Add MS 52571 July 1943 - 1944
Correspondence  Letter
Percy Noble to Cunningham 1 October 1943
'In the words of Winston, when he was out
here the other day, 'we are in the
position of a man who has suddenly
succeeded to two fortunes, the Italian
Fleet and the British Fleet which has been
containing it for so long'!'
Letter
Jack Tovey to Cunningham 5 October 1943:
'For goodness sake don't overwork or let
the PM persuade you to keep his own
unnatural hours'. [There were several
letters in this vein following the
appointment of Cunningham as First Sea
Lord] Letter
from Lambe to Cunningham 5 February 1944
re Anglo-American relations: 'As soon as
the Prime Minister has been persuaded to
concur in CCS 417 -the Strategy for the
War against Japan . . . we will send
RENOWN, ILLUSTRIOUS,
VICTORIOUS and the rest of the Task
Force to arrive in the South West Pacific
in about July. . . .
7. I believe that it is
only by action on the above lines coupled
with some changes in appointments that we
can hope gradually to dispel that part of
the Americans' suspicions which has some
substance. The situation is becoming
similar vis-à-vis the Prime
Minister.
8. If we don't do
something like this quickly I feel that
there is a real danger that the Americans,
backed by the PM, may force us into doing
an operation such as First
CULVERIN in Autumn
1944 because we must do something to save
our faces. We know how wrong strategically
this would be.' Copy
Cunningham to Noble 8 April 1944 'A. As
you know, Fraser was suggested as
Somerville's relief but as a result of
Somerville's telling Dickie Mountbatten
that he rather approved of Operation
CULVERIN the Prime
Minister is now very unwilling that
Somerville should be relieved. . . . B.
The Prime Minister takes diametrically the
opposite view to that of the British COSs
that CULVERIN was
wrong and from what you say it appears
that the American Chiefs of Staff are
half-hearted about having the British in
the Pacific. . . . In the meantime a third
course has been suggested and that is that
the British, using Northern Australia as a
base, should fight their way into the
China Sea. The PM is favourably inclined
to this action as he says his objection to
the Pacific strategy was the long haul
round Australia'. Letter
Dickie to Pug Mountbatten and Ismay 11
August 1944 'Since the PM has decided not
to give Al [Wedemeyer] a letter to
the President, Al feels it is essential
that he should at least carry a letter
from me to General Marshall. [Text
of said letter] You may remember that
the Prime Minister has continuously
favoured a CULVERIN. On my return to
London last week he made it clear to me
that he would prefer to do the minimum in
Burma in order to release resources for
employment elsewhere. . . . But attractive
as the Rangoon operation appeared to me,
it was impossible to undertake it, for the
PM was at that time adamant about the
CULVERIN operation. This new factor
increase in forces for VANGUARD clinches
the matter. I have been able to convince
the Prime Minister that a CULVERIN
operation at the present time, even should
appropriate resources be available, would
not contribute as strongly to agreed
strategy in support of Pacific operations
as would a decisive effort in the Rangoon
area . . . Now that I have been able to
put this case to the PM, and convince him
that it is the best way to contribute to
the timely support of Pacific operations,
he has not only consented to an offensive
in the Rangoon area, but has agreed with
the British Chiefs of Staff to provide
most of the additional resources, to
ensure punch and continued offensive
capabilities'. Ismay's
reply 11 August 1944 referred to the
requirement of PM approval of draft
telegram Cunningham
to Geoffrey [Keyes?] 17th August
1944 'The COS thought that after 3 days of
undiluted PM they were also entitled to
some relaxation so I am off to Cape Wrath
for a few days'. Letter
from Rawlings to Cunningham 27 September
1944 'What have you been doing to the
First Lord [A V Alexander]? He
looks so much fitter and more cheerful and
happier than two years ago. My guess is
you have stopped the PM bullying him! Must
be something like that.' | 
write to David
Irving