reviewing the war situation . . . re
manpower The point is that the PM wishes
the other two services to try &
release men for the army so as to keep it
up to strength for the final round of the
German war. Sun Dec 10 PM sent him Harry Hopkins a message'
(re Greece). Mon Dec 11 Hopkins has asked the PM that there
should be no recriminations & the PM
had agreed. I pointed out however that
this action of King's had made the whole
system of command in the Mediterranean
illusory so it was decided to send a
message to this effect to Somerville for
him to use as ammunition if it ever became
necessary. Cabinet at 12:00 taken by the
Deputy PM so it went quickly. Greece
discussed to some extent & it became
evident that though the PM's speech on
Friday was good its tone had given much
offence. As Attlee put it 'It was a good
horse but not for that race. . . . Another point made in this
morning's cabinet was the communistic tone
of the BBC's announcements. Tues Dec 12 (Detail about Greece & the King and
appointment of a Regent in Greece and how
the King refused. Meeting with Eisenhower.
Dinner with the PM). We did not break up till 01:30 & as
we were leaving the PM called me into the
cabinet room. He first asked me if I was
Scottish which I confirmed. He then said
that he had been looking into the position
of the Orders of Knighthood & did I
know about the Order of the Thistle. I
replied that all I knew was that it was a
very honourable Order. He then asked me if
I would like to be a Knight of the
Thistle. I thanked him warmly & said I
should take it as a great honour. He then
said he would recommend it to his Majesty.
I trust I have not let myself in for too
much. After a cup of soup he then
proceeded to sit down to a pile of papers
in spite of my remonstrances as he was
obviously dead tired. Mon Dec 18 Cabinet at noon. Taken by Deputy PM so
business proceeded rapidly. Tues Dec 19 Anti U Boat meeting at 18:30. PM
inclined to lash out at all & sundry
& rather petulant. Declared that he
could'nt [sic] understand the
difficulties of finding a U boat on the
bottom. Why had the problem only just been
encountered etc etc. . . . PM finished up with a
dissertation on the Western front
situation & said he preferred the
tortoise with its head out even if it
looked like biting him. Wed Dec 20 Thick fog all day. (Cabinet meeting with info. on Monty
and Bradley) 'PM gave a discursive account
of the battle. When the position is
restored and the shouting dies down he
hopes to be able to authorise the addition
of a quarter [written as a
fraction] million men to the army. I
hope the Americans won't ask why it was'nt
[sic] produced before. Thurs Dec 21 (15th wedding anniversary). Sun Dec 22 PM rang me at noon & said he had
heard from the President who proposed a
meeting at Yalta at the end of January
& asked me to let him have a report on
the place. Mon Dec 25 A most cheerful Xmas dinner with
Wehrmacht champagne provided by Lieutenant
General Walter Bedell Smith Eisenhower's
chief of staff. Tues Dec 26 Discovered that the PM had flown to
Athens to try with Eden to clear up the
mess there. Very enterprising of him but
it's rather taking a hammer to crack a
nut. He is living in Ajax. Wed Dec 27 Cabinet at 17:30. Deputy PM in the
chair so business went briskly. Thurs Dec 28 (COS meeting) 'Question arose on a
message from PM about sending more troops
to Greece to clear Athens quickly.' Fri Dec 29 Just as I was getting ready to go to
the cinema show Henry V a cabinet was put
on at 18:00. The PM had arrived back &
wished to give an account of his visit to
Greece to the cabinet. Not much that we
did'nt [sic] know before. He was
favourably impressed both by the
Archbishop of Athens & General
Plastiras. He also stated that our
soldiers were quite sure that we were
doing the right thing in Greece & were
getting rather tough with ELAS troops. Sun Dec 31 Most of the morning occupied shifting
frozen cow pats to the rose bed where I
hope they will provide good roses. Hard
frost during the night but the rain
brought on a thaw. Drove back to town in
the afternoon. Road not as frozen as I
expected but it took 2 hours. | 
write to David
Irving